






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# H I S T O R Y

OF

## R O M E.

BY

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VOL. III.

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PUNIC WAR.

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## P R E F A C E.

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THE publication of this volume has been delayed longer than may have seemed reasonable to the wishes of the author's friends. When I was requested to superintend its progress through the press, I foresaw and stated that other calls, which would have a prior claim to my attention, would inevitably much retard it. But the request was made at a time when my own grief made me doubly anxious to do any thing that might allay the far deeper grief of others; and as it was repeated, notwithstanding this objection, I did not hesitate to comply with it. Indeed, but for this, I should joyfully have welcomed the opportunity of rendering any service to the memory of so great and good a man, a friend whom I so much honoured and revered. There seemed also to be a kind of propriety in my undertaking the task, not only on account of my previous connexion with another great historian of Rome, but also because the first letter I ever received from the author of this work, was written

for the purpose of making some inquiries about Niebuhr's history, of which he said he had heard me speak with much praise. This letter was written in the year 1824; and to me it is an interesting recollection, that I should thus have been the means of introducing Dr. Arnold to a writer, who was to exercise so powerful an influence over the whole frame of his thoughts.

The manuscript which was put into my hands was singularly clear and correct: one might have thought at first sight, that it was fit for going to the press immediately. But it proved that the Author's practice was not to note his references at the time he was composing his narrative: he used to keep them to be added afterwards. Hence the only notes under the text which were found in the manuscript, are the first nine to the first chapter, and that in the Basque numerals in p. 393. I conceive that, after having impregnated his mind with the liveliest conception he could gain of the events he was about to record, from a comparison of the accounts given by the ancient writers, he was unwilling to interrupt the flow of the narrative by pausing to examine the details of the documents, and so reserved all specific remarks on their contents, until the work was revised after its completion. Else such a practice would seem to entail a considerable addition of trouble. But it was also the practice of another friend of mine, who has enriched our litera-

ture with the best of all histories of Greece ; and I have been informed that it was Niebuhr's practice also, only that Niebuhr's memory was so prodigious, he would often insert his references, with the number of the book and chapter, and at times with the words of the original, without feeling any need of verifying them.

Owing to this cause the work became considerably more arduous than I had anticipated ; at least for one whose studies during the last ten years had lain in totally different regions, and who could only find an hour or two now and then, often at long intervals, to employ on it. In executing it, I have been much aided by my connexion and friend, the Rev. Arthur Stanley, whose devoted love for his former master made him rejoice in doing any thing for his remains, and is one among many like noble monuments to Dr. Arnold's praise. Still, although through the chief part of the volume the only sources of information are the regular historians of the period, there are several statements for which it took me many hours to discover the authority : and in some instances, after having abandoned the search as hopeless, I found the passage required in one of the historical fragments recently published by Mai. After all, I have not been able to detect what the author was referring to in p. 57, where he says, that a freedman " might go out as a farmer of the taxes to Sicily," or in p. 392, where mention is made of a

story, which "ascribed the foundation of Gades to Archelaus, the son of Phœnix." Perhaps some scholar with more learning, and with something better than a private library at command, may enable me to supply these omissions in a future edition. The experience of the author's singular accuracy, which I have gained from the examination of his authorities, convinces me that he cannot have written without some definite ground for his assertions. Doubtless too there is some other authority than I have been able to find for the statement in p. 165, that "the older Gaulish chiefs were often averse to war, when the younger were in favour of it."

I have made this statement as a sort of apology for the length of time that this volume has been detained in the press, and to explain why it does not appear, like its predecessors, with the accompaniment of a running commentary, which is so requisite for the history of any period of antiquity, though perhaps less so for that of the second Punic war than of any other. In a very few instances have I allowed myself to do more than add a reference to the passages which I conceived the author had in view; indeed scarcely anywhere, except in pp. 147 and 154. Certain materials, which would have been digested into notes, were found among the author's papers. Of these, such as appeared fitted for publication, have been added in the Appendix.

Now that this volume does at length make its appearance, I trust that the warmest expectations entertained by the author's admirers will be fully satisfied. To me it seems far the best and most valuable portion of his history. This may be because I have been under the necessity of forming a more intimate acquaintance with it, which is often no less serviceable to books than to persons. I believe however that the superiority is real. For in the first place, the author was entering upon ground comparatively unbroken: at least it had not just been exhausted by the mighty intellect which had been reconstructing the earlier history of Rome. How strongly the author felt the difficulty of following one who had said all that could be said about that period, and who left nothing to be gleaned by such as came after him, appears from the Preface to the second volume, where, after the amplest acknowledgment of his obligations to Niebuhr, he speaks with a magnanimous humility of the inferiority of his own work. Had Niebuhr lived to write the history of the second Punic war, it is clear, from the passage at the beginning of his third volume, where he says that "Scipio towers above his nation, as Hannibal above all nations," that he would have entered upon his task with the resolution of doing justice to both the competitors in the grandest struggle ever maintained by a single man; at least with the exception of that which Luther, above



seventeen centuries after, waged also against the power of Rome. But as it is, Dr. Arnold is the first extant historian, and, we may fairly believe, is altogether the first, who has given anything like an adequate representation of the wonderful genius and noble character of Hannibal. This representation however, the reader will observe, is to be found in the whole course of this volume, rather than in the summary which concludes it, and which was written eighteen years before, when the author was only beginning to work his way out of the mists and clouds, which for so many ages had hung over the history of the Roman republic.

Besides, while the laborious avocations of Dr. Arnold's practical life, which would have worn out any common man, would not allow him to devote so much time to his history as would have been requisite to piece together fragments amassed from the whole surface of ancient literature, into a united and living body, it was also more congenial to the tone of his mind, which was rather that of a statesman than of a philologist or philosopher, to portray the life of a state in broad definite forms, than to sketch out an image from seemingly shapeless clouds by gazing upon them with intent divination. And the most remarkable among his talents, his singular geographical eye, which enabled him to find as much pleasure in looking at a map as lovers of painting in a picture by Raphael or Claude, comes more into

play in this volume; as does also, what must be intimately connected with that eye, his talent for military affairs. Even the military genius of Hannibal can hardly have been set on its right ground before. No reader of this volume will be able to close it without deploring that the author did not live to bring the war to its termination.

A strange fatality seems to hang over the history of Rome. No people ever wrote their history like the Romans; and they wrote it out. Other great nations have employed a large portion of their intellectual energies in other fields. Of the three ancient nations who have exercised a lasting influence on the destinies of mankind, the Hebrews were appointed to write their religion on the heart of the world, and the Greeks wrote their poetry and philosophy: but the Romans from first to last were employed in writing the history of Rome, and wrote that history on the face of the whole earth in enduring characters, by their wars, their conquests, their laws, and their language, the traces of which are to be seen at this day in the chief part of Europe. They continued to write their history in larger and larger characters, from the age of the original monarchy down to that of Trajan, and even in some sort to that of Justinian; and when the mind of the nation was in its prime, great historians rose up in it, and gave an image of the history, which their countrymen had written by their deeds. But while the chief works of

the Greek historians have been preserved in singular completeness, those of the Roman have all become fragments. Moreover, in modern times, when the spirit of Rome had again become substantiated in a man who knew all history and all knowledge, and who was about to revive and reanimate what Time had destroyed and scattered, he was cut off in the middle of his work. And now a second great writer, whose mind in many respects was peculiarly qualified to make him the historian of Rome, has left his work a fragment. After Niebuhr's death, when an injudicious friend was advising me to complete his history, I replied that it would be as easy to complete Cologne cathedral. This latter work seems now about to be accomplished; and it may be that a complete history of Rome will in time be written; but it will not be Niebuhr's, nor Arnold's. A great mind comes once, and does not return.

In thinking however of the death of Dr. Arnold, more especially in the present state of the English Nation and Church, there are deeper reasons for sorrow than the non-completion of any merely literary work. The history of Rome will still be written; and when viewed with reference to this object, the loss occasioned by Dr. Arnold's death cannot be compared with that which the whole knowledge of antiquity sustained by Niebuhr's. Doubtless too God will raise up men who will be able to do His work in England in these critical times. But

there was a mission to which Dr. Arnold seemed especially called, and for which he was peculiarly fitted, a mission of the highest importance, which he executed faithfully and dutifully, and in which he had few fellow-workers. In an idolatrous age, one of the men we most need is an idoloclast, to use the word which Coleridge in his Tombless Epitaph applies to his ideal self. Such indeed there ever will be, some frivolous, some reckless; but the idoloclasts whom we need, and who alone will do their work effectually and beneficially, are such as are at once zealous and fearless in demolishing the reigning idols, and at the same time animated with a reverent love for the ideas which those idols carnalize and stifle. Such an idoloclast we had in Dr. Arnold, a dauntless lover of truth, in the midst of an age when few seek or care for any truth, except such as seems to pamper their already bloated predilections and prepossessions. From his unshakable trust in the God of Truth, under the assurance that God is Truth, and that Truth can never be against God, he pursued it boldly, at all risks, in the spirit of the sublime prayer, *ἐν δὲ φάει καὶ ὄλεσσοι.* For he knew that, though he might perish, God would live; though he might fall, God would triumph; and he felt confident that every time Truth is purged with a careful and loving hand from the defilements wherewith the exhalations of the world are continually crusting her over, her form and features

will come out in greater beauty and glory. This should be the spirit of all men who write, above all on religion and philosophy; but in England it is very rare among those who treat on such subjects, whatever it may be among men of science. We are so bound and shackled by all manner of prejudices, national, party, ecclesiastical, individual, that we can hardly move a limb freely; and we are so fenced and penned in, that few can look out over their neighbour's land, or up to any piece of sky, except that which is just over their heads. Many too of our ablest men in these last years, instead of seeking after truth with loving patience and candour, have rather employed their best faculties in decking out their favorite idol with all the finery and tinsel which they could scrape together, and in burning incense before it, until they are wrapt in a mist, and count the glare of their tapers more glorious than the noonday sun. At such a time it is especially wholesome and refreshing to find a man like Dr. Arnold, who loves the truth, and seeks it, and speaks it out. I do not mean to profess an entire agreement with all his opinions: on many points we differed, more or less; but whether differing or agreeing, when I turn from the ordinary theological or religious writers of the day to one of his volumes, there is a feeling, as it were, of breathing the fresh mountain air, after having been shut up in the morbid atmosphere of a sick room, or in the fumi-

gated vapours of an Italian church. He did indeed yearn after truth and righteousness, with yearnings that could hardly be uttered; and to hear of falsehood, to hear of injustice, pained him like a blow. Therefore was his death felt almost like a personal, as well as a national loss, from one end of England to the other. His yearnings now, we may trust, through the Saviour whom he delighted to glorify, are stilled with the contemplation of perfect Truth and perfect Righteousness. O that his example and his teaching may arouse others to a like zeal in the same most holy cause!

J. C. HARE.

*October 20th, 1843.*

## ADVERTISEMENT.

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It is intended to publish the portion of Roman history contributed by Dr. Arnold to the "Encyclopædia Metropolitana," between the years 1823 and 1827, in an additional volume, which will continue the history from the end of the second Punic war to the death of Augustus.



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# HISTORY OF ROME.

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## CHAPTER XLI.

STATE OF ITALY AFTER THE ROMAN CONQUEST.  
POLITICAL RELATIONS OF THE INHABITANTS, AND  
DIFFERENT TENURES OF LAND. LATIN COLONIES.

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Πόλεσι γὰρ — ἐπελθόντες, — καὶ ναῦς καὶ ἵππους καὶ μεγέθη ἐχούσαις, οὐ  
δυνάμενοι ἐπενεγκεῖν οὔτε ἐκ πολιτείας τι μεταβολῆς τὸ διάφορον αὐτοῖς, ᾧ  
προσῆγοντο ἂν, οὔτ' ἐκ παρασκευῆς πολλῶ κρείσσους ὄντες, σφαλλόμενοι  
δὲ τὰ πλείω, — ἠπόρουν. THUCYDIDES, VII. 55.

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THE first and second Punic wars were separated by an interval of two-and-twenty years; and the first Punic war, as we have seen, had lasted for a period of exactly the same duration. The end of the fourth Samnite war, and the final submission of the Samnites, Lucanians, and Bruttians, took place<sup>1</sup> eight years before the beginning of the contest with Carthage; and the treaty which permanently settled the relations of Rome with the Etrurians was concluded eight years earlier still<sup>2</sup>. Thus, when Hannibal, in the spring of the year 537, invaded Etruria, few living Etrurians had

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Establishment of the Roman dominion over Italy.

<sup>1</sup> In 482 A.U.C. See Vol. II. of this History, XXXVIII. 525.

<sup>2</sup> In 474 A.U.C. See Vol. II. XXXVII. 501.

seen their country independent, except in their childhood or earliest youth; and all who were still in the vigour of manhood had been born since it had become the dependent ally of Rome. And when, after his victory at the lake Thrasymenus, he marched into Samnium, and encouraged the Samnites to take up arms once more in their old national quarrel, fifty-five years had passed since the Samnites, abandoned by Pyrrhus, and having tried fortune and hope to the uttermost, had submitted to the consul Sp. Carvilius Maximus. So in Samnium, as well as in Etruria, the existing generation had grown up in peace and alliance with the Romans: and many a Samnite may have been enriched by the plunder of Sicily, and must have shared with the Romans in the memorable vicissitudes of the first Punic war; in the defeat of Drepanum, and the disastrous shipwrecks which followed it; in the five years of incessant fighting with Hannibal's father at Eryx and by Panormus; in the long and painful siege of Lilybæum; in the brilliant victory of L. Metellus; and in the final triumph of C. Lutatius at the Ægates. It is true, that fifty-five years of constrained alliance had not extinguished the old feelings of hatred and rivalry; and the Samnites joined Hannibal, as a hundred and fifty years afterwards they joined the younger Marius, against the same enemy, the dominion of the Roman aristocracy. But that their rising was not universal<sup>3</sup>, nor persisted in

<sup>3</sup> The Pentrian Samnites, that of the Matese, in whose territory is to say, the Samnites on the north Æsernia had formerly been, and

with more desperate resolution; that Etruria, with some doubtful exceptions <sup>4</sup>, offered no encouragement to the Carthaginian general; that the fidelity of Picenum, of Umbria, of the Vestinians, Marsians, Pelignians, Marrucinians, and Sabines never wavered; that the "Latin name" remained true to a man; and that even in Campania the fidelity of Nola and of Cuma was as marked as the desertion of Capua;—all this is to be attributed mainly to the system of government which the Romans had established after their conquest of Italy, and which, so far as it can be traced, we must now proceed to examine in its complicated details. Not that we should by any means regard this system of government as a constitution founded upon justice, and granting to all whom it embraced within its range the benefits of equal law. Its praise is rather, that it secured the Roman dominion, without adopting the extreme measures of tyranny; that its policy was admirable, its iniquity and oppression not intolerable. And so small a portion of justice has usually been dealt to the mass of mankind, that their highest hopes have commonly aspired to nothing more than an escape from extravagant tyranny. If life, and property, and female honour, and domestic, national, and religious

who still held Bovianum, did not revolt from Rome at all. See Livy, XXII. 61. A wealthy Samnite of Bovianum, Numerius Decimus, distinguished himself on the Roman side, in an action fought by M. Minucius against Hannibal, in the year preceding

the battle of Cannæ. Livy, XXII. 24.

<sup>4</sup> Such as the alleged disaffection of the people of Arretium in the eleventh year of the second Punic war, which however displayed itself in no overt acts. Livy, XXVII. 21. 24.

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feelings, have not been constantly and capriciously invaded and outraged, lesser evils have been contentedly endured. Political servitude, a severe conscription, and a heavy taxation, habitual arrogance on the part of the governors, and occasional outbreaks of insolence and cruelty, have been considered no less incident to the condition of humanity, than the visitations of poverty, disease, and death. The dominion of the Romans over the people of Italy therefore, as it allowed the ordinary enjoyment of many rights, and conferred some positive advantages, was viewed by its subjects, notwithstanding its constant absoluteness and occasional tyranny, as a condition quite as likely, if overthrown, to be changed for the worse as for the better.

Aristocrati-  
cal character  
of the  
Roman so-  
vereignty.

“The Lacedæmonians,” says Thucydides <sup>5</sup>, “maintained their supremacy over their allies, by taking care that an oligarchy such as suited their own interests should be every where their allies’ form of government.” This also was one of the means by which the Romans secured their dominion in Italy. They universally supported <sup>6</sup> the aristocratical party, and thus made the principal inhabitants of every city willing instruments to uphold their sovereignty; a fact which alone would prove, if the point were

<sup>5</sup> I. 19. 76. 144.

<sup>6</sup> In the second Punic war, Livy says, “unus velut morbus invaserat omnes Italiæ civitates, ut plebes ab optimatibus dissentirent; senatus Romanis faveret, plebs ad Pœnos rem traheret.” XXIV. 2. So it was at Nola; Livy, XXIII. 15. But we have the

same thing already existing in the Samnite wars: where some of the Ausonian aristocracy betray their cities to the Romans, and the Lucanian aristocracy is attached to the Roman alliance, while the popular party favour the Samnites. See Vol. II. of this History, pp. 240. 329.

otherwise doubtful, that the constitution of Rome itself, even since the passing of the Hortensian laws, was much more an aristocracy than a democracy.

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I have said that the Roman dominion in Italy allowed its subjects the ordinary enjoyment of many rights, and conferred on them some positive advantages. Moreover, it held out to them hopes more or less definite of rising to a higher political condition hereafter. These three points will give us the fair side of the Roman sovereignty, and they shall now be considered in order.

Its advantages.

I. According to the general practice of the ancient world, the relation between Rome and her Italian subjects was nominally that of alliance; and the very term alliance implies something of distinctness; for the members of the same commonwealth cannot be each other's allies. Thus it is understood at once, that most of the Italian states retained their municipal independence: they had their own magistrates; they could pass laws for their internal government; and their ancient <sup>7</sup> laws of inheritance, and marriage, as well as their criminal law, were still preserved in full force. But this applies only to single states, or to the separate parts of a nation;

Ancient rights retained under it.

<sup>7</sup> The Latins retained some peculiar laws relating to marriage, till they obtained the full Roman franchise after the great Italian war in the middle of the seventh century. A. Gellius, IV. 4. And their law of interest, being different from that of Rome, enabled

Roman creditors to evade their own law, by nominally transferring their debts to a Latin, who according to his law might exact a greater rate of interest than was permitted at Rome. Livy, XXXV. 7.



for every thing like a national council or diet was carefully prohibited. Arretium, Perugia, and Volaterræ, might each legislate for themselves; but we hear no more of any general congress of the Lucumones or chiefs of the whole Etruscan nation at the temple of Voltumna. Nay, in some recorded instances<sup>8</sup>, and probably in many others not recorded, the several states or districts of the same nation were so isolated from each other, that the citizens of one could neither intermarry with, nor inherit, nor purchase land, from those of another. Thus the allies were left in possession of their municipal independence; but all free national action amongst them was totally destroyed.

Benefits  
conferred  
by it.

II. Besides the benefits which the Roman dominion did not take away from its subjects, there were some others which it conferred upon them, and which they could not have enjoyed without it. The first and greatest of these was the extinction of internal war. From the Rubicon to the straits of Messina, there were no more of the intolerable miseries of a plundering border warfare, no more wasting of lands, driving away of cattle, burning of houses, and carrying off the inhabitants into slavery. Those cities which had survived the Roman conquest, were thenceforward secure from destruction: their gods would still be worshipped in their old temples; their houses were no longer

<sup>8</sup> As in the case of the Latins after the great Latin war; Livy, VIII. 14; of the Hernicans, after their revolt, in the second Samnite war, Livy, IX. 43; and of the Macedonians, after the battle of Pydna, Livy, XLV. 29.

liable to be laid in ruins by a victorious enemy; their people would not be massacred, made slaves, or scattered over the face of the earth, and their very name and memory extinguished. The Americans feel truly that, whatever may be the inconveniences of their federal union, it has still the inestimable advantage of banishing war from the whole of their vast continent; and this blessing was conferred on ancient Italy by the Roman dominion, and was so far even more valuable, as wars between independent states in the ancient world were far more frequent than now, and produced a far greater amount of human misery.

Again, the allies of Rome, while they escaped the worst miseries of war, were enabled by the great power of their confederacy to reap largely its advantages. In the plunder of Sicily the Italian allies and the Roman legions shared equally; and after the fourth Samnite war the Campanians received as their share of the spoil a large portion of the coast<sup>9</sup> of the Gulf of Salerno, which had formerly belonged to the Samnites. Individuals also amongst the allied states might enjoy the benefits of an occupation of the Roman domain land; a privilege which would naturally bind many of the wealthiest families throughout Italy to the Roman

<sup>9</sup> This appears from the statement, that the Roman colonies of Salernum and Buxentum, founded after the second Punic war, were settled on land which had belonged to Capua. Livy, XXXIV.

45. As the coast of the Gulf of Salernum had originally belonged to the Samnites, we may conclude that the Campanians obtained it as their share of the spoil after the third or fourth Samnite war.

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Hopes held  
out by it.

interest, some already possessing it, and others hoping to obtain it.

III. With these actual benefits, the Roman dominion also held out hopes to its subjects of rising sooner or later to a higher political condition. The regular steps appear to have been, that an allied state should first receive the Roman franchise without the right of voting; and after the lapse of years these imperfect citizens gradually gained the full franchise, and were either formed into one or more new tribes, or were admitted into one of the tribes already existing. It is true that the first step in this process was generally an unwelcome one; because it involved, under ordinary circumstances, the forfeiture of all municipal independence, and the entire adoption of a foreign system of law. But there were cases in which it was stripped of these degradations, and became, as far as appears, a mere benefit: such seems to have been the condition of a large portion of the Campanians at the beginning of the second Punic war. Capua at that time was beyond all doubt municipally independent: it had its own laws and magistrates, and its own domain lands<sup>10</sup>: yet it is no less certain that the Campanian aristocracy at any rate were Roman citizens in all respects, except in the right of suffrage<sup>11</sup>. Other allied states might expect the same reward of their continued fidelity: and from this condition the advance to the full franchise was always to be looked for in

<sup>10</sup> Livy, XXIII. 3, foll. XXVIII. 46.

<sup>11</sup> Livy, VIII. 14. See Niebuhr, Vol. II. note 136.

the course of time; and would in all probability have been the reward of Capua itself, had the Campanians devoted their whole strength to the support of Rome after the battle of Cannæ, instead of opening their gates to Hannibal.

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Living in such a state, with so much not taken from them, with so much given to them, and with the hope of one day obtaining so much more; and being farther bound to their sovereigns by geographical position in all cases, and in most by something of an acknowledged affinity in race and language, the Roman allies had many inducements to acquiesce in their actual condition, and to regard themselves as united indissolubly with Rome, whether for better or for worse. But they had also much to bear; nor can we wonder if the descendants of C. Pontius, or Gellius Egnatius, or Stimius Statilius, or of the Calavii of Capua, should have thought life intolerable under the absolute dominion of that people, against whom their fathers had fought in equal rivalry. England for many generations upheld a system of domestic slavery in her colonies, while her own law so abhorred it, that any slave landed upon English ground became immediately a freeman. What the four seas were to England, that the line running round the city at the distance of a mile from the walls, was to Rome: it was the boundary between law and despotism. Within this precinct the sentences of the magistrates were the sentence of the law (*legitima judicia*); and their power was controlled by the sacred interposi-

its oppres-  
siveness.

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tion of the tribunes. But without this limit all was absolute dominion, *imperium*: there the magistrate wielded the sword with full sovereignty; and judicial sentences were held to proceed, not from the law, but from his personal power, so that their validity lasted in strictness no longer than the duration of his authority. Even Roman citizens had no present protection from this tyranny; they had only the resource of seeking for redress afterwards from the courts of Rome. But the allies had not even this relief, except in cases of extraordinary atrocity: for the *imperium* of the Roman magistrates conferred a plenitude of dominion over the persons and property of the subjects of Rome: any thing might be done on the plea of the service of the Roman people, or of maintaining the dignity of its officers; and the least opposition was held to be rebellion. Therefore, although barefaced robberies of private property were as yet mostly restrained by public opinion, which would not allow a magistrate to use his power for purposes of personal plunder; yet acts of insolence and cruelty, far more galling than any mere spoliations of property, were no doubt frequent from the very beginning of the Roman dominion over Italy, and arose partly out of the very position of the Roman officers with respect to the allies, and partly out of the inherent coarseness and arrogance of the Roman national character.

Differences  
in the con-  
dition of the  
allies.

Thus far we have considered the subjects or allies of Rome, in their relations to Rome generally, without noticing any differences in their condition,



which distinguished them more or less from each other; indeed, in that distant view of the sixth century of Rome, which is all that we are permitted to enjoy, these differences are scarcely perceptible; greatly as they must have affected the internal state of the Italian people, yet in their recorded outward movements we see scarcely any thing but the equal working of the Roman power, which all were alike obliged to obey. The treaties which fixed the relations of the several allied states with Rome, varied considerably in their conditions. Camerinum in Umbria, and Heraclea on the Ionian Sea, are noticed as having treated with the Romans on almost equal terms<sup>12</sup>; and Etruria, making peace at the very moment when Pyrrhus was advancing victoriously upon Rome, must surely have secured more favourable conditions, than could be obtained by the exhausted Samnites and Lucanians, when in utter helplessness they submitted to their triumphant enemy. But we neither know what these differences were, nor, if we did, would the knowledge be of much importance, without much fuller information on the other points than we can now ever recover. One great distinction however claims the attention of the most general history,—that which separated all the other Italian allies from those of the Latin name.

When Mago brought to Carthage the tidings of the victory of Cannæ, and told the council how, not only the Bruttians and Apulians, but even some of

<sup>12</sup> Livy, XXVIII. 46. Camer- manis essent. On Heraclea, see  
tes, quum æquo fœdere cum Ro- Cicero pro Arch. c. 4.

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the Lucanians and Samnites, and above all the great city of Capua itself, had in consequence of it joined the Carthaginians, the leader of the party opposed to Hannibal is represented as asking, whether a single people of the Latin name had revolted, or a single citizen of the thirty-five tribes deserted to the enemy<sup>13</sup>? Unfaithfulness to Rome was thought to be not more impossible in her very citizens than in her Latin allies: Samnium and Capua might revolt; but the fidelity of the Latin name was never to be shaken. What then were the ties which bound the two nations together so indissolubly?

The Latin  
name.

In order to answer this question, we must first explain what was meant in the sixth century of Rome by the "Latin name." Now if we remember that almost all the cities of ancient Latium were long since become Roman, so that scarcely any except Tibur and Præneste could any longer be included under the name of allies, we may wonder how the Latin name could still be spoken of as so powerful, or where could be found those eighty-five thousand Latins, who were returned as able to bear arms in the census of the great Gaulish war<sup>14</sup>.

Its extent.

The answer is, that the Latin name was now extended far beyond its old geographical limits, and was represented by a multitude of flourishing cities scattered over the whole of Italy, from the frontier of Cisalpine Gaul to the southern extremity of Apulia. The people of the Latin name in the sixth

<sup>13</sup> Livy, XXIII. 12.

<sup>14</sup> Polybius, II. 24.



century of Rome were not the Tiburtines merely, and the Prænestines<sup>15</sup>, but the inhabitants of Circeii and Ardea on the old coast of Latium, of Cora and Norba on the edge of the Volscian highlands, of Fregellæ and Interamna in the valley of the Liris, of Sutrium and Nepete under the Ciminian hills, of Cales, Suessa Aurunca, and Saticula on the edge of the Campanian plain, of Alba in the country of the Marsians, of Æsernia and Beneventum in the heart of Samnium, of Narnia and Spoletum in Umbria, of Lucina and Venusia in or close to the frontiers of Apulia, of Hadria and Firmum in Picenum, and finally of Brundisium, far to the south, where the Adriatic opens into the Ionian Sea, and of Ariminum on the frontiers of the Cisalpine Gauls, where the Apennines first leave the shores of the Adriatic, and make room for the vast plain of Northern Italy<sup>16</sup>. All these states, with others which I have not noticed, formed the Latin name in the sixth century; not that they were Latins in their origin, or connected with the cities of the old Latium: on the contrary they were by extraction Romans; they were colonies founded by the Roman people, and consisting of Roman citizens: but the Roman government had resolved, that in their political relations they should be considered, not as Romans, but as Latins; and the Roman settlers, in consideration of the advantages which they enjoyed as colonists, were con-

<sup>15</sup> See Vol. II. p. 160, foll.

<sup>16</sup> Livy, XXVII. 9, 10. Savigny, on the Jus Latii, in the Philological Museum, I. 156.

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Privileges  
belonging  
to it.

tent to descend politically to a lower condition than that which they had received as their birthright.

The states of the Latin name, whether cities of old Latium or Roman colonies, all enjoyed their own laws and municipal government, like the other allies; and all were, like the other allies, subject to the sovereign dominion of the Romans. They were also so much regarded as foreigners, that they could not buy or inherit land from Roman citizens; nor had they generally the right of intermarriage with Romans. But they had two peculiar privileges: one, that any Latin who left behind him a son in his own city, to perpetuate his family there, might remove to Rome, and acquire the Roman franchise; the other, that every person who had held any magistracy or distinguished office in a Latin state, might become at once a Roman citizen. So that in this manner all the principal families in the Latin cities had a definite prospect assured to them of arriving in time at the rights of citizens of Rome.

Its relation  
to Rome.

Yet it is remarkable that when twelve of the Latin colonies, in the middle of the second Punic war, renounced the sovereignty of Rome, the consuls in their remonstrance with them are represented as appealing, not to their peculiar political privileges, but to their sense of duty and gratitude towards their mother country. "They were originally Romans, settled on lands conquered by the Roman arms for the very purpose of rearing sons to do their country service; and whatever duties children owed to their parents, were owed by them to the common-

wealth of Rome<sup>17</sup>." And as no age made a son, according to the Roman law, independent of his father, but entire obedience was ever due to him, without any respect of the greater or less benefits which the son might have received from his kindness, so the Romans thought that the allegiance of their colonies was not to depend on a sense of the advantages which their connection with Rome gave to them, but was a plain matter of duty. When they called on the Campanians not to desert them after the battle of Cannæ, they appealed to their gratitude for the boon of political or social privileges: "We gave you," they said, "the enjoyment of your own laws, and to a great proportion of your people we communicated the rights of our own franchise<sup>18</sup>." How different is this language from the simple admonition to the Latin colonies, "that they were the children of Rome, and should render to their parent a child's obedience!"

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Yet the sense of filial duty might have been quickened in the Latin colonies by a recollection of what they owed to Rome, and how much of their political existence depended on her protection. The colonists of Beneventum and Æsernia, of Luceria and Spoletum, were not the only inhabitants of those cities: they had not been sent as settlers into a wilderness, where every work of man around them was to be their own creation. According to the Roman notions of a colony, they had been sent to

Condition of  
the Latin  
colonies.

<sup>17</sup> Livy, XXVII. 9.

<sup>18</sup> Livy, XXIII. 5.

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occupy cities already built and inhabited, to enter into the possession of lands which man's labour had long since made productive. They were to be the masters and citizens of their new city and its territory, while the old inhabitants were to be their subjects, and strangers, as it were, in their own land. And as long as they remained true to their duties as Roman colonies, the power of Rome would maintain their dominion: but if Rome no longer upheld them, there was no slight danger of their being expelled by the old population of the colony, aided, as the latter would soon be, by their countrymen in the neighbouring cities; and Beneventum and Æsernia would then no longer be Latin colonies, but return to their old condition of independent states of Samnium.

It may be asked however, why the Romans refused to their own colonies the private rights, at any rate, of Roman citizens; and as in some instances colonies of Roman citizens were founded, why was not this made the general rule, and why were the great majority of the colonies obliged to content themselves with the name and franchise of Latins? I do not believe that any existing ancient writer has answered this question directly; and the uncertain history of the early times of Rome embarrasses our conjectures. But it is probable that colonies founded during the equal alliance between Rome and Latium, such as Norba and Ardea, were properly Latin cities, to which the Latins sent colonists equally with the Romans; so that they did not belong exclusively to Rome. It is more difficult to understand why Su-

trium and Nepete, colonies planted on the Etrurian frontier, and at a period when the old Latin alliance was virtually at an end, still received the Latin franchise, and not the Roman; and why Cales, and the other colonies founded after the great Latin war, were colonies, not of the Roman, but of the Latin name. We may suppose, perhaps, that in all these settlements the population of the colony was mixed from the beginning; colonists from Latin cities, some of which were always friendly to Rome, being amongst the original settlers: and after the Latin war, we may conceive that there were many Latins, whom, either as a reward or a precaution, the Romans may have been glad to establish in a colony out of their own country. We may understand also, that as the Roman colonists were often taken, not only from the class of poorer citizens, but also from the freedmen, the government would be glad to get them off from the roll of Roman citizens, which could only be done by their consenting to join a Latin colony, in consideration of its providing them with a grant of land. And generally, as the country of a Greek or a Roman was essentially a single city, it was natural that men leaving that city, and settling in another at a distance, should in the common course of things cease to be citizens of their old country. In the Greek colonies the connexion was broken off altogether: but, as this would have defeated the very purposes for which Rome founded hers, it was not entirely severed, but exchanged for the relation of subject and sove-

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reign, or, in the Roman language, of child and parent.

Subjects of Rome enjoying the lower franchise of the city, under the jurisdiction of præfects.

Besides the allies and the Latin name, there was yet a third class of Roman subjects, those who were Romans in their private rights, but not in their political, who possessed the rights of intermarriage, and of inheritance or purchase of land by mancipation, *connubium*, and *commercium*, but had no vote in the comitia, and were ineligible to all public offices of authority. This condition, although it was often a preparatory step to receiving the full Roman franchise, was yet in itself considered far inferior to that of the allies or of the Latin name, inasmuch as it implied the complete forfeiture of all a nation's laws and institutions, and a complete adoption of the laws and customs of Rome. It was a natural consequence of this state, that it did away all municipal government. A people thus become subject to Rome had properly no magistrates of its own: such public officers as it still retained had merely an honorary office: they were to superintend the sacrifices, preside at festivals, and direct other matters of pageantry and ceremonial. The administration of justice was vested in the hands of a præfect sent from Rome; and districts so governed were properly called præfectures. These præfectures were probably very numerous all over Italy; for the magistrates of the cities had no jurisdiction beyond the city walls; and even in the territory of the colonies themselves, the country district was called a præfecture, although



in these cases the præfect was not sent from Rome, but appointed by the colony. It is possible that this may explain what otherwise seems so puzzling, the application of the terms præfectura and municipium to the same places, and that too in cases where municipium undoubtedly expresses the existence of a municipal government, as at Cumæ, Fundi, and Formiæ<sup>19</sup>. In these instances the towns were municipia, and had their own magistrates; but the country around them may have been a præfecture; and the præfect was not appointed, as in the colonies, by the government of what may be called its local capital, but was sent immediately from Rome.

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This intermixture of different kinds of government, within the same geographical limits, may lead us to consider another point of some importance; the variety of the tenures of land, which the Roman conquest had introduced into every part of Italy; so that in each separate country, for instance in Etruria, Umbria, Samnium, or Lucania, as there were great differences of political condition, so also was there the greatest diversity in the tenures of property. There might be found every where three sorts of land,—1st, Land held by the old inhabitants, whether it had never been forfeited, or, if forfeited at the period of their conquest, formally restored to them by the Roman government; 2dly, Land held by a Roman or Latin colony, by grant

Various  
tenures of  
land.

<sup>19</sup> Festus, v. Præfecturæ.



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from the Roman people; and, 3dly, Land still held by the Roman people as domain, whether it was let or farmed by the government, or was in the occupation of individuals, whether Romans, Latins, or Italians of other nations. We have no Domesday-book of Italy remaining, which would enable us to determine the relative proportion of these three kinds of land; but the amount of the third kind, or domain land, was absolutely enormous; for the Roman people retained their full right of property, as we have seen before, in all land occupied (possessus) by individuals; whereas a large proportion of the manors which Domesday-book records as belonging to the crown, when granted, as they soon were, to private persons, ceased to be domain, and became to all intents and purposes private property. Thus in England, and in other countries of modern Europe, the domain lands have become gradually less and less extensive; but as at Rome nothing could alienate them except a regular assignation, and as various circumstances from time to time added to their amount, on the whole their extent went on increasing rather than diminishing; and we are astonished at the vast proportion of domain land belonging to the commonwealth, even at the end of the seventh century, all of which would have come within the disposal of a general agrarian law.

Effects of  
the domain  
land on the  
state of  
Italy.

The later effects of these enormous tracts of domain land are well known, and will require our notice hereafter. But from the beginning they

must have greatly injured the spirit and life of Italy. The whole spring of social and civil activity in the ancient world lay in its cities; and domain land and cities could not exist together. Towns, therefore, which had been taken at the first conquest of the country, and their inhabitants massacred or sold for slaves, becoming in many instances the domain of the conqueror, were condemned to perpetual desolation. Their old population was dispersed or destroyed; and the wealthy Roman, who became the occupant of their territory, allowed a large part of it perhaps to lie waste, and settled the slaves whom he employed in cultivating the remainder, rather in farm buildings or workhouses in the country, than in the houses of the old town. Thus a scanty and scattered slave population succeeded in the place of those numerous free cities, which, small as they were, yet well answered the great object of civil society, in bringing out at once the faculties and affections of mankind; while by the frequent interposition of these large and blank districts, the free towns which were left became more isolated, and their resources diminished, because they too had lost a part of their territory to the conqueror. The larger cities had in many instances become Latin colonies, and were lost to their old nation: and thus, when the Samnites joined Hannibal, it was like the insurrection of a peasantry, where all the fortresses are in possession of the enemy. Beneventum and Æsernia, the principal cities remaining in Samnium, were Latin colonies, or in

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other words Roman garrisons; the Samnite towns were all inconsiderable; and as soon as Hannibal's protection was withdrawn, the first Roman army which invaded the country recovered them almost without resistance.

Many questions might be asked concerning the state of Italy, to which the above sketch contains no answer. Many indeed I could not answer satisfactorily; and the discussion of doubtful points of law or antiquities, where the greatest men have been unable to arrive at any certain conclusion, seems to me to encumber history, rather than illustrate it. Some points I have forborne to notice at present, because their bearing on the general course of the story is not yet manifest. I have wished, not to write an essay on the condition of ancient Italy in the abstract, but to connect my notices of it with the history of the period, that this chapter may catch some portion of the interest attached to Hannibal's great invasion; whilst it may render the narrative of that invasion more intelligible, and may enable me to pursue it with fewer interruptions.

Meantime we must follow the course of events abroad and at home, through the two and twenty years which still separate us from the beginning of the expedition of Hannibal.

## CHAPTER XLII.

GENERAL HISTORY FROM THE FIRST TO THE SECOND PUNIC WAR. ILLYRIAN WAR. GREAT GAULISH INVASION. MUSTER OF THE FORCES OF ALL ITALY. DEFEAT OF THE GAULS. ROMAN INVASIONS OF CISALPINE GAUL. M. MARCELLUS AND C. FLAMINIUS. A.U.C. 513 TO 535. A.C. 241 TO 219.

ALREADY at the end of the first Punic war some eminent Romans were in their full manhood, whose names are enduringly associated with the events of the second. Q. Fabius Maximus, the great dictator, “who by his caution saved the Roman state,” was consul eight years after the conclusion of the treaty with Carthage; Q. Fulvius Flaccus, the conqueror and butcher of Capua, obtained his first consulship four years earlier, in the year 517; and M. Claudius Marcellus, the conqueror of Syracuse, must have been thirty years old at the end of the first Punic war, had already won honours by his personal prowess as a soldier in Sicily, and had held the office of curule ædile. The earliest Roman historians, C. Fabius Pictor, and L. Cincius Alimentus, must have been at this time old enough to retain some impression of things around them; Nævius, the earliest known Roman poet, had served in the last

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Eminent  
Romans of  
this period.

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war in Sicily; Livius Andronicus, the oldest dramatist, brought his first piece upon the stage in the very year after the conclusion of the war. Hannibal himself, whose genius was to be the mover and controller of the future invasion of Italy, was already born; but he was as yet an innocent child, only six years old, playing in his father's house at Carthage.

State of  
Rome after  
the war.

The transition from war to peace, which we remember five or six and twenty years ago, after a contest of very nearly the same length as the first Punic war, brought rather an increase than an abatement of embarrassment. A great stimulant was withdrawn; but a great burden remained to be borne; and the end is not yet manifest. But no sooner do the marks of battles pass away from the fields where they were fought, than the effects even of an exhausting war were shaken off in ancient times by nations not yet fallen into decline; because wars in those days were not maintained at the expense of posterity. The sole debt which Rome had contracted had been incurred for the building of her last fleet; and this could be paid off immediately by the Carthaginian contributions. Population repairs its losses with wonderful rapidity; and to the dominions which the Romans had possessed before the war, was now added the greatest portion of Sicily. Q. Lutatius, the brother and successor of the consul who had won the decisive victory of the Ægates, passed the whole summer of his consulship in Sicily after the conclusion of the peace, and settled the

future condition of the Roman part of the island<sup>1</sup>. Sicily was the earliest Roman province; and in it was first exhibited that remarkable system of provincial government, which was gradually extended over so large a part of the ancient world. The peculiar character of this system did not consist in the absolute dominion of the Roman magistrates; for their power was no less uncontrolled in Italy itself, everywhere beyond the immediate precinct of Rome, than it could be in the provinces. But the nations of Italy, like the allies of Lacedæmon, aided the sovereign state with their arms, and paid no tribute; while the provinces were disarmed, like the allies of Athens, and served their sovereign with their money, and not with their men. Hence the perpetual difference in Roman law between land in Italy and land in the provinces; that the former might be held by individuals as their freehold, and was liable to no payments of tithe or land tax; while the property of the latter was vested solely in the Roman people. When we hear that a Sicilian state had its forfeited lands restored to it<sup>2</sup>, this means only that they were restored subjected to the sovereign rights of the conqueror; and therefore they were still burdened with the payment of tithes, as an acknowledgment that they were not held by their possessors in full property.

No sooner was the provincial system established in Sicily, than the monied men of Rome, the famous

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Sources of  
wealth  
opened to  
the farmers  
of the reve-  
nues.

<sup>1</sup> Zonaras, VIII. 17.

<sup>2</sup> Cicero in Verrem, III. 6.



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Publicani, began to flock over to the island to farm the tithes and the various other revenues which came in from a province to the Roman people. Then were opened all those sources of acquiring wealth at the expense of the provincials, which rich or influential Roman citizens drained so unsparingly. Many Sicilian states were hindered from buying land in each other's territories<sup>3</sup>; but the Roman could purchase everywhere; and competition being thus restricted, he was enabled to purchase at greater advantage. If any state, or any individual in it, had sustained losses which disabled them from paying what they owed to the government at the appointed time, a wealthy Roman was always ready to lend them money; and as the Roman law of interest did not extend to the provinces, he lent it on his own terms, and availed himself of the necessities of the borrower to the utmost. Even in common commercial transactions the Roman merchant in the provinces came into the market with great advantages. If he wished to buy, a provincial would often be afraid to bid against him: if he sold at a high price, the provincial dealers in the same commodity would be afraid to undersell him. The money thus gained by Roman citizens in the provinces gave them influence at Rome; and this again made their friendship or enmity of importance to the Roman provincial governors. Thus they were armed not only with the general authority of the Roman

<sup>3</sup> Cicero in Verrem, II. 50. III. 40.



name, but with the direct countenance and support of the Roman magistrates; and those magistrates held the lives and properties of the provincials at their absolute disposal.

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While the wealthy had these means afforded them of becoming more wealthy, the end of a long war seemed a fit season for rewarding the faithful services of some of the poorer citizens, and of the subjects of the commonwealth. I have already noticed the large assignation of lands which took place somewhere about this period, and for the direction of which no fewer than fifteen commissioners were appointed. And the censors of the year 513 created two new tribes of Roman citizens, the Quirinian and the Velinian<sup>4</sup>, containing, as the names show, the Sabines of the neighbourhood of Cures and of the valley of the Velinus, and the people possibly of some other towns and districts also. These new tribes raised the whole number of tribes to thirty-five: and none were ever added afterwards. Nearly sixty years had elapsed since the last creation of two tribes, the Aniensian and Terentine, between the second and third Samnite wars. But before another period of sixty years could elapse, Hannibal's invasion had so changed the state of Italy and of the Roman people, that the old practice was never again repeated; and thus the Roman tribes remained fixed at the number of thirty-five, rather from accident, as I believe, than from deliberate design.

Two new  
tribes, rais-  
ing the  
number to  
thirty-five.

<sup>4</sup> Livy, Epitom. XIX.

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Destruction  
of agricultu-  
ral labourers  
supplied by  
slaves.

But the remedy in human affairs is seldom commensurate with the evil. Neither the assignation of lands by the fifteen commissioners, nor the grant of the full Roman franchise to a portion of the Sabine people, could compensate to Italy for the wide destruction of the poorest classes of free citizens occasioned by the naval losses of the first Punic war. "The Romans," says Polybius<sup>5</sup>, "lost in battle and by shipwreck, in the course of the war, no fewer than 700 quinqueremes." They lost besides, at one time, nearly 800 corn ships in the great storm which wrecked the two fleets of L. Junius, on the south coast of Sicily, in the year 505. Now the seamen, as is well known, were taken exclusively from the poorest class of freemen; from those who, in many instances, no doubt, like the corresponding class in Greece, lived only by their labour; who in Etruria, especially, and elsewhere, resembled the *Coloni*, so well known from the law books of the later empire, a class of men humble and dependent, but not slaves. As the war drained this class more and more, it had at the same time supplied the slave market beyond all former example. Nor did the supply cease with the war against Carthage; for several years afterwards we read of expeditions against the Ligurians, Sardinians, or Corsicans<sup>6</sup>; and every expedition brought off slaves as a part of its plunder. "Sardinians for sale"<sup>7</sup> became a proverb to express any

<sup>5</sup> I. 63.

<sup>6</sup> Zonaras, VIII. 18.

<sup>7</sup> *Sardi venales*. Aurelius Victor, de Vir. Ill. c. LVII. attributes the

origin of this saying to the time of the conquest of Sardinia by Tiberius Gracchus.

thing of the least possible value; and the Corsicans were a race so brutish, according to the judgment of the slave dealers of the Augustan age, that they would fetch only the smallest price in the market<sup>8</sup>. These poor wretches therefore would not pay the expense of carrying them to the distant markets of Greece or Asia; they must be sold at home; and their purchasers would commonly be the holders of large estates of domain land, who employed them there in the place of free labourers. Thus began that general use of slave labour in Italy, which in the course of a hundred years had in some places almost extirpated the free population.

At the end of the summer of 513, the consul Q. Lutatius returned home from his settlement of Sicily: but before he went out of office in the following spring, both he and his colleague, A. Manlius, were obliged to employ the whole force of the commonwealth against an enemy scarcely thirty miles distant from the walls of Rome. These enemies were the Faliscans, or people of Falerii<sup>9</sup>; a name which has not been heard of in Roman history for more than a hundred and fifty years; when it is said that the four new tribes created after the recovery of Rome from the Gauls, in the year 368, were composed partly out of the inhabitants of the territory of Falerii. What could tempt a single city to brave the power of Rome at a period when there

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War with  
the Falis-  
cans.

<sup>8</sup> Strabo, V. p. 224.

VIII. 18. Polybius, I. 65. Eu-

<sup>9</sup> Livy, Epitom. XIX. Zonaras, tropius, II. 28. Orosius, IV. 11.

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was no foreign war to make a diversion in its favour, we know not, and can scarcely conjecture. But the Romans thought the example so dangerous, that they exerted their whole force to put an immediate stop to it; and in six days the Faliscans, after a desperate resistance, were obliged to submit at discretion. They were forced to surrender all their arms, horses, and moveable property, and half of their domain land: their city was destroyed; and they were removed to another spot less strongly situated; a condition similar to that which had been imposed on the people of Volsinii, four and twenty years earlier. For this conquest both consuls obtained a triumph.

Employ-  
ments  
during three  
years of  
peace.

With the exception of this six days' war, the three years which followed the treaty with Carthage were to Rome a period of perfect peace. While the Carthaginians in Africa were struggling for their existence against their revolted subjects and their rebellious mercenary soldiers, the Roman annals record nothing but friendly embassies, works of internal improvement, new festivals, and new kinds of amusement. Ambassadors were sent to Ptolemy Euergetes, king of Egypt, to offer him the aid of Rome against the king of Syria<sup>10</sup>; but it was declined with thanks, as the war was already at an end. A carriage road was made to the top of the Aventine by the ædiles, L. and M. Publicius, with the fines which they had recovered from persons con-

<sup>10</sup> Eutropius, III. 1.

victed of pasturing their cattle illegally on the domains of the commonwealth: with another portion of these same fines was defrayed the expense of the games of Flora <sup>11</sup>, now for the first time instituted, and celebrated from henceforward every year, beginning on the 28th of April: and in 514, as I have already mentioned, the first regular drama was exhibited at Rome by L. Livius Andronicus <sup>12</sup>. It may be noticed as a curious coincidence, that the next year, 515, witnessed the birth of Q. Ennius, who may be called the father of the existing poetry of the Latin language.

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This season of peace appears to have infused a spirit of unwonted moderation and honesty into the Roman councils. Some Italian vessels carrying corn to the African rebels were interrupted by the Carthaginians, and the crews thrown into prison <sup>13</sup>. The Romans sent an embassy to require their liberation, which the Carthaginians granted; and this ready compliance so gratified the Roman government, that they released without ransom all the Carthaginian prisoners still left in their hands, permitted supplies of all kinds to be carried to Africa for the use of the Carthaginians, while they strictly forbade all traffic with the rebels; and even, it is said, allowed the Carthaginians to levy soldiers in their dominions; that is, to enlist, as they had been wont in times long past, Lucanian, or Samnite, or Bruttian mer-

Friendly relations with Carthage.

<sup>11</sup> Ovid, *Fast.* V. 279—294. *Brut.* 18.

*Festus*, v. *Publicius*.

<sup>13</sup> *Polybius*, I. 83.

<sup>12</sup> *Cicero*, *Tusc. Quæst.* I. 1.

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cenaries. Nor was this all; for when the mercenaries in Sardinia revolted from Carthage, and called in the Romans to their aid, their request was not listened to; and when the people of Utica, dreading the vengeance of the Carthaginians, offered to give themselves up to Rome, the Romans rejected this offer also.

Beginning  
of new dis-  
putes.

But when Hamilcar's genius had delivered his country from its extreme peril, when the rebel mercenaries were destroyed, and when Utica and the other revolted towns and people of Africa had been obliged to submit at discretion, when perhaps also rumours were already abroad of Hamilcar's intended expedition to Spain, then the jealousy of the Romans seems to have revived, and their whole conduct towards Carthage underwent a total change. The mercenaries of Sardinia, after having revolted from Carthage, and applied at that time vainly for the aid of the Romans, were overpowered by the natives, and obliged to fly from the island<sup>14</sup>. They took refuge in Italy, and had probably never ceased soliciting the Roman government to espouse their quarrel, and take possession of Sardinia for themselves. But now the Romans began to listen to them; and it was resolved to send over a fleet to Sardinia to restore them. The Carthaginians meanwhile, having recovered their dominion in Africa, were proceeding to reduce the revolted islands; and an armament was prepared to attack Sardinia. Then the Romans

<sup>14</sup> Polybius, I. 29.



complained that the Carthaginians, while employing their fleet to prevent the African rebels from receiving supplies by sea, had committed many outrages upon Roman subjects sailing to and from Africa; that this had manifested their hostile feeling towards Rome; and that the armament, prepared ostensibly for the recovery of Sardinia, was intended to attack Italy. Accordingly the senate and people passed a resolution for war with Carthage. The Carthaginians, utterly unable to engage in a new contest, offered any terms for the sake of peace: and the Romans not only obliged them to make a formal cession of Sardinia, but required them to pay 1200 talents, in addition to the sum stipulated by the last treaty, as a compensation for the injuries sustained by the Roman merchants, and a penalty for their meditated aggression<sup>15</sup>. Hamilcar advised compliance with these demands; but he hastened, no doubt with tenfold eagerness, the preparations for his expedition to Spain.

When all was ready, the general performed a solemn sacrifice, to propitiate the gods for the success of his enterprise<sup>16</sup>. The omens were declared favourable; Hamilcar had poured the libation on the victim, which was duly offered on the altar, when on a sudden he desired all his officers, and the ministers of the sacrifice, to step aside to a little distance, and then called his son Hannibal. Hannibal, a boy of nine years old, went up to his father,

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Hannibal's  
VOW.

<sup>15</sup> Polybius, I. 88. Appian de  
Reb. Punic. c. 5.

<sup>16</sup> Polybius, III. 11.



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and Hamilcar asked him kindly, if he would like to go with him to the war. The boy eagerly caught at the offer, and with a child's earnestness implored his father to take him. Then Hamilcar took him by the hand, and led him up to the altar, and bade him, if he wished to follow his father, lay his hand upon the sacrifice, and swear "that he would never be the friend of the Romans." Hannibal swore, and never to his latest hour forgot his vow. He went forth devoted to his country's gods as the appointed enemy and destroyer of their enemies; and the thought of his high calling dwelt ever on his mind, directing and concentrating the spirit and enthusiasm of his youth, and mingling with it the forecast, the great purposes, and the deep and unwavering resolution of the maturest manhood.

Renewed  
disputes  
with Car-  
thage.

This story of his solemn vow was told by Hannibal himself many years afterwards to Antiochus, king of Syria; but at the time it was heard by no other ears than his father's; and when he sailed with Hamilcar to Spain, none knew that he went with any feelings beyond the common light-hearted curiosity of a child. But the Romans viewed Hamilcar's expedition with alarm, and were probably well aware that he would brook his country's humiliation only so long as he was unable to avenge it. More than once they renewed their complaints that the Carthaginians annoyed their merchants at sea, and that they were intriguing with the Sardinians, to excite them to revolt from Rome. A fresh sum of money was paid by Carthage; but the complaints

still continued; and the Romans, for the second time it is said, passed a resolution for war. Embassy after embassy was sent to Rome by the Carthaginian government, to deprecate a renewal of the contest <sup>17</sup>; and at last ten of the principal members of the council of elders were appointed ambassadors, if perhaps their rank and dignity might at once move the Romans to pity, and inspire confidence in the peaceful intentions of Carthage. Still the Romans were for a long time inexorable; till Hanno, the youngest of the ambassadors, and, if he was, as is probable, the famous opponent of Hannibal, himself sincerely inclined to maintain the peace, remonstrated with the senate plainly and boldly. "If you will not have peace with us," he said, "then give us back Sardinia and Sicily; for we yielded them to you, not to purchase a brief truce, but your lasting friendship <sup>18</sup>." Then the Romans were persuaded; and the treaty of peace was again renewed and ratified. This was in the year of Rome 519, in the consulship of T. Manlius Torquatus and C. Atilius Bulbus. It was apparently to assure the Carthaginians that the peace thus ratified was to be sincere and lasting, that the old ceremony of shutting the gates of Janus was now performed <sup>19</sup>; for the first time, it was said, since the reign of King Numa; for the last time also until they were closed by Augustus after his conquest of Egypt.

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<sup>17</sup> Zonaras, VIII. 18. Orosius, CL.  
IV. 12.

<sup>19</sup> Eutropius, III. 3. Orosius,

<sup>18</sup> Dion Cassius, *Fragm. Ursin.* IV. 12.

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Divers wars. But in this very year, as well as for several years before and after it, the Roman arms found employment against barbarian enemies in Sardinia, in Corsica, in Liguria, and in Cisalpine Gaul<sup>20</sup>. These wars served to exercise the citizens in arms, to furnish the consuls with an occasion of triumphs, and to bring fresh multitudes of slaves into Italy. Q. Fabius Maximus, afterwards so famous, was consul for the first time in 521, and obtained a triumph for his victories over the Ligurians<sup>21</sup>.

The Romans  
 cross the  
 Adriatic.

Twelve years after the end of the first Punic war, and six after the solemn confirmation of the treaty, a Roman army was sent, for the first time, across the Ionian gulf. More than forty years had now passed since the death of Pyrrhus; his family in the second generation had become extinct; and the Epirots were governing themselves without a king. But their power had sunk almost to nothing; and the only name now dreaded in those parts was that of the Illyrians.

The Illyri-  
 ans.

The various tribes of the Illyrian nation occupied the whole eastern coast of the Adriatic, from its most northern extremity to its mouth. Their extent inland can scarcely be determined: in the later Roman geography the name of Illyricum was applied to the whole country between Macedonia and the Danube<sup>22</sup>; while the early Greek writers distin-

<sup>20</sup> For the wars in Corsica and Sardinia, see Zonaras VIII. 28. Livy, Epit. XX. Valerius Maximus, VI. 3. § 3. Eutropius, III. 3; for the war in Liguria, Dion Cassius, Fragm. Peiresc. XLV.;

and for that in Cisalpine Gaul, Polybius, II. 21.

<sup>21</sup> Plutarch, Fabius, 2.

<sup>22</sup> Zonaras, VIII. 19. Appian, Illyr. I.

guished the Illyrians from the Pæonians or Pannonians, and appear to have confined the Illyrian name to the tract of country more or less narrow where the streams flow into the Adriatic; and placed other nations, the Triballians, Pæonians, and Thracians, in the country beyond the watershed, where the streams run northwards to the Danube. In truth all these nations were probably connected with each other; and their language, if it belonged, as seems likely, to the Slavonic branch of the great Indo-Germanic family, was not wholly foreign either to the Hellenic, spoken on their southern borders, or to the various dialects of Italy, from which they are so little distant on their western frontier. The Illyrians on the Adriatic coast, and on the western border of Upper Macedonia, were held by the Greeks in great respect for their courage; but, like most barbarians, they loved to maintain themselves by plunder instead of labour; and the innumerable harbours along their coast tempted them to plunder by sea rather than by land. Seventy years before this, they were already formidable to all who navigated the Adriatic: but now, since the fall of the Epirot power, the coast to the southward lay unprotected; and their vessels made frequent plundering descents, not only on Epirus, but even on the western shores of Peloponnesus, on Elis, and on Messenia. This brought them more in the way of the merchant ships of Italy, which were engaged in traffic with Greece and the East; and complaints of the Illyrian piracies had been fre-

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quently brought before the Roman government. These were for a time neglected, but at last they became more numerous and pressing; and they were farther supported by the people of the island of Issa, a Greek colony, who, being attacked by the Illyrians, sent to implore the protection of the Romans.

Ambassadors sent to Illyria put to death.

The senate accordingly sent, as was its custom, three ambassadors to Illyria, to learn the state of the Illyrian power<sup>23</sup>, and to find out what friends the Romans would be likely to have within the country itself, if they should have occasion to declare war. The ambassadors found the king of the Illyrians dead; and his widow Teuta, as the Illyrian law permitted, was governing in the name of her stepson, Pinnes, who was still a child. At the moment when the ambassadors arrived, the Illyrian queen was besieging Issa, and was highly elated with the recent success of her fleet, which had returned loaded with spoil from a plundering expedition against Epirus. She was in no mood therefore to brook the peremptory language always used by Roman ambassadors; and one of the three so offended her, that she sent one of her ships after them on their return home, to seize them. Two of them were killed, and the third was brought to the queen, and thrown into prison<sup>24</sup>.

<sup>23</sup> Polybius, II. 8. Dion, Fragm. Ursin. CLI. Zonaras, VIII. 19.

<sup>24</sup> Polybius, II. 8, gives Caius and Lucius Coruncanius as the names of the ambassadors. Pliny, XXXIV. 11., says that statues

(*tripedaneæ*) were raised by the republic to P. Junius and Titus Coruncanius, who were killed by Teuta, queen of the Illyrians. "Hoc a republica tribui solebat injuria cæsis."



The Romans without delay declared war against the Illyrians, and both consuls, Cn. Fulvius Centumalus and L. Postumius Albinus were sent across the Adriatic with a fleet and army, such as had rarely been seen in those parts. As usual, they found allies within the country; Demetrius, a Greek of the island of Pharos, who was holding Coreyra for the Illyrian queen, surrendered it at once to the Roman fleet <sup>25</sup>, and guided the consuls in all their subsequent operations. A Roman fleet of two hundred quinqueremes, and a regular consular army of 22,000 men, were, as opposed to the piratical barks and robber soldiery of Queen Teuta, like a giant amongst pigmies. Town after town, and tribe after tribe, yielded to them, and Teuta, having taken refuge in Rhizon, which was almost her last remaining stronghold, was glad to obtain peace on the conqueror's terms. The greater part of her former dominion was bestowed on Demetrius; she was to pay a fixed tribute to the Romans, and was never to allow more than two of her ships together, and these not armed vessels, to sail to the south of the port of Lissus, the last place in the Illyrian dominions <sup>26</sup>. In the course of this short war, not only Coreyra, but Apollonia also, and Epidamnus, submitted to the Romans at discretion, and received their liberty, as was afterwards the fate of all Greece, as a gift from the Roman people.

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War with  
the Illyrians.

The Illyrian war having been settled rather by Roman embassies into Greece.

<sup>25</sup> Polybius, II. 11.

<sup>26</sup> Polybius, II. 12.

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the Roman fleet than by the army, Cn. Fabius, who had commanded the fleet, returned home alone to obtain a triumph; while his colleague L. Postumius was left with a small force at Coreyra. He sent ambassadors to the Ætolians and the Achæan league, to explain the grounds on which the Romans had crossed the sea, and to read the treaty which had been concluded with the Illyrians. As all the Greeks had suffered from, or dreaded the Illyrian piracies, the Roman ambassadors met with a most friendly reception, and were welcomed as the benefactors of Greece. Soon afterwards the Romans sent other embassies to Corinth and to Athens, with no other object, so far as appears, than of introducing themselves to some of the most illustrious states of the Greek name, which many of the Romans had already learnt to admire. At Corinth they received the solemn thanks of the Corinthians for the services they had rendered to the Greek nation; and the Romans were allowed to take part in the Isthmian games, as if they were acknowledged to have some connexion with the Hellenian race<sup>27</sup>. The Athenians, it is said, went farther, granted to the Roman people the honorary franchise of Athenian citizens, and admitted them to the Eleusinian mysteries. That this honour was not despised by the highest Roman nobility may be concluded from the fact, that A. Manlius Torquatus, who was censor in 506, and con-

<sup>27</sup> Polybius, II. 12. Zonaras, VIII. 19.



sul in 509 and 512, has the surname of Atticus, in the Capitoline Fasti, a name borne, so far as we know, by no other member of his family, either before or afterwards.

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Nearly about the time when the consuls, Cn. Fulvius and L. Postumius, left Rome on their expedition to Illyria, the Romans must have heard the tidings of the death of Hamilcar. From his first landing in Spain he had advanced with uninterrupted success, training his army in this constant warfare with the bravest of barbarians, and gaining fresh popularity and influence both at home and with his soldiers, by his free distribution of his spoils; spoils not to be estimated by the common poverty of barbarians, but rich in silver and gold, the produce of the still abundant mines of Spain. In the ninth year of his command he had reached the Tagus, when he was killed in a battle with the Vettonians, a tribe who dwelt between the Tagus and the Douro, and was succeeded by his son-in-law, Hasdrubal <sup>28</sup>.

Death of  
Hamilcar.

The work which Hamilcar had begun by the sword, was continued and consolidated by the policy of his successor. Hasdrubal was one of those men who are especially fitted to exercise an ascendancy over the minds of barbarians <sup>29</sup>; his personal appearance was engaging; he understood the habits and feelings of the Spaniards, and spared no pains to

Hasdrubal's  
progress in  
Spain. Measures  
taken  
by the Ro-  
mans to  
check him.

<sup>28</sup> Polybius, II. 1. Zonaras, VIII. 19. Nepos. Diodor. Ecl. lib. XXV.

<sup>29</sup> Polybius, II. 13. 36. Appian, VI. 4. 6.

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accommodate himself to them. Thus the native princes far and near sought his friendship, and were eager to become the allies of Carthage; while by the foundation of New Carthage, or Carthagena, a place possessing one of the best harbours in the Mediterranean, and naturally strong on the land side, he was enabled to command the heart of Spain, from a position close at hand, instead of beginning his operations from a distant corner of the country, like Gades. The Romans observed his progress with no small alarm; but their dread of an approaching Gaulish invasion made them unwilling to provoke a war at this moment with Carthage. They endeavoured therefore to secure themselves by treaty, and concluded a convention with Hasdrubal, by which he bound himself not to extend his conquests to the north of the Iberus or Ebro<sup>30</sup>. By this stipulation the Romans hoped to keep him at a sufficient distance, not from Italy only, but from their old allies the people of Massalia, some of whose colonies had been founded south of the Pyrenees, along the coast of what is now Catalonia. Nor were they abandoning to him the whole country southward of the Iberus; for they had lately formed an alliance with the Saguntines, a people partly of Greek, or at any rate not of Spanish extraction, who lived near the coast between the Iberus and the Sucro, and who, in their fear of the Carthaginian power, had put themselves under the protection of Rome<sup>31</sup>. The

<sup>30</sup> Polybius, II. 13. III. 27. 9.

<sup>31</sup> Polybius, III. 15. 21. 30.

treaty concluded with Hamilcar, at the end of the first Punic war, had contained a clause forbidding either of the contracting parties to molest the allies of the other <sup>32</sup>: Saguntum, therefore, was safe from attack; and the Romans hoped, no doubt, to secure their footing in Spain through its means, and from thence, so soon as the Gaulish war was over, to sap the newly-formed dominion of Carthage, by offering their aid to all the native tribes who might wish to escape from it.

But these hopes and fears for their dominion in Spain were overpowered at present by a nearer anxiety, the dread of a Gaulish invasion. The Cisalpine Gauls had for the last ten years resumed their old hostile dispositions, which before that time had slumbered for nearly forty-five years, since their great defeat by the consul Q. Æmilius Papus, two years before the invasion of Pyrrhus <sup>33</sup>. In that interval they had seen two Roman colonies founded on the land which had formerly been theirs; Sena immediately after the war <sup>34</sup>, and Ariminum about fourteen years afterwards, or four years before the beginning of the war with Carthage. But neither of these occupations of what they must have considered their own land, provoked them, as it seems, to attack the Romans; and they remained quiet through the whole of the first Punic war, when the Romans, engaged year after year in Sicily, would have resisted them at the greatest disadvantage. But three years

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Threatenings of an invasion by the Gauls.

<sup>32</sup> Polybius, III. 21.

History, ch. XXXVII. 474.

<sup>33</sup> A.U.C. 472. Vol. II. of this

<sup>34</sup> Polybius, II. 19.

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after the peace with Carthage, we find the Roman consuls invading the territory of the Gauls. It is difficult to believe that these renewed hostilities were wholly owing, as Polybius says<sup>35</sup>, to the innate restlessness of the Gaulish character, and to the rising up of a new generation, who had forgotten the defeats of their fathers. But this new generation must have been ready for war at least ten years earlier; and their impatience would scarcely have waited so long only to break forth at last when the favourable opportunity was over.

Preparations  
of the Gauls  
for war.

The Cisalpine Gauls called in their brethren from beyond the Alps to aid them; but these new comers excited jealousies; and on one occasion there was a regular battle fought between them and the Cisalpine Gauls, with such slaughter on both sides as relieved the Romans from all present danger<sup>36</sup>. But afterwards, in the year 521, when Fabius Maximus was for the first time consul, an agrarian law was proposed and carried by C. Flaminius, one of the tribunes, for a general assignation of the land between Ariminum and Sena<sup>37</sup>, a measure which not only ejected perhaps many of the old Gaulish inhabitants, who had still been suffered to enjoy their former possessions, but seemed an earnest of the

<sup>35</sup> II. 21.

<sup>36</sup> Polybius, II. 21.

<sup>37</sup> Cicero, De Senectute, c. 4. places this law in 526, when Q. Fabius, *consul iterum*, C. Flaminius, *quoad potuit, restitit, agrum Picentem et Gallicum viritim contra senatus auctoritatem dividenti.*

But from Polybius, II. 21., it appears that the law was carried into effect by M. Lepidus, who was consul in 523; so that it must have been passed in the previous year, when Fabius was consul along with M. Pomponius Matho.

intention of the Romans to extirpate the Gauls altogether from every portion of Gaulish territory which the fortune of war might hereafter give them. Accordingly there was now an unanimous cry amongst the Gauls for war, and for obtaining the aid of their Transalpine countrymen. Their preparations were made with unusual patience; there was no premature movement; but they endeavoured to provide themselves with money, of which they had none of their own, by selling various commodities, wool and hides, and, above all, captive slaves, to merchants who would pay for them in gold and silver<sup>38</sup>. Thus they were enabled to engage the services of a large body of Transalpine Gauls, whom they tempted besides with the prospect of a permanent settlement in Italy; whilst the Romans, knowing full well that the storm was gathering, yet unwilling to provoke it by commencing hostilities, were kept year after year in a state of anxious preparation, till the invasion at last, as it seems, actually burst upon them unexpectedly.

In this state of suspense, superstitious terrors possessed men's minds readily. The Capitol was struck with lightning, an unwonted prodigy; and the Sibylline books were consulted in consequence. The books said, "When the lightning shall strike the Capitol and the temple of Apollo, then must thou, O Roman, beware of the Gauls<sup>39</sup>." And another prophecy said that a time should come "when the

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Superstitious terrors.

<sup>38</sup> Zonaras, VIII. 19.

published by Mai, p. 185.

<sup>39</sup> See the fragments of Dion,

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race of the Greeks and the race of the Gauls should occupy the Forum of Rome." It is characteristic of superstition to transfer to its idols that mockery of truth which itself so delights in, and to believe that they care not for wickedness, if it be done to promote their service. A man and woman of the Gaulish race, with a Greek man and woman, were buried alive in the Forum Boarium, that the prophecy might be fulfilled in word, and might, so the Romans hoped, be proved to be in spirit a lie <sup>39</sup>.

Revolt of  
Sardinia.

It was the spring of the year 529, and the consuls chosen were L. Æmilius Papus and C. Atilius Regulus, son of that Regulus who had been so famous in the first Punic war. The Transalpine Gauls had not yet crossed the Alps; and, on the other hand, tidings arrived that the Sardinians, impatient of the dominion of a Roman prætor, to which they had now, for the first time, been made regularly subject, had broken out into a general revolt. Accordingly C. Regulus, with one consular army, was sent over to Sardinia to put down the revolt <sup>40</sup>.

Preparations  
for the Gaul-  
ish war.

He was already arrived in his province, when the Transalpine Gauls, on the first melting of the snows, crossed the Alps; and the Cisalpine Gauls joining them with all their own disposable forces, the invasion of Italy was no longer delayed. The alarm was given at Rome; and then was seen with what vast power and energy the Roman government could meet an emergency of real danger. The whole free

<sup>39</sup> Orosius, IV. 13. Plutarch, <sup>40</sup> Polybius, II. 23. Zonaras, Marcell. 3. Zonaras, VIII. 19. VIII. 19.



population of Italy, of an age to bear arms, was reported to Rome in the returns of the census of the several states; and in a contest with barbarians such as the Gauls, every state and every man could be depended on; for no evil could equal the victory of such an enemy. Thus knowing the whole extent of its resources, the government prepared accordingly its active armies, and its armies of reserve, while every important city was duly provisioned, and provided with large magazines of arms, and the system being never forgotten of securing allies to act on the enemy's flank or rear, the friendship of the Cenomanians and Venetians was timely obtained, whose country lying along the lower part of the course of the Po, and on the shores of the Adriatic, was in direct communication with the Romans at Ariminum, and commanded the whole eastern frontier of the hostile Gauls, so as to threaten their territory with invasion, as soon as their army should begin to march southwards. In fact, this desertion of the Gaulish cause by the Cenomanians and Venetians crippled the invasion at the very outset; for a large force was kept at home to cover the frontier, and the invading army, according to Polybius, did not finally amount to more than 50,000 foot, and 20,000 cavalry and war chariots<sup>41</sup>.

Two roads led from Cisalpine Gaul into the heart of Italy; the one by Ariminum and Umbria, the other by Etruria. Of these the former was covered

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Position of  
the Roman  
armies.

<sup>41</sup> II. 23.



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by a consular army of 27,000 men, by the disposable force of the Umbrians, amounting to 20,000 men, and by the Cenomanian and Venetian auxiliaries, who are computed at 20,000 men more. The Umbrians and the barbarian auxiliaries were stationed on the edge of the Gaulish frontier, westward probably of Sarsina, to be ready to pour down upon the Boian country, near the modern towns of Forli and Faenza; while the consul L. Æmilius was posted at some point in the direction of Ariminum: but whether he was actually at Ariminum to defend the frontier, or in some position nearer to Rome, from whence he might more easily co-operate with the army covering Etruria, the narrative of Polybius does not state clearly<sup>42</sup>. On the other line, which led through Etruria, there lay an army of 54,000 Sabines and Etruscans, commanded by a Roman prætor; whilst Rome itself was covered by a reserve army of more than 50,000, under the command, we may suppose, of the prætor of the city. These forces were actually called out and organized; but the returns of the population capable of bearing arms, and which in case of need might recruit and support the troops already in the field, presented, it is said, a sum total, inclusive of the soldiers really enlisted, of no fewer than 750,000<sup>43</sup>.

The invaders seem to have conducted their march

<sup>42</sup> Δεύκιον Αἰμίλιον .. ἐξαπέστει-  
λαν ὡς ἐπ' Ἀριμίνοῦ.

<sup>43</sup> Polybius, II. 24. Eutropius,  
III. 5. Polybius, after giving this

enormous muster, adds, ἐφ' οὗς  
'Αννίβας, ἐλάττους ἔχων δισμυρίων,  
ἐπέβαλεν εἰς τὴν Ἰταλίαν.

skilfully; for passing between the Roman armies, they descended from the Apennines into the valley of the upper Arno, followed it down nearly to Arretium, and from thence advanced towards Clusium, in the very heart of Etruria, after having ravaged the whole country near the line of their march without any opposition. When the Roman prætor became aware that the enemy were between him and Rome, he put his army in motion to pursue them. The Gauls met him and defeated him, but were prevented from completing the destruction of his army by the sudden appearance of the consul L. Æmilius, who had also hastened to the scene of action, when he heard that the enemy were in Etruria<sup>44</sup>. Then the Gauls, enriched, but at the same time encumbered, with their plunder, and having been entirely successful hitherto, determined to carry off their prisoners and spoil in safety to their own country, and afterwards, when their army was again fit for action, to repeat their invasion. As the Roman armies were between them and the Apennines, they resolved to retreat by the coast road into Liguria, and descended the valley of the Ombrone with that object. But when they had reached the coast, and were marching northwards towards the mouth of the Arno, they suddenly encountered a new enemy. The consul, C. Regulus, having been recalled from Sardinia, had just landed at Pisa, and was now on his march by the very same coast

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The Gauls  
invade Etru-  
ria, and are  
defeated.

<sup>44</sup> Polybius, II. 25, 26.

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A.C. 225.

road towards Rome<sup>45</sup>. The Gauls were thus placed between two enemies; for L. Æmilius was hanging on their rear; and they were obliged to engage both the consular armies at once. The battle was long and bloody, and the Romans lost one of their consuls, C. Regulus; but in the end they won a complete victory, and the Gaulish army was almost destroyed<sup>46</sup>. Immediately after the victory, L. Æmilius hastened to invade the Gaulish territory by the same road which the Gauls had intended to make their line of retreat; and as the Gauls were mostly on their other frontier, to oppose the Umbrians and their barbarian allies, the consul overran the country without resistance. He returned to Rome and triumphed; and the golden chains worn by the Gauls round their necks and arms were hung up as a splendid monument of the victory in the temple of the Capitoline Jupiter<sup>47</sup>.

Conquest of  
the Boians  
and Insubri-  
ans.

This great success encouraged the Romans to press the war against the Gauls with the utmost vigour, in the hope of completing their destruction, and effecting the conquest of their country. Trusting to their treaty with Hasdrubal, they thought they should have time to deal with their nearer enemies, before they turned their attention seriously to the affairs of Spain. Accordingly for the next three years both consuls were each year employed in Cisalpine Gaul, and with such success, that the Boian and Insubrian nations, whose country stretched

<sup>45</sup> Polybius, II. 27.

<sup>46</sup> Polybius, II. 28—31.

<sup>47</sup> Polybius, II. 31.

from the Apennines to the Alps across the whole plain of Northern Italy, and extended from the neighbourhood of Ariminum westward as far as the Ticinus, were obliged one after the other to submit at discretion<sup>48</sup>.

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XLII.

The details of battles fought with barbarians are rarely worth recording; but among the consuls of these three years were men whose personal fame attracts our notice; and some of the circumstances connected with their military proceedings will lead us naturally to a subject of far deeper interest, the political state of Rome on the eve of the second Punic war.

The consuls of the year 530, who succeeded L. Campaign of 530. Æmilius and C. Regulus, had both of them been consuls before, and censors; and in their censorship they had been colleagues, as now in their second consulship. These were T. Manlius Torquatus and Q. Fulvius Flaccus, men of kindred character; Manlius possessing all the traditional sternness of his race, and Q. Fulvius, in his unyielding and unrelenting nature, rivalling the proudest patricians in Rome. They were made consuls together, in the hope that the Gaulish war, under their conduct, would be brought to a speedy conclusion: but in this they disappointed their countrymen; for although they reduced the Boians to submission, yet they could do nothing against the Insubrians, owing to an unusually rainy season, which, filling all the streams, made the coun-

<sup>48</sup> Polybius, II. 32—35. Zonaras, VIII. 19. Orosius, IV. 13.

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XLII.  
A.U.C. 530.  
A.C. 224.

try about the Po impracticable, and occasioned epidemic diseases among the soldiers<sup>49</sup>. The consuls were apparently required to abdicate before the end of the year; for the old and blind L. Metellus, the pontifex maximus, was named dictator, to hold the comitia; and by him were elected the consuls of the following year, C. Flaminius Nepos and P. Furius Philus.

Flaminius  
defeats the  
Gauls, and  
triumphs in  
spite of the  
senate.

Flaminius, as we have seen<sup>50</sup>, had been tribune ten years before, and had then carried an agrarian law for a general assignation of the land formerly conquered from the Gauls near Ariminum. It was perhaps from some expectation that, if he made fresh conquests, he would propose a similar assignation of them, that the people elected him consul: the senate, on the other hand, used their utmost endeavours to make his consulship wholly inactive. He was already in the field with his colleagues, and had entered the enemy's country, when the senate sent orders to both the consuls to return instantly to Rome. Dreadful prodigies had been manifested; three moons had been seen at once in the sky; a vulture had haunted the Forum; and a stream in Picenum had run blood<sup>51</sup>. The augurs declared that the omens had not been duly observed at the election of the consuls; they must therefore be forthwith recalled. Flaminius, guessing the purport of the senate's despatches, and receiving them when he was on the very eve of a battle, would not read

<sup>49</sup> Polybius, II. 31.

<sup>50</sup> Above, p. 9.

<sup>51</sup> Zonaras, VIII. 20. Orosius, IV. 13.

them till the action was over; and having gained a complete victory, he declared, when he did read them, that the gods themselves had solved the senate's scruples as to the lawfulness of his appointment, and that it was needless for him now to return. He continued his operations therefore till the end of the season with much success; he took a great many prisoners, and a large amount of plunder, all of which he distributed to his soldiers; and on his return to Rome he demanded a triumph. The senate, resenting his disobedience, refused it; but he obtained it, as the popular consuls Horatius and Valerius had done 220 years before, by a decree of the comitia <sup>52</sup>.

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A.U.C. 531.  
A.C. 223.

Flaminius was through life the enemy of the aristocratical party; and our accounts of these times come from writers whose feeling was strongly aristocratical. Besides, his defeat and death at Thrasymenus made the Romans in general unfriendly to his memory; as national pride is always ready to ascribe disasters in war to the incapacity either of the general or the government. But Flaminius was a brave and honest man, over confident, it is true, and over vehement, but neither a demagogue, nor a mere blind partisan. Like many others of the noblest of the plebeians, he was impatient of that craft of augury, which he well knew was no genuine and simple-hearted superstition, but an engine of aristocratical policy used by the nobility against those whom they hated or feared. Yet the time

Character of  
Flaminius.

<sup>52</sup> Zonaras, VIII. 20.



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A.U.C. 531.  
A.C. 223.

was not come when the people at large saw this equally; and therefore Flaminius shared the fate, and incurred the blame, of those premature reformers, who, putting the sickle to the corn before it is ripe, reap only mischief to themselves, and obtain no fruit for the world.

A.U.C. 532.  
A.C. 222.  
Character of  
Marcellus.

Flaminius and Furius were succeeded in the consulship by M. Claudius Marcellus and Cn. Cornelius Scipio. Marcellus, afterwards so famous, was at this time nearly fifty years old, and in his natural character seems greatly to have resembled Flaminius. Like him he was a brave and hardy soldier, open in his temper, active and enterprising in the highest degree; but so adventurous and imprudent, that even in old age he retained the thoughtlessness of a boy, and perished at sixty by plunging into a snare which a stripling might have expected and shunned. But he attached himself to the aristocracy, which Flaminius opposed; and all his military successes met with their full share of honour and reward. In this his first consulship he encountered Britomarus, or Viridomarus, one of the Gaulish chiefs, in single combat, and slew him in the sight of his army. For this exploit he was ranked with Romulus and Cornelius Cossus, who, like him, when commanding the Roman armies, had slain the enemy's general with their own hand; and he offered the *Spolia Opima*, or choice spoils, of the slain chief to Jupiter Feretrius, as the most striking part of the spectacle of his splendid triumph <sup>53</sup>.

<sup>53</sup> Plutarch. Marcell. 7, 8. Livy, Epit. XX. Eutropius, III. 6.



The two following years, 533 and 534, were only marked by wars with new barbarian enemies; the Istrians, whose country ran out like a peninsula into the Adriatic, at the very head of the gulf, to the east of the country of the Venetians, and the Gaulish or mixed Gaulish tribes, which lived to the north of the Insubrians, on the very roots of the Alps. The Istrians, a people of kindred race and habits to the Illyrians of the more southern parts of the Adriatic, were accused like them of having committed acts of piracy on the Roman merchant vessels. They were defeated, but not without a severe loss on the side of the Romans. One of the consuls employed against them was M. Minucius Rufus, so famous four years afterwards as master of the horse to the dictator Q. Fabius <sup>54</sup>.

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A.U.C. 533.  
A.C. 221.  
War with  
the Istrians.

The year of Rome 534 was marked by the censorship of L. Æmilius Papus and C. Flaminius; a censorship distinguished by several memorable regulations and public works, and which throws great light on the character of Flaminius, and through him on the general state of parties in the commonwealth. In the first place, we may be quite certain that no mere demagogue, nor any one who was considered a bad or unwise man, would have been elected censor at this period. The high dignity of the office repelled from it all but citizens of the very first reputation; nor were the bravery and activity of a good soldier the qualities which most fitted a man

Censorship  
of Flami-  
nius.

<sup>54</sup> Zonaras, VIII. 20. Orosius, IV. 13. Eutropius, III. 7.

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A.U.C. 533.  
A.C. 221.

to discharge its many important duties. Flaminius had carried an agrarian law, and had continued to command his army as consul, in direct opposition to the majority of the senate; but he knew how to distinguish between the selfishness and jealousy of an aristocracy, and those aristocratical elements which are essential to all good government; and the great measure of his censorship was a repetition of the regulation made by the famous censors Q. Fabius Rullus and P. Decius, about eighty years before: he removed all freedmen from the country tribes, and enrolled them in the four city tribes, the Palatine, the Esquiline, the Colline, and the Suburban.

Transfer of  
the freed-  
men to the  
city tribes.

A single line in the epitome of Livy's twentieth book contains all our information respecting this measure, and it relates the fact merely, without a word of explanation. We must suppose that the regulation of Fabius and Decius had been regarded as a remedy for a crying evil at a particular time, and not as a general rule to be observed for ever. In common times the freedman, being still closely connected with his old master, who was now become his patron, patronus, would be enrolled in his patron's tribe; and this would seem the most natural course, when the particular case was considered, without reference to the political consequences of the system, so soon as it was generally adopted. These consequences would be to give political influence to a class of men in all respects unlike the old agricultural commons. The class of freedmen contained many rich citizens, and many poor ones; but rich and poor alike lived by

trade, rather than by agriculture,—in Rome, rather than in the country. It is said that the freed negro in America is confined by public feeling to the exercise of two or three trades or callings only, and these humble ones; but the freedman of the ancient world laboured under no such restriction. He might keep a little stall in the Forum, or he might be a merchant trafficking with Egypt and with Carthage: or again, he might be a monied man, and live on the interest of his loans; or he might go out as a farmer of the taxes to Sicily, and acquire an immense fortune at the expense of the province. But in no case were his habits like those of the agricultural citizen; and Flaminius, like M. Curius, and P. Decius, and like C. Marius in later times, was an enemy to every thing which might elevate the mercantile and monied classes, and still more the small shopkeepers and low populace of the city, above the proprietors and cultivators of the land.

It was probably in the same spirit that Flaminius shortly afterwards supported the bill of an unknown tribune, Q. Claudius, which forbade all senators and sons of senators from being the owners of a ship of the burden of more than 300 amphoræ. The express object of this bill was to hinder the Roman aristocracy from becoming, like the Venetian nobles, a company of wealthy merchants. The corn ships which the Istrians were accused of intercepting, belonged, no doubt, to some of the nobility, and were engaged in carrying the corn grown on their extensive occupation lands in Picenum and the coast of

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XLII.  
A.U.C. 533.  
A.C. 221.

Bill to check the growth of a mercantile spirit among the senators.

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A. U. C. 533.  
A. C. 221.

Umbria, to the markets of Greece and Macedonia. Flaminius thought that traffic was unworthy of the Roman nobility: perhaps he fancied that they who derived their wealth from foreign trade would be too much afraid of offending their customers, and would compromise their country's honour for the sake of their own profit. But on this occasion he stood alone in the senate: neither Q. Fabius, nor T. Manlius, nor M. Marcellus, nor any of the Atilii, or Sempronii, or Carvili, supported him; but as the comitia by the Hortensian law enjoyed the supreme legislative power, the opposition of the senate was vain, and the bill was passed<sup>55</sup>.

Public  
Works.  
The Flami-  
nian Way.

Yet, while Flaminius imitated Fabius and Decius in their political regulations, he rivalled Appius Claudius in the greatness of his public works. He perfected the direct communication between Rome and Ariminum<sup>56</sup>, the great road, which, turning to the right after crossing the Milvian bridge, ascended the valley of the Tiber, leaving Soracte on its left, till it again joined the line of the modern road where it recrosses the Tiber and ascends to Oericulum; which then ascended the valley of the Nar to Narnia and Interamnia, passed over the lofty ridge of the Monte Somma, descended on the newly-founded colony of Spoletum, and passed through the magnificent plain beyond till it reached Fulginia; which there again penetrating into the green valley of the Calcignolo, wound its way along the stream to Nu-

<sup>55</sup> Livy, XXI. 63.

<sup>56</sup> Livy, Epit. XX.

ceria; which then, by an imperceptible ascent, rose through the wide upland plain of Helvillum (Sigillo) to the central ridge of the Apennines; which, the moment it had crossed the ridge, plunged precipitately down into the deep and narrow gorge of the Cantiano, and, hemmed in between gigantic walls of cliff, struggled on for many miles through the defile, till it came out upon the open country, where the Cantiano joins the Metaurus; which then, through a rich and slightly-varied plain, followed the left bank of that fateful stream till it reached the shores of the Adriatic; and which finally kept the line of the low coast to Ariminum, the last city of Italy, on the very edge of Cisalpine Gaul. This great road, which is still one of the chief lines of communication in Italy, and which still exhibits in its bridges, substructions, and above all in the magnificent tunnel of Furlo, splendid monuments of Roman greatness, has immortalized the name of C. Flaminius, and was known throughout the times of the Commonwealth and the Empire as the Flaminian Way.

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A.U.C. 533.  
A.C. 221.

His other great work was the building of a Circus in the Campus Martius, which was also called by his name, and which, like the Greek theatres, was used not only for the exhibition of games, but also occasionally for meetings of the senate and assemblies of the people, when they were held without the walls of the city.

The Flaminian Circus.

Flaminius, although opposed to the overbearing rule of the aristocracy, stood aloof, as we have seen, from the party of the populace, and wished to do no

Growth of a lower democratic party.

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XLII.  
A.U.C. 533.  
A.C. 221.

more than to tread in the steps of the best citizens of former times, of Fabius Rullus and Decius, of M. Curius and Fabricius. But we find symptoms of the growth of another party, which, in the later times of the Commonwealth, was almost the sole representative of the popular cause, the party of the poorer classes within Rome itself, the Forum populace, as they were called, in whom the ancient political writers saw the worst form of democracy. By the influence of this party, it seems, C. Terentius Varro, a butcher's son, had already been raised to the quæstorship, and had been made plebeian and curule ædile, and was now looking forward to still higher distinctions. But the war with Carthage crushed it for the present, and delayed its revival for nearly a hundred years, and established the power of the aristocracy on the firmest base, that of the public respect and love, feelings which their conduct in the great national struggle had justly earned for them.

Death of  
Hasdrubal :  
Hannibal  
takes the  
command :  
ambassadors  
sent to Han-  
nibal and to  
Carthage.

Hasdrubal had died in the year before Flaminius' censorship, having been assassinated in his tent by a Gaulish slave, in revenge for the death of his master<sup>57</sup>. The voice of the army had immediately called Hannibal to the command, and the government of Carthage had ratified their choice. He had made two campaigns, and had so put down all opposition to the Carthaginian dominion, that the Saguntines, expecting to be attacked next, as the only

<sup>57</sup> Polybius, II. 36. Appian, Hispan. 8.



people still left independent, sent earnest embassies to Rome, to request the interference of the Romans in their behalf<sup>58</sup>. Towards the close of the year 534, Roman ambassadors visited Hannibal in his winter quarters at New Carthage, warning him not to attack Saguntum, which was an ally of Rome, nor to carry his arms beyond the Iberus. Receiving unsatisfactory answers, they proceeded to Carthage, and declared to the government that the Romans would consider any attack upon Saguntum, or any advance of the Carthaginians beyond the Iberus, as acts of direct hostility against Rome. They could not imagine that Carthage would dare to incur such a penalty: she had paid money and ceded parts of her territory to escape the resentment of the Romans; would she now voluntarily brave it by acts of aggression? Hannibal's party could not have obtained so complete an ascendancy; and his opponents would surely recover their influence, when his policy threatened to involve his country in the dreaded evils of another war with Rome. So L. Æmilius Paullus and M. Livius were chosen consuls for the year 535, as if the peace would not be broken; and they were both sent over to Illyria with two consular armies to chastise the revolt of Demetrius of Pharus, who, relying on his intimate connexion with the court of Macedon, had committed various breaches of treaty, and was setting the Romans at defiance<sup>59</sup>.

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A.U.C. 534.  
A.C. 220.

<sup>58</sup> Polybius, III. 15. Appian, Hispan. 11. Livy, XXI. 10.

<sup>59</sup> Polybius, III. 16. 18. Zonaras, VIII. 20



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A.C. 219.  
War in Illy-  
ria.

L. Æmilius was a brave and able officer; and he and his colleague did their work effectually; they reduced all the enemy's strong holds, took Pharus itself, and obliged Demetrius to escape for his life to Macedonia, and finally received the submission of all Illyria, and settled its affairs at their discretion. They returned to Rome at the end of the season, and obtained a triumph; the last that was for some years enjoyed by any Roman officer: for already the falsehood of the Roman calculations was manifest; Saguntum, unaided by Rome, had been taken and destroyed; war with Carthage was no longer doubtful; and the seat of that war was likely to be no longer Spain, but Italy.

## CHAPTER XLIII.

### SECOND PUNIC WAR.

HANNIBAL. MARCH OF HANNIBAL FROM SPAIN TO ITALY. PASSAGE OF THE ALPS. BATTLES OF THE TREBIA, AND OF THRASYMENUS. Q. FABIUS MAXIMUS DICTATOR. BATTLE OF CANNÆ. A.U.C. 535 TO 538.

TWICE in history has there been witnessed the struggle of the highest individual genius against the resources and institutions of a great nation; and in both cases the nation has been victorious. For seventeen years Hannibal strove against Rome; for sixteen years Napoleon Buonaparte strove against England: the efforts of the first ended in Zama, those of the second in Waterloo.

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A.U.C. 535.  
A.C. 219.  
Second  
Punic war.

True it is, as Polybius has said, that Hannibal was supported by the zealous exertions of Carthage<sup>1</sup>; and the strength of the opposition to his policy has been very possibly exaggerated by the Roman writers. But the zeal of his country in the contest, as Polybius himself remarks in another place<sup>2</sup>, was itself the work of his family. Never did great men more show themselves the living spirit of a nation than Hamilcar, and Hasdrubal, and Hannibal, during a period of nearly fifty years, approved themselves to

Greatness of  
Hannibal.

<sup>1</sup> Polybius, III. 10.

<sup>2</sup> IX. 22.

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be to Carthage. It is not then merely through our ignorance of the internal state of Carthage, that Hannibal stands so prominent in all our conceptions of the second Punic war: he was really its moving and directing power; and the energy of his country was but a light reflected from his own. History therefore gathers itself into his single person: in that vast tempest, which from north and south, from the west and the east, broke upon Italy, we see nothing but Hannibal.

Greatness of Rome. The success of Rome has been for the good of mankind.

But if Hannibal's genius may be likened to the Homeric god, who in his hatred of the Trojans rises from the deep to rally the fainting Greeks, and to lead them against the enemy; so the calm courage with which Hector met his more than human adversary in his country's cause, is no unworthy image of the unyielding magnanimity displayed by the aristocracy of Rome. As Hannibal utterly eclipses Carthage, so on the contrary Fabius, Marcellus, Claudius Nero, even Scipio himself, are as nothing when compared to the spirit, and wisdom, and power of Rome. The senate which voted its thanks to its political enemy Varro, after his disastrous defeat, "because he had not despaired of the Commonwealth," and which disdained either to solicit, or to reprove, or to threaten, or in any way to notice the twelve colonies which had refused their accustomed supplies of men for the army, is far more to be honoured than the conqueror of Zama. This we should the more carefully bear in mind, because our tendency is to admire individual greatness far more than national; and as

no single Roman will bear comparison with Hannibal, we are apt to murmur at the event of the contest, and to think that the victory was awarded to the least worthy of the combatants. On the contrary, never was the wisdom of God's providence more manifest than in the issue of the struggle between Rome and Carthage. It was clearly for the good of mankind, that Hannibal should be conquered: his triumph would have stopped the progress of the world. For great men can only act permanently by forming great nations; and no one man, even though it were Hannibal himself, can in one generation effect such a work. But where the nation has been merely enkindled for a while by a great man's spirit, the light passes away with him who communicated it; and the nation, when he is gone, is like a dead body, to which magic power had for a moment given an unnatural life: when the charm has ceased, the body is cold and stiff as before. He who grieves over the battle of Zama, should carry on his thoughts to a period thirty years later, when Hannibal must, in the course of nature, have been dead, and consider how the isolated Phœnician city of Carthage was fitted to receive and to consolidate the civilization of Greece, or by its laws and institutions to bind together barbarians of every race and language into an organized empire, and prepare them for becoming, when that empire was dissolved, the free members of the commonwealth of Christian Europe.

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A.U.C. 535.  
A.C. 219.

Hannibal was twenty-six years of age when he was appointed commander-in-chief of the Carthaginian

Hannibal  
takes Sagun-  
tum.

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XLIII.  
A.U.C. 535.  
A.C. 219.

armies in Spain, upon the sudden death of Hasdrubal. Two years, we have seen, had been employed in expeditions against the native Spaniards; the third year was devoted to the siege of Saguntum. Hannibal's pretext for attacking it was, that the Saguntines had oppressed one of the Spanish tribes in alliance with Carthage<sup>3</sup>; but no caution in the Saguntine government could have avoided a quarrel, which their enemy was determined to provoke. Saguntum, although not a city of native Spaniards, resisted as obstinately as if the very air of Spain had breathed into foreign settlers on its soil the spirit so often, in many different ages, displayed by the Spanish people. Saguntum was defended like Numantia and Gerona: the siege lasted eight months; and when all hope was gone, several of the chiefs kindled a fire in the market-place, and after having thrown in their most precious effects, leapt into it themselves, and perished. Still the spoil found in the place was very considerable: there was a large treasure of money, which Hannibal kept for his war expenses; there were numerous captives, whom he distributed amongst his soldiers as their share of the plunder; and there was much costly furniture from the public and private buildings, which he sent home to decorate the temples and palaces of Carthage<sup>4</sup>.

Ambassadors sent to Carthage, who declare war.

It must have been towards the close of the year, but apparently before the consuls were returned

<sup>3</sup> Polybius, III. 15. Appian. Hispan. XI.

<sup>4</sup> Livy, XXI. 14. Polybius, III. 18.

from Illyria, that the news of the fall of Saguntum reached Rome. Immediately ambassadors were sent to Carthage; M. Fabius Buteo, who had been consul seven and twenty years before, C. Licinius Varus, and Q. Bæbius Tamphilus. Their orders were simply to demand that Hannibal and his principal officers should be given up for their attack upon the allies of Rome, in breach of the treaty, and, if this were refused, to declare war<sup>5</sup>. The Carthaginians tried to discuss the previous question, whether the attack on Saguntum was a breach of the treaty; but to this the Romans would not listen. At length M. Fabius gathered up his toga, as if he was wrapping up something in it, and holding it out thus folded together, he said, "Behold, here are peace and war; take which you choose!" The Carthaginian suffete or judge answered, "Give whichever thou wilt." Hereupon Fabius shook out the folds of his toga, saying, "Then here we give you war;" to which several members of the council shouted in answer, "With all our hearts we welcome it." Thus the Roman ambassadors left Carthage, and returned straight to Rome.

But before the result of this embassy could be known in Spain, Hannibal had been making preparations for his intended expedition, in a manner which showed, not only that he was sure of the support of his government, but that he was able to dispose at his pleasure of all the military resources of Carthage.

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Hannibal's  
preparations  
for war.

<sup>5</sup> Livy, XXI. 18. Polybius, III. 20. Zonaras, VIII. 22.



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A.C. 219.

At his suggestion fresh troops from Africa were sent over to Spain to secure it during his absence, and to be commanded by his own brother, Hasdrubal; and their place was to be supplied by other troops raised in Spain<sup>6</sup>; so that Africa was to be defended by Spaniards, and Spain by Africans, the soldiers of each nation, when quartered amongst foreigners, being cut off from all temptation or opportunity to revolt. So completely was he allowed to direct every military measure, that he is said to have sent Spanish and Numidian troops to garrison Carthage itself; in other words, this was a part of his general plan, and was adopted accordingly by the government. Meanwhile he had sent ambassadors into Gaul, and even across the Alps, to the Gauls who had so lately been at war with the Romans, both to obtain information as to the country through which his march lay, and to secure the assistance and guidance of the Gauls in his passage of the Alps, and their co-operation in arms when he should arrive in Italy. His Spanish troops he had dismissed to their several homes at the end of the last campaign, that they might carry their spoils with them, and tell of their exploits to their countrymen, and enjoy, during the winter, that almost listless ease which is the barbarian's relief from war and plunder. At length he received the news of the Roman embassy to Carthage, and the actual declaration of war; his officers also had returned from Cisalpine Gaul. "The

<sup>6</sup> Polybius, III. 33. Livy, XXI. 21.

natural difficulties of the passage of the Alps were great," they said, "but by no means insuperable; while the disposition of the Gauls was most friendly, and they were eagerly expecting his arrival<sup>7</sup>." Then Hannibal called his soldiers together, and told them openly that he was going to lead them into Italy. "The Romans," he said, "have demanded that I and my principal officers should be delivered up to them as malefactors. Soldiers, will you suffer such an indignity? The Gauls are holding out their arms to us, inviting us to come to them, and to assist them in revenging their manifold injuries. And the country which we shall invade, so rich in corn and wine and oil, so full of flocks and herds, so covered with flourishing cities, will be the richest prize that could be offered by the gods to reward your valour." One common shout from the soldiers assured him of their readiness to follow him. He thanked them, fixed the day on which they were to be ready to march, and then dismissed them.

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A.C. 218.

In this interval, and now on the very eve of commencing his appointed work, to which for eighteen years he had been solemnly devoted, and to which he had so long been looking forward with almost sickening hope, he left the head-quarters of his army to visit Gades, and there, in the temple of the supreme god of Tyre, and all the colonies of Tyre, to offer his prayers and vows for the success of his enterprise<sup>8</sup>. He was attended only by those immediately attached

Hannibal's  
sacrifice.

<sup>7</sup> Polybius, III. 34.

<sup>8</sup> Livy, XXI. 21. Compare Polybius, XXXIV. 9.

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to his person; and amongst these was a Sicilian Greek, Silenus, who followed him throughout his Italian expedition, and lived at his table. When the sacrifice was over, Hannibal returned to his army at New Carthage; and every thing being ready, and the season sufficiently advanced, for it was now late in May, he set out on his march for the Iberus.

His vision.

And here the fulness of his mind, and his strong sense of being the devoted instrument of his country's gods to destroy their enemies, haunted him by night as they possessed him by day. In his sleep, so he told Silenus, he fancied that the supreme god of his fathers had called him into the presence of all the gods of Carthage, who were sitting on their thrones in council. There he received a solemn charge to invade Italy; and one of the heavenly council went with him and with his army, to guide him on his way. He went on, and his divine guide commanded him, "See that thou look not behind thee." But after a while, impatient of the restraint, he turned to look back; and there he beheld a huge and monstrous form, thick set all over with serpents; wherever it moved, orchards and woods and houses fell crashing before it. He asked his guide in wonder, what that monster form was? The god answered, "Thou seest the desolation of Italy; go on thy way, straight forwards, and cast no look behind<sup>9</sup>." Thus, with no divided heart, and with an entire resignation of all personal and domestic enjoy-

<sup>9</sup> Cicero de Div. I. 24. Livy, I. 7. 1. Externa. Zonaras, VIII. XXIV. 22. Valerius Maximus, 22.

ments for ever, Hannibal went forth, at the age of twenty-seven<sup>10</sup>, to do the work of his country's gods, and to redeem his early vow.

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The consuls at Rome came into office at this period on the 15th of March: it was possible therefore for a consular army to arrive on the scene of action in time to dispute with Hannibal not only the passage of the Rhone, but that of the Pyrenees. But the Romans exaggerated the difficulties of his march, and seem to have expected that the resistance of the Spanish tribes between the Iberus and the Pyrenees, and of the Gauls between the Pyrenees and the Rhone, would so delay him that he would not reach the Rhone till the end of the season. They therefore made their preparations leisurely.

Miscalculations of the Romans.

Of the consuls for this year, the year of Rome 536, and 218 before the Christian æra, one was P. Cornelius Scipio, the son of L. Scipio, who had been consul in the sixth year of the first Punic war, and the grandson of L. Scipio Barbatus, whose services in the third Samnite war are recorded in his famous epitaph. The other was Ti. Sempronius Longus, probably, but not certainly, the son of that C. Sempronius Blæsus, who had been consul in the year 501. The consuls' provinces were to be Spain and Sicily; Scipio, with two Roman legions, and 15,600 of the Italian allies, and with a fleet of sixty quinqueremes, was to command in Spain; Sempronius, with a somewhat larger army, and a fleet of 160 quinque-

Their preparations for war.

<sup>10</sup> Nepos, Hannibal, c. 3.

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remes, was to cross over to Lilybæum, and from thence, if circumstances favoured, to make a descent on Africa. A third army, consisting also of two Roman legions, and 11,000 of the allies, was stationed in Cisalpine Gaul, under the prætor, L. Manlius Vulso<sup>11</sup>. The Romans suspected that the Gauls would rise in arms ere long; and they hastened to send out the colonists of two colonies, which had been resolved on before, but not actually founded, to occupy the important stations of Placentia and Cremona on the opposite banks of the Po. The colonists sent to each of these places were no fewer than six thousand; and they received notice to be at their colonies in thirty days. Three commissioners, one of them, C. Lutatius Catulus, being of consular rank, were sent out, as usual, to superintend the allotment of lands to the settlers; and these 12,000 men, together with the prætor's army, were supposed to be capable of keeping the Gauls quiet<sup>12</sup>.

Revolt of  
the Gauls.

It is a curious fact, that the danger on the side of Spain was considered to be so much the least urgent, that Scipio's army was raised the last, after those of his colleague and of the prætor L. Manlius<sup>13</sup>. Indeed Scipio was still at Rome, when tidings came that the Boians and Insubrians had revolted, had dispersed the new settlers at Placentia and Cremona, and driven them to take refuge at Mutina, had treacherously seized the three commissioners at a conference, and had defeated the prætor L. Manlius,

<sup>11</sup> Polybius, III. 40, 41.

<sup>12</sup> Polybius, III. 40.

<sup>13</sup> Livy, XXI. 26.

and obliged him also to take shelter in one of the towns of Cisalpine Gaul, where they were blockading him<sup>14</sup>. One of Scipio's legions, with five thousand of the allies, was immediately sent off into Gaul under another prætor, C. Atilius Serranus; and Scipio waited till his own army should again be completed by new levies. Thus he cannot have left Rome till late in the summer; and when he arrived with his fleet and army at the mouth of the eastern branch of the Rhone, he found that Hannibal had crossed the Pyrenees; but he still hoped to impede his passage of the river.

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Hannibal meanwhile, having set out from New Carthage with an army of 90,000 foot, and 12,000 horse, crossed the Iberus<sup>15</sup>; and from thenceforward the hostile operations of his march began. He might probably have marched through the country between the Iberus and the Pyrenees, had that been his sole object, as easily as he made his way from the Pyrenees to the Rhone; a few presents and civilities would easily have induced the Spanish chiefs to allow him a free passage. But some of the tribes northward of the Iberus were friendly to Rome: on the coast were the Greek cities of Rhoda and Emporiæ, Massaliot colonies, and thus attached to the Romans as the old allies of their mother city: if this part of Spain were left unconquered, the Romans would immediately make use of it as the base of their operations, and proceed from thence to attack the

Hannibal  
conquers the  
north of  
Spain.

<sup>14</sup> Polybius, III. 40.

<sup>15</sup> Polybius, III. 35. Livy, XXI. 23.



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whole Carthaginian dominion. Accordingly Hannibal employed his army in subduing the whole country, which he effected with no great loss of time, but at a heavy expense of men, as he was obliged to carry the enemy's strongholds by assault, rather than incur the delay of besieging them. He left Hanno with eleven thousand men to retain possession of the newly-conquered country; and he further diminished his army by sending home as many more of his Spanish soldiers, probably those who had most distinguished themselves, as an earnest to the rest, that they too, if they did their duty well, might expect a similar release, and might look forward to return ere long to their homes full of spoil and of glory. These detachments, together with the heavy loss sustained in the field, reduced the force with which Hannibal entered Gaul to no more than 50,000 foot, and 9000 horse<sup>16</sup>.

He marches  
to the  
Rhone.

From the Pyrenees to the Rhone his progress was easy. Here he had no wish to make regular conquests; and presents to the chiefs mostly succeeded in conciliating their friendship, so that he was allowed to pass freely. But on the left bank of the Rhone the influence of the Massaliots with the Gaulish tribes had disposed them to resist the invader; and the passage of the Rhone was not to be effected without a contest.

Scipio's  
movements.

Scipio by this time had landed his army near the eastern mouth of the Rhone; and his information

<sup>16</sup> Polybius, III. 35.

of Hannibal's movements was vague and imperfect. His men had suffered from sea sickness on their voyage from Pisa to the Rhone; and he wished to give them a short time to recover their strength and spirits, before he led them against the enemy. He still felt confident that Hannibal's advance from the Pyrenees must be slow, supposing that he would be obliged to fight his way; so that he never doubted that he should have ample time to oppose his passage of the Rhone. Meanwhile he sent out 300 horse, with some Gauls, who were in the service of the Massaliots, ordering them to ascend the left bank of the Rhone, and discover, if possible, the situation of the enemy. He seems to have been unwilling to place the river on his rear, and therefore never to have thought of conducting his operations on the right bank, or even of sending out reconnoitring parties in this direction <sup>17</sup>.

The resolution which Scipio formed a few days afterwards, of sending his army to Spain, when he himself returned to Italy, was deserving of such high praise, that we must hesitate to accuse him of over caution or needless delay at this critical moment. Yet he was sitting idle at the mouth of the Rhone, while the Gauls were vainly endeavouring to oppose Hannibal's passage of the river. We must understand that Hannibal kept his army as far away from the sea as possible in order to conceal his

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Hannibal's  
preparations  
for passing  
the Rhone.

<sup>17</sup> Polybius, II. 41. Livy, XXI. 26.

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movements from the Romans; therefore he came upon the Rhone, not on the line of the later Roman road from Spain to Italy, which crossed the river at Tarasco, between Avignon and Arles, but at a point much higher up, above its confluence with the Durance, and nearly half way, if we can trust Polybius' reckoning, from the sea to its confluence with the Isere<sup>18</sup>. Here he obtained from the natives on the right bank, by paying a fixed price, all their boats and vessels of every description with which they were accustomed to traffic down the river: they allowed him also to cut timber for the construction of others; and thus in two days he was provided with the means of transporting his army. But finding that the Gauls were assembled on the eastern bank to oppose his passage, he sent off a detachment of his army by night with native guides, to ascend the right bank, for about two and twenty miles, and there to cross as they could, where there was no enemy to stop them. The woods which then lined the river, supplied this detachment with the means of constructing barks and rafts enough for the passage; they took advantage of one of the many islands in this part of the Rhone, to cross where the stream was divided; and thus they all reached the left bank in safety. There they took up a strong position, probably one of those strange masses of rock which rise here and there with steep cliffy sides like islands out of the vast plain, and

<sup>18</sup> Polybius, III. 42.

rested for four and twenty hours after their exertions in the march and the passage of the river.

Hannibal allowed eight and forty hours to pass from the time when the detachment left his camp; and then, on the morning of the fifth day after his arrival on the Rhone, he made his preparations for the passage of his main army. The mighty stream of the river, fed by the snows of the high Alps, is swelled rather than diminished by the heats of summer; so that, although the season was that when the southern rivers are generally at their lowest, it was rolling the vast mass of its waters along with a startling fulness and rapidity. The heaviest vessels were therefore placed on the left, highest up the stream, to form something of a breakwater for the smaller craft crossing below; the small boats held the flower of the light armed foot, while the cavalry were in the larger vessels; most of the horses being towed astern swimming, and a single soldier holding three or four together by their bridles. Every thing was ready, and the Gauls on the opposite side had poured out of their camp, and lined the bank in scattered groups at the most accessible points, thinking that their task of stopping the enemy's landing would be easily accomplished. At length Hannibal's eye observed a column of smoke rising on the farther shore, above or on the right of the barbarians. This was the concerted signal which assured him of the arrival of his detachment; and he instantly ordered his men to embark, and to push across with all possible speed. They pulled

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The army  
crosses the  
river.

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vigorously against the rapid stream, cheering each other to the work; while behind them were their friends, cheering them also from the bank; and before them were the Gauls singing their war songs, and calling them to come on with tones and gestures of defiance. But on a sudden a mass of fire was seen on the rear of the barbarians; the Gauls on the bank looked behind, and began to turn away from the river; and presently the bright arms and white linen coats of the African and Spanish soldiers appeared above the bank, breaking in upon the disorderly line of the Gauls. Hannibal himself, who was with the party crossing the river, leaped on shore amongst the first, and forming his men as fast as they landed, led them instantly to the charge. But the Gauls, confused and bewildered, made little resistance; they fled in utter rout; whilst Hannibal, not losing a moment, sent back his vessels and boats for a fresh detachment of his army; and before night his whole force, with the exception of his elephants, was safely established on the eastern side of the Rhone<sup>19</sup>.

Arrival of  
emissaries  
from the  
Cisalpine  
Gauls.

As the river was no longer between him and the enemy, Hannibal early on the next morning sent out a party of Numidian cavalry to discover the position and numbers of Scipio's forces, and then called his army together, to see and hear the communications of some chiefs of the Cisalpine Gauls, who were just arrived from the other side of the

<sup>19</sup> Polybius, III. 42, 43.

Alps. Their words were explained to the Africans and Spaniards in the army by interpreters; but the very sight of the chiefs was itself an encouragement; for it told the soldiers that the communication with Cisalpine Gaul was not impracticable, and that the Gauls had undertaken so long a journey for the purpose of obtaining the aid of the Carthaginian army against their old enemies, the Romans. Besides, the interpreters explained to the soldiers that the chiefs undertook to guide them into Italy by a short and safe rout, on which they would be able to find provisions; and spoke strongly of the great extent and richness of Italy, when they did arrive there, and how zealously the Gauls would aid them. Hannibal then came forward himself and addressed his army: their work, he said, was more than half accomplished by the passage of the Rhone; their own eyes and ears had witnessed the zeal of their Gaulish allies in their cause; for the rest, their business was to do their duty, and obey his orders implicitly, leaving every thing else to him. The cheers and shouts of the soldiers again satisfied him how fully he might depend upon them; and he then addressed his prayers and vows to the gods of Carthage, imploring them to watch over the army, and to prosper its work to the end, as they had prospered its beginning. The soldiers were now dismissed, with orders to prepare for their march on the morrow<sup>20</sup>.

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<sup>20</sup> Polybius, III. 44.



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Scipio sends  
his army to  
Spain, and  
returns to  
Italy.

Scarcely was the assembly broken up, when some of the Numidians who had been sent out in the morning, were seen riding for their lives to the camp, manifestly in flight from a victorious enemy. Not half of the original party returned; for they had fallen in with Scipio's detachment of Roman and Gaulish horse, and after an obstinate conflict had been completely beaten. Presently after, the Roman horsemen appeared in pursuit; but when they observed the Carthaginian camp, they wheeled about and rode off, to carry back word to their general. Then at last Scipio put his army in motion, and ascended the left bank of the river to find and engage the enemy<sup>21</sup>. But when he arrived at the spot where his cavalry had seen the Carthaginian camp, he found it deserted, and was told that Hannibal had been gone three days, having marched northwards, ascending the left bank of the river. To follow him seemed desperate: it was plunging into a country wholly unknown to the Romans, where they had neither allies nor guides, nor resources of any kind; and where the natives, over and above the common jealousy felt by all barbarians toward a foreign army, were likely, as Gauls, to regard the Romans with peculiar hostility. But if Hannibal could not be followed now, he might easily be met on his first arrival in Italy; from the mouth of the Rhone to Pisa was the chord of a circle, while Hannibal was going to make a long circuit; and the Romans had

<sup>21</sup> Polybius, III. 45.

an army already in Cisalpine Gaul; while the enemy would reach the scene of action exhausted with the fatigues and privations of his march across the Alps. Accordingly Scipio descended the Rhone again, embarked his army, and sent it on to Spain under the command of his brother Cnæus Scipio, as his lieutenant; while he himself in his own ship sailed for Pisa, and immediately crossed the Apennines to take the command of the forces of the two prætors, Manlius and Atilius, who, as we have seen, had an army of about 25,000 men, over and above the colonists of Placentia and Cremona, still disposable in Cisalpine Gaul <sup>22</sup>.

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This resolution of Scipio to send his own army on to Spain, and to meet Hannibal with the army of the two prætors, appears to show that he possessed the highest qualities of a general, which involve the wisdom of a statesman no less than of a soldier. As a mere military question, his calculation, though baffled by the event, was sound: but if we view it in a higher light, the importance to the Romans of retaining their hold on Spain would have justified a far greater hazard; for if the Carthaginians were suffered to consolidate their dominion in Spain, and to avail themselves of its immense resources, not in money only, but in men, the hardiest and steadiest of barbarians, and, under the training of such generals as Hannibal and his brother, equal to the best soldiers in the world, the Romans would hardly have been able to maintain the contest. Had not

Wisdom of  
this resolu-  
tion.

<sup>22</sup> Polybius, III. 47.

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P. Scipio then dispatched his army to Spain at this critical moment, instead of carrying it home to Italy, his son in all probability would never have won the battle of Zama.

The ele-  
phants are  
carried over  
the Rhone.

Meanwhile Hannibal, on the day after the skirmish with Scipio's horse, had sent forward his infantry, keeping the cavalry to cover his operations, as he still expected the Romans to pursue him; while he himself waited to superintend the passage of the elephants. These were thirty-seven in number; and their dread of the water made their transport a very difficult operation. It was effected by fastening to the bank large rafts of 200 feet in length, covered carefully with earth: to the end of these, smaller rafts were attached, covered with earth in the same manner, and with towing lines extended to a number of the largest barks, which were to tow them over the stream. The elephants, two females leading the way, were brought upon the rafts by their drivers without difficulty; and as soon as they came upon the smaller rafts, these were cut loose at once from the larger, and towed out into the middle of the river. Some of the elephants in their terror leaped overboard, and drowned their drivers; but they themselves, it is said, held their huge trunks above water, and struggled to the shore; so that the whole thirty-seven were landed in safety<sup>23</sup>. Then Hannibal called in his cavalry, and covering his march with them

<sup>23</sup> Polybius, III. 46. Livy, XXI. 28.

and with the elephants, set forward up the left bank of the Rhone to overtake the infantry.

In four days they reached the spot where the Isere<sup>24</sup>, coming down from the main Alps, brings to the Rhone a stream hardly less full or mighty than his own. In the plains above the confluence two Gaulish brothers were contending which should be chief of their tribe; and the elder called in the stranger general to support his cause. Hannibal readily complied, established him firmly on the throne, and received important aid from him in return. He supplied the Carthaginian army plentifully with provisions, furnished them with new arms, gave them new clothing, especially shoes, which were found very useful in the subsequent march, and accompanied them to the first entrance on the mountain country, to secure them from attacks on the part of his countrymen.

The attentive reader, who is acquainted with the geography of the Alps and their neighbourhood, will perceive that this account of Hannibal's march is vague. It does not appear whether the Carthaginians ascended the left bank of the Isere, or the right bank; or whether they continued to ascend the Rhone for a time, and leaving it only so far as to avoid the great angle which it makes at Lyons, rejoined it again just before they entered the mountain country, a little to the left of the present road from Lyons to Chamberri. But these uncertainties

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Hannibal's  
march  
through  
Gaul.

Difficulty of  
determining  
his line of  
march.

<sup>24</sup> Polybius, III. 49.

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cannot now be removed, because Polybius neither possessed a sufficient knowledge of the bearings of the country, nor sufficient liveliness as a painter, to describe the line of the march so as to be clearly recognised. I believe however that Hannibal crossed the Isere, and continued to ascend the Rhone; and that afterwards, striking off to the right across the plains of Dauphiné, he reached what Polybius calls the first ascent of the Alps, at the northern extremity of that ridge of limestone mountains, which, rising abruptly from the plain to the height of 4000 or 5000 feet, and filling up the whole space between the Rhone at Belley and the Isere below Grenoble, first introduces the traveller coming from Lyons to the remarkable features of Alpine scenery.

Hannibal  
finds the  
mountain-  
eers ready to  
oppose him.

At the end of the lowland country, the Gaulish chief, who had accompanied Hannibal thus far, took leave of him: his influence probably did not extend to the Alpine valleys; and the mountaineers, far from respecting his safe conduct, might be in the habit of making plundering inroads on his own territory. Here then Hannibal was left to himself; and he found that the natives were prepared to beset his passage. They occupied all such points as commanded the road; which, as usual, was a sort of terrace cut in the mountain side, overhanging the valley whereby it penetrated to the central ridge. But as the mountain line is of no great breadth here, the natives guarded the defile only by day, and withdrew when night came

on to their own homes, in a town or village among the mountains, and lying in the valley behind them <sup>25</sup>. Hannibal, having learnt this from some of his Gaulish guides whom he sent among them, encamped in their sight just below the entrance of the defile; and as soon as it was dusk, he set out with a detachment of light troops, made his way through the pass, and occupied the positions which the barbarians, after their usual practice, had abandoned at the approach of night.

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Day dawned; the main army broke up from its camp, and began to enter the defile; while the natives, finding their positions occupied by the enemy, at first looked on quietly, and offered no disturbance to the march. But when they saw the long narrow line of the Carthaginian army winding along the steep mountain side, and the cavalry and baggage cattle struggling at every step with the difficulties of the road, the temptation to plunder was too strong to be resisted; and from many points of the mountain above the road they rushed down upon the Carthaginians. The confusion was terrible; for the road or track was so narrow, that the least crowd or disorder pushed the heavily loaded baggage cattle down the steep below; and the horses, wounded by the barbarians' missiles, and plunging about wildly in their pain and terror, increased the mischief. At last Hannibal was obliged to charge down from his position, which

He baffles  
them.

<sup>25</sup> Polybius, III. 50.



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commanded the whole scene of confusion, and to drive the barbarians off. This he effected: yet the conflict of so many men on the narrow road made the disorder worse for a time; and he unavoidably occasioned the destruction of many of his own men<sup>26</sup>. At last, the barbarians being quite beaten off, the army wound its way out of the defile in safety, and rested in the wide and rich valley which extends from the lake of Bourget, with scarcely a perceptible change of level, to the Isere at Montmeillan. Hannibal meanwhile attacked and stormed the town, which was the barbarians' principal stronghold; and here he not only recovered a great many of his own men, horses, and baggage cattle, but also found a large supply of corn and cattle belonging to the barbarians, which he immediately made use of for the consumption of his soldiers.

Difficulties  
of the  
march.

In the plain which he had now reached, he halted for a whole day, and then, resuming his march, proceeded for three days up the valley of the Isere on the right bank, without encountering any difficulty. Then the natives met him with branches of trees in their hands, and wreaths on their heads, in token of peace: they spoke fairly, offered hostages, and wished, they said, neither to do the Carthaginians any injury, nor to receive any from them. Hannibal mistrusted them, yet did not wish to offend them; he accepted their terms, received their hostages, and obtained large supplies of cattle;

<sup>26</sup> Polybius, III. 51.

and their whole behaviour seemed so trustworthy, that at last he accepted their guidance, it is said, through a difficult part of the country, which he was now approaching<sup>27</sup>. For all the Alpine valleys become narrower, as they draw nearer to the central chain; and the mountains often come so close to the stream, that the roads in old times were often obliged to leave the valley and ascend the hills by any accessible point, to descend again when the gorge became wider, and follow the stream as before. If this is not done, and the track is carried nearer the river, it passes often through defiles of the most formidable character, being no more than a narrow ledge above a furious torrent, with cliffs rising above it absolutely precipitous, and coming down on the other side of the torrent abruptly to the water, leaving no passage by which man or even goat could make its way.

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It appears that the barbarians persuaded Hannibal to pass through one of these defiles, instead of going round it; and while his army was involved in it, they suddenly, and without a provocation, as we are told, attacked him. Making their way along the mountain sides above the defile, they rolled down masses of rock on the Carthaginians below, or even threw stones upon them from their hands, stones and rocks being equally fatal against an enemy so entangled. It was well for Hannibal, that, still doubting the barbarians' faith, he had sent forward

Attacks of  
the moun-  
taineers.

<sup>27</sup> Polybius, III. 52.

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his cavalry and baggage, and covered the march with his infantry, who thus had to sustain the brunt of the attack. Foot soldiers on such ground were able to move, where horses would be quite helpless; and thus at last Hannibal, with his infantry, forced his way to the summit of one of the bare cliffs overhanging the defile, and remained there during the night, whilst the cavalry and baggage slowly struggled out of the defile<sup>28</sup>. Thus again baffled, the barbarians made no more general attacks on the army; some partial annoyance was occasioned at intervals; and some baggage was carried off; but it was observed, that wherever the elephants were, the line of march was secure; for the barbarians beheld those huge creatures with terror, having never had the slightest knowledge of them, and not daring to approach when they saw them.

Hannibal reaches the summit of the Alps.

Without any farther recorded difficulty, the army on the ninth day after they had left the plains of Dauphiné arrived at the summit of the central ridge of the Alps. Here there is always a plain of some extent, immediately overhung by the snowy summits of the high mountains, but itself in summer presenting in many parts a carpet of the freshest grass, with the chalets of the shepherds scattered over it, and gay with a thousand flowers. But far different is its aspect through the greatest part of the year: then it is one unvaried waste of snow;

<sup>28</sup> Polybius, III. 53.

and the little lakes, which on many of the passes enliven the summer landscape, are now frozen over, and covered with snow, so as to be no longer distinguishable. Hannibal was on the summit of the Alps about the end of October: the first winter snows had already fallen; but two hundred years before the Christian æra, when all Germany was one vast forest, the climate of the Alps was far colder than at present, and the snow lay on the passes all through the year. Thus the soldiers were in dreary quarters: they remained two days on the summit, resting from their fatigues, and giving opportunity to many of the stragglers, and of the horses and cattle, to rejoin them by following their track; but they were cold and worn and disheartened; and mountains still rose before them, through which, as they knew too well, even their descent might be perilous and painful.

But their great general, who felt that he now stood victorious on the ramparts of Italy, and that the torrent which rolled before him was carrying its waters to the rich plains of Cisalpine Gaul, endeavoured to kindle his soldiers with his own spirit of hope. He called them together; he pointed out the valley beneath, to which the descent seemed the work of a moment: "That valley," he said, "is Italy; it leads us to the country of our friends the Gauls; and yonder is our way to Rome." His eyes were eagerly fixed on that point of the horizon; and as he gazed, the distance between seemed to vanish, till he could almost fancy that

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Looks down  
upon Italy.

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Descent.

he was crossing the Tiber, and assailing the capitol <sup>29</sup>.

After the two days' rest the descent began. Hannibal experienced no more open hostility from the barbarians, only some petty attempts here and there to plunder; a fact strange in itself, but doubly so, if he was really descending the valley of the Doria Baltea, through the country of the Salassians, the most untamable robbers of all the Alpine barbarians. It is possible that the influence of the Insubrians may partly have restrained the mountaineers; and partly also they may have been deterred by the ill success of all former attacks, and may by this time have regarded the strange army and its monstrous beasts with something of superstitious terror. But the natural difficulties of the ground on the descent were greater than ever. The snow covered the track so that the men often lost it, and fell down the steep below: at last they came to a place where an avalanche had carried it away altogether for about three hundred yards, leaving the mountain side a mere wreck of scattered rocks and snow. To go round was impossible; for the depth of the snow on the heights above rendered it hopeless to scale them; nothing therefore was left but to repair the road. A summit of some extent was found, and cleared of the snow; and here the army were obliged to encamp, whilst the work went on. There was no want of hands; and every man

<sup>29</sup> Polybius, III. 54. Livy, XXI. 35.

was labouring for his life: the road therefore was restored, and supported with solid substructions below; and in a single day it was made practicable for the cavalry and baggage cattle, which were immediately sent forward, and reached the lower valley in safety, where they were turned out to pasture. A harder labour was required to make a passage for the elephants: the way for them must be wide and solid; and the work could not be accomplished in less than three days. The poor animals suffered severely in the interval from hunger; for no forage was to be found in that wilderness of snow, nor any trees whose leaves might supply the place of other herbage. At last they too were able to proceed with safety<sup>30</sup>: Hannibal overtook his cavalry and baggage; and in three days more the whole army had got clear of the Alpine valleys, and entered the country of their friends, the Insubrians, on the wide plain of northern Italy.

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Hannibal was arrived in Italy, but with a force so weakened by its losses in men and horses, and by the exhausted state of the survivors, that he might seem to have accomplished his great march in vain. According to his own statement, which there is no reason to doubt, he brought out of the Alpine valleys no more than 12,000 African and 8000 Spanish infantry, with 6000 cavalry<sup>31</sup>; so that his march from the Pyrenees to the plains of northern Italy must have cost him 33,000 men; an enormous loss, which

Arrival in  
Italy.  
Losses on  
the march.

<sup>30</sup> Polybius, III. 54, 55.

<sup>31</sup> Polybius, III. 56.



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proves how severely the army must have suffered from the privations of the march and the severity of the Alpine climate; for not half of these 33,000 men can have fallen in battle. With his army in this condition, some period of repose was absolutely necessary: accordingly, Hannibal remained in the country of the Insubrians, till rest, and a more temperate climate, and wholesome food, with which the Gauls plentifully supplied him, restored the bodies and spirits of his soldiers, and made them again ready for action<sup>32</sup>. His first movement was against the Taurinians, a Ligurian people, who were constant enemies of the Insubrians, and therefore would not listen to Hannibal, when he invited them to join his cause. He therefore attacked and stormed their principal town, put the garrison to the sword, and struck such terror into the neighbouring tribes, that they submitted immediately, and became his allies. This was his first accession of strength in Italy, the first fruits, as he hoped, of a long succession of defections among the allies of Rome, so that the swords of the Italians might effect for him the conquest of Italy.

Scipio  
marches to  
meet him.

Meanwhile Scipio had landed at Pisa, had crossed the Apennines, and taken the command of the prætors' army, sending the prætors themselves back to Rome, had crossed the Po at Placentia, and was ascending its left bank, being anxious to advance with all possible haste, in order to hinder

<sup>32</sup> Polybius, III. 60.

a general rising of the Gauls by his presence<sup>33</sup>. Hannibal, for the opposite reason, was equally anxious to meet him, being well aware that the Gauls were only restrained from revolting to the Carthaginians by fear, and that on his first success in the field they would hasten to join him<sup>34</sup>. He therefore descended the left bank of the Po, keeping the river on his right; and Scipio having thrown a bridge over the Ticinus, had entered what are now the Sardinian dominions, and was still advancing westward, with the Po on his left, although, as the river here makes a bend to the southward, he was no longer in its immediate neighbourhood<sup>35</sup>.

Each general was aware that his enemy was at hand; and both pushed forward with their cavalry and light troops in advance of their main armies, to reconnoitre each other's position and numbers. Thus was brought on accidentally the first action between Hannibal and the Romans in Italy, which, with some exaggeration, has been called the battle of the Ticinus<sup>36</sup>. The Numidians in Hannibal's army, being now properly supported by heavy cavalry, were able to follow their own manner of fighting, and, falling on the flanks and rear of the Romans, who were already engaged in front with Hannibal's heavy horsemen, took ample vengeance for their defeat on the Rhone. The Romans were routed; and the consul himself was severely wounded, and owed his life, it is

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Engagement  
on the  
Ticinus.

<sup>33</sup> Polybius, III. 56.

<sup>34</sup> Polybius, III. 60.

<sup>35</sup> Polybius, III. 64.

<sup>36</sup> Polybius, III. 65.

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said, to the courage and fidelity of a Ligurian slave <sup>37</sup>. With their cavalry thus crippled, it was impossible to act in such an open country; the Romans therefore hastily retreated, recrossed the Ticinus, and broke down the bridge, yet with so much hurry and confusion, that 600 men were left on the right bank, and fell into the enemy's hands; and then, crossing the Po also, established themselves under the walls of their colony Placentia.

Hannibal's  
advance.

Hannibal, finding the bridge over the Ticinus destroyed, reascended the left bank of the Po till he found a convenient point to cross, and then, having constructed a bridge with the river boats, carried over his army in safety. Immediately, as he had expected, the Gauls on the right bank received him with open arms; and again descending the river, he arrived on the second day after his passage in sight of the Roman army, and on the following day offered them battle. But as the Romans did not move, he chose out a spot for his camp, and posted his army five or six miles from the enemy, and apparently on the east of Placentia, cutting off their direct communication with Ariminum and Rome <sup>38</sup>.

Campaign  
in Sicily.  
Sempronius  
joins Scipio.

On the first news of Hannibal's arrival in Italy, the senate had sent orders to the other consul, Ti. Sempronius, to return immediately to reinforce his colleague <sup>39</sup>. No event of importance had marked the first summer of the war in Sicily. Hannibal's spirit so animated the Carthaginian government, that

<sup>37</sup> Polybius, III. 66. Livy, XXI. 46.

<sup>38</sup> Polybius, III. 66.  
<sup>39</sup> Polybius, III. 61.

they were every where preparing to act on the offensive; and before the arrival of Sempronius, M. Æmilius, the prætor, had already had to fight a naval action with the enemy, in order to defend Lilybæum<sup>40</sup>. He had defeated them, and prevented their landing, but the Carthaginian fleets still kept the sea; and whilst Sempronius was employing his whole force in the conquest of the island of Melita, the enemy were cruising on the northern side of Sicily, and making descents on the coast of Italy. On his return to Lilybæum he was going in pursuit of them, when he received orders to return home and join his colleague. He accordingly left part of his fleet with the prætor in Sicily, and part he committed to Sex. Pomponius, his lieutenant, for the protection of the coasts of Lucania and Campania; while, from a dread of the dangers and delays of the winter navigation of the Adriatic, his army was to march from Lilybæum to Messina, and after crossing the strait to go by land through the whole length of Italy, the soldiers being bound by oath to appear on a certain day at Ariminum. They completed their long march, it is said, in forty days; and from Ariminum they hastened to the scene of action, and effected their junction with the army of Scipio<sup>41</sup>.

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Sempronius found his colleague no longer in his original position, close by Placentia and the Po, but withdrawn to the first hills which bound the great plain on the south, and leave an interval here of

Position of  
the Roman  
army.

<sup>40</sup> Livy, XXI. 49, 50.

<sup>41</sup> Polybius, III. 61. 68. Livy, XXI. 51.

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about six miles between themselves and the river<sup>42</sup>. But Hannibal's army lying, as it seems, to the eastward, the Roman consul retreated westward, and leaving Placentia to its own resources, crossed to the left bank of the Trebia, and there lay encamped, just where the stream issues from the last hills of the Apennines. It appears that the Romans had several magazines on the right bank of the Po above Placentia, on which the consul probably depended for his subsistence; and these posts, together with the presence of his army, kept the Gauls on the immediate bank of the river quiet, so that they gave Hannibal no assistance. When the Romans fell back behind the Trebia, Hannibal followed them, and encamped about five miles off from them, directly between them and Placentia<sup>43</sup>. But his powerful cavalry kept his communications open in every direction; and the Gauls who lived out of the immediate control of the Roman army and garrisons, supplied him with provisions abundantly.

Hannibal's  
policy.

It is not explained by any existing writer how Sempronius was able to effect his junction with his colleague without any opposition from Hannibal. The regular road from Ariminum to Placentia passes through a country unvaried by a single hill; and the approach of a large army should have been announced to Hannibal by his Numidian cavalry, soon enough to allow him to interrupt it. But so much in war

<sup>42</sup> Polybius, III. 67.

<sup>43</sup> Polybius, III. 68.

depends upon trifling accidents, that it is vain to guess where we are without information. We only know that the two consular armies were united in Scipio's position on the left bank of the Trebia; that their united forces amounted to 40,000 men; and that Hannibal, with an army so reinforced by the Gauls since his arrival in Italy, that it was little inferior to the enemy's <sup>44</sup>, was so far from fearing to engage either consul singly, that he wished for nothing so much as to bring on a decisive battle with the combined armies of both. Depending on the support of the Gauls for his subsistence, he must not be too long a burden to them: they had hoped to be led to live on the plunder of the enemy's country, not to maintain him at the expense of their own. In order to force the Romans to a battle, he began to attack their magazines. Clastidium, now Casteggio, a small town on the right bank of the Po, nearly opposite to the mouth of the Ticinus, was betrayed into his hands by the governor; and he here found large supplies of corn <sup>45</sup>.

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On the other hand, Sempronius, having no fears for the event of a battle, was longing for the glory of a triumph over such an enemy as Hannibal <sup>46</sup>; and as Scipio was still disabled by his wound, he had the command of the whole Roman army. Besides, the Gauls who lived in the plain between the Trebia and Placentia, not knowing which side to espouse, had

Sempronius  
commands  
the Roman  
army, and  
is anxious  
to engage.

<sup>44</sup> Polybius, III. 72. Livy,  
XXI. 52.

<sup>45</sup> Polybius, III. 69.  
<sup>46</sup> Polybius, III. 70.



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been plundered by Hannibal's cavalry, and besought the consuls to protect them. This was no time, Sempronius thought, to neglect any ally who still remained faithful to Rome: he sent out his cavalry and light troops over the Trebia to drive off the plunderers; and in such skirmishes he obtained some partial success, which made him the more disposed to risk a general battle <sup>47</sup>.

His rash-  
 ness.

For this, as a Roman officer, and before Hannibal's military talents were fully known, he ought not to be harshly judged; but his manner of engaging was rash, and unworthy of an able general. He allowed the attacks of Hannibal's light cavalry to tempt him to follow them to their own field of battle. Early in the morning the Numidians crossed the river, and skirmished close up to the Roman camp: the consul first sent out his cavalry, and then his light infantry, to repel them <sup>48</sup>; and when they gave way and recrossed the river, he led his regular infantry out of his camp, and gave orders for the whole army to advance over the Trebia and attack the enemy.

Commence-  
 ment of the  
 battle on the  
 Trebia.

It was mid-winter, and the wide pebbly bed of the Trebia, which the summer traveller may almost pass dry-shod, was now filled with a rapid stream running breast-high. In the night it had rained or snowed heavily; and the morning was raw and chilly, threatening sleet or snow <sup>49</sup>. Yet Sempronius led his soldiers through the river, before they had eaten any

<sup>47</sup> Polybius, III. 69.

<sup>49</sup> Polybius, III. 72.

<sup>48</sup> Polybius, III. 71.

thing; and wet, cold, and hungry as they were, he formed them in order of battle on the plain. Meanwhile Hannibal's men had eaten their breakfast in their tents, and had oiled their bodies, and put on their armour around their fires. Then, when the enemy had crossed the Trebia, and were advancing in the open plain, the Carthaginians marched out to meet them; and about a mile in front of their camp they formed in order of battle. Their disposition was simple: the heavy infantry, Gauls, Spaniards, and Africans, to the number of 20,000, were drawn up in a single line: the cavalry, 10,000 strong, was, with the elephants, on the two wings; the light infantry and Balearian slingers were in the front of the whole army. This was all Hannibal's visible force. But near the Trebia, and now left in their rear by the advancing Roman legions, were lying close hid in the deep and overgrown bed of a small watercourse, two thousand picked soldiers, horse and foot, commanded by Hannibal's younger brother Mago, whom he had posted there during the night, and whose ambush the Romans passed with no suspicion. Arrived on the field of battle, the legions were formed in their usual order, with the allied infantry on the wings; and their weak cavalry of 4000 men, ill able to contend with the numerous horsemen of Hannibal, were on the flanks of the whole line.

The Roman velites, or light infantry, who had been in action since daybreak, and had already shot away half their darts and arrows, were soon driven

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Defeat of  
the Roman  
light in-  
fantry and  
cavalry.

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back upon the hastati and principes, and passed through the intervals of the maniples to the rear. With no less ease were the cavalry beaten on both wings, by Hannibal's horse and elephants. But when the heavy infantry, superior in numbers and better armed both for offence and defence, closed with the enemy, the confidence of Sempronius seemed to be justified: and the Romans, numbed and exhausted as they were, yet, by their excellence in all soldierly qualities, maintained the fight with equal advantage<sup>50</sup>.

Rout of the  
whole army.

On a sudden a loud alarm was heard; and Mago, with his chosen band, broke out from his ambush, and assaulted them furiously in the rear. Meantime both wings of the Roman infantry were broken down by the elephants, and overwhelmed by the missiles of the light infantry, till they were utterly routed, and fled towards the Trebia. The legions in the centre, finding themselves assailed on the rear, pushed desperately forwards, forced their way through the enemy's line, and marched off the field straight to Placentia. Many of the routed cavalry made off in the same direction, and so escaped. But those who fled towards the river were slaughtered unceasingly by the conquerors till they reached it; and the loss here was enormous. The Carthaginians however stopped their pursuit on the brink of the Trebia: the cold was piercing, and to the elephants so intolerable that they almost all perished; even of the men

<sup>50</sup> Polybius, III. 73.

and horses many were lost, so that the wreck of the Roman army reached their camp in safety; and when night came on, Scipio again led them across the river, and, passing unnoticed by the camp of the enemy, took refuge with his colleague within the walls of Placentia <sup>51</sup>.

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So ended Hannibal's first campaign in Italy. The Romans, after their defeat, despaired of maintaining their ground on the Po; and the two consular armies retreated in opposite directions, Scipio's upon Ariminum, and that of Sempronius across the Apennines into Etruria. Hannibal remained master of Cisalpine Gaul; but the season did not allow him to besiege Placentia and Cremona; and the temper of the Gauls rendered it evident that he must not make their country the seat of war in another campaign. Already they bore the burden of supporting his army so impatiently, that he made an attempt, in the dead of the winter, to cross the Apennines into Etruria, and was only driven back by the extreme severity of the weather, the wind sweeping with such fury over the ridges, and through the passes of the mountains, that neither men nor beasts could stand against it <sup>52</sup>. He was forced therefore to winter in Gaul; but the innate fickleness and treachery of the people led him to suspect that attempts would be made against his life, and that a Gaulish assassin might hope to purchase forgiveness from the Romans for his country's revolt, by destroying the general who had seduced them.

Hannibal  
winters in  
Gaul.

<sup>51</sup> Polybius, III. 74.

<sup>52</sup> Livy, XXI. 58.

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He therefore put on a variety of disguises to baffle such designs; he wore false hair, appearing sometimes as a man of mature years, and sometimes with the grey hairs of old age<sup>53</sup>; and if he had that taste for humour which great men are seldom without, and which some anecdotes of him imply, he must have been often amused by the mistakes thus occasioned, and have derived entertainment from that which policy or necessity had dictated.

Flaminius is  
chosen consul,  
and takes the  
command.

We should be glad to catch a distinct view of the state of Rome, when the news first arrived of the battle of the Trebia. Since the disaster of Caudium, more than a hundred years before, there had been known no defeat of two consular armies united; and the surprise and vexation must have been great. Sempronius, it is said, returned to Rome to hold the comitia; and the people resolved to elect as consul a man who, however unwelcome to the aristocracy, had already distinguished himself by brilliant victories in the very country which was now the seat of war. They accordingly chose C. Flaminius for the second time consul; and with him was elected Cn. Servilius Geminus, a man of an old patrician family, and personally attached to the aristocratical party, but unknown to us before his present consulship. Flaminius' election was most unpalatable to the aristocracy; and as numerous prodigies were reported, and the Sibylline books consulted, and it was certain that various rites would be ordered to propitiate

<sup>53</sup> Polybius, III. 78.

the favour of the gods<sup>54</sup>, he had some reason to suspect that his election would again be declared null and void, and he himself thus deprived of his command. He was anxious therefore to leave Rome as soon as possible: as his colleague was detained by the religious ceremonies, and by the care of superintending the new levies, Flaminius, it is said, left the city before the 15th of March, when his consulship was to begin, and actually entered upon his office at Ariminum, whither he had gone to superintend the formation of magazines, and to examine the state of the army<sup>55</sup>. But the aristocracy thought it was no time to press party animosities; they made no attempt to disturb Flaminius' election; and he appears to have had his province assigned him without opposition, and to have been appointed to command Sempronius' army in Etruria, while Servilius succeeded Scipio at Ariminum. The levies of soldiers went on vigorously; two legions were employed in Spain; one was sent to Sicily, another to Sardinia, and another to Tarentum; and four legions, more or less thinned by the defeat at the Trebia, still formed the nucleus of two armies in Ariminum and in Etruria. It appears that four new legions were levied, with an unusually large proportion of soldiers from the Italian allies and the Latin name; and these being divided between the two consuls, the armies opposed to Hannibal on either line, by which he might ad-

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<sup>54</sup> Livy, XXI. 62.

<sup>55</sup> Livy, XXI. 63.



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vance, must have been in point of numbers exceedingly formidable. Servilius, as we have seen, had his head-quarters at Ariminum; and Scipio, whom he superseded, sailed as proconsul into Spain, to take the command of his original army there. Flaminius succeeded to Sempronius in Etruria, and lay encamped, it is said, in the neighbourhood of Arretium <sup>56</sup>.

Hannibal  
enters  
Etruria.

Thus the main Roman armies lay nearly in the same positions which they had held eight years before, to oppose the expected invasion of the Gauls. But as the Gauls then broke into Etruria unperceived by either Roman army, so the Romans were again surprised by Hannibal on a line where they had not expected him. He crossed the Apennines, not by the ordinary road to Lucca, descending the valley of the Macra, but, as it appears, by a straighter line down the valley of the Anser or Serchio; and leaving Lucca on his right, he proceeded to struggle through the low and flooded country which lay between the right bank of the Arno and the Apennines below Florence, and of which the marsh or lake of Fucecchio still remains a specimen. Here again the sufferings of the army were extreme; but they were rewarded when they reached the firm ground below Fæsulæ, and were let loose upon the plunder of the rich valley of the upper Arno <sup>57</sup>.

Advances  
toward  
Perugia.

Flaminius lay quiet at Arretium, and did not attempt to give battle, but sent messengers to his

<sup>56</sup> Livy, XXII. 2.

<sup>57</sup> Polybius, III. 78, 79.

colleague, to inform him of the enemy's appearance in Etruria. Hannibal was now on the south of the Apennines, and in the heart of Italy; but the experience of the Samnites and of Pyrrhus had shown that the Etruscans were scarcely more to be relied on than the Gauls; and it was in the south, in Samnium and Lucania and Apulia, that the only materials existed for organizing a new Italian war against Rome. Accordingly Hannibal advanced rapidly into Etruria, and finding that Flaminius still did not move, passed by Arretium, leaving the Roman army in his rear, and marching, as it seemed, to gain the great plain of central Italy, which reaches from Perugia to Spoleto, and was traversed by the great road from Ariminum to Rome.

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The consul Flaminius now at last broke up from his position, and followed the enemy. Hannibal laid waste the country on every side with fire and sword, to provoke the Romans to a hasty battle; and leaving Cortona on his left untouched on its mountain seat, he approached the lake of Trasymenus, and followed the road along its north-eastern shore, till it ascended the hills which divide the lake from the basin of the Tiber<sup>58</sup>. Flaminius was fully convinced that Hannibal's object was not to fight a battle, but to lay waste the richest part of Italy: had he wished to engage, why had he not attacked him when he lay at Arretium, and while his colleague was far away at Ariminum? With this

Flaminius  
follows him.

<sup>58</sup> Polybius, III. 82. Livy, XXII. 3.

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impression he pressed on his rear closely, never dreaming that the lion would turn from the pursuit of his defenceless prey, to spring on the shepherds who were dogging his steps behind.

Difficulty of  
marking out  
the field of  
battle.

The modern road along the lake, after passing the village of Passignano, runs for some way close to the water's edge on the right, hemmed in on the left by a line of cliffs, which make it an absolute defile. Then it turns from the lake and ascends the hills; yet, although they form something of a curve, there is nothing to deserve the name of a valley; and the road, after leaving the lake, begins to ascend almost immediately, so that there is a very short distance during which the hills on the right and left command it. The ground therefore does not well correspond with the description of Polybius, who states that the valley in which the Romans were caught, was not the narrow interval between the hills and the lake, but a valley beyond this defile, and running down to the lake, so that the Romans when engaged in it had the water not on their right flank, but on their rear<sup>59</sup>. Livy's account is different, and represents the Romans as caught in the defile beyond Passignano, between the cliff and the lake. It is possible that, if the exact line of the ancient road could be discovered, it might assist in solving the difficulty: in the meantime the battle of Thrasymenus must be one of the many events in ancient military history, where the accounts of historians, differing either

<sup>59</sup> III. 83.

with each other or with the actual appearances of the ground, are to us inexplicable.

The consul had encamped in the evening on the side of the lake, just within the present Roman frontier, and on the Tuscan side of Passignano: he had made a forced march, and had arrived at his position so late that he could not examine the ground before him<sup>60</sup>. Early the next morning he set forward again; the morning mist hung thickly over the lake and the low grounds, leaving the heights, as is often the case, quite clear. Flaminius, anxious to overtake his enemy, rejoiced in the friendly veil which thus concealed his advance, and hoped to fall upon Hannibal's army while it was still in marching order, and its columns encumbered with the plunder of the valley of the Arno. He passed through the defile of Passignano, and found no enemy: this confirmed him in his belief that Hannibal did not mean to fight. Already the Numidian cavalry were on the edge of the basin of the Tiber: unless he could overtake them speedily, they would have reached the plain; and Africans, Spaniards, and Gauls, would be rioting in the devastation of the garden of Italy. So the consul rejoiced as the heads of his columns emerged from the defile, and, turning to the left, began to ascend the hills, where he hoped at least to find the rear guard of the enemy.

At this moment the stillness of the mist was broken by barbarian war-cries on every side; and

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Flaminius  
advances to  
attack Han-  
nibal.

Destruction  
of the main  
body of the  
Romans.

<sup>60</sup> Polybius, III. 83, 84.

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both flanks of the Roman column were assailed at once. Their right was overwhelmed by a storm of javelins and arrows, shot as if from the midst of darkness, and striking into the soldier's unguarded side, where he had no shield to cover him; while ponderous stones, against which no shield or helmet could avail, came crashing down upon their heads. On the left were heard the trampling of horse, and the well known war-cries of the Gauls; and presently Hannibal's dreaded cavalry emerged from the mist, and were in an instant in the midst of their ranks; and the huge forms of the Gauls and their vast broad swords broke in upon them at the same moment. The head of the Roman column, which was already ascending to the higher ground, found its advance also barred; for here was the enemy whom they had so longed to overtake; here were some of the Spanish and African foot of Hannibal's army drawn up to wait their assault. The Romans instantly attacked these troops, and cut their way through; these must be the covering parties, they thought, of Hannibal's main battle; and, eager to bring the contest to a decisive issue, they pushed forward up the heights, not doubting that on the summit they should find the whole force of the enemy. And now they were on the top of the ridge, and to their astonishment no enemy was there; but the mist drew up, and, as they looked behind, they saw too plainly where Hannibal was: the whole valley was one scene of carnage, while on the sides of the hills above were the masses of the

Spanish and African foot witnessing the destruction of the Roman army, which had scarcely cost them a single stroke.

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The advanced troops of the Roman column had thus escaped the slaughter; but being too few to retrieve the day, they continued their advance, which was now become a flight, and took refuge in one of the neighbouring villages. Meantime, while the centre of the army was cut to pieces in the valley, the rear was still winding through the defile beyond, between the cliffs and the lake. But they too were attacked from the heights above by the Gauls, and forced in confusion into the water. Some of the soldiers in desperation struck out into the deep water swimming, and weighed down by their armour presently sank: others ran in as far as was within their depth, and there stood helplessly, till the enemy's cavalry dashed in after them. Then they lifted up their hands, and cried for quarter: but on this day of sacrifice, the gods of Carthage were not to be defrauded of a single victim; and the horsemen pitilessly fulfilled Hannibal's vow.

Of the rear  
guard.

Thus, with the exception of the advanced troops of the Roman column, who were about 6000 men, the rest of the army was utterly destroyed. The consul himself had not seen the wreck consummated. On finding himself surrounded, he had vainly endeavoured to form his men amidst the confusion, and to offer some regular resistance: when this was hopeless, he continued to do his duty as a brave soldier, till one of the Gaulish horsemen, who is said to have

Death of  
Flaminius.



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known him by sight from his former consulship, rode up and ran him through the body with his lance, crying out, "So perish the man who slaughtered our brethren, and robbed us of the lands of our fathers <sup>61</sup>." In these last words we probably rather read the unquenchable hatred of the Roman aristocracy to the author of an agrarian law, than the genuine language of the Gaul. Flaminius died bravely, sword in hand, having committed no greater military error than many an impetuous soldier, whose death in his country's cause has been felt to throw a veil over his rashness, and whose memory is pitied and honoured. The party feelings which have so coloured the language of the ancient writers respecting him, need not be shared by a modern historian: Flaminius was indeed an unequal antagonist to Hannibal; but in his previous life, as consul and as censor, he had served his country well; and if the defile of Thrasymenus witnessed his rashness, it also contains his honourable grave.

Capture of  
the advanced  
guard.  
Conduct of  
Hannibal to  
the prisoners.

The battle must have been ended before noon; and Hannibal's indefatigable cavalry, after having destroyed the centre and rear of the Roman army, hastened to pursue the troops who had broken off from the front, and had for the present escaped the general overthrow. They were supported by the light-armed foot and the Spaniards, and finding the Romans in the village to which they had retreated, proceeded to invest it on every side. The

<sup>61</sup> Livy, XXII. 6.

Romans, cut off from all relief, and with no provisions, surrendered to Maharbal, who commanded the party sent against them. They were brought to Hannibal: with the other prisoners taken in the battle, the whole number amounted to 15,000. The general addressed them by an interpreter; he told the soldiers who had surrendered to Maharbal, that their lives, if he pleased, were still forfeited, for Maharbal had no authority to grant terms without his consent: then he proceeded, with the vehemence often displayed by Napoleon in similar circumstances, to inveigh against the Roman government and people, and concluded by giving all his Roman prisoners to the custody of the several divisions of his army. Then he turned to the Italian allies: they were not his enemies, he said; on the contrary, he had invaded Italy to aid them in casting off the yoke of Rome; he should still deal with them as he had treated his Italian prisoners taken at the Trebia; they were free from that moment, and without ransom<sup>62</sup>. This being done, he halted for a short time to rest his army, and buried with great solemnity thirty of the most distinguished of those who had fallen on his own side in the battle. His whole loss had amounted only to 1500 men, of whom the greater part were Gauls. It is said also that he caused careful search, but in vain, to be made for the body of the consul, Flaminius, being anxious to give him honourable burial<sup>63</sup>. So he acted afterwards to

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<sup>62</sup> Polybius, III. 85.

<sup>63</sup> Livy, XXII. 7. Compare Valerius Maximus, V. 1. Ext. 6.

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L. Æmilius and to Marcellus ; and these humanities are worthy of notice, as if he had wished to show that, though his vow bound him to unrelenting enmity towards the Romans while living, it was a pleasure to him to feel that he might honour them when dead.

He ravages  
Umbria.

The army of Hannibal now broke up from the scene of its victory, and leaving Perugia unassailed, crossed the infant stream of the Tiber, and entered upon the plains of Umbria. Here Maharbal, with the cavalry and light troops, obtained another victory over a party of some thousand men, commanded by C. Centenius, and killed, took prisoners, or dispersed the whole body<sup>64</sup>. Then that rich plain, extending from the Tiber under Perugia to Spoleto at the foot of the Monte Somma, was laid waste by the Carthaginians without mercy. The white oxen of the Clitumnus, so often offered in sacrifice to the gods of Rome by her triumphant generals, were now the spoil of the enemy, and were slaughtered on the altars of the gods of Carthage, amidst prayers for the destruction of Rome. The left bank of the Tiber again heard the Gaulish war-cry ; and the terrified inhabitants fled to the mountains or into the fortified cities from this unwonted storm of barbarian invasion. The figures and arms of the Gauls, however formidable, might be familiar to many of the Umbrians ; but they gazed in wonder on the slingers from the Balearian islands, on the hardy Spanish foot, con-

<sup>64</sup> Polybius, III. 86.

spicuous by their white linen coats bordered with scarlet <sup>65</sup>; on the regular African infantry, who had not yet exchanged their long lances and small shields for the long shield and stabbing sword of the Roman soldier; on the heavy cavalry, so numerous, and mounted on horses so superior to those of Italy; above all, on the bands of wild Numidians, who rode without saddle or bridle, as if the rider and his horse were one creature, and who scoured over the country with a speed and impetuosity defying escape or resistance. Amidst such a scene the colonists of Spoletum deserved well of their country, for shutting their gates boldly, and not yielding to the general panic; and when the Numidian horsemen reined up their horses, and turned away from its well-manned walls, the colonists, with an excusable boasting, might claim the glory of having repulsed Hannibal <sup>66</sup>.

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But Hannibal's way lay not over the Monte Somma, although its steep pass, rising immediately behind Spoletum, was the last natural obstacle between him and Rome. Beyond that pass the country was full, not of Roman colonies merely, but of Roman citizens: he would soon have entered on the territory of the thirty-five Roman tribes, where every man whom he would have met was his enemy. His eyes were fixed elsewhere: the south was entirely open to him; the way to Apulia and Samnium was cleared of every impediment. He crossed the

He marches  
into Apulia.

<sup>65</sup> Polybius, III. 114. Livy, XXII. 46.

<sup>66</sup> Livy, XXII. 9.

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Apennines in the direction of Ancona, and invaded Picenum: he then followed the coast of the Adriatic, through the country of the Marrucinians and Frentanians, till he arrived in the northern part of Apulia, in the country called by the Greeks Daunia<sup>67</sup>. He advanced slowly and leisurely, encamping after short marches, and spreading devastation far and wide: the plunder of slaves, cattle, corn, wine, oil, and valuable property of every description, was almost more than the army could carry or drive along. The soldiers, who after their exhausting march from Spain over the Alps, had ever since been in active service, or in wretched quarters, and who from cold and the want of oil for anointing the skin had suffered severely from scorbutic disorders, were now revelling in plenty in a land of corn and olives and vines, where all good things were in such abundance that the very horses of the army, so said report, were bathed in old wines to improve their condition<sup>68</sup>. Meanwhile, wherever the army passed, all Romans or Latins, of an age to bear arms, were by Hannibal's express orders put to the sword<sup>69</sup>. Many an occupier of domain land, many a farmer of the taxes, or of those multiplied branches of revenue which the Roman government possessed all over Italy, collectors of customs and port duties, surveyors and farmers of the forests, farmers of the mountain pastures, farmers of the salt on the sea coast, and of the mines in the mountains, were cut off by the vengeance of the

<sup>67</sup> Polybius, III. 86. Livy, XXII. 9.

<sup>68</sup> Polybius, III. 87, 88.

<sup>69</sup> Polybius, III. 86.

Carthaginians; and Rome, having lost thousands of her poorer citizens in battle, and now losing hundreds of the richer classes in this exterminating march, lay bleeding at every pore.

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But her spirit was invincible. When the tidings of the disaster of Thrasymenus reached the city, the people crowded to the Forum, and called upon the magistrates to tell them the whole truth<sup>70</sup>. The prætor peregrinus, M. Pomponius Matho, ascended the rostra, and said to the assembled multitude, "We have been beaten in a great battle; our army is destroyed; and C. Flaminius, the consul, is killed." Our colder temperaments scarcely enable us to conceive the effect of such tidings on the lively feelings of the people of the south, or to image to ourselves the cries, the tears, the hands uplifted in prayer, or clenched in rage, the confused sounds of ten thousand voices, giving utterance with breathless rapidity to their feelings of eager interest, of terror, of grief, or of fury. All the northern gates of the city were beset with crowds of wives and mothers, imploring every fresh fugitive from the fatal field for some tidings of those most dear to them. The prætors, M. Æmilius and M. Pomponius, kept the senate sitting for several days from sunrise to sunset, without adjournment, in earnest consultation on the alarming state of their country.

State of  
Rome on  
hearing the  
news of the  
battle.

Peace was not thought of for a moment: nor was it proposed to withdraw a single soldier from Spain,

FabiusMax-  
imus is ap-  
pointed  
dictator.

<sup>70</sup> Polybius, III. 85. Livy, XXII. 7.



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or Sicily, or Sardinia; but it was resolved that a dictator ought to be appointed, to secure unity of command. There had been no dictatorship for actual service since that of A. Atilius Calatinus, two-and-thirty years before, in the disastrous consulship of P. Claudius Pulcher and L. Junius Pullus. But it is probable that some jealousy was entertained of the senate's choice, if, in the absence of the consul Cn. Servilius, the appointment, according to ancient usage, had rested with them: nor was it thought safe to leave the dictator to nominate his master of the horse. Hence an unusual course was adopted: the centuries in their comitia elected both the one and the other, choosing one from each of the two parties in the state; the dictator, Q. Fabius Maximus, from one of the noblest, but at the same time the most moderate families of the aristocracy, and himself a man of a nature no less gentle than wise; the master of the horse, M. Minucius Rufus, as representing the popular party<sup>71</sup>.

Measures to  
propitiate  
the gods.

Religion in the mind of Q. Fabius was not a mere instrument for party purposes: although he may have had little belief in its truth, he was convinced of its excellence, and that a reverence for the gods was an essential element in the character of a nation, without which it must assuredly degenerate. Therefore, on the very day that he entered on his office, he summoned the senate, and dwelling on the importance of propitiating the gods, moved that

<sup>71</sup> Polybius, III. 87. Livy, XXII. 8.

the sibylline books should forthwith be consulted <sup>72</sup>. They directed among other things, that the Roman people should vow to the gods, what was called “a holy spring,” that is to say, that every animal fit for sacrifice born in the spring of that year, between the first day of March and the thirtieth of April, and reared on any mountain or plain or river bank or upland pasture throughout Italy, should be offered to Jupiter <sup>73</sup>. Extraordinary games were also vowed to be celebrated in the Circus Maximus; prayers were put up at all the temples; new temples were vowed to be built; and for three days those solemn sacrifices were performed, in which the images of the gods were taken down from their temples, and laid on couches richly covered, with tables full of meat and wine set before them, in the sight of all the people, as if the gods could not but bless the city where they had deigned to receive hospitality.

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Then the dictator turned his attention to the state of the war. A long campaign was in prospect; for it was still so early in the season that the prætors had not yet gone out to their provinces; and Hannibal was already in the heart of Italy. All measures were taken for the defence of the country; even the walls and towers of Rome were ordered to be made good against an attack. Bridges were to be broken down; the inhabitants of open towns were to withdraw into places of security; and in the expected line of Hannibal’s march, the country was

Plan of Fabius for the campaign.

<sup>72</sup> Livy, XXII. 9.

<sup>73</sup> Livy, XXII. 10.

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to be laid waste before him, the corn destroyed, and the houses burnt<sup>74</sup>. This would probably be done effectually in the Roman territory; but the allies were not likely to make such extreme sacrifices: and this of itself was a reason why Hannibal did not advance directly upon Rome.

Roman  
levies.

More than thirty thousand men, in killed and prisoners, had been lost to the Romans in the late battle. The consul Cn. Servilius commanded above thirty thousand in Cisalpine Gaul; and he was now retreating in all haste, after having heard of the total defeat of his colleague. Two new legions were raised, besides a large force out of the city tribes, which was employed partly for the defence of Rome itself, and partly, as it consisted largely of the poorer citizens, for the service of the fleet. This last indeed was become a matter of urgent necessity: for the Carthaginian fleet was already on the Italian coast, and had taken a whole convoy of corn-ships, off Cosa, in Etruria, carrying supplies to the army in Spain; while the Roman ships, both in Sicily and at Ostia, had not yet been launched after the winter<sup>75</sup>. Now all the ships at Ostia and in the Tiber were sent to sea in haste, and the consul Cn. Servilius commanded them; whilst the dictator and master of the horse, having added the two newly raised legions to the consul's army, proceeded through Campania and Samnium into Apulia, and, with an army greatly superior in numbers, encamped at the distance of about five or six miles from Hannibal<sup>76</sup>.

<sup>74</sup> Livy, XXII. 11.    <sup>75</sup> Livy, XXII. 11.    <sup>76</sup> Polybius, III. 88.

Besides the advantage of numbers, the Romans had that of being regularly and abundantly supplied with provisions. They had no occasion to scatter their forces in order to obtain subsistence; but keeping their army together, and exposing no weak point to fortune, they followed Hannibal at a certain distance, watched their opportunity to cut off his detached parties, and above all, by remaining in the field with so imposing an army, overawed the allies, and checked their disposition to revolt<sup>77</sup>. Thus Hannibal, finding that the Apulians did not join him, recrossed the Apennines, and moved through the country of the Hirpinians into that of the Caudinian Samnites. But Beneventum, once a great Samnite city, was now a Latin colony; and its gates were close shut against the invader. Hannibal laid waste its territory with fire and sword, then moved onwards under the south side of the Matese, and took possession of Telesia, the native city of C. Pontius, but now a decayed and defenceless town: thence descending the Calor to its junction with the Vulturnus, and ascending the Vulturnus till he found it easily fordable, he finally crossed it near Allifæ, and passing over the hills behind Calatia, descended by Cales into the midst of the Falernian plain, the glory of Campania<sup>78</sup>.

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Hannibal  
ravages  
Samnium  
and enters  
Campania.

Fabius steadily followed him, not descending into the plain, but keeping his army on the hills above it, and watching all his movements. Again the Numi-

Fabius  
follows him.

<sup>77</sup> Polybius, III. 90.

<sup>78</sup> Polybius, III. 90. Livy, XXII. 13.

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dian cavalry were seen scouring the country on every side; and the smoke of burning houses marked their track. The soldiers in the Roman army beheld the sight with the greatest impatience: they were burning for battle, and the master of the horse himself shared and encouraged the general feeling. But Fabius was firm in his resolution; he sent parties to secure even the pass of Tarracina, lest Hannibal should attempt to advance by the Appian road upon Rome; he garrisoned Casilinum on the enemy's rear; the Vulturnus from Casilinum to the sea barred all retreat southwards; the colony of Cales stopped the outlet from the plain by the Latin road; while from Cales to Casilinum the hills formed an unbroken barrier, steep and wooded, the few paths over which were already secured by Roman soldiers<sup>79</sup>. Thus Fabius thought that Hannibal was caught as in a pitfall; that his escape was cut off, while his army, having soon wasted its plunder, could not possibly winter where it was, without magazines, and without a single town in its possession. For himself, he had all the resources of Campania and Samnium on his rear; while on his right the Latin road, secured by the colonies of Cales, Casinum, and Fregellæ, kept his communications with Rome open.

Hannibal's  
artifice to  
escape the  
Roman  
army.

Hannibal on his part had no thought of wintering where he was; but he had carefully husbanded his plunder, that it might supply his winter consump-

<sup>79</sup> Livy, XXII. 15.

tion, so that it was important to him to carry it off in safety. He had taken many thousand cattle; and his army besides was encumbered with its numerous prisoners, over and above the corn, wine, oil, and other articles, which had been furnished by the ravage of one of the richest districts in Italy. Finding that the passes in the hills between Cales and the Vulturnus were occupied by the enemy, he began to consider how he could surprise or force his passage without abandoning any of his plunder. He first thought of his numerous prisoners; and dreading lest in a night march they should either escape or overpower their guards and join their countrymen in attacking him, he commanded them all, to the number it is said of 5000 men, to be put to the sword. Then he ordered 2000 of the stoutest oxen to be selected from the plundered cattle, and pieces of split pine wood, or dry vine wood, to be fastened to their horns. About two hours before midnight the drovers began to drive them straight to the hills, having first set on fire the bundles of wood about their heads; while the light infantry following them till they began to run wild, then made their own way to the hills, scouring the points just above the pass occupied by the enemy. Hannibal then commenced his march; his African infantry led the way, followed by the cavalry; then came all the baggage; and the rear was covered by the Spaniards and Gauls. In this order he followed the road in the defile, by which he was to get out into the upper

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CHAP. XLIII. valley of the Volturnus, above Casilinum and the  
 A.U.C. 537. enemy's army<sup>80</sup>.  
 A.C. 217.  
 Its success.

He found the way quite clear; for the Romans who had guarded it, seeing the hills above them illuminated on a sudden with a multitude of moving lights, and nothing doubting that Hannibal's army was attempting to break out over the hills in despair of forcing the road, quitted their position in haste, and ran towards the heights to interrupt or embarrass his retreat. Meanwhile Fabius, with his main army, confounded at the strangeness of the sight, and dreading lest Hannibal was tempting him to his ruin as he had tempted Flaminius, kept close within his camp till the morning. Day dawned only to show him his own troops, who had been set to occupy the defile, engaged on the hills above with Hannibal's light infantry. But presently the Spanish foot were seen scaling the heights to reinforce the enemy; and the Romans were driven down to the plain with great loss and confusion; while the Spaniards and the light troops, having thoroughly done their work, disappeared behind the hills, and followed their main army<sup>81</sup>. Thus completely successful, and leaving his shamed and baffled enemy behind him, Hannibal no longer thought of returning to Apulia by the most direct road, but resolved to extend his devastations still farther before the season ended. He mounted the valley of the

<sup>80</sup> Polybius, III. 93. Livy, XXII. 16, 17.

<sup>81</sup> Polybius, III. 94. Livy, XXII. 18.

Vulturnus towards Venafrum, marched from thence into Samnium, crossed the Apennines, and descended into the rich Pelignian plain by Sulmo, which yielded him an ample harvest of plunder; and thence retracing his steps into Samnium, he finally returned to the neighbourhood of his old quarters in Apulia.

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The summer was far advanced; Hannibal had overrun the greater part of Italy: the meadows of the Clitumnus and the Vulturnus, and the forest glades of the high Apennines, had alike seen their cattle driven away by the invading army; the Falerian plain and the plain of Sulmo had alike yielded their tribute of wine and oil; but not a single city had as yet opened its gates to the conqueror, not a single state of Samnium had welcomed him as its champion, under whom it might revenge its old wrongs against Rome. Every where the aristocratical party had maintained its ascendancy, and had repressed all mention of revolt from Rome. Hannibal's great experiment therefore had hitherto failed. He knew that his single army could not conquer Italy: as easily might King William's Dutch guards have conquered England: and six months had brought Hannibal no fairer prospect of aid within the country itself, than the first week after his landing in Torbay brought to King William. But among Hannibal's greatest qualities was the patience with which he knew how to abide his time; if one campaign had failed of its main object, another must be tried; if the fidelity of the Roman allies had been un-

His plan for  
the winter.

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shaken by the disaster of Thrasymenus, it must be tried by a defeat yet more fatal. Meantime he would take undisputed possession of the best winter quarters in Italy; his men would be plentifully fed; his invaluable cavalry would have forage in abundance; and this at no cost to Carthage, but wholly at the expense of the enemy. The point which he fixed upon to winter at, was the very edge of the Apulian plain, where it joins the mountains: on one side was a boundless expanse of corn, intermixed with open grass land, burnt up in summer, but in winter fresh and green; whilst on the other side were the wide pastures of the mountain forests, where his numerous cattle might be turned out till the first snows of autumn fell. These were as yet far distant; for the corn in the plain, although ripe, was still standing; and the rich harvests of Apulia were to be gathered this year by unwonted reapers.

He takes  
Geronium.

Descending from Samnium, Hannibal accordingly appeared before the little town of Geronium, which was situated somewhat more than twenty miles north-west of the Latin colony of Luceria, in the immediate neighbourhood of Larinum<sup>82</sup>. The town, refusing to surrender, was taken, and the inhabitants put to the sword; but the houses and walls were left standing, to serve as a great magazine for the army; and the soldiers were quartered in a regularly fortified camp without the town. Here Hannibal

<sup>82</sup> Polybius, III. 100. Livy, XXII. 23.

posted himself; and, keeping a third part of his men under arms to guard the camp and to cover his foragers, he sent out the other two-thirds to gather in all the corn of the surrounding country, or to pasture his cattle on the adjoining mountains. In this manner the storehouses of Geronium were in a short time filled with corn.

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Meanwhile the public mind at Rome was strongly excited against the dictator. He seemed like a man, who, having played a cautious game, at last makes a false move, and is beaten; his slow, defensive system, unwelcome in itself, seemed rendered contemptible by Hannibal's triumphant escape from the Falernian plain. But here too Fabius showed a patience worthy of all honour. Vexed as he must have been at his failure in Campania, he still felt sure that his system was wise; and again he followed Hannibal into Apulia, and encamped as before on the high grounds in his neighbourhood. Certain religious offices called him at this time to Rome; but he charged Minucius to observe his system strictly, and on no account to risk a battle <sup>83</sup>.

Unpopularity of  
Fabius.

The master of the horse conducted his operations wisely: he advanced his camp to a projecting ridge of hills, immediately above the plain, and sending out his cavalry and light troops to cut off Hannibal's foragers, obliged the enemy to increase his covering force, and to restrict the range of his harvesting. On one occasion he cut off a great

Minucius  
adopts a  
bolder  
system.

<sup>83</sup> Polybius, III. 94. Livy, XXII. 18.

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number of the foragers, and even advanced to attack Hannibal's camp, which, owing to the necessity of detaching so many men all over the country, was left with a very inferior force to defend it. The return of some of the foraging parties obliged the Romans to retreat; but Minucius was greatly elated, and sent home very encouraging reports of his success <sup>84</sup>.

His authority is made equal to the dictator's.

The feeling against Fabius could no longer be restrained. Minucius had known how to manage his system more ably than he had done himself; such merit at such a crisis deserved to be rewarded; nor was it fit that the popular party should continue to be deprived of its share in the conduct of the war. Even among his own party Fabius was not universally popular: he had magnified himself and his system somewhat offensively, and had spoken too harshly of the blunders of former generals. Thus it does not appear, that the aristocracy offered any strong resistance to a bill brought forward by the tribune M. Metilius, for giving the master of the horse power equal to the dictator's. The bill was strongly supported by C. Terentius Varro, who had been prætor in the preceding year, and was easily carried <sup>85</sup>.

He is routed, and Fabius saves him.

The dictator and master of the horse now divided the army between them, and encamped apart, at more than a mile's distance from each other. Their want of co-operation was thus notorious; and Han-

<sup>84</sup> Polybius, III. 101, 102. Livy, XXII. 24.

<sup>85</sup> Polybius, III. 103. Livy, XXII. 25, 26.

nibal was not slow to profit by it. He succeeded in tempting Minucius to an engagement on his own ground; and having concealed about 5000 men in some ravines and hollows close by, he called them forth in the midst of the action to fall on the enemy's rear. The rout of the Trebia was well nigh repeated; but Fabius was near enough to come up in time to the rescue; and his fresh legions checked the pursuit of the conquerors, and enabled the broken Romans to rally. Still the loss already sustained was severe; and it was manifest that Fabius had saved his colleague from total destruction. Minucius acknowledged this generously: he instantly gave up his equal and separate command, and placed himself and his army under the dictator's orders<sup>86</sup>. The rest of the season passed quietly; and the dictator and master of the horse resigning their offices as usual at the end of six months, the army during the winter was put under the command of the consuls; Cn. Servilius having brought home and laid up the fleet, which he had commanded during the summer, and M. Atilius Regulus having been elected to fill the place of Flaminius.

Meanwhile the elections for the following year were approaching; and it was evident that they would be marked by severe party struggles. The mass of the Roman people were impatient of the continuance of the war in Italy; not only the poorer citizens, whom it obliged to constant military service

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State of  
feeling at  
Rome.

<sup>86</sup> Polybius, III. 104, 105. Livy, XXI. 28, 29. Plutarch, Fabius, 13.



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through the winter, and with no prospect of plunder, but still more perhaps the monied classes, whose occupation as farmers of the revenue was so greatly curtailed by Hannibal's army. Again, the occupiers of domain lands in remote parts of Italy could get no returns from their property; the wealthy graziers, who fed their cattle on the domain pastures, saw their stock carried off to furnish winter provisions for the enemy. Besides, if Hannibal were allowed to be unassailable in the field, the allies sooner or later must be expected to join him; they would not sacrifice everything for Rome, if Rome could neither protect them nor herself. The excellence of the Roman infantry was undisputed: if with equal numbers they could not conquer Hannibal's veterans, let their numbers be increased, and they must overwhelm him. These were no doubt the feelings of many of the nobility themselves, as well as of the majority of the people; but they were embittered by party animosity: the aristocracy, it was said, seemed bent on throwing reproach on all generals of the popular party, as if none but themselves were fit to conduct the war; Minucius himself had yielded to this spirit by submitting to be commanded by Fabius, when the law had made him his equal: one consul at least must be chosen, who would act firmly for himself and for the people; and such a man, to whose merits the bitter hatred of the aristocratical party bore the best testimony, was to be found in C. Terentius Varro <sup>87</sup>.

<sup>87</sup> Livy, XXII. 34.

Varro, his enemies said, was a butcher's son; nay, it was added that he had himself been a butcher's boy<sup>88</sup>, and had only been enabled by the fortune which his father had left him to throw aside his ignoble calling, and to aspire to public offices. So Cromwell was called a brewer: but Varro had been successively elected quæstor, plebeian and curule ædile, and prætor, while we are not told that he was ever tribune; and it is without example in Roman history, that a mere demagogue, of no family, with no other merits, civil or military, should be raised to such nobility. Varro was eloquent, it is true; but eloquence alone would scarcely have so recommended him; and if in his prætorship, as is probable, he had been one of the two home prætors, he must have possessed a competent knowledge of law. Besides, even after his defeat at Cannæ, he was employed for several years in various important offices, civil and military; which would never have been the case had he been the mere factious braggart that historians have painted him. The aristocracy tried in vain to prevent his election: he was not only returned consul, but he was returned alone, no other candidate obtaining a sufficient number of votes to entitle him to the suffrage of a tribe<sup>89</sup>. Thus he held the comitia for the election of his colleague; and considering the great influence exercised by the magistrate so presiding, it is creditable to him, and to the temper of the people generally, that the other

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Election of  
the new  
consuls:  
Varro and  
Æmilius  
Paullus.

<sup>88</sup> Valerius Maximus, III. 4. 4.

<sup>89</sup> Livy, XXII. 35.

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consul chosen was L. Æmilius Paullus, who was not only a known partisan of the aristocracy, but having been consul three years before, had been brought to trial for an alleged misappropriation of the plunder taken in the Illyrian war, and, although acquitted, was one of the most unpopular men in Rome. Yet he was known to be a good soldier; and the people, having obtained the election of Varro, did not object to gratify the aristocracy by accepting the candidate of their choice.

New præ-  
tors.

No less moderate and impartial was the temper shown in the elections of prætors. Two of the four were decidedly of the aristocratical party, M. Marcellus and L. Postumius Albinus; the other two were also men of consular rank, and no way known as opponents of the nobility, P. Furius Philus and M. Pomponius Matho. The two latter were to have the home prætorships; Marcellus was to command the fleet, and take charge of the southern coast of Italy; L. Postumius was to watch the frontier of Cisalpine Gaul.

Position of  
the armies.

The winter and spring passed without any military events of importance. Servilius and Regulus retained their command as proconsuls for some time after their successors had come into office; but nothing beyond occasional skirmishes took place between them and the enemy. Hannibal was at Geronium, maintaining his army on the supplies which he had so carefully collected in the preceding campaign: the consuls apparently were posted a little to the southward, receiving their supplies from the

country about Canusium, and immediately from a large magazine, which they had established at the small town of Cannæ, near the Aufidus<sup>90</sup>.

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Never was Hannibal's genius more displayed than during this long period of inactivity. More than half of his army consisted of Gauls, of all barbarians the most impatient and uncertain in their humour, whose fidelity, it was said, could only be secured by an ever open hand; no man was their friend any longer than he could gorge them with pay or plunder. Those of his soldiers who were not Gauls, were either Spaniards or Africans; the Spaniards were the newly conquered subjects of Carthage, strangers to her race and language, and accustomed to divide their lives between actual battle and the most listless bodily indolence; so that, when one of their tribes first saw the habits of a Roman camp, and observed the centurions walking up and down before the prætorium for exercise, the Spaniards thought them mad, and ran up to guide them to their tents, thinking that he who was not fighting could do nothing but lie at his ease and enjoy himself<sup>91</sup>. Even the Africans were foreigners to Carthage: they were subjects harshly governed, and had been engaged within the last twenty years in a war of extermination with their masters. Yet the long inactivity of winter quarters, trying to the discipline of the best national armies, was borne patiently by Hannibal's soldiers: there was neither desertion nor mutiny

Wisdom  
shown by  
Hannibal  
during the  
winter.

<sup>90</sup> Polybius, III. 107.

<sup>91</sup> Strabo, p. 164.

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amongst them; even the fickleness of the Gauls seemed spell-bound; they remained steadily in their camp in Apulia, neither going home to their own country, nor over to the enemy. On the contrary, it seems that fresh bands of Gauls must have joined the Carthaginian army after the battle of Thrasymenus, and the retreat of the Roman army from Ariminum. For the Gauls and the Spaniards and the Africans were overpowered by the ascendancy of Hannibal's character: under his guidance they felt themselves invincible: with such a general the yoke of Carthage might seem to the Africans and Spaniards the natural dominion of superior beings; in such a champion the Gauls beheld the appointed instrument of their country's gods to lead them once more to assault the capitol.

Silanus.

Silanus, the Greek historian, was living with Hannibal daily<sup>92</sup>; and though not entrusted with his military and political secrets, he must have seen and known him as a man; he must have been familiar with his habits of life, and must have heard his conversation in those unrestrained moments when the lightest words of great men display the character of their minds so strikingly. His work is lost to us; but had it been worthy of his opportunities, anecdotes from it must have been quoted by other writers, and we should know what Hannibal was. Then too the generals who were his daily companions would be something more to us than names:

<sup>92</sup> Nepos, Hannib. c. XIII.

we should know Maharbal, the best cavalry officer of the finest cavalry service in the world; and Hasdrubal, who managed the commissariat of the army for so many years in an enemy's country; and Hannibal's young brother, Mago, so full of youthful spirit and enterprise, who commanded the ambush at the battle of the Trebia. We might learn something too of that Hannibal, surnamed the Fighter, who was the general's counsellor, ever prompting him, it was said, to deeds of savage cruelty<sup>93</sup>, but whose counsels Hannibal would not have listened to, had they been merely cruel, had they not breathed a spirit of deep devotion to the cause of Carthage, and of deadly hatred to Rome, such as possessed the heart of Hannibal himself. But Silanus saw and heard without heeding or recording; and on the tent and camp of Hannibal there hangs a veil, which the fancy of the poet may penetrate; but the historian turns away in deep disappointment; for to him it yields neither sight nor sound.

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Spring was come, and well nigh departing; and in the warm plains of Apulia the corn was ripening fast, while Hannibal's winter supplies were now nearly exhausted. He broke up from his camp before Geronium, descended into the Apulian plains, and whilst the Roman army was still in its winter position, he threw himself on its rear, and surprised its great magazine at Cannæ<sup>94</sup>. The citadel of Cannæ was a fortress of some strength; this accordingly

Opening of  
the cam-  
paign; Han-  
nibal takes  
Cannæ.

<sup>93</sup> Polybius, IX. 24, 5.

<sup>94</sup> Polybius, III. 107.



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he occupied, and placed himself, on the very eve of harvest, between the Roman army and its expected resources, while he secured to himself all the corn of southern Apulia. It was only in such low and warm situations that the corn was nearly ready; the higher country, in the immediate neighbourhood of Apulia, is cold and backward; and the Romans were under the necessity of receiving their supplies from a great distance, or else of retreating, or of offering battle. Under these circumstances the proconsuls sent to Rome, to ask what they were to do.

The Roman  
army.

The turning point of this question lay in the disposition of the allies. We cannot doubt that Hannibal had been busy during the winter in sounding their feelings; and now it appeared that, if Italy was to be ravaged by the enemy for a second summer without resistance, their patience would endure no longer. The Roman government therefore resolved to risk a battle; but they sent orders to the proconsuls to wait till the consuls should join them with their newly raised army; for, a battle being resolved upon, the senate hoped to secure success by an overwhelming superiority of numbers. We do not exactly know the proportion of the new levies to the old soldiers; but when the two consuls arrived on the scene of action, and took the supreme command of the whole army, there were no fewer than eight Roman legions under their orders, with an equal force of allies; so that the army opposed to Hannibal must have amounted to 90,000 men<sup>95</sup>. It was

<sup>95</sup> Polybius, III. 107.

evident that so great a multitude could not long be fed at a distance from its resources; and thus a speedy engagement was inevitable.

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But the details of the movements by which the two armies were brought in presence of each other on the banks of the Aufidus, are not easy to discover. It appears that the Romans, till the arrival of the new consuls, had not ventured to follow Hannibal closely; for when they did follow him, it took them two days' march to arrive in his neighbourhood, where they encamped at about six miles distance from him<sup>96</sup>. They found him on the left bank of the Aufidus, about eight or nine miles from the sea, and busied probably in collecting the corn from the early district on the coast, the season being about the middle of June. The country here was so level and open, that the consul L. Æmilius was unwilling to approach the enemy more closely, but wished to take a position on the hilly ground farther from the sea, and to bring on the action there<sup>97</sup>. But Varro, impatient for battle, and having the supreme command of the whole army alternately with Æmilius every other day, decided the question irrevocably on the very next day, by interposing himself between the enemy and the sea, with his left resting on the Aufidus, and his right communicating with the town of Salapia.

Varro resolves to bring on a battle.

From this position Æmilius, when he again took the command in chief, found it impossible to with-

Æmilius crosses the Aufidus.

<sup>96</sup> Polybius, III. 110.

<sup>97</sup> Polybius, III. 110.

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draw. But availing himself of his great superiority in numbers, he threw a part of his army across the river, and posted them in a separate camp on the right bank, to have the supplies of the country south of the Aufidus at command, and to restrain the enemy's parties who might attempt to forage in that direction. When Hannibal saw the Romans in this situation, he also advanced nearer to them, descending the left bank of the Aufidus, and encamped over against the main army of the enemy, with his right resting on the river.

Preparatory  
manœuvres  
and skir-  
mishes.

The next day, which, according to the Roman calendar, was the last of the month *Quinctilis*, or *July*, the Roman reckoning being six or seven weeks in advance of the true season, Hannibal was making his preparations for battle, and did not stir from his camp; so that *Varro*, whose command it was, could not bring on an action. But on the first of *Sextilis*, or *August*, Hannibal being now quite ready, drew out his army in front of his camp and offered battle. *Æmilius* however remained quiet, resolved not to fight on such ground, and hoping that Hannibal would soon be obliged to fall back nearer the hills, when he found that he could no longer forage freely in the country near the sea<sup>98</sup>. Hannibal, seeing that the enemy did not move, marched back his infantry into his camp, but sent his Numidian cavalry across the river to attack the Romans on that side, as they were coming down

<sup>98</sup> Polybius, III. 111. Livy, XXII. 45.

in straggling parties to the bank to get water. For the Aufidus, though its bed is deep and wide, to hold its winter floods, is a shallow or a narrow stream in summer, with many points easily fordable, not by horse only, but by infantry. The watering parties were driven in with some loss, and the Numidians followed them to the very gates of the camp, and obliged the Romans, on the right bank, to pass the summer night in the burning Apulian plain without water.

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At daybreak on the next morning, the red ensign, which was the well-known signal for battle, was seen flying over Varro's head quarters<sup>99</sup>; and he issued orders, it being his day of command, for the main army to cross the river, and form in order of battle on the right bank. Whether he had any farther object in crossing to the right bank, than to enable the soldiers on that side to get water in security, we do not know; but Hannibal, it seems, thought that the ground on either bank suited him equally; and he too forded the stream at two separate points, and drew out his army opposite to the enemy. The strong town of Canusium was scarcely three miles off in his rear; he had left his camp on the other side of the river; if he were defeated, escape seemed hopeless. But when he saw the wide open plain around him, and looked at his numerous and irresistible cavalry, and knew that his infantry, however inferior in numbers, were far better and

Hannibal  
draws out  
his army.

<sup>99</sup> Plutarch, Fabius, 15.

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older soldiers than the great mass of their opponents, he felt that defeat was impossible. In this confidence his spirits were not cheerful merely, but even mirthful; he rallied one of his officers jestingly, who noticed the overwhelming numbers of the Romans; those near him laughed; and as any feeling at such a moment is contagious, the laugh was echoed by others; and the soldiers, seeing their great general in such a mood, were satisfied that he was sure of victory<sup>100</sup>.

Its position.

The Carthaginian army faced the north, so that the early sun shone on their right flank, while the wind, which blew strong from the south, but without a drop of rain, swept its clouds of dust over their backs, and carried them full into the faces of the enemy<sup>101</sup>. On their left, resting on the river, were the Spanish and Gaulish horse; next in the line, but thrown back a little, were half of the African infantry armed like the Romans; on their right, somewhat in advance, were the Gauls and Spaniards, with their companies intermixed; then came the rest of the African foot, again thrown back like their comrades; and on the right of the whole line were

<sup>100</sup> Plutarch, Fabius, 15. Εἰπόντος δὲ τίνος τῶν περὶ αὐτὸν ἀνδρῶν ἰσοτίμου, τοῦνομα Γίσκωνος, ὡς θαυμαστὸν αὐτῷ φαίνεται τὸ πλῆθος τῶν πολεμίων, συναγαγὼν τὸ πρόσωπον ὁ Ἀννίβας, “ἕτερον,” εἶπεν, “ὦ Γίσκων, λέληθέ σε τοῦτου θαυμασιώτερον.” Ἐρομένου δὲ τοῦ Γίσκωνος “Τὸ ποῖον.” “Ὅτι” ἔφη “τούτων ὄντων τοσούτων, οὐδεὶς ἐν αὐταῖς Γίσκων καλεῖται.” Γενομένου δὲ παρὰ δόξαν αὐτοῖς τοῦ σκόμματος ἐμπίπτει γέλωσ πᾶσι καὶ

κατέβαινον ἀπὸ τοῦ λόφου τοῖς ἀπαντῶσιν αἰεὶ τὸ πεπαιγμένον ἀπαγγέλλοντες, ὥστε διὰ πολλῶν πολλὴν εἶναι τὸν γέλωτα καὶ μὴδ’ ἀναλαβεῖν ἑαυτοὺς δύνασθαι τοὺς περὶ Ἀννίβαν. Τοῦτο τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις ἰδοῦσι θάρρος παρέστη λογιζομένοις ἀπὸ πολλοῦ καὶ ἰσχυροῦ τοῦ καταφρονοῦντος ἐπιέναι γελᾶν οὔτω καὶ παίζειν τῷ στρατηγῷ παρὰ τὸν κίνδυνον.

<sup>101</sup> Livy, XXII. 46. Plutarch, Fabius, 16.

the Numidian light horsemen<sup>102</sup>. The right of the army rested, so far as appears, on nothing; the ground was open and level; but at some distance were hills overgrown with copsewood, and furrowed with deep ravines, in which, according to one account of the battle, a body of horsemen and of light infantry lay in ambush. The rest of the light troops, and the Balearian slingers, skirmished as usual in front of the whole line.

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Meanwhile the masses of the Roman infantry were forming their line opposite. The sun on their left flashed obliquely on their brazen helmets, now uncovered for battle, and lit up the waving forest of their red and black plumes, which rose upright from their helmets a foot and a half high.

That of the  
Roman  
army,

They stood brandishing their formidable pila, covered with their long shields, and bearing on their right thigh their peculiar and fatal weapon, the heavy sword, fitted alike to cut and to stab<sup>103</sup>. On the right of the line were the Roman legions; on the left the infantry of the allies; while between the Roman right and the river were the Roman horsemen, all of them of wealthy or noble families; and on the left, opposed to the Numidians, were the horsemen of the Italians and of the Latin name. The velites or light infantry covered the front, and were ready to skirmish with the light troops and slingers of the enemy.

For some reason or other, which is not explained

drawn up in  
columns.

<sup>102</sup> Polybius, III. 113. Livy, XXII. 46.

<sup>103</sup> Polybius, III. 114. Livy, XXII. 45.



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in any account of the battle, the Roman infantry were formed in columns rather than in line, the files of the maniples containing many more than their ranks<sup>104</sup>. This seems an extraordinary tactic to be adopted in a plain by an army inferior in cavalry, but very superior in infantry. Whether the Romans relied on the river as a protection to their right flank, and their left was covered in some manner which is not mentioned,—one account would lead us to suppose that it reached nearly to the sea<sup>105</sup>,—or whether the great proportion of new levies obliged the Romans to adopt the system of the phalanx, and to place their raw soldiers in the rear, as incapable of fighting in the front ranks with Hannibal's veterans,—it appears at any rate that the Roman infantry, though nearly double the number of the enemy, yet formed a line of only equal length with Hannibal's.

Defeat of  
the Roman  
cavalry.

The skirmishing of the light-armed troops precluded as usual to the battle: the Balearian slingers slung their stones like hail into the ranks of the

<sup>104</sup> Polybius, III. 113. *ποιῶν πολλαπλάσιον τὸ βάθος ἐν ταῖς σπεύραις τοῦ μετώπου*. Raleigh suggests that "this had been found convenient against the Carthaginians in the former war. It was indeed no bad way of resistance against elephants, to make the ranks thick and short, but the files long, as also to strengthen well the rear, that it might stand fast compacted as a wall, under shelter whereof the disordered troops might rally themselves. Thus much it seems, that Teren-

tius had learned of some old soldiers; and therefore he now ordered his battles accordingly, as meaning to show more skill than was in his understanding. But the Carthaginians had here no elephants with them in the field: their advantage was in horse, against which this manner of imbattailing was very unprofitable, forasmuch as their charge is better sustained in front, than upon a long flank."

<sup>105</sup> Appian, VII. 21. *οἱ τὸ λαῖὸν ἔχοντες ἐπὶ τῇ θαλάσῃ*.

Roman line, and severely wounded the consul Æmilius himself. Then the Spanish and Gaulish horse charged the Romans front to front, and maintained a standing fight with them, many leaping off their horses and fighting on foot, till the Romans, outnumbered and badly armed, without cuirasses, with light and brittle spears, and with shields made only of ox-hide, were totally routed, and driven off the field <sup>106</sup>. Hasdrubal, who commanded the Gauls and Spaniards, followed up his work effectually; he chased the Romans along the river till he had almost destroyed them; and then, riding off to the right, he came up to aid the Numidians, who, after their manner, had been skirmishing indecisively with the cavalry of the Italian allies. These, on seeing the Gauls and Spaniards advancing, broke away and fled; the Numidians, most effective in pursuing a flying enemy, chased them with unweariable speed, and slaughtered them unsparingly; while Hasdrubal, to complete his signal services on this day, charged fiercely upon the rear of the Roman infantry.

He found its huge masses already weltering in helpless confusion, crowded upon one another, totally disorganized, and fighting each man as he best could, but struggling on against all hope by mere indomitable courage. For the Roman columns on the right and left, finding the Gaulish and Spanish foot advancing in a convex line or wedge, pressed forwards to assail what seemed the flanks of the enemy's

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Of the  
whole army.

<sup>106</sup> Polybius, III. 115. Livy, XXII. 47.

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column; so that, being already drawn up with too narrow a front by their original formation, they now became compressed still more by their own movements, the right and left converging towards the centre, till the whole army became one dense column, which forced its way onwards by the weight of its charge, and drove back the Gauls and Spaniards into the rear of their own line. Meanwhile its victorious advance had carried it, like the English column at Fontenoy, into the midst of Hannibal's army; it had passed between the African infantry on its right and left; and now, whilst its head was struggling against the Gauls and Spaniards, its long flanks were fiercely assailed by the Africans, who, facing about to the right and left, charged it home, and threw it into utter disorder. In this state, when they were forced together into one unwieldy crowd, and already falling by thousands, whilst the Gauls and Spaniards, now advancing in their turn, were barring farther progress in front, and whilst the Africans were tearing their mass to pieces on both flanks, Hasdrubal with his victorious Gaulish and Spanish horsemen broke with thundering fury upon their rear. Then followed a butchery such as has no recorded equal, except the slaughter of the Persians in their camp, when the Greeks forced it after the battle of Plataea. Unable to fight or fly, with no quarter asked or given, the Romans and Italians fell before the swords of their enemies, till, when the sun set upon the field, there were left out of that vast multitude no more than three thousand

men alive and unwounded; and these fled in straggling parties, under cover of the darkness, and found a refuge in the neighbouring towns<sup>107</sup>. The consul Æmilius, the proconsul Cn. Servilius, the late master of the horse M. Minucius, two quæstors, twenty-one military tribunes, and eighty senators, lay dead amidst the carnage; Varro with seventy horsemen had escaped from the rout of the allied cavalry on the right of the army, and made his way safely to Venusia.

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But the Roman loss was not yet completed. A large force had been left in the camp on the left bank of the Aufidus, to attack Hannibal's camp during the action, which it was supposed that, with his inferior numbers, he could not leave adequately guarded. But it was defended so obstinately, that the Romans were still besieging it in vain, when Hannibal, now completely victorious in the battle, crossed the river to its relief. Then the besiegers fled in their turn to their own camp, and there, cut off from all succour, they presently surrendered. A few resolute men had forced their way out of the smaller camp on the right bank, and had escaped to Canusium; the rest who were in it followed the example of their comrades on the left bank, and surrendered to the conqueror.

Capture of  
the camps.

Less than six thousand men of Hannibal's army had fallen: no greater price had he paid for the total destruction of more than eighty thousand of

Results of  
the battle.

<sup>107</sup> Polybius, III. 116. Livy, XXII. 49.

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the enemy, for the capture of their two camps, for the utter annihilation, as it seemed, of all their means for offensive warfare. It is no wonder that the spirits of the Carthaginian officers were elated by this unequalled victory. Maharbal, seeing what his cavalry had done, said to Hannibal, "Let me advance instantly with the horse, and do thou follow to support me; in four days from this time thou shalt sup in the capitol<sup>108</sup>." There are moments when rashness is wisdom; and it may be that this was one of them. The statue of the goddess Victory in the capitol may well have trembled in every limb on that day, and have dropped her wings, as if for ever. But Hannibal came not; and if panic had for one moment unnerved the iron courage of the Roman aristocracy, on the next their inborn spirit revived; and their resolute will, striving beyond its present power, created, as is the law of our nature, the power which it required.

<sup>108</sup> Livy, XXII. 51.

## CHAPTER XLIV.

PROGRESS OF THE WAR IN ITALY AFTER THE BATTLE OF CANNÆ. REVOLT OF CAPUA, AND OF THE PEOPLE OF SOUTHERN ITALY TO HANNIBAL. GREAT EXERTIONS OF THE ROMANS. SURPRISE OF TARENTUM. SIEGE OF CAPUA. HANNIBAL MARCHES ON ROME. REDUCTION AND PUNISHMENT OF CAPUA. A.U.C 538 TO 543.

FROM New Carthage to the plains of Cannæ, Hannibal's march resembles a mighty torrent, which, rushing along irresistible and undivided, fixes our attention to the one line of its course: all other sights and sounds in the landscape are forgotten, while we look on the rush of the vast volume of waters, and listen to their deep and ceaseless roar. Therefore I have not wished to draw away the reader's attention to other objects, but to keep it fixed upon the advance of Hannibal. But from Cannæ onwards the character of the scene changes. The single torrent, joined by a hundred lesser streams, has now swelled into a wide flood, overwhelming the whole valley; and the principal object

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the character  
of the  
war.



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of our interest is the one rock, now islanded amid the waters, and on which they dash furiously on every side, as though they must needs sweep it away. But the rock stands unshaken: the waters become feebler; and their streams are again divided: and the flood shrinks; and the rock rises higher and higher; and the danger is passed away. In the next part of the second Punic war, our attention will be mainly fixed on Rome, as it has hitherto been on Hannibal. But in order to value aright the mightiness of her energy, we must consider the multitude of her enemies; how all southern Italy, led by Hannibal, struggled with her face to face; how Sicily and Macedon struck at her from behind; how Spain supplied arms to her most dangerous enemy. Yet her policy and her courage were every where: Sicily was struck to the earth by one blow; Macedon obliged to defend himself against his nearer enemies; the arms which Spain was offering to Hannibal were torn out of his grasp; revolted Italy was crushed to pieces; and the great enemy, after all his forces were dispersed and destroyed, was obliged, like Hector, to fight singly under his country's walls, and to fall like Hector, with the consolation of "having done mighty deeds, to be famed in after ages."

The news of  
the defeat  
reaches  
Rome.

The Romans, knowing that their army was in presence of the enemy, and that the consuls had been ordered no longer to decline a battle, were for some days in the most intense anxiety. Every tongue was repeating some line of old prophecy, or relating some new wonder or portent; every tem-

ple was crowded with supplicants; and incense and sacrifices were offered on every altar. At last the tidings arrived of the utter destruction of both the consular armies, and of a slaughter such as Rome had never before known. Even Livy felt himself unable adequately to paint the grief and consternation of that day<sup>1</sup>; and the experience of the bloodiest and most embittered warfare of modern times would not help us to conceive it worthily. But one simple fact speaks eloquently: the whole number of Roman citizens able to bear arms had amounted at the last census to 270,000<sup>2</sup>; and supposing, as we fairly may, that the loss of the Romans in the late battles had been equal to that of their allies, there must have been killed or taken, within the last eighteen months, no fewer than 60,000, or more than a fifth part of the whole population of citizens above seventeen years of age. It must have been true, without exaggeration, that every house in Rome was in mourning.

The two home prætors summoned the senate to consult for the defence of the city. Fabius was no longer dictator; yet the supreme government at this moment was effectually in his hands; for the resolutions which he moved were instantly and unanimously adopted. Light horsemen were to be sent out to gather tidings of the enemy's movements; the members of the senate, acting as magistrates, were to keep order in the city, to stop all loud or public lamentations, and to take care that all intelligence

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<sup>1</sup> Livy, XXII. 54.

<sup>2</sup> Livy, Epit. XX.

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was conveyed in the first instance to the prætors: above all, the city gates were to be strictly guarded, that no one might attempt to fly from Rome, but all abide the common danger together<sup>3</sup>. Then the forum was cleared, and the assemblies of the people suspended; for at such a moment, had any one tribune uttered the word "peace," the tribes would have caught it up with eagerness, and obliged the senate to negotiate.

Arrival of  
dispatches  
from Varro

Thus the first moments of panic passed; and Varro's dispatches arrived, informing the senate that he had rallied the wrecks of the army at Canusium, and that Hannibal was not advancing upon Rome<sup>4</sup>. Hope then began to revive; the meetings of the senate were resumed, and measures taken for maintaining the war.

Marcellus is  
sent into  
Apulia.

M. Marcellus, one of the prætors for the year, was at this moment at Ostia, preparing to sail to Sicily. It was resolved to transfer him at once to the great scene of action in Apulia; and he was ordered to give up the fleet to his colleague P. Furius Philus, and to march with the single legion which he had under his command into Apulia, there to collect the remains of Varro's army, and to fall back as he best could into Campania, while the consul returned immediately to Rome<sup>5</sup>.

Varro's man-  
ly conduct.

In the mean time the scene at Canusium was like the disorder of a ship going to pieces, when

<sup>3</sup> Livy, XXII. 55.

<sup>4</sup> Livy, XXII. 56.

<sup>5</sup> Livy, XXII. 57. Plutarch, Marcellus, 9.

fear makes men desperate, and the instinct of self-preservation swallows up every other feeling. Some young men of the noblest families, a Metellus being at the head of them, looking upon Rome as lost, were planning to escape from the ruin, and to fly beyond sea, in the hope of entering into some foreign service. Such an example at such a moment would have led the way to a general panic: if the noblest citizens of Rome despaired of their country, what allied state, or what colony, could be expected to sacrifice themselves in defence of a hopeless cause? The consul exerted himself to the utmost to check this spirit, and aided by some firmer spirits amongst the officers themselves, he succeeded in repressing it<sup>6</sup>. He kept his men together, gave them over

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<sup>6</sup> The author would doubtless have explained his reasons for ascribing the suppression of this conspiracy to leave Italy to Varro. By Livy, XXII. 53, by Valerius Maximus, V. 6, 7, by Dion Fragm. Peiresc. XLIX., it is attributed to Scipio. See also Silius Italicus, X. 426, fol. It is somewhat remarkable that Polybius makes no mention of the fact, either in the account of the battle of Cannæ, or in the character of Scipio, X. 1—6, where he speaks of Scipio's early exploits. According to Livy, with whose account Dion's concurs, the fugitives at Canusium were headed by four tribunes, who voluntarily submitted to the command of Scipio and Appius Claudius, two of their number; and Scipio, by a characteristic act of youthful heroism, stifled the plot. Meanwhile Varro is represented to have been at Venusia. Appian's account too, VII. 26,

though differing as to the order of the events, and plainly inaccurate, —since it makes Varro resign the command to Scipio, instead of Marcellus, when he went to Rome,—implies that Scipio distinguished himself at Canusium. Dion's statement is the more trustworthy, as he did not join in the cry against Varro, but speaks with high praise of his conduct after the defeat. Ἐς τὸ Κανύσιον ἐλθὼν τὰ τε ἐνταῦθα κατεστήσατο, καὶ τοῖς πλησιοχώροις φρουρὰς ὡς ἐκ τῶν παρόντων ἐπέμψεν, προσβάλλοντάς τε τῇ πόλει ἰππέας ἀπεκρούσατο· τὸ τε σύνολον οὐτ' ἀθυμήσας, οὔτε καταπτῆξας, ἀλλ' ἀπ' ὀρθῆς τῆς διανοίας ὥσπερ μηδενὸς σφίσι δεινοῦ συμβεβηκότος, πάντα τὰ πρόσφορα τοῖς παρούσι καὶ ἐβούλευσε καὶ ἔπραξεν. Zonaras was so careless in abridging his author, that he transfers what Dion here says of Varro, to Scipio.

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to the prætor Marcellus on his arrival at Canusium, and prepared instantly to obey the orders of the senate by returning to Rome. The fate of P. Claudius and L. Junius in the last war might have warned him of the dangers which threatened a defeated general; he himself was personally hateful to the prevailing party at Rome; and if the memory of Flaminius was persecuted, notwithstanding his glorious death, what could he look for, a fugitive general from that field where his colleague and all his soldiers had perished? Demosthenes dared not trust himself to the Athenian people after his defeat in Ætolia; but Varro, with a manlier spirit, returned to bear the obloquy and the punishment which the popular feeling, excited by party animosity, was so likely to heap on him. He stopped as usual without the city walls, and summoned the senate to meet him in the Campus Martius.

The senate  
thank him.

The senate felt his confidence in them, and answered it nobly. All party feeling was suspended; all popular irritation was subdued; the butcher's son, the turbulent demagogue, the defeated general, were all forgotten; only Varro's latest conduct was remembered, that he had resisted the panic of his officers, and instead of seeking shelter at the court of a foreign king, had submitted himself to the judgment of his countrymen. The senate voted him their thanks, "because he had not despaired of the commonwealth<sup>7</sup>."

<sup>7</sup> Livy, XXII. 61. Plutarch, Fabius, 18. See also Florus, II. 6.

It was resolved to name a dictator; and some writers related that the general voice of the senate and people offered the dictatorship to Varro himself, but that he positively refused to accept it<sup>8</sup>. This story is extremely doubtful; but the dictator actually named was M. Junius Pisa, a member of a popular family, and who had himself been consul and censor. His master of the horse was T. Sempronius Gracchus, the first of that noble but ill-fated name who appears in the Roman annals<sup>9</sup>.

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A dictator  
appointed.

Already, before the appointment of the dictator, the Roman government had shown that its resolution was fixed to carry on the war to the death. Hannibal had allowed his Roman prisoners to send ten of their number to Rome to petition that the senate would permit the whole body to be ransomed by their friends at the sum of three minæ, or 3000 asses, for each prisoner. But the senate absolutely forbade the money to be paid, neither choosing to furnish Hannibal with so large a sum, nor to show any compassion to men who had allowed themselves to fall alive into the enemies' hands<sup>10</sup>. The prisoners therefore were left in hopeless captivity; and the armies which the state required were to be formed out of other materials. The expedients adopted showed the urgency of the danger.

The senate  
refuses to  
ransom the  
prisoners.

When the consuls took the field at the beginning

Measures to  
raise troops.

<sup>8</sup> Valerius Maximus, III. 4. § 4. IV. 5. § 2. Frontinus, IV. 5, 6. "Honoribus, quum ei deferrentur a populo, renuntiavit, dicens, felicioribus magistratibus reipublicæ opus esse."

<sup>9</sup> Livy, XXII. 57.

<sup>10</sup> Polybius, VI. 58. Livy, XXII. 58—61. Appian, VII. 28. Cicero de Off. I. 13, 32. III. 32. Aulus Gellius, VII. 18.



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of the campaign, two legions had been left, as usual, to cover the capital. These were now to be employed in active service; and with them was a small detachment of troops, which had been drawn from Picenum and the neighbourhood of Ariminum, where their services were become of less importance. The contingents from the allies were not ready; and there was no time to wait for them. In order, therefore, to enable the dictator to take the field immediately, eight thousand slaves were enlisted, having expressed their willingness to serve; and arms were provided by taking down from the temple the spoils won in former wars<sup>11</sup>. The dictator went still farther: he offered pardon to criminals and release to debtors, if they were willing to take up arms; and amongst the former class were some bands of robbers, who then, as in later times, infested the mountains, and who consented to serve the state on receiving an indemnity for their past offences<sup>12</sup>. With this strange force, amounting it is said to about 25,000 men, M. Junius marched into Campania; whilst a new levy of the oldest and youngest citizens supplied two new legions for the defence of the capital, in the place of those which followed the dictator into the field. M. Junius fixed his head quarters at Teanum<sup>13</sup>, on high ground upon the edge of the Falernian plain, with the Latin colony of Cales in his front, and communicating by the Latin road with Rome.

<sup>11</sup> Livy, XXII. 57.

<sup>12</sup> Livy, XXIII. 14.

<sup>13</sup> Livy, XXIII. 24.

The dictator was at Teanum, and M. Marcellus with the army of Cannæ, whom we left in Apulia, is described as now lying encamped above Suessula<sup>14</sup>, that is, on the right bank of the Volturnus, on the hills which bound the Campanian plain, ten or twelve miles to the east of Capua, on the right of the Appian road as it ascends the pass of Caudium towards Beneventum. Thus we find the seat of war removed from Apulia to Campania; but the detail of the intermediate movements is lost; and we must restore the broken story as well as we can, by tracing Hannibal's operations after the battle of Cannæ, which are undoubtedly the key to those of his enemies.

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Position of  
the Roman  
army.

The fidelity of the allies of Rome, which had not been shaken by the defeat of Thrasymenus, could not resist the fiery trial of Cannæ. The Apulians joined the conqueror immediately, and Arpi and Salapia opened their gates to him. Bruttium, Lucania, and Samnium were ready to follow the example<sup>15</sup>; and Hannibal was obliged to divide his army, and send officers into different parts of the country, to receive and protect those who wished to join him, and to organize their forces for effective co-operation in the field. Meanwhile he himself remained in Apulia, not perhaps without hope that this last blow had broken the spirit as well as the power of the enemy, and that they would listen readily to proposals of peace. With this view he sent a Car-

Revolt of  
the allies:  
conduct of  
Hannibal.

<sup>14</sup> Livy, XXII. 14.

<sup>15</sup> Livy, XXII. 61. Polybius, III. 118. Appian, VII. 31.

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thaginian officer to accompany the deputation of the Roman prisoners to Rome, and ordered him to encourage any disposition on the part of the Romans to open a negotiation<sup>16</sup>. When he found therefore on the return of the deputies, that his officer had not been allowed to enter the city, and that the Romans had refused to ransom their prisoners, his disappointment betrayed him into acts of the most inhuman cruelty. The mass of the prisoners left in his hands he sold for slaves; and so far he did not overstep the recognized laws of warfare; but many of the more distinguished among them he put to death; and those who were senators he obliged to fight as gladiators with each other in the presence of his whole army. It is added, that brothers were in some instances brought out to fight with their brothers, and sons with their fathers; but that the prisoners refused so to sin against nature, and chose rather to suffer the worst torments than to draw their swords in such horrible combats<sup>17</sup>. Hannibal's

<sup>16</sup> Livy, XXII. 58.

<sup>17</sup> Diodorus, XXVI. Exc. de Virtut. et Vitiis. Appian, VII. 28. Zonaras, IX. 2. Valerius Maximus, IX. 2. Ext. 2. But as even Livy does not mention these stories, though they would have afforded such a topic for his rhetoric,—nor does Polybius, either in IX. 24, when speaking of Hannibal's alleged cruelty, or in VI. 58, where he gives the account of the mission of the captives, and adds that Hannibal, when he heard that the Romans had refused to ransom them, *κατεπλάγη τὸ στάσιμον καὶ τὸ μεγαλόψυχον τῶν ἀνδρῶν*

*ἐν τοῖς διαβουλίαις*,—there must doubtless be a great deal of exaggeration in them, even if they had any foundation at all. The story in Pliny, VIII. 7, that the last survivor of these gladiatorial combats had to fight against an elephant, and killed him, and was then treacherously waylaid and murdered by Hannibal's orders, was probably invented with reference to this very occasion. The remarks of Polybius should make us slow to believe the stories of Hannibal's cruelties, which so soon became a theme for the invention of poets and rhetoricians.

vow may have justified all these cruelties in his eyes; but his passions deceived him, and he was provoked to fury by the resolute spirit which ought to have excited his admiration. To admire the virtue which thwarts our dearest purposes, however natural it may seem to indifferent spectators, is one of the hardest trials of humanity.

Finding the Romans immovable, Hannibal broke up from his position in Apulia, and moved into Samnium. The popular party in Compsa opened their gates to him; and he made the place serve as a depôt for his plunder, and for the heavy baggage of his army<sup>18</sup>. His brother Mago was then ordered to march into Bruttium with a division of the army, and after having received the submission of the Hirpinians on his way, to embark at one of the Bruttian ports, and carry the tidings of his success to Carthage<sup>19</sup>. Hanno, with another division, was sent into Lucania to protect the revolt of the Lucanians<sup>20</sup>; while Hannibal himself, in pursuit of a still greater prize, descended once more into the plains of Campania. The Pentrian Samnites, partly restrained by the Latin colony of Æsernia, and partly by the influence of their own countryman, Num. Decimius of Bovianum, a zealous supporter of the Roman alliance, remained firm in their adherence to Rome: but the Hirpinians and the Caudinian Samnites all joined the Carthaginians; and their soldiers no doubt formed part of the army

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Hannibal enters Campania: revolt of Capua.

<sup>18</sup> Livy, XXIII. 1.

<sup>19</sup> Livy, XXIII. 11.

<sup>20</sup> Livy, XXIII. 37.

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with which Hannibal invaded Campania<sup>21</sup>. There all was ready for his reception. The popular party in Capua were headed by Pacuvius Calavius, a man of the highest nobility, and married to a daughter of Appius Claudius, but whose ambition led him to aspire to the sovereignty, not of his own country only, but, through Hannibal's aid, of the whole of Italy, Capua succeeding, as he hoped, to the supremacy now enjoyed by Rome. The aristocratical party were weak and unpopular, and could offer no opposition to him; while the people, wholly subject to his influence, concluded a treaty with Hannibal, and admitted the Carthaginian general and his army into the city<sup>22</sup>. Thus the second city in Italy, capable, it is said, of raising an army of 30,000 foot and 4000 horse<sup>23</sup>, connected with Rome by the closest ties, and which for nearly a century had remained true to its alliance under all dangers, threw itself into the arms of Hannibal, and took its place at the head of the new coalition of southern Italy, to try the old quarrel of the Samnite wars once again.

Marcellus  
encamps at  
Suessula.

This revolt of Capua, the greatest result, short of the submission of Rome itself, which could have followed from the battle of Cannæ, drew the Roman armies towards Campania. Marcellus had probably fallen back from Canusium by the Appian road through Beneventum, moving by an interior and shorter line; whilst Hannibal advanced by

<sup>21</sup> Livy, XXII. 61. 24.

<sup>22</sup> Livy, XXIII. 2—4.

<sup>23</sup> Livy, XXIII. 5. See Niebuhr, Vol. II. note 145.

Compsa upon Abellinum, descending into the plain of Campania by what is now the pass of Monteforte. Hannibal's cavalry gave him the whole command of the country; and Marcellus could do no more than watch his movements from his camp above Suessula, and wait for some opportunity of impeding his operations in detail.

At this point in the story of the war, the question arises, how was it possible for Rome to escape destruction? Nor is this question merely prompted by the thought of Hannibal's great victories in the field, and the enormous slaughter of Roman citizens at Thrasymenus and Cannæ; it appears even more perplexing to those who have attentively studied the preceding history of Rome. A single battle, evenly contested and hardly won, had enabled Pyrrhus to advance into the heart of Latium; the Hernican cities and the impregnable Præneste had opened their gates to him; yet Capua was then faithful to Rome; and Samnium and Lucania, exhausted by long years of unsuccessful warfare, could have yielded him no such succour, as now, after fifty years of peace, they were able to afford to Hannibal. But now, when Hannibal was received into Capua, the state of Italy seemed to have gone backwards a hundred years, and to have returned to what it had been after the battle of Lautulæ in the second Samnite war<sup>24</sup>, with the immense addition of the genius of Hannibal and the power of Carthage thrown into

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How came  
it that Rome  
was not  
destroyed?

<sup>24</sup> See Vol. II. Chap. XXXI.



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the scale of the enemies of Rome. Then, as now, Capua had revolted, and Campania, Samnium, and Lucania, were banded together against Rome; but this same confederacy was now supported by all the resources of Carthage: and at its head in the field of battle was an army of thirty thousand veteran and victorious soldiers, led by one of the greatest generals whom the world has ever seen. How could it happen that a confederacy so formidable was only formed to be defeated?—that the revolt of Capua was the term of Hannibal's progress?—that from this day forwards his great powers were shown rather in repelling defeat than in commanding victory?—that, instead of besieging Rome, he was soon employed in protecting and relieving Capua?—and that his protection and his succours were alike unavailing?

Causes  
which saved  
her.

No single cause will explain a result so extraordinary. Rome owed her deliverance principally to the strength of the aristocratical interest throughout Italy,—to her numerous colonies of the Latin name, —to the scanty numbers of Hannibal's Africans and Spaniards, and to his want of an efficient artillery. The material of a good artillery must surely have existed in Capua; but there seem to have been no officers capable of directing it; and no great general's operations exhibit so striking a contrast of strength and weakness, as may be seen in Hannibal's battles and sieges. And when Cannæ had taught the Romans to avoid pitched battles in the open field, the war became necessarily a series of sieges, where Hannibal's strongest arm, his cavalry, could

render little service, while his infantry was in quality not more than equal to the enemy, and his artillery was decidedly inferior.

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With two divisions of his army absent in Lucania and Bruttium, and while anxiously waiting for the reinforcements which Mago was to procure from Carthage, Hannibal could not undertake any great offensive operation after his arrival in Campania. He attempted only to reduce the remaining cities of the Campanian plain and sea coast, and especially to dislodge the Romans from Casilinum, which, lying within three miles of Capua, and commanding the passage of the Volturnus, not only restrained all his movements, but was a serious annoyance to Capua, and threatened its territory with continual incursions. Atilla and Calatia had revolted to him already with Capua; and he took Nuceria, Alfaterna, and Acerræ. The Greek cities on the coast, Neapolis and Cumæ, were firmly attached to Rome, and were too strong to be besieged with success; but Nola lay in the midst of the plain nearly midway between Capua and Nuceria; and the popular party there, as elsewhere, were ready to open their gates to Hannibal. He was preparing to appear before the town; but the aristocracy had time to apprise the Romans of their danger; and Marcellus, who was then at Casilinum, marched round behind the mountains to escape the enemy's notice, and descended suddenly upon Nola from the hills which rise directly above it. He secured the place, repressed the popular party by some bloody executions, and when

Military  
measures in  
Campania.

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Hannibal advanced to the walls, made a sudden sally, and repulsed him with some loss<sup>25</sup>. Having done this service, and left the aristocratical party in absolute possession of the government, he returned again to the hills, and lay encamped on the edge of the mountain boundary of the Campanian plain, just above the entrance of the famous pass of Caudium. His place at Casilinum was to be supplied by the dictator's army from Teanum; but Hannibal watched his opportunity, and anticipating his enemies this time, laid regular siege to Casilinum, which was defended by a garrison of about 1000 men.

Conduct of  
the garrison  
of Casili-  
num.

This garrison had acted the very same part towards the citizens of Casilinum, which the Campanians had acted at Rhegium in the war with Pyrrhus<sup>26</sup>. About 500 Latins of Præneste, and 450 Etruscans of Perugia, having been levied too late to join the consular armies when they took the field, were marching after them into Apulia by the Apian road, when they heard the tidings of the defeat of Cannæ. They immediately turned about, and fell back upon Casilinum, where they established themselves, and for their better security massacred the Campanian inhabitants, and, abandoning the quarter of the town which was on the left bank of the Vulturnus, occupied the quarter on the right bank<sup>27</sup>. Marcellus, when he retreated from Apulia with the wreck of Varro's army, had fixed his head quarters for a time at Casilinum; the position being one of

<sup>25</sup> Livy, XXIII. 14—17. Plutarch, Marcellus, 11.

<sup>26</sup> See Vol. II. p. 493.

<sup>27</sup> Livy, XXIII. 17.

great importance, and there being some danger lest the garrison, while they kept off Hannibal, should resolve to hold the town for themselves rather than for the Romans. They were now left to themselves; and dreading Hannibal's vengeance for the massacre of the old inhabitants, they resisted his assaults desperately, and obliged him to turn the siege into a blockade. This was the last active operation of the campaign: all the armies now went into winter quarters. The dictator remained at Teanum; Marcellus lay in his mountain camp above Nola; and Hannibal's army was at Capua<sup>28</sup>. Being quartered in the houses of the city, instead of being encamped by themselves, their discipline, it is likely, was somewhat impaired by the various temptations thrown in their way; and as the wealth and enjoyments of Capua at that time were notorious, the writers who adopted the vulgar declamations against luxury, pretended that Hannibal's army was ruined by the indulgences of this winter, and that Capua was the Cannæ of Carthage<sup>29</sup>.

This intermission of active warfare will afford us an opportunity of noticing the progress of events elsewhere, which we have hitherto unavoidably neglected. From the banks of the Iberus Hannibal had made his way without interruption to Capua; and the countries which he left behind him sink in like manner from the notice of the historian. We must now see what had happened in each of them since Hannibal's passage.

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Progress of  
the war in  
other quar-  
ters.

<sup>28</sup> Livy, XXIII. 18.

<sup>29</sup> Livy, XXIII. 45. Florus, II.  
6. Valerius Maximus, ix. 1. Ext. 1.

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Success of  
the Romans  
in Spain.

It has been mentioned above, that P. Scipio, when he returned from the Rhone to Italy, to be ready to meet Hannibal in Cisalpine Gaul, sent his army into Spain under the command of his brother<sup>30</sup>. After his consulship was over, his province of Spain was still continued to him as proconsul; and he went thither accordingly to take the command. He found that his brother had already effected much: he had defeated and made prisoner the Carthaginian general, Hanno, whom Hannibal left to maintain his latest conquests in Spain, and had driven the Carthaginians beyond the Iberus<sup>31</sup>. His own arrival in Spain took place in the summer of the year 537, three or four months after the battle of Thrasymenus; and although little was done in the field before the end of the season, the Carthaginian governor of Saguntum was persuaded to set at liberty all the Spanish hostages left in his custody; and the Spaniard who had advised this step under the mask of goodwill to Carthage, as a means of securing the affections of the Spanish people, had no sooner received the hostages with orders to take them back to their several homes, than he delivered them up to the Romans. Thus Scipio enjoyed the whole credit of restoring them to their friends, and made the Roman name generally popular<sup>32</sup>. In the following year, Hasdrubal, the son of Hamilcar, having received orders to march into Italy to co-operate with his brother, was encountered by the

<sup>30</sup> Above, p. 81.

<sup>31</sup> Polybius, III. 76.

<sup>32</sup> Polybius, III. 98, 99.

Romans near the Iberus, and defeated<sup>33</sup>; so that his invasion of Italy was for the present effectually prevented.

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The importance of this Spanish war cannot be estimated too highly; for, by disputing the possession of Spain, the Romans deprived their enemy of his best nursery of soldiers, from which otherwise he would have been able to raise army after army for the invasion of Italy. But its importance consisted not so much in the particular events, as in its being kept up at all: nor is there any thing requiring explanation in the success of the Romans. Their army had originally consisted of 20,000 men; and P. Scipio had brought some reinforcements; while Hasdrubal and Hanno in their two armies had a force not much superior: hence, after the total defeat of Hanno, Hasdrubal could not meet the Romans with any chance of success. For Spanish levies were now no longer to be depended on, while the Romans were inviting the nations of Spain to leave the Carthaginians, and come over to them. In this contest between the two nations, which should most influence the minds of the Spaniards, the ascendancy of the Roman character was clearly shown; and the natives were drawn, as by an invincible attraction, to the worthier.

Its great importance.

While Spain was thus the scene of active warfare, Cisalpine Gaul, after Hannibal's advance into Italy, seems to have sunk back into a state of

Tranquillity  
of Cisalpine  
Gaul.

<sup>33</sup> Livy, XXIII. 27, 28, 29.



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tranquillity, such as it had enjoyed in the first Punic war. It is very remarkable, that the colonies of Placentia and Cremona, so far in advance of the Roman frontier, and surrounded by hostile tribes, were left unassailed from the time when Hannibal crossed the Apennines into Etruria. We are only told that L. Postumius Albinus, one of the prætors of the year 538, was sent with an army into Gaul, when Varro and Æmilius marched into Apulia, with the express object of compelling the Gauls in Hannibal's service to return to the defence of their own country<sup>34</sup>. What he did in the course of that summer we know not: at the end of the consular year he was still in his province, and was elected consul for the year following, with Ti. Sempronius Gracchus. But before his consulship began, early in March apparently, according to the Roman calendar, he fell into an ambuscade, while advancing into the enemy's country, and was cut to pieces<sup>35</sup> with his whole army. We are told that the Romans found it utterly impossible to replace the army thus lost, and that it was resolved for the present to leave the Gauls to themselves<sup>36</sup>. But it was not so certain that the Gauls, if unopposed, would leave the Romans to themselves; and we find that M. Pomponius Matho, who had been city prætor in 538, was sent, on the expiration of his office, with proconsular power to Ariminum, and that he remained on that frontier for two years with an army of two

<sup>34</sup> Polybius, III. 106.

<sup>36</sup> Livy, XXIII. 25.

<sup>35</sup> Livy, XXIII. 24. Polybius, III. 118.

legions<sup>37</sup>, while C. Varro with another legion was quartered in Picenum, to support him in time of need<sup>38</sup>. Still the inaction of the Gauls is extraordinary, the more so as we find them in arms immediately after the end of the war with Carthage, and attacking Placentia and Cremona, which they had so long left in peace<sup>39</sup>. We can only suppose that the absence of a large portion of their soldiers, who were serving in Hannibal's army, crippled the power of the Gauls who were left at home; and that long experience had taught them that, unless when conducted by a general of a more civilized nation, they could not carry on war successfully with the Romans. The older Gaulish chiefs also were often averse to war, when the younger chiefs were in favour of it<sup>40</sup>; and the Romans were likely to be lavish of presents at a time so critical, to confirm their friends in their peaceful sentiments, and to win over their adversaries. It seems probable that some truce was concluded, which restrained either the Gauls or Romans from invading each other's territory; and the Romans were contented not to require the recall of the Gauls serving with Hannibal; some of whom, we know, continued to be with him till a much later period. The multitude of the Gauls rejoiced, perhaps, that they had won thus much from their proud enemy, and were well content that the war should be carried

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<sup>37</sup> Livy, XXIV. 10. 44. See Duker's note on the former passage.

<sup>39</sup> Livy, XXXI. 10.

<sup>40</sup> See for instance Cæsar, B. G. II. 17.

<sup>38</sup> Livy, XXIII. 32.

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on far from their own frontiers, and yet that they should share in its advantages. But wiser men might regret that better use was not made of the favourable moment; that no Carthaginian officer had been left with them to organize their armies and conduct them into the field; that the Roman encroachments on their soil were still maintained; and that there was no Gellius Gnatius in northern Italy to rouse the Etruscans and Umbrians to unite their forces with those of the Gauls on the south of the Apennines, and, while Hannibal lay triumphant in Capua, to revenge the defeat of Sentinum by a second victory on the Alia or the Tiber.

Resources of  
the Romans.

Whatever was the cause, the inactivity of the Gauls, after their great victory over L. Postumius, might strengthen the argument of those Greeks who ascribed the conquests of the Romans to their good fortune. It was no less timely than the peace with Etruria, concluded at the very moment when Pyrrhus was advancing upon Rome, or than the quiet of these same Gauls during the first Punic war. The consequence was, that the Romans had the whole force of Etruria and Umbria disposable for the contest in the south; and that any disposition to revolt, which might have existed in those countries, was unable to show itself in action. Their soldiers served as allies in the Roman armies, and with the Sabines, Picentians, Vestinians, Frentanians, Marrucinians, Marsians, and Pelignians, together with the cities of the Latin name, composed the Roman confederacy after the revolt of southern Italy. That revolt made

the drain, both of men and money, press more heavily on the states which still remained faithful; and the friends of Rome must every where have had the greatest difficulty in persuading their countrymen not to desert a cause which seemed so ruinous. Under such a pressure, the Roman government plainly told its officers in Sardinia and Sicily, that they must provide for their armies as they best could, for that they must expect no supplies of any kind from home <sup>41</sup>. The proprætor of Sicily applied to the never-failing friendship of Hiero, and obtained from him, almost as the last act of his long life, money enough to pay his soldiers, and corn for six months' consumption. But the proprætor of Sardinia had no such friend to help him; and he was obliged to get both corn and money from the people of the province <sup>42</sup>. The money, it seems, like the benevolences of our own government in old times, was nominally a free-will offering of the loyal cities of Sardinia to the Roman people: but the Sardinians knew that it was a gift which they could not help giving; and impatient of this addition to their former burdens, they applied to Carthage for aid, and broke out the following year into open revolt <sup>43</sup>.

It is not without reason that the Roman government had abandoned its officers in the provinces to their own resources. Their financial difficulties were enormous. Large tracts of land, arable, pasture, and forest, from which the state ordinarily derived a

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Their financial difficulties.

<sup>41</sup> Livy, XXIII. 21.    <sup>42</sup> Livy, XXIII. 21.    <sup>43</sup> Livy, XXIII. 32.

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revenue, were in the hands of the enemy; the number of tax-payers had been greatly diminished by the slaughter of so many citizens in battle; and in many cases their widows and children would be unable to cultivate their little property, and would be altogether insolvent. If the poorer citizens were again obliged, as after the Gaulish invasion, to borrow money of the rich, discontent and misery would have been the sure consequence; and the debtor would regard his creditor as a worse enemy than Hannibal. Accordingly three commissioners were appointed, on the proposition of the tribune Minucius, like the five commissioners of the year 403, with the express object of facilitating the circulation, and assisting the distressed tax-payer<sup>44</sup>. Their measures are not recorded; but we may suppose that they acted like the former commissioners, and allowed the poor citizens to pay their taxes in kind, when they could not procure money, and did not force them to sell their property, when it must have been sold at a certain loss<sup>45</sup>. The war must no doubt have raised the value of money, and diminished that of land; and the agricultural population, who had to pay a fixed amount of taxation in money, were thus doubly sufferers. As a mere financial operation, the commissioners' measures may not have been very profitable; but the government had

<sup>44</sup> Livy, XXIII. 21. Compare VII. 21.

<sup>45</sup> Salmasius (*de Usuris*, p. 510), conceives that the reduction of the as to an ounce, which, Pliny

(XXXIII. 13) says, took place in the dictatorship of Fabius Maximus, was a measure of these commissioners.

the wisdom to see that every thing depended on the unanimity and devotion of all classes to the cause of their country; and it was worth a great pecuniary sacrifice, even in the actual financial difficulties, to attach the people heartily to the government, and to prevent that intolerable evil of a general state of debt, which must speedily have led to a revolution, and laid Rome prostrate at the feet of Hannibal.

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Neither Rome nor Carthage could be said to have the undisputed mastery of the sea. Roman fleets sometimes visited the coasts of Africa; and Carthaginian fleets in the same way appeared off the coasts of Italy. Hannibal received supplies from Carthage, which were landed in the ports of Bruttium; and when the Carthaginians wished to assist the revolt of the Sardinians, the expedition which they sent, although it suffered much from bad weather, was neither delayed nor prevented by the enemy<sup>46</sup>. On the other hand, the Romans had gained a naval victory of some importance in Spain<sup>47</sup>; and their cruising squadrons in the Ionian Gulf, having the ports of Brundisium and Tarentum to run to in case of need, were of signal service, as we shall see hereafter, in intercepting the communications which the king of Macedon was trying to open with Hannibal<sup>48</sup>.

Events of  
the naval  
war.

Meantime the news of the battle of Cannæ had been carried to Carthage, as we have seen, by Hannibal's brother Mago, accompanied with a request for reinforcements. Nearly two years before, when

Re-inforce-  
ments from  
Carthage.

<sup>46</sup> Livy, XXIII. 43. 34.

<sup>47</sup> Polybius, III. 96.

<sup>48</sup> Livy, XXIII. 32. 34.



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he first descended from the Alps into Cisalpine Gaul, his Africans and Spaniards were reduced to no more than 20,000 foot, and 6000 horse. The Gauls, who had joined him since, had indeed more than doubled this number at first; but three great battles, and many partial actions, besides the unavoidable losses from sickness during two years of active service, must again have greatly diminished it; and this force was now to be divided: a part of it was employed in Bruttium, a part in Lucania, leaving an inconsiderable body under Hannibal's own command. On the other hand, the accession of the Campanians, Samnites, Lucanians, and Bruttians supplied him with auxiliary troops in abundance, and of excellent quality; so that large reinforcements from home were not required, but only enough for the Africans to form a substantial part of every army employed in the field, and above all, to maintain his superiority in cavalry. It is said that some of the reinforcements which were voted on Mago's demand, were afterwards diverted to other services<sup>49</sup>; and we do not know what was the amount of force actually sent over to Italy, nor when it arrived<sup>50</sup>. It consisted chiefly, if not entirely, of cavalry and elephants; for all the elephants which Hannibal had brought with him into Italy had long since perished; and his anxiety to obtain others, troublesome and hazardous as it must have been to transport them from Africa by sea, speaks strongly in favour

<sup>49</sup> Livy, XXIII. 13. 32.

<sup>50</sup> He is represented as having elephants at the siege of Casili-

num. Livy, XXIII. 18. If this be correct, the reinforcements must already have joined him.

of their use in war, which modern writers are perhaps too much inclined to depreciate<sup>51</sup>.

We have no information as to the feelings entertained by Hannibal and the Campanians towards each other, while the Carthaginians were wintering in Capua. The treaty of alliance had provided carefully for the independence of the Campanians, that they might not be treated as Pyrrhus had treated the Tarentines. Capua was to have its own laws and magistrates; no Campanian was to be compelled to any duty, civil or military, nor to be in any way subject to the authority of the Carthaginian officers<sup>52</sup>. There must have been something of a Roman party opposed to the alliance with Carthage altogether; though the Roman writers mention one man only, Decius Magius, who was said to have resisted Hannibal to his face with such vehemence, that Hannibal sent him prisoner to Carthage<sup>53</sup>. But three hundred Campanian horsemen of the richer classes, who were serving in the Roman army in Sicily when Capua revolted, went to Rome as soon as their service was over, and were there received as Roman citizens<sup>54</sup>; and others, though unable to resist the general voice of their countrymen, must have longed in their hearts to return to the Roman alliance. Of the leaders of the Campanian people, we know little: Pacuvius Calavius, the principal author of the revolt, is never mentioned afterwards;

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Feelings of  
the Campanians.

<sup>51</sup> See the interesting dissertation on elephants by A.W. Schlegel in his *Indische Bibliothek*, Vol. i. 173, foll.

<sup>52</sup> Livy, XXIII. 7.

<sup>53</sup> Livy, XXIII. 7. 10.

<sup>54</sup> Livy, XXIII. 4. 7. 31.

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nor do we know the fate of his son Perolla, who, in his zeal for Rome, wished to assassinate Hannibal at his own father's table, when he made his public entrance into Capua<sup>55</sup>. Vibius Virrius is also named as a leading partisan of the Carthaginians<sup>56</sup>; and amid the pictures of the luxury and feebleness of the Campanians, their cavalry, which was formed entirely out of the wealthiest classes, is allowed to have been excellent<sup>57</sup>; and one brave and practised soldier, Jubellius Taurea, had acquired a high reputation amongst the Romans when he served with them, and had attracted the notice and respect of Hannibal<sup>58</sup>.

Measures to fill up the senate. Two dictators at the same time.

During the interval from active warfare afforded by the winter, the Romans took measures for filling up the numerous vacancies which the lapse of five years, and so many disastrous battles, had made in the numbers of the senate<sup>59</sup>. The natural course would have been to elect censors, to whom the duty of making out the roll of the senate properly belonged; but the vacancies were so many, and the censor's power in admitting new citizens, and degrading old ones, was so enormous, that the senate feared, it seems, to trust to the result of an ordinary election; and resolved that the censor's business should be performed by the oldest man in point of standing, of all those who had already been censors, and that he should be appointed dictator for this

<sup>55</sup> Livy, XXIII. 8, 9.

<sup>56</sup> Livy, XXIII. 6.

<sup>57</sup> Frontinus, Strateg. IV. 7.

29.

<sup>58</sup> Livy, XXIII. 8. 46, 47.

XXVI. 15. Valerius Maximus,

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<sup>59</sup> Livy, XXIII. 22.

especial duty, although there was one dictator already for the conduct of the war. The person thus selected was M. Fabius Buteo, who had been censor six and twenty years before, at the end of the first Punic war, and who had more recently been the chief of the embassy sent to declare war on Carthage after the destruction of Saguntum. That his appointment might want no legal formality, C. Varro, the only surviving consul, was sent for home from Apulia to nominate him, the senate intending to detain Varro in Rome till he should have presided at the comitia for the election of the next year's magistrates. The nomination as usual took place at midnight; and on the following morning M. Fabius appeared in the forum with his four and twenty lictors, and ascended the rostra to address the people. Invested with absolute power for six months, and especially charged with no less a task than the formation, at his discretion, of that great council which possessed the supreme government of the commonwealth, the noble old man neither shrunk weakly from so heavy a burden, nor ambitiously abused so vast an authority. He told the people that he would not strike off the name of a single senator from the list of the senate, and that, in filling up the vacancies, he would proceed by a defined rule; that he would first add all those who had held curule offices within the last five years, without having been admitted as yet into the senate; that in the second place he would take all who within the same period had been tribunes, ædiles, or

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quæstors; and thirdly, all those who could show in their houses spoils won in battle from an enemy, or who had received the wreath of oak for saving the life of a citizen in battle. In this manner 177 new senators were placed on the roll; the new members thus forming a large majority of the whole number of the senate, which amounted only to three hundred. This being done forthwith, the dictator, as he stood in the rostra, resigned his office, dismissed his lictors, and went down into the forum a private man. There he purposely lingered amidst the crowd, lest the people should leave their business to follow him home; but their admiration was not cooled by this delay; and when he withdrew at the usual hour, the whole people attended him to his house<sup>60</sup>. Such was Fabius Buteo's dictatorship, so wisely fulfilled, so simply and nobly resigned, that the dictatorship of Fabius Maximus himself has earned no purer glory.

Election of  
officers for  
year 539.

Varro, it is said, not wishing to be detained in Rome, returned to his army the next night, without giving the senate notice of his departure. The dictator, M. Junius, was therefore requested to repair to Rome to hold the comitia; and Ti. Gracchus and M. Marcellus were to come with him to report on the state of their several armies, and concert measures for the ensuing campaign<sup>61</sup>. There is no doubt that the senate determined on the persons to be proposed at the ensuing elections, and that, if any one else had come forward as a candidate, the

<sup>60</sup> Livy, XXIII. 23.

<sup>61</sup> Livy, XXIII. 24.

dictator who presided would have refused to receive votes for him. Accordingly the consuls and prætors chosen were all men of the highest reputation for ability and experience: the consuls were L. Postumius, whose defeat and death in Cisalpine Gaul were not yet known at Rome, and Ti. Gracchus, now master of the horse. The prætors were M. Valerius Lævinus, Ap. Claudius Pulcher, a grandson of the famous censor, Appius the blind, Q. Fulvius Flaccus, old in years, but vigorous in mind and body, who had already been censor, and twice consul, and Q. Mucius Scævola<sup>62</sup>. When the death of L. Postumius was known, his place was finally filled by no less a person than Q. Fabius Maximus: whilst Marcellus was still to retain his command with proconsular power, as his activity and energy could ill be spared at a time so critical<sup>63</sup>.

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The officers for the year being thus appointed, it remained to determine their several provinces, and to provide them with sufficient forces<sup>64</sup>. Fabius was to succeed to the army of the dictator, M. Junius; and his head quarters were advanced from Teanum to Cales, at the northern extremity of the Falernian plain, about seven English miles from Casilinum and the Vulturinus, and less than ten from Capua. The other consul, Ti. Sempronius, was to have no other Roman army than two legions of volunteer slaves, who were to be raised for the occasion; but both he and his colleague had the usual contingent of Latin

Distribution  
of provinces  
and troops.

<sup>62</sup> Livy, XXIII. 30. <sup>63</sup> Livy, XXIII. 31. <sup>64</sup> Livy, XXIII. 31, 32.



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and Italian allies. Gracchus named Sinuessa on the Appian road, at the point where the Massic hills run out with a bold headland into the sea, as the place of meeting for his soldiers; and his business was to protect the towns on the coast, which were still faithful to Rome, such as Cuma and Neapolis. Marcellus was to command two new Roman legions, and to lie as before in his camp above Nola; while his old army was sent into Sicily to relieve the legions there, and enable them to return to Italy, where they formed a fourth army under the command of M. Valerius Lævinus, the prætor peregrinus, in Apulia. The small force which Varro had commanded in Apulia was ordered to Tarentum, to add to the strength of that important place; while Varro himself was sent with proconsular power into Picenum, to raise soldiers, and to watch the road along the Adriatic by which the Gauls might have sent reinforcements to Hannibal. Q. Fulvius Flaccus, the prætor urbanus, remained at Rome to conduct the government, and had no other military command than that of a small fleet for the defence of the coast on both sides of the Tiber. Of the other two prætors, Ap. Claudius was to command in Sicily, and Q. Mucius in Sardinia; and P. Scipio as proconsul still commanded his old army of two legions in Spain. On the whole, including the volunteer slaves, there appeared to have been fourteen Roman legions in active service at the beginning of the year 539, without reckoning the soldiers who served in the fleets; and of these fourteen legions, nine were

employed in Italy. If we suppose that the Latin and Italian allies bore their usual proportion to the number of Roman soldiers in each army, we shall have a total of 140,000 men, thus divided; 20,000 in Spain, and the same number in Sicily; 10,000 in Sardinia; 20,000 under each of the consuls; 20,000 with Marcellus; 20,000 under Lævinus in Apulia; and 10,000 in Tarentum.

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Seventy thousand men were thus in arms, besides the seamen, out of a population of citizens which at the last census before the war had amounted only to 270,213<sup>65</sup>, and which had since been thinned by so many disastrous battles. Nor was the drain on the finances of Rome less extraordinary. The legions in the provinces had indeed been left to their own resources as to money; but the nine legions serving in Italy must have been paid regularly; for war could not there be made to support war; and if the Romans had been left to live at free quarters upon their Italian allies, they would have driven them to join Hannibal in mere self-defence. Yet the legions in Italy cost the government in pay, food, and clothing, at the rate of 541,800 denarii a month; and as they were kept on service throughout the year, the annual expense was 6,501,600 denarii, or in Greek money, reckoning the denarius as equal to the drachma, 1083 Euboic talents. To meet these enormous demands on the treasury, the government resorted to the simple expedient of doubling the year's

Extraordinary exertions of the Romans, military and financial.

<sup>65</sup> Livy, Epit. XX.

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taxes, and calling at once for the payment of one half of this amount, leaving the other to be paid at the end of the year<sup>66</sup>. It was a struggle for life and death; and the people were in a mood to refuse no sacrifices, however costly: but the war must have cut off so many sources of wealth, and agriculture itself must have so suffered from the calling away of so many hands from the cultivation of the land, that we wonder how the money could be found, and how many of the poorer citizens' families could be provided with daily bread.

Other mili-  
tary means  
of the  
Romans.

In addition to the five regular armies which the Romans brought into the field in Italy, an irregular warfare was also going on, we know not to what extent; and bands of peasants and slaves were armed in many parts of the country to act against the revolted Italians, and to ravage their territory. For instance, a great tract of forest in Bruttium, as we have seen, was the domain of the Roman people; this would be farmed like all the other revenues; and the publicani who farmed it, or the wealthy citizens who turned out cattle to pasture in it, would have large bodies of slaves employed as shepherds, herdsmen, and woodmen, who, when the Bruttian towns on the coast revolted, would at once form a guerilla force capable of doing them great mischief. And lastly, besides all these forces, regular and irregular, the Romans still held most of the principal towns in the south of Italy; because they had long since converted them into Latin colonies. Brundi-

<sup>66</sup> Livy, XXIII. 31.

sium on the Ionian sea, Paestum on the coast of Lucania, Luceria, Venusia, and Beneventum in the interior, were all so many strong fortresses, garrisoned by soldiers of the Latin name, in the very heart of the revolted districts<sup>67</sup>; whilst the Greek cities of Cumæ and Neapolis in Campania, and Rhegium on the straits of Messina, were held for Rome by their own citizens with a devotion no way inferior to that of the Latin colonies themselves<sup>68</sup>.

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Against this mass of enemies, the moment that they had learnt to use their strength, Hannibal, even within six months after the battle of Cannæ, was already contending at a disadvantage. We have seen that he had detached two officers with two divisions of his army, one into Lucania, the other into Bruttium, to encourage the revolt of those countries, and then to organize their resources in men and money for the advancement of the common cause. Most of the Bruttians took up arms immediately as Hannibal's allies, and put themselves under the command of his officer, Himilcon; but Petelia, one of their cities, was for some reason or other inflexible in its devotion to Rome, and endured a siege of eleven months, suffering all extremities of famine before it surrendered<sup>69</sup>. Thus Himilcon must have been still engaged in besieging it long after the campaign was opened in the neighbourhood of Capua. The Samnites also had taken up arms, and apparently were

Hannibal's  
resources.

<sup>67</sup> Livy, XXVII. 10.

61. XXIII. 20. 30. Appian, VII.

<sup>68</sup> Livy, XXIII. 1. 36, 37. XXIV. 1.

28. Valerius Maximus, VI. 6. Ext. 2.

<sup>69</sup> Polybius, VII. 1. Livy, XXII.

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attached to Hannibal's own army: the return of their whole population of the military age, made ten years before during the Gaulish invasion, had stated it at 70,000 foot, and 7000 horse<sup>70</sup>; but the Pentrians, the most powerful tribe of their nation, were still faithful to Rome; and the Samnites, like the Romans themselves, had been thinned by the slaughter of Thrasymenus and Cannæ, which they had shared as their allies. It is vexatious that we have no statement of the amount of Hannibal's old army, any more than of the allies who joined him, at any period of the war later than the battle of Cannæ. His reinforcements from home, as we have seen, were very trifling; while his two divisions in Lucania and Bruttium, and the garrisons which he had been obliged to leave in some of the revolted towns, as, for example, at Arpi in Apulia<sup>71</sup>, must have considerably lessened the force under his own personal command. Yet, with the accession of the Samnites and Campanians, it was probably much stronger than any one of the Roman armies opposed to him; quite as strong indeed, in all likelihood, as was consistent with the possibility of feeding it.

Fall of  
Casilinum.

Before the winter was over, Casilinum fell. The garrison had made a valiant defence, and yielded at last to famine: they were allowed to ransom themselves by paying each man seven ounces of gold for his life and liberty. The plunder which they had won from the old inhabitants enabled them to dis-

<sup>70</sup> Polybius, II 24. 10. <sup>71</sup> Livy, XXIV. 46, 47. Appian, VII. 31.

charge this large sum; and they were then allowed to march out unhurt, and retire to Cumæ. Casilinum again became a Campanian town; but its important position, at once covering Capua, and securing a passage over the Vulturnus, induced Hannibal to garrison it with seven hundred soldiers of his own army<sup>72</sup>.

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The season for active operations was now arrived. The three Roman armies of Fabius, Gracchus, and Marcellus, had taken up their positions round Campania; and Hannibal marched out of Capua, and encamped his army on the mountain above it, on that same Tifata where the Samnites had so often taken post in old times, when they were preparing to invade the Campanian plain<sup>73</sup>. Tifata did not then exhibit that bare and parched appearance which it has now; the soil, which has accumulated in the plain below, so as to have risen several feet above its ancient level, has been washed down in the course of centuries, and after the destruction of its protecting woods, from the neighbouring mountains; and Tifata in Hannibal's time furnished grass in abundance for his cattle in its numerous glades, and offered cool and healthy summer quarters for his men. There he lay waiting for some opportunity of striking a blow against his enemies around him, and eagerly watching the progress of his intrigues with the Tarentines, and his negotiations with the king of Macedon. A party at Tarentum began to open a correspondence

Hannibal  
encamps on  
mount  
Tifata.  
Rome de-  
serted by her  
allies.

<sup>72</sup> Livy, XXIII. 19, 20.

<sup>73</sup> Livy, XXIII. 36. VII. 29.



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with him immediately after the battle of Cannæ<sup>74</sup>; and since he had been in Campania he had received an embassy from Philip, king of Macedon, and had concluded an alliance, offensive and defensive, with the ambassadors, who acted with full powers in their master's name<sup>75</sup>. Such were his prospects on one side, while, if he looked westward and south-west, he saw Sardinia in open revolt against Rome<sup>76</sup>; and in Sicily the death of Hiero at the age of ninety, and the succession of his grandson Hieronymus, an ambitious and inexperienced youth, were detaching Syracuse also from the Roman alliance. Hannibal had already received an embassy from Hieronymus, to which he had replied by sending a Carthaginian officer of his own name to Sicily, and two Syracusan brothers, Hippocrates and Epicyles, who had long served with him in Italy and in Spain, being in fact Carthaginians by their mother's side, and having become naturalized at Carthage, since Agathocles had banished their grandfather, and their father had married and settled in his place of exile<sup>77</sup>. Thus the effect of the battle of Cannæ seemed to be shaking the whole fabric of the Roman dominion; their provinces were revolting; their firmest allies were deserting them; while the king of Macedon himself, the successor of Alexander, was throwing the weight of his power, and of all his acquired and inherited glory, into the scale of their enemies. Seeing the

<sup>74</sup> Livy, XXII. 61. Appian, VII. 32.

<sup>76</sup> Livy, XXIII. 32. 34.

<sup>75</sup> Livy, XXIII. 33. Zonaras, IX. 4.

<sup>77</sup> Livy, XXIII. 4. 6. Polybius,

fruit of his work thus fast ripening, Hannibal sat quietly on the summit of Tifata, to break forth like the lightning flash when the storm should be fully gathered.

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Thus the summer of 539 was like a breathing time, in which both parties were looking at each other, and considering each other's resources, while they were recovering strength after their past efforts, and preparing for a renewal of the struggle. Fabius, with the authority of the senate, issued an order, calling on the inhabitants of all the country which either actually was, or was likely to become, the seat of war, to clear their corn off the ground, and carry it into the fortified cities, before the first of June, threatening to lay waste the land, sell the slaves, and burn the farm buildings, of any one who should disobey the order<sup>78</sup>. In the utter confusion of the Roman calendar at this period, it is difficult to know whether in any given year it was in advance of the true time, or behind it; so that we can scarcely tell whether the corn was only to be got in when ripe without needless delay, or whether it was to be cut when green, lest Hannibal should use it as forage for his cavalry. But at any rate Fabius was now repeating the system which he had laid down in his dictatorship, and hoped by wasting the country to oblige Hannibal to retreat; for his means of transport were not sufficient for him to feed his army from a distance: hence, when the resources in

Measures of  
Fabius to  
cut off  
Hannibal's  
supplies.

<sup>78</sup> Livy, XXIII. 32.

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A.C. 215.  
Massacre of  
2000 Ca-  
puans at a  
festival by  
Gracchus.

his immediate neighbourhood were exhausted, he was obliged to move elsewhere.

Meanwhile Gracchus had crossed the Vulturinus near its mouth, and was now at Liternum, busily employed in exercising and training his heterogeneous army. The several Campanian cities were accustomed to hold a joint festival every year at a place called Hamæ, only three miles from Cumæ<sup>79</sup>. These festivals were seasons of general truce, so that the citizens even of hostile nations met at them safely: the government of Capua announced to the Cumæans, that their chief magistrate and all their senators would appear at Hamæ as usual on the day of the solemnity; and they invited the senate of Cumæ to meet them. At the same time they said that an armed force would be present to repel any interruption from the Romans. The Cumæans informed Gracchus of this; and he attacked the Capuans in the night, when they were in such perfect security, that they had not even fortified a camp, but were sleeping in the open country, and massacred about 2000 of them, among whom was Marius Alfius, the supreme magistrate of Capua. The Romans charge the Capuans with having meditated treachery against the Cumæans, and say that they were caught in their own snare; but this could only be a suspicion, while the overt acts of violence were their own. Hannibal no sooner heard of this disaster, than he descended from Tifata, and

<sup>79</sup> Livy, XXIII. 35.

hastened to Hamæ, in the hope of provoking the enemy to battle in the confidence of their late success. But Gracchus was too wary to be so tempted, and had retreated in good time to Cumæ, where he lay safe within the walls of the town<sup>80</sup>. It is said that Hannibal, having supplied himself with all things necessary for a siege, attacked the place in form, and was repulsed with loss, so that he returned defeated to his camp at Tifata. A consular army defending the walls of a fortified town was not indeed likely to be beaten in an assault; and neither could a maritime town, with the sea open, be easily starved; nor could Hannibal linger before it safely, as Fabius, with a second consular army, was preparing to cross the Vulturnus.

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Casilinum being held by the enemy, Fabius was obliged to cross at a higher point behind the mountains, nearly opposite to Allifæ; and he then descended the left bank to the confluence of the Calor with the Vulturnus, crossed the Calor, and passing between Taburnus and the mountains above Caserta and Maddaloni, stormed the town of Saticula, and joined Marcellus in his camp above Suessula<sup>81</sup>. He was again anxious for Nola, where the popular party were said to be still plotting the surrender of the town to Hannibal: to stop this mischief, he sent Marcellus with his whole army to garrison Nola, while he himself took his place in the camp above Suessula. Gracchus on his side advanced from

Strength of  
the Roman  
armies.

<sup>80</sup> Livy, XXIII. 36.

<sup>81</sup> Livy, XXIII. 39.

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A.C. 215.

Cumæ towards Capua; so that three Roman armies, amounting in all to above sixty thousand men, were on the left bank of the Volturnus together; and all, so far as appears, in free communication with each other. They availed themselves of their numbers and of their position, to send plundering parties out on their rear to over-run the lands of the revolted Samnites and Hirpinians; and as the best troops of both these nations were with Hannibal on Tifata, no force was left at home sufficient to check the enemy's incursions. Accordingly the complaints of the sufferers were loud, and a deputation was sent to Hannibal, imploring him to protect his allies <sup>82</sup>.

Hannibal  
receives his  
reinforce-  
ments.

Already Hannibal felt that the Roman generals understood their business, and had learnt to use their numbers wisely. On ground where his cavalry could act, he would not have feared to engage their three armies together; but when they were amongst mountains, or behind walls, his cavalry were useless, and he could not venture to attack them: besides, he did not wish to expose the territory of Capua to their ravages; and therefore he did not choose lightly to move from Tifata. But the prayers of the Samnites were urgent; his partisans in Nola might require his aid, or might be able to admit him into the town; and his expected reinforcement of cavalry and elephants from Carthage had landed safely in Bruttium, and was on its way to join him, which the position of Fabius and Marcellus might render difficult,

<sup>82</sup> Livy, XXIII. 41, 42.

if he made no movement to favour it. He therefore left Tifata, advanced upon Nola, and timed his operation so well, that his reinforcements arrived at the moment when he was before Nola; and neither Fabius nor Marcellus attempted to prevent their junction <sup>83</sup>.

Thus encouraged, and perhaps not aware of the strength of the garrison, Hannibal not only overran the territory of Nola, but surrounded the town with his soldiers, in the hope of taking it by escalade. Marcellus was alike watchful and bold; he threw open the gates and made a sudden sally, by which he drove back the enemy within their camp; and this success, together with his frank and popular bearing, won him, it is said, the affections of all parties at Nola, and put a stop to all intrigues within the walls <sup>84</sup>. A more important consequence of this action was the desertion of above 1200 men, Spanish foot, and Numidian horse, from Hannibal's army to the Romans <sup>85</sup>; as we do not find that their example was followed by others, it is probable that they were not Hannibal's old soldiers, but some of the troops which had just joined him, and which could not as yet have felt the spell of his personal ascendancy. Still their treason naturally made him uneasy, and would for the moment excite a general suspicion in the army: the summer too was drawing to a close; and wishing to relieve Capua from the burden of feeding his troops, he marched away into Apulia, and fixed his quarters for the winter near Arpi.

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Advantages  
gained by  
Marcellus.  
Hannibal  
marches into  
Apulia.

<sup>83</sup> Livy, XXIII. 43.

<sup>84</sup> Livy, XXIII. 44, 45, 46.

<sup>85</sup> Livy, XXIII. 40.



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Gracchus, with one consular army, followed him; while Fabius, after having ravaged the country round Capua, and carried off the green corn, as soon as it was high enough out of the ground, to his camp above Suessula, to furnish winter food for his cavalry, quartered his own army there for the winter, and ordered Marcellus to retain a sufficient force to secure Nola, and to send the rest of his men home to be disbanded <sup>86</sup>.

Complete  
success of  
the Romans  
in Sardinia.

Thus the campaign was ended, and Hannibal had not marked it with a victory. The Romans had employed their forces so wisely, that they had forced him to remain mostly on the defensive; and his two offensive operations, against Cumæ and against Nola, had both been baffled. In Sardinia their success had been brilliant and decisive. Mucius the prætor fell ill soon after he arrived in the island; upon which the senate ordered Q. Fabius, the city prætor, to raise a new legion, and to send it over into Sardinia, under any officer whom he might think proper to appoint. He chose a man, in age, rank, and character, most resembling himself, T. Manlius Torquatus, who in his first consulship, twenty years before, had fought against the Sardinians, and obtained a triumph over them. Manlius' second command in the island was no less brilliant than his first: he totally defeated the united forces of the Sardinians and Carthaginians, took their principal generals prisoners, reduced the revolted towns to obedience,

<sup>86</sup> Livy, XXIII. 46. 48.

levied heavy contributions of corn and money as a punishment of their rebellion, and then embarked with the troops which he had brought out with him, only leaving the usual force of a single legion in the island, and returned to Rome to report the complete submission of Sardinia. The money of his contributions was paid over to the quæstors, for the payment of the armies; the corn was given to the ædiles to supply the markets of Rome<sup>87</sup>.

Fortune in another quarter served the Romans no less effectually. The Macedonian ambassadors, after having concluded their treaty with Hannibal at Tifata, made their way back into Bruttium in safety, and embarked to return to Greece. But their ship was taken off the Calabrian coast by the Roman squadron on that station; and the ambassadors with all their papers were sent prisoners to Rome<sup>88</sup>. A vessel which had been of their company escaped the Romans, and informed the king what had happened. He was obliged therefore to send a second embassy to Hannibal, as the former treaty had never reached him; and although this second mission went and returned safely, yet the loss of time was irreparable, and nothing could be done till another year<sup>89</sup>. Meanwhile the Romans, thus timely made aware of the king's intentions, resolved to find such employment for him at home as should prevent his invading Italy. M. Valerius Lævinus was to take the command of the fleet at Tarentum and Brundisium, and to cross

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A.U.C. 539.  
A.C. 215.

Capture of  
the Macedo-  
nian am-  
bassadors.  
Expedition  
to Greece.

<sup>87</sup> Livy, XXIII. 34. 41.

<sup>88</sup> Livy, XXIII. 38.

<sup>89</sup> Livy, XXIII. 39.

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A.C. 215.

the Ionian gulf, in order to rouse the Ætolians, and the barbarian chiefs whose tribes bordered on Philip's western frontier, and, with such other allies as could be engaged in the cause, to form a Greek coalition against Macedon<sup>90</sup>.

Measures of  
the Romans  
to raise  
money; a  
loan.

These events, and the continued successes of their army in Spain, revived the spirits of the Romans, and encouraged them to make still greater sacrifices, in the hope that they would not be made in vain. The distress of the treasury was at its height: P. Scipio, in announcing his victories, reported that his soldiers and seamen were in a state of utter destitution; that they had no pay, corn, or clothing; and that the two latter articles must at any rate be supplied from Rome<sup>91</sup>. His demands were acknowledged to be reasonable; but the republic had lost so large a portion of her foreign revenue, that her chief resource now lay in the taxation of her own people: this had been doubled in the present year, yet was found inadequate; and to increase it, or even to continue it at its present amount, was altogether impossible. Accordingly the city prætor, Q. Fulvius, addressed the people from the rostra, explained the distress of the government to them, and appealed to the patriotism of the monied class to assist their country with a loan. Fabius did not mean to hold out an opportunity to the public creditor of investing his money to advantage, subject only to the risk

<sup>90</sup> Livy, XXIII. 38. 48. XXIV.  
10. Zonaras, IX. 4.

<sup>91</sup> Livy, XXIII. 48.

of a national bankruptcy: on this Roman loan no interest was to be paid; the creditors were simply assured that, as soon as the treasury was solvent, their demands should be discharged before all others; in the mean time their money was totally lost to them. But, on the other hand, opportunities of investing money profitably must have been greatly diminished by the war; to lend it to the government was not therefore so great a sacrifice. Still a public spirit was shown in the ready answer to the prætor's appeal, such as merchants have often honourably displayed in seasons of public danger; mixed up however—for when are human motives altogether pure?—with a considerable regard to personal advantage. Three companies were formed, each, as it seems, composed of eighteen members and a president, or chairman; and these were to supply the corn and clothing which the armies might require. But in return they demanded an exemption from military service, whilst they were thus serving the state with their money; and they also required the government to undertake the whole sea risk, whether from storms, or from the enemy: whatever articles were thus lost were to be the loss of the nation, and not of the companies<sup>92</sup>. It will be seen hereafter how some of the contractors abused this equitable condition, and wilfully destroyed cargoes of small value, in order to recover the insurance upon them from the government. That a citizen should enrich

CHAP.  
XLIV.  
A.U.C. 539.  
A.C. 215.

<sup>92</sup> Livy, XXIII. 49.

CHAP.  
XLIV.  
A.U.C. 539.  
A.C. 215.

himself by frauds practised on his country in such a season of distress and danger is sufficiently monstrous; but the spirit of what is so emphatically called jobbing is inveterate in human nature; and we cannot wonder at its existence among Roman citizens, while Rome was struggling for life or death, when it has been known to find its way into the prison of Christian martyrs<sup>93</sup>.

Property  
tax.

Yet neither the ordinary taxation, nor the loan in addition to it, were sufficient for the vast expenditure of the war. The hostility of Macedon had made it necessary to raise an additional fleet; for the coasts of Italy must be protected; and Hannibal's free communications with Africa must be restrained; and now another fleet was required, by the threatening aspect of affairs in Sicily. Accordingly a graduated property tax for the occasion was imposed on all citizens whose property amounted to or exceeded 100,000 asses; that is, they were required to furnish a certain number of their slaves as seamen, to arm and equip them, and to provide them with dressed provisions for thirty days, and with pay, in some cases for six months, in others for a whole year<sup>94</sup>. The senators, who were rated higher than all other citizens, were obliged in this manner each to provide eight seamen, with pay for the longer term of the whole year.

Whilst the commonwealth was making these extraordinary efforts, it was of the last importance that

<sup>93</sup> See Cyprian, Epp. X. XXII.  
Ed. Rigalt.

<sup>94</sup> Liv. XXIV. 11. comp. XXVI.  
36. XXXIV. 6.

they should not be wasted by incompetent leaders, either at home or abroad. Gracchus was watching Hannibal in Apulia; so that Fabius went to Rome to hold the comitia. It was not by accident doubtless, that he had previously sent home to fix the day of the meeting, or that his own arrival was so nicely timed, that he reached Rome when the tribes were actually met in the Campus Martius: thus, without entering the city, he passed along under the walls, and took his place as presiding magistrate at the comitia<sup>95</sup>, while his lictors still bore the naked axe in the midst of their fasces, the well known sign of that absolute power which the consul enjoyed every where out of Rome. Fabius, in concert no doubt with Q. Fulvius and T. Manlius, and other leading senators, had already determined who were to be consuls: when the first century, in the free exercise of its choice, gave its vote in favour of T. Otacilius and M. Æmilius Regillus, he at once stopped the election, and told the people that this was no time to choose ordinary consuls; that they were electing generals to oppose Hannibal, and should fix upon those men under whom they would most gladly risk their sons' lives and their own, if they stood at that moment on the eve of battle. "Wherefore, crier," he concluded, "call back the century to give its votes over again<sup>96</sup>."

Otacilius, who was present, although he had mar-

CHAP.  
XLIV.  
A.U.C. 540.  
A.C. 214.  
Fabius holds  
the comitia.

<sup>95</sup> Livy, XXIV. 7.

<sup>96</sup> Livy, XXIV. 8.



CHAP.  
XLIV.  
A.U.C. 540.  
A.C. 214.  
Fabius and  
Marcellus  
are elected  
consuls.

ried Fabius' niece, protested loudly against this interference with the votes of the people, and charged Fabius with trying to procure his own re-election. The old man had always been so famous for the gentleness of his nature, that he was commonly known by the name of "the Lamb<sup>97</sup>;" but now he acted with the decision of Q. Fulvius or T. Manlius; he peremptorily ordered Otacilius to be silent, and bade him remember that his lictors carried the naked axe: the century was called back, and now gave its voice for Q. Fabius and M. Marcellus. All the centuries of all the tribes unanimously confirmed this choice<sup>98</sup>. Q. Fulvius was also re-elected prætor; and the senate by a special vote continued him in the prætorship of the city, an office which put him at the head of the home government. The election of the other three prætors, it seems, was left free: so the people, as they could not have Otacilius for their consul, gave him one of the remaining prætorships, and bestowed the other two on Q. Fabius, the consul's son, who was then curule ædile, and on P. Cornelius Lentulus.

Great exertions of the Romans: armies abroad.

Great as the exertions of the commonwealth had been in the preceding year, they were still greater this year. Ten legions were to be employed

<sup>97</sup> *Ovicula*: see Aurelius Victor de Vir. Illustr. c. 43. Plutarch, Fabius, c. 1. 'Ὁ δὲ Ὀσσυκοῦλας σημαίνει τὸ προβάτιον· ἐτέθη δὲ πρὸς τὴν πρᾶξιν καὶ βαρύτητα τοῦ ἤθους ἔτι παιδὸς ὄντος. Τὸ γὰρ ἡσύχιον αὐτοῦ καὶ σιωπηλὸν καὶ μετὰ πολλῆς εὐλαβείας τῶν παιδικῶν ἀπτόμενον ἡδονῶν, βραδέως δὲ καὶ διαπόνως

δεχόμενον τὰς μαθήσεις, εὐκόλον δὲ πρὸς τοὺς συνήθειαι καὶ κατήκοον ἀβελτερίας τινὸς καὶ νωθρότητος ὑπόνοιαν εἶχε παρὰ τοῖς ἐκτός· ὀλίγοι δ' ἦσαν οἱ τὸ δυσκίνητον ὑπὸ βᾶθους καὶ τὸ μεγαλόψυχον καὶ λεοντώδες ἐν τῇ φύσει καθορῶντες αὐτοῦ.

<sup>98</sup> Livy, XXIV. 9.

in different parts of Italy, besides the reserve army of the two city legions, which was to protect the capital. Two legions were to hold Sardinia, where the sparks of revolt were probably not altogether extinguished: two were sent to Sicily with a prospect of no inactive service; and two were stationed in Cisalpine Gaul, there being some likelihood, we must suppose, that the Gauls would soon require a force in their neighbourhood; or possibly the colonies of Placentia and Cremona were thought insecure, if they were left to their own resources, insulated as they were in the midst of the enemy's country. Finally, the Scipios still commanded their two legions in Spain; and the naval service in Sicily, and on the coast of Calabria, required no fewer than a hundred and fifty ships of war<sup>99</sup>.

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A.U.C. 540.  
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The Italian armies were disposed as follows: Cales, and the camp above Suessula and Nola, were again to be the head quarters of the two consuls, each of whom was to command a regular consular army of two legions. Gracchus, with proconsular power, was to keep his own two legions, and was at present wintering near Hannibal in the north of Apulia. Q. Fabius, one of the new prætors, was to be ready to enter Apulia with an army of equal strength, so soon as Gracchus should be called into Lucania and Sannium, to take part in the active operations of the campaign. C. Varro, with his single legion, was

Distribution  
of those in  
Italy.

<sup>99</sup> Livy, XXIV. 11.

CHAP.  
XLIV.  
A.U.C. 540.  
A.C. 214.

still to hold Picenum; and M. Lævinus, also with proconsular power, was to remain at Brundisium with another single legion<sup>100</sup>. The two city legions served as a sort of depôt, to recruit the armies in the field in case of need; and there was a large armed population, serving as garrisons in the Latin colonies, and in other important posts in various parts of the country, the amount of which it is not possible to estimate. Nor can we calculate the numbers of the guerilla bands, which were on foot in Lucania, Bruttium, and possibly in Samnium, and which hindered Hannibal from having the whole resources of those countries at his disposal. The Roman party was nowhere probably altogether extinct: wealthy Lucanians, who were attached to Rome, would muster their slaves and peasantry, and either by themselves, or getting some Roman officer to head them, would ravage the lands of the Carthaginian party, and carry on a continued harassing warfare against the towns or districts which had joined Hannibal. Thus the whole south of Italy was one wide flood of war, the waters every where dashing and eddying, and running in cross currents innumerable; whilst the regular armies, like the channels of the rivers, held on their way, distinguishable amidst the chaos by their greater rapidity and power.

Hannibal  
marches into  
Campania.

Hannibal watched this mass of war with the closest attention. To make head against it directly being

<sup>100</sup> Livy, XXIV. 12. 10.

impossible, his business was to mark his opportunities, to strike wherever there was an opening; and being sure that the enemy would not dare to attack him on his own ground, he might maintain his army in Italy for an indefinite time, whilst Carthage, availing herself of the distraction of her enemy's power, renewed her efforts to conquer Spain and recover Sicily. He hoped ere long to win Tarentum; and, if left to his own choice, he would probably have moved thither at once, when he broke up from his winter quarters: but the weakness or fears of the Campanians hung with encumbering weight upon him; and an earnest request was sent to him from Capua, calling on him to hasten to its defence, lest the two consular armies should besiege it<sup>101</sup>. Accordingly he broke up from his winter quarters at Arpi, and marched once more into Campania, where he established his army as before on the summit of Tifata.

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The perpetual carelessnesses and omissions in Livy's narrative, drawn as it is from various sources, with no pains to make one part correspond with another, render it a work of extreme difficulty to present an account of these operations, which shall be at once minute and intelligible. We also miss that notice of chronological details, which is essential to the history of a complicated campaign. Even the year in which important events happened is sometimes doubtful; yet we want, not to fix the year only, but

Fabius collects the Roman armies around Hannibal.

<sup>101</sup> Livy, XXIV. 12.

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XLIV.  
A.U.C. 540.  
A.C. 214.

the month, that we may arrange each action in its proper order. When Hannibal set out on his march into Campania, Fabius was still at Rome; but the two new legions, which were to form his army, were already assembled at Cales; and Fabius, on hearing of Hannibal's approach, set out instantly to take the command. His old army, which had wintered in the camp above Suessula, had apparently been transferred to his colleague, Marcellus; and a considerable force had been left at the close of the last campaign to garrison Nola. Fabius however wished to have three Roman armies co-operating with each other, as had been the case the year before; and he sent orders to Gracchus to move forwards from Apulia, and to occupy Beneventum; while his son, Q. Fabius, the prætor, with a fourth army, was to supply the place of Gracchus at Luceria<sup>102</sup>. It seemed as if Hannibal, having once entered Campania, was to be hemmed in on every side, and not permitted to escape: but these movements of the Roman armies induced him to call Hanno to his aid, the officer who commanded in Lucania and Bruttium, and who, with a small force of Numidian cavalry, had an auxiliary army under his orders, consisting chiefly of Italian allies. Hanno advanced accordingly in the direction of Beneventum, to watch the army of Gracchus, and, if an opportunity offered, to bring it to action<sup>103</sup>.

Meanwhile Hannibal, having left some of his best

<sup>102</sup> Livy, XXIV. 12.

<sup>103</sup> Livy, XXIV. 14.

troops to maintain his camp at Tifata, and probably to protect the immediate neighbourhood of Capua, descended into the plain towards the coast, partly in the hope of surprising a fortified post, which the Romans had lately established at Puteoli, and partly to ravage the territory of Cumæ and Neapolis. But the avowed object of his expedition was to offer sacrifice to the powers of the unseen world, on the banks of the dreaded lake of Avernus<sup>101</sup>. That crater of an old volcano, where the very soil still seemed to breathe out fire, while the unbroken rim of its basin was covered with the uncleared masses of the native woods, was the subject of a thousand mysterious stories, and was regarded as one of those spots where the lower world approached most nearly to the light of day, and where offerings paid to the gods of the dead were most surely acceptable. Such worship was a main part of the national religion of the Carthaginians; and Hannibal, whose latest act, before he set out on his great expedition, had been a journey to Gades to sacrifice to the god of his fathers, the Hercules of Tyre, visited the lake of Avernus, it is probable, quite as much in sincere devotion, as in order to mask his design of attacking Puteoli. Whilst he was engaged in his sacrifice, five noble citizens of Tarentum came to him, entreating him to lead his army into their country, and engaging that the city should be surrendered, as soon as his standard should be visible

CHAP.  
XLIV.  
A.U.C. 540.  
A.C. 214.  
Hannibal  
offers sacrifice at the  
lake Aver-  
nus.

<sup>101</sup> Livy, XXIV. 12, 13.



CHAP.  
XLIV.  
A.U.C. 540.  
A.C. 214.

from the walls. He listened to their invitation gladly: they offered him one of the richest cities in Italy, with an excellent harbour, equally convenient for his own communication with Carthage, and for the reception of the fleet of his Macedonian allies, whom he was constantly expecting to welcome in Italy. He promised that he would soon be at Tarentum; and the Tarentines returned home to prepare their plans against his arrival<sup>105</sup>.

He marches  
against  
Tarentum,

With this prospect before him, it is not likely that he would engage in any serious enterprise in Campania. Finding that he could not surprise Puteoli, he ravaged the lands of the Cumæans and Neapolitans. According to the ever suspicious stories of the exploits of Marcellus, he made a third attempt upon Nola, and was a third time repulsed; Marcellus having called down the army from the camp above Suessula to assist him in defending the town. Then, says the writer whom Livy copied, despairing of taking a place which he had so often attacked in vain, he marched off at once towards Tarentum<sup>106</sup>. The truth probably is, that, finding a complete consular army in Nola, and having left his light cavalry, and some of the flower of his infantry, in the camp on Tifata, he had no thought of attacking the town, but returned to Tifata to take the troops from thence; and having done this, and stayed long enough in Campania for the Capuans to get in their harvest safely, he set off on his march for Tarentum. None

<sup>105</sup> Livy, XXIV. 13.

<sup>106</sup> Livy, XXIV. 17.

of the Roman armies attempted to stop him, or so much as ventured to follow him. Fabius and Marcellus took advantage of his absence to besiege Casilinum with their united forces<sup>107</sup>; Gracchus kept wisely out of his reach, whilst he swept on like a fiery flood, laying waste all before him, from Tifata to the shores of the Ionian sea<sup>108</sup>. He certainly did not burn or plunder the lands of his own allies, either in Samnium or Lucania; but his march lay near the Latin colony of Venusia; and the Lucanians and Samnites in his army would carefully point out those districts, which belonged to their countrymen of the Roman party; above all, those ample tracts which the Romans had wrested from their fathers, and which were now farmed by the Roman publicani, or occupied by Roman citizens. Over all these, no doubt, the African and Numidian horse poured far and wide; and the fire and sword did their work.

Yet, after all, Hannibal missed his prey. Three but fails. days before he reached Tarentum, a Roman officer arrived in the city, whom M. Valerius Lævinus had sent in haste from Brundisium to provide for its defence<sup>109</sup>. There was probably a small Roman garrison in the citadel, to support him in case of need; but the aristocratical party in Tarentum itself, as elsewhere, was attached to Rome; and with their aid Livius, the officer whom Lævinus had sent, effectually repressed the opposite party, embodied the

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<sup>107</sup> Livy, XXIV. 19.

<sup>108</sup> Livy, XXIV. 20.

<sup>109</sup> Livy, XXIV. 20.

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population of the town, and made them keep guard on the walls, and selecting a certain number of persons, whose fidelity he most suspected, sent them off as hostages to Rome. When the Carthaginian army therefore appeared before the walls, no movement was made in their favour; and after waiting a few days in vain, Hannibal was obliged to retreat. His disappointment however did not make him lose his temper: he spared the Tarentine territory, no less when leaving it, than when he first entered it, in the hope of winning the city; a moderation which doubtless produced its effect, and confirmed the Tarentines in the belief that his professions of friendship had been made in honesty. But he carried off all the corn which he could find in the neighbourhood of Metapontum and Heraclea, and then returned to Apulia, and fixed his quarters for the winter at Salapia. His cavalry overran all the forest country above Brundisium, and drove off such numbers of horses which were kept there to pasture, that he was enabled to have four thousand broken in for the service of his army <sup>110</sup>.

The Romans  
 take Casi-  
 linum.

Meanwhile the Roman consuls in Campania were availing themselves of his absence, to press the siege of Casilinum. The place was so close to Capua, that it was feared the Capuans would attempt to relieve it; Marcellus therefore, with a second consular army, advanced from Nola to cover the siege. The defence was very obstinate; for there were

<sup>110</sup> Livy, XXIV. 20.

seven hundred of Hannibal's soldiers in the place, and two thousand Capuans; and Fabius, it is said, was disposed to raise the siege; but his colleague reminded him of the loss of reputation, if so small a town were allowed to baffle two consular armies; and the siege was continued. At last the Capuans offered to Fabius to surrender the town, on condition of being allowed to retire to Capua; and it appears that he accepted the terms, and that the garrison had begun to march out, when Marcellus broke in upon them, seized the open gate from which they were issuing, cut them down right and left, and forced his way into the city. Fabius, it is said, was able to keep his faith to no more than fifty of the garrison, who had reached his quarters before Marcellus arrived, and whom he sent unharmed to Capua. The rest of the Capuans and of Hannibal's soldiers were sent prisoners to Rome; and the inhabitants were divided amongst the neighbouring cities, to be kept in custody till the senate should determine their fate <sup>111</sup>.

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After this scandalous act of treachery, Marcellus returned to Nola, and there remained inactive, being confined, it was said, by illness <sup>112</sup>, till the senate, before the end of the summer, sent him over to Sicily to meet the danger that was gathering there. Fabius advanced into Samnium, combining his operations, it seems, with his son, who commanded a prætorian army in Apulia, and with Gracchus, who

Fabius  
ravages  
Samnium.

<sup>111</sup> Livy, XXIV. 19.

<sup>112</sup> Livy, XXIV. 20.

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was in Lucania, and whose army formed the link between the prætor in Apulia and his father in Samnium. These three armies were so formidable, that Hanno, the Carthaginian commander in Lucania, could not maintain his ground, but fell back towards Bruttium, leaving his allies to their own inadequate means of defence. Accordingly the Romans ravaged the country far and wide, and took so many towns that they boasted of having killed or captured 25,000 of the enemy<sup>113</sup>. After these expeditions, Fabius, it seems, led back his army to winter quarters in the camp above Suessula; Gracchus remained in Lucania; and Fabius the prætor wintered at Luceria.

Gracchus  
defeats Hanno,  
and  
enfranchises  
the slaves in  
his army.

I have endeavoured to follow the operations of the main armies on both sides throughout the campaign, without noticing those of Gracchus and Hanno in Lucania. But the most important action of the year, if we believe the Roman accounts, was the victory obtained by Gracchus near Beneventum, when he moved thither out of Apulia to co-operate with the consuls in Campania, and Hanno was ordered by Hannibal to march to the same point out of Lucania. Hanno, it is said, had about 17,000 foot, mostly Bruttians and Lucanians, and 1200 Numidian and Moorish horse; and Gracchus, encountering him near Beneventum, defeated him with the loss of almost all his infantry; he himself and his cavalry being the only part of the army that escaped<sup>114</sup>. The num-

<sup>113</sup> Livy, XXIV. 20.

<sup>114</sup> Livy, XXIV. 14, 15, 16.

bers, as usual, are probably exaggerated immensely; but there is no reason to doubt that Gracchus gained an important victory; and it was rendered famous by his giving liberty to the volunteer slaves, by whose valour it had mainly been won. Some of these had behaved ill in the action, and were afraid that they should be punished, rather than rewarded; but Gracchus first set them all free without distinction, and then, sending for those who had misbehaved, made them severally swear that they would eat and drink standing, so long as their military service should last, by way of penance for their fault. Such a sentence, so different from the usual merciless severity of the Roman discipline, added to the general joy of the army; the soldiers marched back to Beneventum in triumph; and the people poured out to meet them, and entreated Gracchus that they might invite them all to a public entertainment. Tables were set out in the streets; and the freed slaves attracted every one's notice by their white caps, the well known sign of their enfranchisement, and by the strange sight of those who, in fulfilment of their penance, ate standing, and waited upon their worthier comrades. The whole scene delighted the generous and kind nature of Gracchus: to set free the slave and to relieve the poor appear to have been hereditary virtues in his family: to him, no less than to his unfortunate descendants, beneficence seemed the highest glory. He caused a picture to be painted, not of his victory over Hanno, but of the feasting of the enfranchised slaves in the streets of Bene-

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ventum, and placed it in the Temple of Liberty on the Aventine, which his father had built and dedicated <sup>115</sup>.

Hanno re-  
 trieves his  
 loss.

The battle of Beneventum obliged Hanno to fall back into Lucania, and perhaps as far as the confines of Bruttium. But he soon recruited his army, the Lucanians and Bruttians, as well as the Picentines, who lived on the shores of the gulf of Salerno, being very zealous in the cause; and ere long he revenged his defeat by a signal victory over an army of Lucanians of the Roman party, whom Gracchus had enlisted to act as an irregular force against their countrymen of the opposite faction. Still Hanno was not tempted to risk another battle with a Roman consular army; and when Gracchus advanced from Beneventum into Lucania, he retired again into Bruttium <sup>116</sup>.

Comitia for  
 new officers.

There seems to have been no farther dispute with regard to the appointment of consuls. Fabius and the leading members of the senate appear to have nominated such men as they thought most equal to the emergency; and no other candidates came forward. Fabius again held the comitia; and his son, Q. Fabius, who was prætor at the time, was elected consul together with Gracchus. The prætors were entirely changed. Q. Fulvius was succeeded in the city prætorship by M. Atilius Regulus, who had just resigned the censorship, and who had already been twice consul: the other three prætors were

<sup>115</sup> Livy, XXIV. 16.

<sup>116</sup> Livy, XXIV. 20.

M. Æmilius Lepidus, Cn. Fulvius Centumalus, and P. Sempronius Tuditanus. The two former were men of noble families: Sempronius appears to have owed his appointment to his resolute conduct at Cannæ, when he cut his way from the camp through the surrounding enemies, and escaped in safety to Canusium <sup>117</sup>.

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Thus another year passed over; and although the state of affairs was still dark, the tide seemed to be on the turn. Hannibal had gained no new victory; Tarentum had been saved from his hands; and Casilinum had been wrested from him. Public spirit was rising daily; and fresh instances of the patriotic devotion which possessed all classes of the commonwealth, were continually occurring. The owners of the slaves whom Gracchus had enfranchised refused to receive any price for them: the wealthy citizens who served in the cavalry determined not to take their pay; and their example was followed by the centurions of the legions. Trust monies belonging to minors, or to widows and unmarried women, were deposited in the treasury; and whatever sums the trustees had occasion to draw for, were paid by the quæstor in bills on the banking commissioners, or triumviri mensarii: it is probable that these bills were actually a paper currency, and that they circulated as money, on the security of the public faith. In the same way we must suppose that the government contracts were also paid in

Public spirit  
shown by  
the Romans.

<sup>117</sup> Livy, XXIV. 43.

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paper; for the censors, we are told, found the treasury unable to supply the usual sums for public works and entertainments; there was no money to repair or keep up the temples, or to provide horses for the games of the circus. Upon this the persons who were in the habit of contracting for these purposes, came forward in a body to the censors, and begged them to make their contracts as usual, promising not to demand payment before the end of the war. This must mean, I conceive, that they were to be paid in orders upon the treasury, which orders were to be converted into cash, when the present difficulties of the government should be at an end <sup>118</sup>.

Severe measures of the censors.

While such was the spirit of the people, any severity exercised by the government towards the timid or the unpatriotic was sure to be generally acceptable. The censors, M. Atilius Regulus and P. Furius Philus, summoned all those persons, most of them members of noble, and all of wealthy families, who had proposed to fly from Italy after the battle of Cannæ. L. Metellus, who was said to have been the first author of that proposal, was at this time quæstor; but he and all who were concerned in it were degraded from the equestrian order, and removed from their respective tribes. Two thousand citizens of lower rank were also removed from their tribes, and deprived of their political franchise, for having evaded military service during the last four years; and the senate inflicted an additional punish-

<sup>118</sup> Livy, XXIV. 18.

ment by ordering that they should serve as foot soldiers in Sicily, along with the remains of the army of Cannæ, and should continue to serve so long as the enemy was in Italy <sup>119</sup>. The case of Metellus seems to have been considered a hard one: in spite of the censor's sentence he was elected one of the tribunes in the following year. He then impeached the censors before the people; but the other nine tribunes interposed, and would not allow the trial to proceed <sup>120</sup>. If Metellus had been wronged, the people had made up for it by electing him tribune; but it was thought a dangerous precedent to subject the censors to a trial for the exercise of their undoubted prerogative, when there was no reason to suspect the honesty of their motives.

The forces to be employed in Italy in the approaching campaign were to consist of nine legions, three fewer than in the year before. The consuls were each to have their two legions, Gracchus in Lucania, and Fabius in Apulia. M. Æmilius was to command two legions also in Apulia, having his head quarters at Luceria; Cn. Fulvius with two more was to occupy the camp above Suessula; and Varro was to remain with his one legion in Picenum. Two consular armies of two legions each were required in Sicily; one commanded by Marcellus as proconsul, the other by P. Lentulus as proprætor: two legions were employed in Cisalpine Gaul under P. Sempronius, and two in Sardinia under their old

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Distribution  
of the Ro-  
man armies.

<sup>119</sup> Livy, XXIV. 18.

<sup>120</sup> Livy, XXIV. 43.

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commander, Q. Mucius. M. Valerius Lævinus retained his single legion and his fleet, to act against Philip on the eastern side of the Ionian sea; and P. Scipio and his brother were still continued in their command in Spain <sup>121</sup>.

Opening of  
the cam-  
paign.

Hannibal passed the winter at Salapia, where, the Romans said, was a lady whom he loved, and who became famous from her influence over him <sup>122</sup>. Whether his passion for her made him careless of everything else, or whether he was really taken by surprise, we know not; but the neighbouring town of Arpi was attacked by the consul Fabius, and given up to him by the inhabitants; and some Spaniards, who formed part of the garrison, entered into the Roman service <sup>123</sup>. Gracchus obtained some slight successes in Lucania; and some of the Bruttian towns returned to their old alliance with Rome; but a Roman contractor, T. Pomponius Veientanus, who had been empowered by the government to raise soldiers in Bruttium, and to employ them in plundering the enemies' lands, was rash enough to venture a regular action with Hanno, in which he was defeated and made prisoner <sup>124</sup>. This disaster checked the reaction in Bruttium for the present.

Hannibal  
lingers near  
Tarentum.

Meanwhile Hannibal's eyes were still fixed upon Tarentum; and thither he marched again as soon as he took the field, leaving Fabius behind him in

<sup>121</sup> Livy, XXIV. 44.      tuor. XII. and Hemsterhuis' note.  
<sup>122</sup> Appian, VII. 43. Pliny, <sup>123</sup> Livy, XXIV. 46, 47.  
III. 16. See Lucian, Dial. Mor- <sup>124</sup> Livy, XXV. 1.

Apulia. He passed the whole summer in the neighbourhood of Tarentum, and reduced several small towns in the surrounding country: but his friends in Tarentum made no movement; for they dared not compromise the safety of their countrymen and relations, who had been carried off as hostages to Rome. Accordingly the season wore away unmarked by any memorable action. Hannibal still lingered in the country of the Sallentines, unwilling to give up all hope of winning the prize he had so long sought; and to lull the suspicions of the Romans, he gave out that he was confined to his camp by illness, and that this had prevented his army from returning to its usual winter quarters in Apulia <sup>125</sup>.

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Matters were in this state, when tidings arrived at Tarentum, that the hostages, for whose safety their friends had been so anxious, had been all cruelly put to death at Rome, for having attempted to escape from their captivity <sup>126</sup>. Released in so shocking a manner from their former hesitation, and burning to revenge the blood of their friends, Hannibal's partisans no longer delayed. They communicated secretly with him, arranged the details of their attempt, and signed a treaty of alliance, by which he bound himself to respect the independence and liberty of the Tarentines, and only stipulated for the plunder of such houses as were occupied by Roman

Conspiracy  
to betray it  
to Hannibal.

<sup>125</sup> Polybius, VIII. 28. Livy, XXV. 8.

<sup>126</sup> Livy, XXV. 7.



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citizens<sup>127</sup>. Two young men, Philemenus and Nicon, were the leaders of the enterprise. Philemenus, under pretence of hunting, had persuaded the officer at one of the gates to allow him to pass in and out of the town by night without interruption. He was known to be devoted to his sport; he scarcely ever returned without having caught or killed some game or other; and by liberally giving away what he had caught, he won the favour and confidence, not only of the officer of the gate, but also of the Roman governor himself, M. Livius Macatus, a relation of M. Livius Salinator, who afterwards defeated Hasdrubal, but a man too indolent and fond of good cheer to be the governor of a town threatened by Hannibal. So little did Livius suspect any danger, that on the very day which the conspirators had fixed for their attempt, and when Hannibal with ten thousand men was advancing upon the town, he had invited a large party to meet him at the Temple of the Muses near the market-place, and was engaged from an early hour in festivity<sup>128</sup>.

Situation of  
Tarentum  
favourable  
to the con-  
spirators.

The city of Tarentum formed a triangle, two sides of which were washed by the water; the outer or western side by the Mediterranean; the inner, or north-eastern side by that remarkable land-locked basin, now called the Little Sea, which has a mouth narrower than the entrance into the Norwegian Fjords, but runs deep into the land, and spreads out into a wide surface of the calmest water,

<sup>127</sup> Polybius, VIII. 26, 27.  
Livy, XXV. 8.

<sup>128</sup> Polybius, VIII. 28, 29.  
Livy, XXV. 8, 9.

scarcely ruffled by the hardest gales. Exactly at the mouth of this basin was a little rocky knoll, forming the apex of the triangle of the city, and occupied by the citadel: the city itself stood on low and mostly level ground; and its south-eastern wall, the base of the triangle, stretched across from the Little Sea to the Mediterranean<sup>129</sup>. Thus the citadel commanded the entrance into the basin, which was the port of the Tarentines; and it was garrisoned by the Romans, although many of the officers and soldiers were allowed to lodge in the city. All attempts upon the town by land must be made then against the south-eastern side, which was separated from the citadel by the whole length of the city: and there was another circumstance which was likely to favour a surprise; for the Tarentines, following the direction of an oracle, as they said, buried their dead within the city walls; and the street of the tombs was interposed between the gates and the inhabited parts of the town<sup>130</sup>. This the conspirators turned to their own purposes: in this lonely quarter two of their number, Nicon and Tragiscus, were waiting for Hannibal's arrival without the gates. As soon as they perceived the signal which was to announce his presence, they, with a party of their friends, were to surprise the gates from within, and put the guards to the sword; while others had been left in the city to keep watch near

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<sup>129</sup> Strabo, VI. p. 278.

<sup>130</sup> Polybius, VIII. 30.

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Carelessness  
of the  
governor.

the museum, and prevent any communication from being conveyed to the Roman governor<sup>131</sup>.

The evening wore away; the governor's party broke up; and his friends attended him to his house. On their way home they met some of the conspirators, who, to lull all suspicion, began to jest with them, as though themselves going home from a revel, and joining the party amidst riotous shouts and loud laughter, accompanied the governor to his own door. He went to rest in joyous and careless mood; his friends were all gone to their quarters; the noise of revellers returning from their festivities died away through the city; and when midnight was come, the conspirators alone were abroad. They now divided into three parties: one was posted near the governor's house, a second secured the approaches to the market-place, and the third hastened to the quarter of the tombs, to watch for Hannibal's signal<sup>132</sup>.

Hannibal  
enters one of  
the gates.

They did not watch long in vain; a fire in a particular spot without the walls assured them that Hannibal was at hand. They lit a fire in answer; and presently, as had been agreed upon, the fire without the walls disappeared. Then the conspirators rushed to the gate of the city, surprised it with ease, put the guards to the sword, and began to hew asunder the bar by which the gates were fastened. No sooner was it forced, and the gates opened, than Hannibal's soldiers were seen ready to

<sup>131</sup> Polybius, VIII. 29, 30.    <sup>132</sup> Polybius, VIII. 29.  
Livy, XXV. 9.

enter; so exactly had the time of the operation been calculated. The cavalry were left without the walls as a reserve; but the infantry, marching in regular column, advanced through the quarter of the tombs to the inhabited part of the city<sup>133</sup>.

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Meantime Philemenus with a thousand Africans had been sent to secure another gate by stratagem. The guards were accustomed to let him in at all hours, whenever he returned from his hunting expeditions; and now, when they heard his usual whistle, one of them went to the gate to admit him. Philemenus called to the guard from without to open the wicket quickly; for that he and his friends had killed a huge wild boar, and could scarcely bear the weight any longer. The guard, accustomed to have a share in the spoil, opened the wicket; and Philemenus, and three other conspirators, disguised as countrymen, stepped in, carrying the boar between them. They instantly killed the poor guard, as he was admiring and feeling their prize; and then let in about thirty Africans, who were following close behind. With this force they mastered the gate-house and towers, killed all the guards, and hewed asunder the bars of the main gates to admit the whole column of Africans, who marched in on this side also in regular order, and advanced towards the market-place<sup>134</sup>.

Another is  
opened to  
him by Phi-  
lemenus.

No sooner had both Hannibal's columns reached their destination, and as it seems without exciting

Slaughter of  
the Roman  
troops.

<sup>133</sup> Polybius, VIII. 30, 31.

<sup>134</sup> Polybius, VIII. 31.

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any general alarm, than he detached three bodies of Gaulish soldiers to occupy the principal streets which led to the market-place. The officers in command of these troops had orders to kill every Roman who fell in their way; but some of the Tarentine conspirators were sent with each party to warn their countrymen to go home and remain quiet, assuring them that no mischief was intended to them. The toils being thus spread, the prey was now to be enticed into them. Philemenus and his friends had provided some Roman trumpets; and these were loudly blown, sounding the well known call to arms to the Roman soldier. Roused at this summons, the Romans quartered about the town armed themselves in haste, and poured into the streets to make their way to the citadel. But they fell in scattered parties into the midst of Hannibal's Gauls, and were cut down one after another. The governor alone had been more fortunate: the alarm had reached him in time; and being in no condition to offer any resistance,—for he felt, says Polybius, that the fumes of wine were still overpowering him,—he hastened to the harbour, and getting on board a boat, was carried safely to the citadel <sup>135</sup>.

Hannibal addresses the Tarentines, and promises to protect them.

Day at last dawned, but did not quite clear up the mystery of the night's alarm to the mass of the inhabitants of Tarentum. They were safe in their houses, unmassacred, unplundered; the only blast of war had been blown by a Roman trumpet; yet Roman

<sup>135</sup> Polybius, VIII. 32. Livy, XXV. 10.

soldiers were lying dead in the streets; and Gauls were spoiling their bodies. Suspense at length was ended by the voice of the public crier summoning the citizens of Tarentum, in Hannibal's name, to appear without their arms in the market-place; and by repeated shouts of "Liberty! Liberty!" uttered by some of their own countrymen, who ran round the town calling the Carthaginians their deliverers. The firm partisans of Rome made haste to escape into the citadel, while the multitude crowded to the market-place. They found it regularly occupied by Carthaginian troops; and the great general, of whom they had heard so much, was preparing to address them. He spoke to them, in Greek apparently, declaring, as usual, that he was come to free the inhabitants of Italy from the dominion of Rome. "The Tarentines therefore had nothing to fear; they should go home, and write each over his door, *a Tarentine's house*; these words would be a sufficient security; no door so marked should be violated. But the mark must not be set falsely upon any Roman's quarters; a Tarentine guilty of such treason would be put to death as an enemy; for all Roman property was the lawful prize of the soldiers." Accordingly all houses where Romans had been quartered were given up to be plundered; and the Carthaginian soldiers gained a harvest, says Polybius, which fully answered their hopes. This can only be explained by supposing that the Romans were quartered generally in the houses of the wealthier Tarentines, who were attached to the

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He drags  
the Taren-  
tine fleet  
through the  
town, and  
returns into  
Apulia.

Roman alliance; and that the plunder was not the scanty baggage of the legionary soldiers, but the costly furniture of the richest citizens in the greatest city of southern Italy <sup>136</sup>.

Thus Tarentum was won; but the citadel on its rocky knoll was still held by the Romans; and its position at once threatened the town, and shut up the Tarentine fleet useless in the harbour. Hannibal proceeded to sink a ditch, and throw up a wall along the side of the town towards the citadel, in order to repress the sallies of the garrison. While engaged in these works he purposely tempted the Romans to a sally, and having lured them on to some distance from their cover, turned fiercely upon them, and drove them back with such slaughter, that their effective strength was greatly reduced. He then hoped to take the citadel; but the garrison was reinforced by sea from Metapontum, the Romans withdrawing their troops from thence for this more important service; and a successful night-sally destroyed the besiegers' works, and obliged them to trust to a blockade. But as this was hopeless, while the Romans were masters of the sea, Hannibal instructed the Tarentines to drag their ships overland, through the streets of the city, from the harbour to the outer sea; and this being effected without difficulty, as the ground was quite level, the Tarentine fleet became at once effective, and the sea communications of the enemy were cut

<sup>136</sup> Polybius, VIII. 33. Livy, XXV. 10.

off. Having thus, as he hoped, enabled the Tarentines to deal by themselves with the Roman garrison, he left a small force in the town, and returned with the mass of his troops to his winter quarters in the country of the Sallentines, or on the edge of Apulia<sup>137</sup>.

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It will be observed that the only events recorded of this year, 541, are the reduction of Arpi by Fabius, the unimportant operations of Gracchus in Lucania, and Hannibal's surprise of Tarentum; which last action however did not happen till the end of the campaign, about the middle of the winter. According to Livy, Hannibal had passed the whole summer near Tarentum; he must therefore have been some months in that neighbourhood; and what was going on elsewhere the while? Gracchus, we are told, was engaged in Lucania; but where was the consul Fabius, with his father? and what was done by the four Roman legions, Fabius' consular army, and the prætorian army of M. Æmilius, which were both stationed in Apulia? Allowing that Cn. Fulvius with his two legions in the camp above Suessula was busied in watching the Campanians, yet Fabius and Æmilius had nearly forty thousand men at their disposal; and yet Capua was not besieged; nor was Hannibal impeded in his attempts upon Tarentum. Is it to be conceived that so large a portion of the power of Rome, directed by old Fabius himself, can have been totally wasted during a whole summer, useless alike for attack or defence?

What were  
the Romans  
doing?

<sup>137</sup> Polybius, VIII. 34—36. Livy, XXV. 11.

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Chronological  
difficulties.

The answer to this question depends upon another point, which is itself not easy to fix; the true date namely of the surprise of Tarentum. Livy tells us that it was placed by different writers in different years; and he himself prefers the later date<sup>138</sup>, yet does not give it correctly. For as Tarentum was surprised in the winter, the doubt must have been, whether to fix it towards the end of the consulship of Fabius and Gracchus, or of Fulvius and Appius Claudius: it could never have been placed so early as the consulship of Fabius and Marcellus. Livy describes it after he has mentioned the coming into office of Fulvius and Claudius, as if it belonged to their year; yet he places it before the opening of the campaign, which implies that it must have occurred in the preceding winter, whilst Fabius and Gracchus were still in office. Polybius evidently gave the later date, that is, the year of Fulvius and Appius, but the end of it: according to him it followed the death of Gracchus, and the various events of the summer of 542. And there are some strong reasons for believing this to be the more probable position. If this were so, we must suppose that the summer of 541 was passed without any important action, because Hannibal, after the loss of Arpi, continued to watch the two Roman armies in Apulia; and that either the fear of losing Tarentum, or the hope of recovering Salapia and other Apulian towns, detained Fabius in the south-east, and delayed the siege of Capua.

<sup>138</sup> Livy, XXV. 11.

In the mean time men's minds at Rome were restless and uneasy; and the government had enough to do to prevent their running wild in one direction or another. The city had suffered from a fire, which lasted a whole day and two nights, and destroyed all the buildings along the river, with many of those on the slope of the Capitoline hill, and between it and the Palatine<sup>139</sup>. The distress thus caused would be great; and the suspicions of treason and incendiarism, the constant attendants of great fires in large cities, would be sure to embitter the actual suffering. At such a time every one would crave to know what the future had in store for him; and whoever professed to be acquainted with the secrets of fate found many to believe him. Faith in the gods of Rome was beginning to be shaken: if they could not, or would not save, other powers might be more propitious; and sacrifices and prayers to strange gods were offered in the forum and capitol; while prophets, deceiving or deceived, were gathering crowds in every street, making a profit of their neighbours' curiosity and credulity<sup>140</sup>. Nor were these vagabond prophets the only men who preyed upon the public distress: the wealthy merchants, who had come forward with patriotic zeal to supply the armies when the treasury was unable to bear the burden, were now found to be seeking their own base gain out of their pretended liberality. M.

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Disorders at  
Rome.

<sup>139</sup> Livy, XXIV. 47.

<sup>140</sup> Livy, XXV. 1. 12.

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Postumius of Pyrgi was charged by public rumour with the grossest frauds: he had demanded to be reimbursed for the loss of stores furnished by him at sea, when no such loss had occurred; he had loaded old rotten vessels with cargoes of trifling value; the sailors had purposely sunk the ships, and had escaped in their boats; and then Postumius magnified the value of the cargo, and prayed to be indemnified for the loss<sup>141</sup>. Even the virtue of Roman matrons could not stand the contagion of this evil time: more than one case of shame was brought by the ædiles before the judgment of the people<sup>142</sup>. Man's spirit failed with woman's modesty: the citizens of the military age were slow to enlist; and many from the country tribes would not come to Rome when the consuls summoned them<sup>143</sup>. All this unsoundness at home may have had its effect on the operations of the war, and tended to make Fabius more than usually cautious, as another defeat at such a moment might have extinguished the Roman name.

Vigorous  
measures of  
the senate.

Against this weight of evils the senate bore up vigorously. The superstitions of the people, their worship of strange gods, and their shrinking from military service, required to be noticed without delay. The city prætor, M. Atilius, issued an edict forbidding all public sacrifices to strange gods, or with any strange rites. All books of prophecies, all formularies of prayer or of sacrifice, were to be brought

<sup>141</sup> Livy, XXV. 3, 4.

<sup>142</sup> Livy, XXV. 2.

<sup>143</sup> Livy, XXV. 5.



to him before the first of April; that is, before he went out of office <sup>144</sup>. The great ceremonies of the national religion were celebrated with more than usual magnificence; the great games of the circus were kept up for an additional day; two days were added to the celebration of the games of the commons; and they were farther marked by a public entertainment given in the precincts of the temple of Jupiter on the capitol to all the poorer citizens <sup>145</sup>. A great military effort was to be made in the ensuing campaign; old Q. Fulvius Flaccus, one of the ablest as well as severest men in Rome, was chosen consul for the third time; and Appius Claudius was elected as his colleague <sup>146</sup>. The armies, notwithstanding the difficulty of enlisting soldiers, were to be augmented: two extraordinary commissions of three members each were appointed, one to visit all the country tribes within fifty miles of Rome, and the other such as were more remote. Every free-born citizen was to be passed in review; and boys under seventeen were to be enlisted, if they seemed strong enough to bear arms; but their years of service were to count from their enlistment; and if they were called out before the military age began, they might claim their discharge before it ended <sup>147</sup>.

While dealing thus strictly with the disorders and want of zeal of the multitude, the senate, it might have been supposed, would not spare the fraud of

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Punishment  
of Postu-  
mius.

<sup>144</sup> Livy, XXV. 1.

<sup>145</sup> Livy, XXV. 2.

<sup>146</sup> Livy, XXV. 3.

<sup>147</sup> Livy, XXV. 5.



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the contractor Postumius. But with that neglect of equal justice, which is the habitual sin of an aristocracy, they punished the poor, but were afraid to attack the wealthy: and although the city prætor had made an official representation of the tricks practised by Postumius, no steps were taken against him. Amongst the new tribunes however were two of the noble house of the Carvillii, who, indignant at the impunity of so great an offender, resolved to bring him to trial. They at first demanded no other penalty than that a fine of 200,000 asses should be imposed on him; but when the trial came on, a large party of the monied men broke up the assembly by creating a riot, and no sentence was passed. This presumption, however, overshot its mark; the consuls took up the matter and laid it before the senate: the senate resolved that the peace of the commonwealth had been violently outraged; and the tribunes now proceeded against Postumius and the principal authors of the disturbance capitally. Bail was demanded of them; but they deserted their bail and went into exile; upon which the people, on the motion of the tribunes, ordered that their property should be sold, and themselves outlawed<sup>148</sup>. Thus the balance of justice was struck; and this doubtless contributed to conciliate the poorer citizens, and to make them more ready to bear their part in the war.

Resolution  
to besiege  
Capua.

It was resolved that Capua should be besieged

<sup>148</sup> Livy, XXV. 4.

without delay. In the preceding year, 112 noble Capuans had left the city, and come over to the Romans, stipulating for nothing but their lives and properties<sup>149</sup>. This shows that the aristocratical party in Capua could not be depended on: if the city were hard pressed, they would not be ready to make any extraordinary sacrifices in its behalf. Hannibal was far away in the farthest corner of Italy; and as long as the citadel of Tarentum held out, he would be unwilling to move towards Campania. Even if he should move, four armies were ready to oppose him; those of the two consuls, of the consul's brother, Cn. Fulvius, who was prætor in Apulia, and of another prætor, C. Claudius Nero, who commanded two legions in the camp above Suessula. Besides this mass of forces, Ti. Gracchus, the consul of the preceding year, still retained his army as proconsul in Lucania, and might be supposed capable of keeping Hanno and the army of Bruttium in check.

It was late in the spring before the consuls took the field. One of them succeeded to the army of the late consul, Fabius; the other took the two legions with which Cn. Fulvius Centumulus had held the camp above Suessula<sup>150</sup>. These armies marching, the one from Apulia, the other from Campania, met at Bovianum: there, at the back of the Matese, in the country of the Pentrian Samnites, the faithful allies of Rome, the consuls were making prepara-

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The Campanians apply to Hannibal for aid.

<sup>149</sup> Livy, XXIV. 47.

<sup>150</sup> Livy, XXV. 3.

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tions for the siege of Capua, and perhaps were at the same time watching the state of affairs in the south, and the movements of Hannibal. The Campanians suspected that mischief was coming upon them, and sent a deputation to Hannibal, praying him to aid them. If they were to stand a siege, it was important that the city should be well supplied with provisions; and their own harvest had been so insufficient, owing to the devastation caused by the war, that they had scarcely enough for their present consumption. Hannibal would therefore be pleased to order that supplies should be sent to them from the country of his Samnite and Lucanian allies, before their communications were cut off by the presence of the Roman armies<sup>151</sup>.

He sends Hanno to relieve them, who fails through their negligence.

Hannibal was still near Tarentum, whether hoping to win the town or the citadel, the doubtful chronology of this period will not allow us to decide. He ordered Hanno, with the army of Bruttium, to move forward into Samnium; a most delicate operation, if the two consuls were with their armies at Bovianum, and Gracchus in Lucania itself, in the very line of Hanno's march, and if C. Nero with two legions more was lying in the camp above Suessula. But the army from Suessula had been given to one of the consuls; and the legions which were to take its place were to be marched from the coast of Picenum, and perhaps had hardly reached their destination. The Lucanians themselves seem to have found

<sup>151</sup> Livy, XXV. 13.

sufficient employment for Gracchus; and Hanno moved with a rapidity, which friends and enemies were alike unprepared for. He arrived safely in the neighbourhood of Beneventum, encamped his army in a strong position about three miles from the town, and dispatched word to the Capuans that they should instantly send off every carriage and beast of burden in their city, to carry home the corn which he was going to provide for them. The towns of the Caudine Samnites emptied their magazines for the purpose, and forwarded all their corn to Hanno's camp. Thus far all prospered; but the negligence of the Capuans ruined every thing: they had not carriages enough ready; and Hanno was obliged to wait in his perilous situation, where every hour's delay was exposing him to destruction<sup>152</sup>. Beneventum was a Latin colony, in other words, a strong Roman garrison, watching all his proceedings: from thence, information was sent to the consuls at Bovianum; and Fulvius with his army instantly set out, and entered Beneventum by night. There he found that the Capuans with their means of transport were at length arrived; that all disposable hands had been pressed into the service; that Hanno's camp was crowded with cattle and carriages, and a mixed multitude of unarmed men, and even of women and children; and that a vigorous blow might win it with all its spoil: the indefatigable general was absent, scouring the country for additional supplies of corn.

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<sup>152</sup> Livy, XXV. 13.

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Fulvius rallied from Beneventum a little before day-break, and led his soldiers to assault Hanno's position. Under all disadvantages of surprise and disorder, the Carthaginians resisted so vigorously, that Fulvius was on the point of calling off his men, when a brave Pelignian officer threw the standard of his cohort over the enemy's wall, and desperately climbed the rampart and scaled the wall to recover it. His cohort rushed after him; and a Roman centurion then set the same example, which was followed with equal alacrity. Then the Romans broke into the camp on every side, even the wounded men struggling on with the mass, that they might die within the enemy's ramparts. The slaughter was great, and the prisoners many; but above all, the whole of the corn which Hanno had collected for the relief of Capua was lost, and the object of his expedition totally frustrated. He himself, hearing of the wreck of his army, retreated with speed into Brutium<sup>153</sup>.

The Capuans again apply for aid.

Again the Capuans sent to Hannibal, requesting him to aid them ere it was too late. Their negligence had just cost him an army, and had frustrated all his pains for their relief; but with unmoved temper he assured them that he would not forget them, and sent back 2000 of his invincible cavalry with the deputation, to protect their lands from the enemy's ravages. It was important to him not to leave the south of Italy till the very last moment;

<sup>153</sup> Livy, XXV. 14. Valerius Maximus, III. 2. 20.

for since he had taken Tarentum, the neighbouring Greek cities of Metapontum, Heraclea, and Thurii, had joined him; and as he had before won Croton and Locri, he was now master of the whole coast from the straits of Messina to the mouth of the Adriatic, with the exception of Rhegium and the citadel of Tarentum. Into the latter the Romans had lately thrown supplies of provisions; and the garrison was so strong, that Hannibal was unwilling to march into Campania, while such a powerful force of the enemy was left behind in so favourable a position <sup>154</sup>.

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The consuls meanwhile, not content with their own two armies, and with the two legions expected, if not yet arrived, in the camp above Suessula, sent to Gracchus in Lucania, desiring him to bring up his cavalry and light troops to Beneventum, to strengthen them in that kind of force, in which they fully felt their inferiority. But before he could leave his own province, he was drawn into an ambushade by the treachery of a Lucanian in the Roman interest, and perished <sup>155</sup>. His quæstor, Cn. Cornelius, marched with his cavalry towards Beneventum, according to the consul's orders; but the infantry, consisting of the slaves whom he had enfranchised, thought that their service was ended by the death of their deliverer, and immediately dispersed to their homes <sup>156</sup>. Thus Lucania was left without either

Death of  
Gracchus :  
Centenius  
raises an  
army in  
Lucania.

<sup>154</sup> Livy, XXV. 15. Appian, VII.  
35.

<sup>155</sup> Livy, XXV. 16.  
<sup>156</sup> Livy, XXV. 20.



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a Roman army or general; but M. Centenius, an old centurion, distinguished for his strength and courage, undertook the command there, if the senate would entrust him with a force equal to a single legion. Perhaps, like T. Pomponius Veientanus, he was connected with some of the contractors and monied men, and owed his appointment as much to their interest as to his own reputation. But he was a brave and popular soldier; and so many volunteers joined him on his march, hoping to be enriched by the plunder of Lucania, that he arrived there with a force, it is said, amounting to near sixteen thousand men. His confidence and that of his followers was doomed to be wofully disappointed<sup>157</sup>.

The Romans  
are repulsed  
by a sally  
from Capua.

The consuls knew that Hannibal was far away; and they did not know that any of his cavalry were in Capua. They issued boldly therefore from the Caudine Forks on the great Campanian plain, and scattered their forces far and wide to destroy the still green corn. To their astonishment the gates of Capua were thrown open; and with the Campanian infantry they recognised the dreaded cavalry of Hannibal. In a moment their foragers were driven in; and as they hastily formed their legions in order of battle to cover them, the horsemen broke upon them like a whirlwind, and drove them with great loss and confusion to their camp<sup>158</sup>. This sharp lesson taught them caution; but their numbers were overwhelming; and their two armies, encamped

<sup>157</sup> Livy, XXV. 19.

<sup>158</sup> Livy, XXV. 18.

before Capua, cut off the communications of the city, and had the harvest of the whole country in their power.

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But ere many days had elapsed, an unwelcome sight was seen on the summit of Tifata; Hannibal was there once more with his army. He descended into Capua; two days afterwards he marched out to battle; again his invincible Numidians struck terror into the Roman line, when the sudden arrival of Cn. Cornelius with the cavalry of Gracchus' army broke off the action; and neither side, it is said, knowing what this new force might be, both as if by common consent retreated<sup>159</sup>. How Hannibal so outstripped Cornelius as to arrive from Tarentum on the scene of action two or three days before him, who was coming from Lucania, we are not told, and can only conjecture. But the arrival of this reinforcement, though it had saved the consuls from defeat, did not embolden them to hold their ground: they left their camps as soon as night came on; Fulvius fell down upon the coast, near Cumæ; Appius Claudius retreated in the direction of Lucania.

Hannibal  
returns to  
Tifata.

Few passages in history can offer a parallel to Hannibal's campaigns; but this confident gathering of the enemies' overwhelming numbers round the city of his nearest allies, his sudden march, the unlooked for appearance of his dreaded veterans, and the instant scattering of the besieging armies before him, remind us of the deliverance of Dresden in

He enters  
Capua.

<sup>159</sup> Livy, XXV. 19.

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1813, when Napoleon broke in upon the allies' confident expectations of victory, and drove them away in signal defeat. And like the allies in that great campaign, the Roman generals knew their own strength; and though yielding to the shock of their adversary's surpassing energy and genius, they did not allow themselves to be scared from their purpose, but began again steadily to draw the toils, which he had once broken through. Great was the joy in Capua, when the people rose in the morning and saw the Roman camps abandoned: there needs no witness to tell us with what sincere and deep admiration they followed and gazed on their deliverer; how confident they felt that, with him for a shield, no harm could reach them. But almost within sight and hearing of their joy, the stern old Fulvius was crouching as it were in his thicket, watching the moment for a second spring upon his prey; and when Hannibal left that rejoicing and admiring multitude to follow the traces of Appius, he passed through the gates of Capua, to enter them again no more.

On his return into Lucania he destroys the army of Centenius;

Appius retreated in the direction of Lucania: this is all that is reported of his march; and then, after a while, having led his enemy in the direction which suited his purposes, he turned off by another road, and made his way back to Campania<sup>160</sup>. With such a total absence of details, it is impossible to fix the line of this march exactly. It was easy for Appius

<sup>160</sup> Livy, XXV. 19.

to take the round of the Matese; retiring first by the great road to Beneventum, then turning to his left and regaining his old quarters at Bovianum, from whence, the instant that Hannibal ceased to follow him, he would move along under the north side of the Matese to Æsernia, and descend again upon Campania by the valley of the Volturnus. Hannibal's pursuit was necessarily stopped as soon as Appius moved northwards from Beneventum: he could not support his army in the country of the Pentrian Sannites, where every thing was hostile to him; nor did he like to abandon his line of direct communication with southern Italy. He had gained a respite for Capua, and had left an auxiliary force to aid in its defence: meanwhile other objects must not be neglected; and the fall of the citadel of Tarentum might of itself prevent or raise the siege of Capua. So he turned off from following Appius, and was marching back to the south, when he was told that a Roman army was attempting to bar his passage in Lucania. This was the motley multitude commanded by Centenius, which had succeeded, as we have seen, to the army of Gracchus. With what mad hope, or under what false impression, Centenius could have been tempted to rush upon certain destruction, we know not: but in the number no less than the quality of his troops, he must have been far inferior to his adversary. His men fought bravely; and he did a centurion's duty well, however he may have failed as a general; but he was killed,

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and that of  
Cn. Fulvius  
in Apulia.

and nearly fifteen thousand men are said to have perished with him <sup>161</sup>.

Thus Lucania was cleared of the Romans; and as the firmest partisan of the Roman interest among the Lucanians had been the very man who had betrayed Gracchus to his fate, it is likely that the Carthaginian party was triumphant through the whole country. Only one Roman army was left in the south of Italy, the two legions commanded by Cn. Fulvius Flaccus, the consul's brother, in Apulia. But Cn. Fulvius had nothing of his brother's ability; he was a man grown old in profligacy; and the discipline of his army was said to be in the worst condition. Hannibal, hoping to complete his work, moved at once into Apulia, and found Fulvius in the neighbourhood of Herdonea. The Roman general met him in the open field without hesitation, and was presently defeated: he himself escaped from the action; but Hannibal had occupied the principal roads in the rear of the enemy with his cavalry; and the greatest part of the Roman army was cut to pieces <sup>162</sup>.

What were  
the results  
of these  
victories?

We naturally ask what result followed from these two great victories; and to this question we find no recorded answer. Hannibal, we are told, returned to Tarentum; but finding that the citadel still held out, and could neither be forced nor surprised, and that provisions were still introduced

<sup>161</sup> Livy, XXV. 19.

<sup>162</sup> Livy, XXV. 20, 21.

by sea, a naval blockade in ancient warfare being always inefficient, he marched off towards Brundisium, on some prospect that the town would be betrayed into his hands. This hope also failed him; and he remained inactive in Apulia, or in the country of the Sallentines, during the rest of the year. Meantime the consuls received orders from the senate to collect the wrecks of the two beaten armies, and to search for the soldiers of Gracchus' army, who had dispersed, as we have seen, after his death. The city prætor, P. Cornelius, carried on the same search nearer Rome; and these duties, says Livy, were all performed most carefully and vigorously<sup>163</sup>. This is all the information which exists for us in the remains of the ancient writers; but assuredly this is no military history of a campaign.

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It is always to be understood that Hannibal could not remain long in an enemy's country, from the difficulty of feeding his men, especially his cavalry. But the country round Capua was not all hostile; Atella and Calatia, in the plain of Campania itself, were still his allies; so were many of the Caudine Samnites, from whose cities Hanno had collected the corn early in this year for the relief of Capua. Again, we can conceive how the number of the Roman armies sometimes oppressed him; how he dared not stay long in one quarter, lest a greater evil should befall him in another. But at this moment three great disasters, the dispersion

Difficulties  
of Hanni-  
bal's situa-  
tion.

<sup>163</sup> Livy, XXV. 22.



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of the army of Gracchus, and the destruction of those of Centenius and Fulvius, had cleared the south of Italy of the Romans; and his friends in Apulia, in Lucania, at Tarentum, and in Bruttium, could have nothing to fear, had he left them for the time to their own resources. Why, after defeating Fulvius, did he not retrace his steps towards Campania, hold the field with the aid of his Campanian and Samnite allies till the end of the military season, and then winter close at hand, on the shores of the gulf of Salerno, in the country of his allies, so as to make it impossible for the Romans either to undertake or to maintain the siege of Capua?

His probable reasons for wintering in Apulia.

That his not doing this was not his own fault, his extraordinary ability and energy may sufficiently assure us. But where the hindrance was, we cannot for certain discover. His army must have been worn by its long and rapid march to and from Campania, and by two battles fought with so short an interval. His wounded must have been numerous; nor can we tell how such hard service in the heat of summer may have tried the health of his soldiers. His horses too must have needed rest; and to overstrain the main arm of his strength would have been fatal. Perhaps too, great as was Hannibal's ascendancy over his army, there was a point beyond which it could not be tried with safety. Long marches and hard-fought battles gave the soldier, especially the Gaul and the Spaniard, what in his eyes was a rightful claim to a season of rest and enjoyment: the men might have murmured had they

not been permitted to taste some reward of their victories. Besides all these reasons, the necessity of a second march into Campania may not have seemed urgent: the extent of Capua was great; if the Roman consuls did encamp before it, still the city was in no immediate danger; after the winter another advance would again enable him to throw supplies into the town, and to drive off the Roman armies. So Capua was left for the present to its own resources, and Hannibal passed the autumn and winter in Apulia.

Immediately the Roman armies closed again upon their prey. Three grand magazines of corn were established, to feed the besieging army during the winter, one at Casilinum within three miles of Capua; another at a fort built for the purpose at the mouth of the Vulturnus; and a third at Puteoli. Into these two last magazines the corn was conveyed by sea from Ostia, whither it had already been collected from Sardinia and Etruria<sup>164</sup>. Then the consuls summoned C. Nero from his camp above Suessula; and the three armies began the great work of surrounding Capua with double continuous lines, strong enough to repel the besieged on the one side, and Hannibal on the other, when he should again appear in Campania. The inner line was carried round the city, at a distance of about a quarter of a mile from the walls; the outer line was concentric with it; and the space between the two served for the

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The Romans surround Capua with a double wall.

<sup>164</sup> Livy, XXV. 22.

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cantonments and magazines of the besiegers. The lines, says Appian<sup>165</sup>, looked like a great city, inclosing a smaller city in the middle; like the famous lines of the Peloponnesians before Plataea. What time was employed in completing them we know not: they were interrupted by continual sallies of the besieged; and Jubellius Taurea and the Capuan cavalry were generally too strong for the Roman horsemen<sup>166</sup>. But their infantry could do nothing against the legions; the besieging army must have amounted nearly to sixty thousand men; and slowly but surely the imprisoning walls were raised, and their circle completed, shutting out the last gleams of light from the eyes of the devoted city.

Their offer to allow any of the citizens to come out safely is rejected.

Before the works were closed all round, the consuls, according to the senate's directions signified to them by the city prætor, announced to the Capuans, that whoever chose to come out of the city with his family and property before the ides of March, might do so with safety, and should be untouched in body or goods<sup>167</sup>. It would seem then that the works were not completed till late in the winter; for we cannot suppose that the term of grace would have been prolonged to a remote day, especially as the ides of March were the beginning of the new consular year; and it could not be known long beforehand whether the present consuls would be continued in their command or no. The offer was received by the besieged,

<sup>165</sup> VII. 37.

<sup>167</sup> Livy, XXV. 22.

<sup>166</sup> Appian, VII. 37. Livy, XXVI. 4.

it is said, with open scorn; their provisions were as yet abundant, their cavalry excellent; their hope of aid from Hannibal, as soon as the campaign should open, was confident. But Fulvius waited his time; nor was his thirst for Capuan blood to be disappointed by his removal from the siege at the end of the year: it would seem as if the new consuls were men of no great consideration, appointed probably for that very reason, that their claims might not interfere with those of their predecessors. One of them, P. Sulpicius Galba, had filled no curule office previously; the other, Cn. Fulvius Centumalus, had been prætor two years before, but was not distinguished by any remarkable action. The siege of Capua was still to be conducted by Appius Claudius and Fulvius; and they were ordered not to retire from their positions till they should have taken the city<sup>168</sup>.

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What was the state of affairs in Capua meantime, we know not. The Roman stories are little to be credited, which represent all the richer and nobler citizens as abandoning the government, and leaving the office of chief magistrate, Meddix Tuticus, to be filled by one Seppius Lesius, a man of obscure condition, who offered himself as a candidate<sup>169</sup>. Neither Vibius Virrius nor Jubellius Taurea wanted resolution to abide by their country to the last; and it is expressly said that, down to the latest period of the siege, there was no Roman party in

State of  
Capua.

<sup>168</sup> Livy, XXVI. 1. Frontinus, III. 18. 3.

<sup>169</sup> Livy, XXVI. 6.

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Capua; no voice was heard to speak of peace or surrender; no citizen had embraced the consul's offers of mercy<sup>170</sup>. Even when they had failed to prevent the completion of the Roman lines, they continued to make frequent sallies; and the proconsuls could only withstand their cavalry by mixing light armed foot soldiers amongst the Roman horsemen, and thus strengthening that weakest arm in the Roman service. Still, as the blockade was now fully established, famine must be felt sooner or later: accordingly a Numidian was sent to implore Hannibal's aid, and succeeded in getting through the Roman lines, and carrying his message safely to Bruttium<sup>171</sup>.

Hannibal  
comes to its  
relief.

Hannibal listened to the prayer, and leaving his heavy baggage, and the mass of his army behind, set out with his cavalry and light infantry, and with thirty-three elephants<sup>172</sup>. Whether his Samnite and Lucanian allies joined him on the march, is not stated: if they did not, and if secrecy and expedition were deemed of more importance than an addition of force, the troops which he led with him must have been more like a single corps, than a complete army. Avoiding Beneventum, he descended the valley of the Calor towards the Vulturnus, stormed a Roman post, which had been built apparently to cut off the communications of the besieged with the upper valley of the Vulturnus, and encamped immediately behind the ridge of Tifata.

<sup>170</sup> Livy, XXVI. 12.

<sup>172</sup> Livy, XXVI. 5.

<sup>171</sup> Livy, XXVI. 4. Frontinus, IV. 7. 29.

From thence he descended once more into the plain of Capua, displayed his cavalry before the Roman lines, in the hope of tempting them out to battle, and finding that this did not succeed, commenced a general assault upon their works.

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Unprovided with any artillery, his best hope was that the Romans might be allured to make some rash sally: his cavalry advanced by squadrons up to the edge of the trench, and discharged showers of missiles into the lines; while his infantry assailed the rampart, and tried to force their way through the palisade which surmounted it. From within, the lines were attacked by the Campanians and Hannibal's auxiliary garrison; but the Romans were numerous enough to defend both fronts of their works; they held their ground steadily, neither yielding nor rashly pursuing; and Hannibal finding his utmost efforts vain, drew off his army<sup>173</sup>. Some resolution must be taken promptly; his cavalry could not be fed where he was, for the Romans had previously destroyed or carried away every thing that might serve for forage; nor could he venture to wait till the new consuls should have raised their legions, and be ready to march from Rome and threaten his rear. One only hope remained; one attempt might yet be made, which should either raise the siege of Capua or accomplish a still greater object: Hannibal resolved to march upon Rome.

Hannibal attacks the Roman lines ineffectually, and resolves to march against Rome.

A Numidian was again found, who undertook to pass over to the Roman lines as a deserter, and from

He sets out suddenly by night.

<sup>173</sup> Polybius, IX. 3. Livy, XXVI. 5.



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thence to make his escape into Capua, bearing a letter from Hannibal, which explained his purpose, and conjured the Capuans patiently to abide the issue of his attempt for a little while<sup>174</sup>. When this letter reached Capua, Hannibal was already gone; his camp-fires had been seen burning as usual all night in his accustomed position on Tifata; but he had begun his march the preceding evening, immediately after dark, while the Romans still thought that his army was hanging over their heads, and were looking for a second assault<sup>175</sup>.

Difficulty of  
making out  
his line of  
march.

His army disappeared from the eyes of the Romans behind Tifata; and they knew not whither he was gone. Even so is it with us at this day; we lose him from Tifata; we find him before Rome; but we know nothing of his course between. Conflicting and contradictory accounts have made the truth undiscoverable: what regions of Italy looked with fear or hope on the march of the great general and his famous soldiers, it is impossible from our existing records to determine. Whether he followed the track of Pyrrhus, and spread havoc through the lands of the numerous colonies on the Latin road, Cales, Casinum, Interamna, and Fregellæ<sup>176</sup>; or whether, to baffle the enemy's pursuit, and avoid the delay of crossing the Volturnus, he plunged northwards into the heart of Samnium<sup>177</sup>, astonished the Latin colonists of Æsernia with his unlooked-for passage, crossed the central Apennines into the country of

<sup>174</sup> Polybius, IX. 5. Livy, XXVI. 7.

<sup>175</sup> Polybius, IX. 5.

<sup>176</sup> Livy, XXVI. 9.

<sup>177</sup> Polybius, IX. 5.

the Pelignians, and then, turning suddenly to his left, broke down into the land of the Marsians, passing along the glassy waters of Fucinus, and under the ancient walls of Alba, and scaring the upland glades and quiet streams of the aboriginal Sabines, with the wild array of his Numidian horsemen; we cannot with any confidence decide. Yet the agreement of all the stories as to the latter part of his march seems to point out the line of its beginning. All accounts say, that, descending nearly by the old route of the Gauls, he kept the Tiber on his right, and the Anio on his left; and that, finally, he crossed the Anio, and encamped at a distance of less than four miles from the walls of Rome<sup>178</sup>.

Before the sweeping pursuit of his Numidians, crowds of fugitives were seen flying towards the city, while the smoke of burning houses arose far and wide into the sky. Within the walls the confusion and terror were at their height: he was come at last, this Hannibal, whom they had so long dreaded; he had at length dared what even the slaughter of Cannæ had not emboldened him to venture; some victory greater even than Cannæ must have given him this confidence; the three armies before Capua must be utterly destroyed; last year he had destroyed or dispersed three other armies, and had gained possession of the entire south of Italy; and now he had stormed the lines before Capua, had cut to pieces the whole remaining force of the Roman people, and

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Terror in  
Rome:  
fortitude of  
the senate.

<sup>178</sup> Polybius, IX. 6. Livy, XXVI. 9. Appian, VII. 38.

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was come to Rome to finish his work. So the wives and mothers of Rome lamented, as they hurried to the temples; and there, prostrate before the gods, and sweeping the sacred pavement with their unbound hair in the agony of their fear, they remained pouring forth their prayers for deliverance. Their sons and husbands hastened to man the walls and the citadel, and to secure the most important points without the city; whilst the senate, as calm as their fathers of old, whom the Gauls massacred when sitting at their own doors, but with the energy of manly resolution, rather than the resignation of despair, met in the forum, and there remained assembled, to direct every magistrate on the instant, how he might best fulfil his duty<sup>179</sup>.

Rome is preserved from an assault.

But God's care watched over the safety of a people whom he had chosen to work out the purposes of his providence: Rome was not to perish. Two city legions were to be raised, as usual, at the beginning of the year; and it so happened that the citizens from the country tribes were to meet at Rome on this very day for the enlistment for one of these legions; while the soldiers of the other, which had been enrolled a short time before, were to appear at Rome on this same day in arms, having been allowed, as the custom was, to return home for a few days after their enlistment, to prepare for active service. Thus it happened that ten thousand men were brought together at the very moment when

<sup>179</sup> Polybius, IX. 6. Livy, XXVI. 9.

they were most needed, and were ready to repel any assault upon the walls<sup>180</sup>. The allies, it seems, were not ordinarily called out to serve with the two city legions; but on this occasion it is mentioned that the Latin colony of Alba, having seen Hannibal pass by their walls, and guessing the object of his march, sent its whole force to assist in the defence of Rome; a zeal which the Greek writers compared to that of Plataea, whose citizens fought alone by the side of the Athenians on the day of Marathon<sup>181</sup>.

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To assault the walls of Rome was now hopeless; but the open country was at Hannibal's mercy, a country which had seen no enemy for near a hundred and fifty years, cultivated and inhabited in the full security of peace. Far and wide it was overrun by Hannibal's soldiers; and the army appears to have moved about, encamping in one place after another, and sweeping cattle and prisoners and plunder of every sort, beyond numbering, within the enclosure of its camp<sup>182</sup>.

Hannibal  
ravages the  
country  
round.

It was probably in the course of these excursions, that Hannibal, at the head of a large body of cavalry, came close up to the Colline gate, rode along leisurely under the walls to see all he could of the city, and is said to have cast his javelin into it as in defiance<sup>183</sup>. From farthest Spain he had come into Italy; he had wasted the whole country of the Romans and their allies with fire and sword for more than six years, had slain more of their citizens than

He rides up  
to the walls  
of Rome.

<sup>180</sup> Polybius, IX. 6.

<sup>182</sup> Polybius, IX. 6.

<sup>181</sup> Appian, VII. 39.

<sup>183</sup> Livy, XXVI. 10. Pliny, XXXIV. 15.

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were now alive to bear arms against him; and at last he was shutting them up within their city, and riding freely under their walls, while none dared meet him in the field. If any thing of disappointment depressed his mind at that instant; if he felt that Rome's strength was not broken, nor the spirit of her people quelled, that his own fortune was wavering, and that his last effort had been made, and made in vain; yet thinking where he was, and of the shame and loss which his presence was causing to his enemies, he must have wished that his father could have lived to see that day, and must have thanked the gods of his country that they had enabled him so fully to perform his vow.

Fulvius returns to Rome, and the Romans march out to check Hannibal.

For some time, we know not how long, this devastation of the Roman territory lasted without opposition. Meanwhile the siege of Capua was not raised; and Fabius, in earnestly dissuading such a confession of fear, showed that he could be firm no less than cautious, when boldness was the highest prudence. But Fulvius, with a small portion of the besieging army, was recalled to Rome: Fabius had ever acted with him, and was glad to have the aid of his courage and ability; and when he arrived, and by a vote of the senate was united with the consuls in the command, the Roman forces were led out of the city, and encamped, according to Fabius' old policy, within ten stadia of the enemy, to check his free licence of plunder<sup>184</sup>. At the same time,

<sup>184</sup> Livy, XXVI. 8, 9, 10. Polybius, IX. 7. Appian, VII. 40.

parties acting on the rear of Hannibal's army had broken down the bridges over the Anio, his line of retreat, like his advance, being on the right bank of that river, and not by the Latin road.

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Hannibal had purposely waited to allow time for his movement to produce its intended effect in the raising of the siege of Capua. That time, according to his calculations, was now come: the news of his arrival before Rome must have reached the Roman lines before Capua; and the armies from that quarter, hastening by the Latin road to the defence of their city, must have left the communication with Capua free. The presence of Fulvius with his army in Latium, which Hannibal would instantly discover, by the thrice-repeated sounding of the watch, as Hasdrubal found out Nero's arrival in the camp of Livius near Sena, would confirm him in his expectation that the other proconsul was on his march with the mass of the army; and he accordingly commenced his retreat by the Tiburtine road, that he might not encounter Appius in front, while the consuls and Fabius were pressing on his rear.

Hannibal  
retires.

Accordingly, as the bridges were destroyed, he proceeded to effect his passage through the river, and carried over his army under the protection of his cavalry, although the Romans attacked him during the passage, and cut off a large part of the plunder which he had collected from the neighbourhood of Rome<sup>185</sup>. He then continued his retreat; and the

The Romans  
follow him  
at a distance.



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Romans followed him, but at a careful distance, and keeping steadily on the higher grounds, to be safe from the assaults of his dreaded cavalry<sup>186</sup>.

He marches  
down into  
Bruttium.

In this manner Hannibal marched with the greatest rapidity for five days, which, if he was moving by the Valerian road, must have brought him at least as far as the country of the Marsians, and the shores of the lake Fucinus<sup>187</sup>. From thence he would again have crossed by the Forca Carrosa to the plain of the Pelignians, and so retraced his steps through Samnium towards Capua. But at this point he received intelligence that the Roman armies were still in their lines, that his march upon Rome had therefore failed, and that his communications with Capua were as hopeless as ever. Instantly he changed all his plans; and feeling obliged to abandon Capua, the importance of his operations in the south rose upon him in proportion. Hitherto he had not thought fit to delay his march for the sake of attacking the army which was pursuing him; but now he resolved to rid himself of this enemy; so he turned fiercely upon them, and assaulted their camp in the night. The Romans, surprised and confounded, were driven from it with considerable loss, and took refuge in a strong position in the mountains. Hannibal then resumed his march, but, instead of turning short to his right towards Campania, descended towards the Adriatic and the plains of Apulia, and from thence returned to what was now the strong-

<sup>186</sup> Appian, VII. 40.

<sup>187</sup> Polybius, IX. 7.

hold of his power in Italy, the country of the Bruttians <sup>188</sup>.

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He misses  
taking  
Rhegium.

The citadel of Tarentum still held out against him; but Rhegium, confident in its remoteness, had never yet seen his cavalry in its territory, and was now less likely than ever to dread his presence, as he had so lately been heard of in the heart of Italy, and under the walls of Rome. With a rapid march therefore he hastened to surprise Rhegium. Tidings of his coming reached the city just in time for the Rhegians to shut their gates against him; but half their people were in the country, in the full security of peace; and these all fell into his power <sup>189</sup>. We know not whether he treated them kindly, as hoping through their means to win Rhegium, as he had won Tarentum; or whether disappointment was now stronger than hope, and, despairing of drawing the allies of Rome to his side, he was now as inveterate against them as against the Romans. He retired from his fruitless attempt to win Rhegium only to receive the tidings of the loss of Capua.

The Romans had patiently waited their time, and were now to reap their reward. The consuls were both to command in Apulia with two consular armies: one of them therefore must have returned to Rome, to raise the two additional legions which were required. Fulvius hastened back to the lines before Capua. His prey was now in his power; the straitness of the blockade could no longer be endured, and

The Romans  
press the  
siege of  
Capua.

<sup>188</sup> Polybius, IX. 7. Appian, VII. 41—43.

<sup>189</sup> Polybius, IX. 7.

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aid from Hannibal was not to be hoped. It is said that mercy was still promised to any Capuan who should come over to the Romans before a certain day, but that none availed themselves of the offer, feeling, says Livy, that their offence was beyond forgiveness<sup>190</sup>. This can only mean that they believed the Romans to be as faithless as they were cruel, and felt sure that every promise of mercy would be evaded or openly broken. One last attempt was made to summon Hannibal again to their aid; but the Numidians employed on the service were detected this time in the Roman lines, and were sent back torn with stripes, and with their hands cut off, into the city<sup>191</sup>.

The chief  
senators of  
Capua  
poison them-  
selves.

No Capuan writer has survived to record the last struggle of his country; and never were any people less to be believed than the Romans, when speaking of their enemies. Yet the greatest man could not have supported the expiring weakness of an unheroic people; and we hear of no great man in Capua. Some of the principal men in the senate met, it is said, at the house of one of their number, Vibius Virrius, where a magnificent banquet had been prepared for them; they ate and drank, and when the feast was over, they all swallowed poison. Then, having done with pleasure and with life, they took a last leave of each other; they embraced each other, lamenting with many tears their own and their country's calamity; and some remained to be burned

<sup>190</sup> Livy, XXVI. 12.

<sup>191</sup> Livy, XXVI. 12.

together on the same funeral pile, while others went away to die at their own homes. All were dead before the Romans entered the city<sup>192</sup>.

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In the meanwhile the Capuan government, unable to restrain their starving people, had been obliged to surrender to the enemy. In modern warfare the surrender of a besieged town involves no extreme suffering; even in civil wars, justice or vengeance only demands a certain number of victims, and the mass of the population scarcely feels its condition affected. But surrender, *deditio*, according to the Roman laws of war, placed the property, liberties, and lives of the whole surrendered people at the absolute disposal of the conquerors; and that not formally, as a right, the enforcement of which were monstrous, but as one to abate which in any instance was an act of free mercy. In this sense Capua was surrendered; in the morning after Vibius Virrius' funeral banquet, the gate of Jupiter, which looked towards the Roman head quarters, was thrown open; and a Roman legion, with its usual force of cavalry doubled, marched in to take possession. It was commanded by C. Fulvius, the brother of the proconsul, who immediately placed guards at all the gates, caused all the arms in the city to be brought to him, made prisoners of the Carthaginian garrison, and sent all the Capuan senators into the Roman camp, to abide his brother's sentence.

Surrender  
of the city.

No Roman family has preserved a more uniform

<sup>192</sup> Livy, XXVI. 14.

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A.C. 211.  
Fulvius puts  
all the  
senators to  
death.

character of pride and cruelty through successive generations than the Claudii; but in the treatment of the Capuans, Q. Fulvius was so much the principal actor, that, according to some of the annals, Appius Claudius was no longer alive, having been mortally wounded some time before the end of the siege<sup>193</sup>. His daughter had been married to a Campanian; and the senators of Capua might perhaps seem to him worthier of regard than the commons of Rome. But whether Appius was living or dead, he was unable to arrest the course of his colleague's vengeance. The Capuan senators were immediately chained as bondslaves, were commanded to give up all their gold and silver to the quæstors, and were then sent in custody, five-and-twenty to Cales, and twenty-eight to Teanum. Ere the next night was over, Fulvius, with 2000 chosen horsemen, left the camp, and arrived at Teanum by daybreak. He took his seat in the forum, ordered the magistrates of Teanum to bring forth their prisoners, and saw them all scourged and beheaded in his presence. Then he rode off to Cales, and repeated the same tragedy there<sup>194</sup>.

Severe  
treatment of  
all the Cam-  
panians.

Atilia and Calatia followed the example of Capua, and surrendered at discretion to the Romans. There, also, about twenty senators were executed; and about three hundred persons of noble birth, in one or other of the three cities, were sent to Rome, and thrown into the Mamertine prison, there to die of starvation

<sup>193</sup> Livy, XXVI. 16. Zonaras, <sup>194</sup> Livy, XXVI. 15. Valerius  
IX. 6. Maximus, III. 8. 1.

and misery, while others met a similar fate in the various allied cities whither they were sent prisoners<sup>195</sup>. The besieging army was then relieved from its long services; part of it was probably sent home, or transferred to one of the consuls to form his army in Apulia. C. Nero, the proprætor, was sent with about 13,000 men into Spain, where the Roman affairs were in a most critical state<sup>196</sup>; while Q. Fulvius remained still as proconsul in Capua, exercising the utmost severity of conquest over the remnant of the unfortunate people.

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A few months afterwards, on the night of the 18th of March in the following year, a fire broke out at Rome in several places at once, in the neighbourhood of the forum. The temple of Vesta, and its eternal fire, the type of the life of the commonwealth, were saved with great difficulty. This fire was said to be the work of some noble Capuans, whose fathers had been beheaded by Q. Fulvius; they were accused by one of their slaves; and a confession of the charge having been forced from their other slaves by torture, the young men were put to death<sup>197</sup>. Fulvius made this a pretence for fresh severities against the Capuans; and no doubt it had an influence upon the senate when the fate of the three revolted cities of Campania was finally decided. As the Capuans had enjoyed the franchise of Roman citizens, the senate was obliged to obtain an act of the comitia, empowering them to determine their future condition. A

Decrees  
about them.

<sup>195</sup> Livy, XXVI. 16.

<sup>196</sup> Livy, XXVI. 17.

<sup>197</sup> Livy, XXVI. 27.



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number of decrees were passed accordingly, as after the great Latin war, distinguishing the punishment of different classes, and even of different individuals. All who had been senators, or held any office, were reduced to utter beggary, their lands being forfeited to Rome, together with the whole Campanian territory, and their personal property of every kind being ordered to be sold. Some were sold, besides, for slaves, with their wives and children; and it was especially ordered that they should be sold at Rome, lest some of their countrymen or neighbours should purchase them for the purpose of restoring their liberty. All who had been in Capua during the siege were transported beyond the Tiber, and forbidden to possess lands or houses above a certain measure, or out of certain specified districts: those who had not been in Capua, or in any other revolted city, during the war, were only transported beyond the Liris; while those who had gone over to the Romans before Hannibal entered Capua, were removed no farther than across the Vulturnus. In their exiled state, however, they were still to be personally free, but were incapable of enjoying either the Roman franchise or the Latin<sup>198</sup>. The city of Capua, bereaved of all its citizens, was left to be inhabited by that mixed multitude of resident foreigners, freedmen, and half-citizens, who, as shopkeepers and mechanics, had always formed a large part of the population; but all political organization was strictly

<sup>198</sup> Livy, XXVI. 33, 34.

denied to them; and they were placed under the government of a præfect sent thither every year from Rome<sup>199</sup>. The Campanian plain, the glory of Italy, and all the domain lands which Capua had won in former wars, when she was the ally of Rome, as her share of the spoils of Samnium, were forfeited to the Roman people. In the domain lands some colonies were planted soon after the war<sup>200</sup>; but the Campanian plain was held in occupation by a number of Roman citizens; and the vectigal, or rent, which they paid to the state, was for a hundred and fifty years an important part of the Roman revenue<sup>201</sup>. Only two individuals were found deserving of favour, it is said, among the whole Capuan people: these were two women, one of whom had daily sacrificed in secret during the siege for the success of the Romans; and the other had secretly fed some Roman prisoners. These had their property restored to them by a special decree of the senate; and they were desired to go to Rome and to petition the senate, if they thought proper, for some additional reward<sup>202</sup>.

I have given the settlement of Campania and the fate of the Capuans in detail, because it seems taken from authentic sources, and is characteristic of the stern determination with which the Roman government went through its work. It is no less characteristic that when Q. Fulvius applied for a triumph, after his most important and splendid success, the senate refused to grant it, because he had only recovered what had belonged to Rome before;

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Fulvius is  
refused a  
triumph.

<sup>199</sup> Livy, XXVI. 16.

<sup>200</sup> Livy, XXXIV. 45.

<sup>201</sup> Cicero, De Leg. Agrar. II. 39.

<sup>202</sup> Livy, XXVI. 33, 34.

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and the mere retrieving of losses, and restoring the dominion of the commonwealth to its former extent, was no subject of extraordinary exultation <sup>203</sup>.

Importance  
of the taking  
of Capua.

But although not rewarded by a triumph, the conquest of Capua was one of the most important services ever rendered by a Roman general to his country. It did not merely deprive Hannibal of the greatest fruit of his greatest victory, and thus seem to undo the work of Cannæ; but its effect was felt far and wide, encouraging the allies of Rome, and striking terror into her enemies; tempting the cities which had revolted to return without delay to their allegiance, and filling Hannibal with suspicions of those who were still true to him, as if they only waited to purchase their pardon by some act of treachery towards his garrisons. By the recovery of Capua his great experiment seemed decided against him. It appeared impossible, under any circumstances, to rally such a coalition of the Italian states against the Roman power in Italy, as might be able to overthrow it. We almost ask, with what reasonable hopes could Hannibal from this time forward continue the war? or why did he not change the seat of it from Southern Italy to Etruria and Cisalpine Gaul?

Hannibal's  
favourable  
prospects.

But with whatever feelings of disappointment and grief he may have heard of the fall of Capua, of the ruin of his allies, and the bloody death of so many of the Capuan senators, and of the brave Jubellius Taurea, whom he had personally known and honoured, yet the last campaign was not without many solid

<sup>203</sup> Valerius Maximus, II. 8. 4.

grounds of encouragement. Never had the invincible force of his army been more fully proved. He had overrun half Italy, had crossed and recrossed the passes of the Apennines, had plunged into the midst of the Roman allies, and had laid waste the territory of Rome with fire and sword. Yet no superiority of numbers, no advantage of ground, no knowledge of the country, had ever emboldened the Romans to meet him in the field, or even to beset his road, or to obstruct and harass his march. Once only, when he was thought to be retreating, had they ventured to follow him at a cautious distance; but he had turned upon them in his strength; and the two consuls, and Q. Fulvius with them, were driven before him as fugitives to the mountains, their camp stormed, and their legions scattered. It was plain, then, that he might hold his ground in Italy as long as he pleased, supporting his army at its cost, and draining the resources of Rome and her allies, year after year, till in mere exhaustion the Roman commons would probably join the Latin colonies and the allies in forcing the senate to make peace.

At this very moment Etruria was restless, and required an army of two legions to keep it quiet<sup>204</sup>; the Roman commons, in addition to their heavy taxation and military service, had seen their lands laid waste, and yet were called upon to bear fresh burdens: and there was a spirit of discontent working in the Latin colonies, which a little more

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Unfavourable circumstances of the Romans in Italy and in Spain.

<sup>204</sup> Livy, XXVI. 1. 28; XXVII. 7. Comp. XXVII. 21, 22. 24.

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provocation might excite to open revolt. Spain besides seemed at last to be freed from the enemy; and the recent defeats and deaths of the two Scipios there held out the hope to Hannibal, that now at length his brother Hasdrubal, having nothing to detain him in Spain, might lead a second Carthaginian army into Italy, and establish himself in Etruria, depriving Rome of the resources of the Etruscan and Umbrian states, as she had already lost those of half Samnium, of Lucania, Bruttium, and Apulia. Then, assailed at once by two sons of Hamilcar, on the north and the south, the Roman power, which one of them singly had so staggered, must, by the joint efforts of both, be beaten to the ground and destroyed. With such hopes, and with no unreasonable confidence, Hannibal consoled himself for the loss of Capua, and allowed his army, after its severe marching, to rest for the remainder of the year in Apulia<sup>205</sup>. And now, as we have brought the war in Italy to this point, it is time to look abroad, and to observe the course of this mighty contest in Spain, in Greece, and in Sicily.

<sup>205</sup> Compare Livy, XXVI. 37.

## CHAPTER XLV.

PROGRESS OF THE WAR IN SPAIN, SICILY, AND GREECE.

OPERATIONS OF THE SCIPIOS IN SPAIN. THEIR DEFEAT AND DEATH. MACEDON AND GREECE. REVOLUTIONS OF SYRACUSE. MARCELLUS IN SICILY. SIEGE OF SYRACUSE. ARCHIMEDES. SACK OF SYRACUSE, AND REDUCTION OF SICILY. MUTINES, THE NUMIDIAN, IN SICILY. A.U.C. 538 TO 543.

WARS must of necessity form a large part of all history; but in most wars the narrative of military operations is without interest for posterity, and should only be given by contemporary writers. It was right for Thucydides to relate every little expedition of the Peloponnesian war at length; but modern writers do wrong in following his example; for the details of petty warfare are unworthy to survive their own generation. And there are also wars conducted on a great scale, and very important in their consequences, the particulars of which may safely be forgotten. For military events should only be related circumstantially to after ages, when they either contain a great lesson in the art of war, or are so striking in their incidents, as to acquire the

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When wars ought to be related circumstantially.



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interest of a romance, and thus retain their hold on the imaginations and moral feelings of all ages and countries. Hannibal's campaigns in Italy have this double claim on our notice: they are a most valuable study for the soldier, whilst for readers in general they are a varied and eventful story, rich in characters, scenes, and actions. But the war in Spain, although most important in its results, and still more the feeble bickerings rather than wars of the decayed states of Greece, may and ought to be related summarily. A closer attention must be given to the war in Sicily: there again the military and the general interest of the story are great; we have the ancient art of defence exhibited in its highest perfection; we have the immortal names of Syracuse and Archimedes.

Campaign of  
541 in Spain.

There is another reason, however, why we should not give a minute account of the Spanish war: because we really know nothing about it. The Roman annalists, whom Livy has copied here, seem to have outdone their usual exaggerations in describing the exploits of the two Scipios; and what is the truth concealed beneath this mass of fiction, we are wholly unable to discover. Spain, we know, has in later wars been overrun victoriously and lost again in a single summer; and no one can say how far the Scipios may at times have penetrated into the heart of the country; but it is certain that in the first years of their command they made no lasting impression south of the Iberus. Still their maintaining their ground at all in Spain was of signal

service to Rome. The Carthaginians, on the other hand, knew the importance of expelling them: but it appears that in the year 541, they became engaged in a war with Syphax, one of the kings or chiefs of the Numidians; and a war in Africa was always so alarming to them, that they recalled Hasdrubal, Hannibal's brother, from Spain, with a part of their forces employed in that country, and thus took off the pressure from the Romans at a most critical moment<sup>1</sup>. The Scipios availed themselves of this relief ably; and now they seem to have advanced into the heart of Spain with effect, to have drawn over many of the Spanish tribes to the Roman alliance, and thus to have obtained large recruits for their own army, which received but slight reinforcements from Rome. It is said that 20,000 Celtiberians were raised to serve under the Scipios, and that at the same time 300 noble Spaniards were sent into Italy to detach their countrymen there from Hannibal's service<sup>2</sup>. Cn. Scipio, we are told, was greatly loved and revered by the Spaniards<sup>3</sup>; and his influence probably attracted the Celtiberians to the Roman armies; but we know not where he found money to pay them, as the Roman treasury was in no condition to supply him, and he was obliged to make war support war. However, careful economy of the plunder which he may have won from some of the allies of Carthage, assisted perhaps by loans from

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<sup>1</sup> Appian, VI. 15. Livy, XXIV. 48.

<sup>3</sup> Livy, XXV. 36. Appian, VI. 15.

<sup>2</sup> Livy, XXV. 32. XXIV. 49.

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some of the Spanish chiefs attached to himself and to Rome, had enabled him to raise a large army; so that, when Hasdrubal returned from Africa, apparently late in 542, although there were two other Carthaginian generals in Spain<sup>4</sup>, each commanding a separate army, yet the Roman generals thought themselves strong enough to act on the offensive; and they concerted a grand plan for the campaign of 543, by which they hoped to destroy all the armies opposed to them, and to drive the Carthaginians out of Spain. With this confidence they divided their forces, and having crossed the Iberus, marched each in pursuit of a separate enemy. Cn. Scipio was to attack Hasdrubal, while his brother was to fall on the other two Carthaginian generals, Hasdrubal the son of Gisco and Mago<sup>5</sup>.

Campaign of  
543: defeat  
and death of  
the Scipios.

They had wintered, it seems, in the country of their new auxiliaries, or, according to one account, even farther to the south, in the valley of the Bætis or Guadalquiver<sup>6</sup>. But it is as impossible to disentangle the geography of this war as its history. The Carthaginian generals owed their triumph—and more than this we cannot ascertain—to the ascendancy of Hasdrubal's name and personal character; for the Celtiberians, when brought into his neighbourhood, were unable to resist his influence, and abruptly left the Roman camp, and returned home<sup>7</sup>. Thus abandoned, and at a great distance from all their re-

<sup>4</sup> Livy, XXV. 32. Appian, VI. 16.

VI. 16.

<sup>6</sup> Appian, VI. 16.

<sup>7</sup> Livy, XXV. 33.

<sup>5</sup> Livy, XXV. 32.

sources, the two Roman generals were successively attacked by the Carthaginians, defeated, and killed <sup>8</sup>. Of the wreck of their armies, some fled to the towns of their Spanish allies for refuge, and were in some instances slain by them, or betrayed to the Carthaginians: a remnant, which had either been left behind the Iberus before the opening of the campaign, or had effected its retreat thither, was still held together by Scipio's lieutenant, T. Fonteius, and by L. Marcius<sup>9</sup>. Marcius was only a simple Roman knight, that is, a man of good fortune, who therefore served, not in the infantry of the legions, but in the cavalry: he had a natural genius for war, and was called irregularly, it seems, by the common voice of the soldiers to take the command; and we need not doubt that by some timely advantages gained over some of the enemies' parties, he raised the spirits of the men, and preserved the Roman cause in Spain from utter extinction. But the extravagant fables of his victories over the victorious Carthaginians, and of his storming their camps, show too clearly out of what wretched materials the Roman history has to be written <sup>10</sup>.

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If the defeat of the Scipios took place, as seems probable, early in the year 543, that is, a few weeks before the fall of Capua, we may again admire the

The Romans are driven to the foot of the Pyrenees.

<sup>8</sup> Livy, XXV. 34—36. Appian, VI. 16.

<sup>9</sup> Livy, XXV. 36—39.

<sup>10</sup> Livy, XXV. 39. According to one account, 37,000 men were slain on the Carthaginian side. Valerius Antias returned 17,000

killed, and 4330 prisoners. Appian (VI. 17.) substitutes Marcellus by mistake for Marcius, but says, he did nothing brilliant, so that the Carthaginian power increased, and spread almost over the whole of Spain.

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wonderful disposal of events by which the ruin of the Roman cause in Spain was delayed till their affairs in Italy had passed over their crisis, and were beginning to mend. The Scipios' army was replaced by that of C. Nero, which the fall of Capua set at liberty<sup>11</sup>: a year earlier this resource would not have been available. Still the Carthaginians immediately recovered all the states south of the Ebro, which had before revolted; and the Romans were confined to a narrow strip of coast between the Iberus and the Pyrenees<sup>12</sup>, from which the overwhelming force of their enemies was likely ere long to drive them. And so it would, had not the external weakness of the Roman cause been now upheld for the first time by individual genius; so that a defeated and dispirited army became, in the hands of the young P. Scipio, the instrument by which all Spain was conquered.

Strange in-  
efficiency of  
Macedon,

Seventy years before this period, a Greek army under Pyrrhus had shaken the whole power of Rome: yet the kingdom of Pyrrhus was little more than a dependency of Macedon, and Pyrrhus had struggled against the arms of the Macedonian kings vigorously, but without success. Now a young, warlike, and popular king, was seated on the throne of Macedon<sup>13</sup>: he had just concluded a war victoriously with the only state in Greece which seemed

<sup>11</sup> Livy, XXVI. 17.

<sup>12</sup> Appian, VI. 17.

<sup>13</sup> Philip was not more than seventeen years old in the archon-

ship of Ariston, A.U.C. 534. Polybius, IV. 5. For his popular and warlike character see Polybius, IV. 77. 82. 1.

capable of resisting his power. What Pyrrhus had almost done alone, would surely be easy for Philip to accomplish, with Hannibal and his invincible army to aid him; and what could Rome have done, if to the irresistible African cavalry there had been joined a body of heavy-armed Macedonians, and a force of artillery and engineers such as Greek science alone could furnish? The strangest and most unaccountable blank in history is the early period of the Macedonian war, before the Ætolians became the allies of Rome and a coalition was formed against Philip in Greece itself. Philip's treaty with Hannibal was concluded in the year 539, or early enough, at any rate, to allow of his commencing operations in the year 540<sup>14</sup>. The Ætolians concluded their treaty with Rome in 543, after the fall of Capua<sup>15</sup>. More than three precious years seem to have been utterly wasted; and during all this time M. Valerius Lævinus, commanding at Brundisium with a single legion and a small fleet, was allowed to paralyse the whole power of Macedon<sup>16</sup>.

The cause of this is to be found in that selfish attention to separate objects which has so often been the ruin of coalitions. Philip's object, or rather that of Demetrius of Pharos, whose influence appears plainly in all this war with Rome, was to undo the work of the late Roman victories in Illyria, and to wrest the western coast of Epirus from their

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arising from  
Philip's self-  
ishness.

<sup>14</sup> Livy, XXIII. 33. 39. Above, <sup>16</sup> Livy, XXIV. 10. 44. XXV. p. 182. 3. XXVI. 24.

<sup>15</sup> Livy, XXVI. 24.



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dominion. In his treaty with Hannibal, Philip had especially stipulated that the Romans should not be allowed to retain their control over Coreyra, Apollonia, Epidamnus, Pharus, Dimalla or Dimalus, the country of the Parthinians, and Atintania<sup>17</sup>; places which in the Illyrian wars had either submitted to, or been conquered by the Romans. Philip does not appear to have understood that all these were to be reconquered most surely in Italy; that it was easier to crush Lævinus at Brundisium, than to repel him from Epirus; more prudent to march against him at the head of the Greeks of Italy, than to let him come to the aid of the Greeks on the coast of Illyria. Thus he trifled away his strength in petty enterprises, and those not always successful, till the Romans found the time come to carry on the war against him in earnest; and they were not apt either to neglect their opportunities or to misuse them.

He wastes  
his time on  
petty ob-  
jects.

Philip was personally brave, and could on occasion show no common activity and energy. But he had not that steadiness of purpose, without which energy in political affairs is worthless. Thus he was lightly deterred from an enterprise by dangers which he was not afraid of, but rather did not care to encounter. The naval power of Greece had long since sunk to nothing; Philip had no regular navy, and the small vessels which he could collect were no match for the Roman quinqueremes; so that a descent upon Italy appeared hazardous, while various

<sup>17</sup> Polybius, VII. 9.

schemes opened upon him nearer home, which his own temper, or the interests of his advisers, led him to prefer. Hence, he effected but little during three years. He neither took Epidamnus, nor Apollonia, nor Coreyra; but he won Lissus, and the strong fortress which served as its citadel<sup>18</sup>; and he seems also to have conquered Dimalus or Dimallus, and to have enlarged his dominion more or less nominally with the countries of the Parthinians and Atintanians, of which the sovereignty had belonged to the Romans<sup>19</sup>. From all this Hannibal derived no benefit, and Rome sustained no serious injury.

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In the year of Rome 491, in the second year of the first Punic war, Hiero, king of Syracuse, had made peace with the Romans, and had become their ally<sup>20</sup>. Forty-seven years had passed away since, when the tidings of the battle of Cannæ arrived at Syracuse, and seemed to announce that a great part of Sicily was again to change its masters, and to be subjected once more to the Carthaginian dominion. But Hiero, although about ninety years of age, did not waver. Far from courting the friendship of Carthage, he increased his exertions in behalf of Rome: he supplied the Roman army in Sicily with money and corn at a time when all supplies from home had failed<sup>21</sup>; and about a year afterwards, when a fleet was prepared to meet the hostile de-

Hiero's  
faithful  
friendship to  
the Romans;  
his death;

<sup>18</sup> Polybius, VIII. 15, 16.

<sup>19</sup> In Livy, XXIX. 12, we find these attacked by the Romans, as being subject to Mæcedon.

<sup>20</sup> See Vol. II. of this history, p. 570.

<sup>21</sup> Livy, XXIII. 22. See above, p. 167.

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signs of Philip of Macedon, Hiero again sent 50,000 medimni of wheat and barley to provision it<sup>22</sup>. This must nearly have been his last public act. Towards the close of the year 539, after a life of ninety years, and a reign of fifty-four, but still retaining all his faculties, sound in mind and vigorous in body, Hiero died<sup>23</sup>.

preceded by  
that of his  
son Gelon.

He had enjoyed and deserved the constant affection of his people, and had seen his kingdom flourishing more and more under his government. One only thing had marred the completeness of his fortune: his son Gelon had died before him, with whom he had lived in the most perfect harmony, and who had ever rendered him the most devoted and loving obedience<sup>24</sup>. He had still two daughters, Damarata and Heraclea, who were married to two eminent Syracusans, Andranodorus and Zoippus; and he had one grandson, a boy of about fifteen, the son of Gelon, Hieronymus<sup>25</sup>.

He is suc-  
ceeded by  
his grandson  
Hierony-  
mus: his  
character.

It is the most difficult problem in a hereditary monarchy, how to educate the heir to the throne, when the circumstances of his condition, so much more powerful than any instruction, are apt to train him for evil far more surely than the lessons of the wisest teachers can train him for good. In the ancient world, moreover, there was no fear of God to sober the mind, which was raised above all fear or respect for man; and if the philosophers spoke of the superiority of virtue and wisdom over all the

<sup>22</sup> Livy, XXIII. 38.

<sup>23</sup> Polybius, VII. 8.

<sup>24</sup> Polybius, VII. 8.

<sup>25</sup> Livy, XXIV. 4.

gifts of fortune, their own example, when they were seen to sue for the king's favour, and to dread his anger, no less than ordinary men, made their doctrines regarded either as folly or hypocrisy. Hieronymus at fifteen became king of Syracuse; a child in understanding, but with passions precociously vigorous, because he had such large means of indulging them; insolent, licentious, and cruel, yet withal so thoughtless and so mere a slave of every impulse, that he was sure to be the instrument of his own ruin.

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We have already noticed his early communication with Hannibal, and the arrival of Hippocrates and Epicydes at Syracuse, Syracusans by extraction, but born at Carthage, and by education and franchise Carthaginians, whom Hannibal had sent to Hieronymus to confirm him in his alienation from Rome<sup>26</sup>. They won the youth's ear by telling him of Hannibal's marches and victories; for in those days events that were two or three years old were still news to foreigners; common fame had reported the general facts, but the details could only be gathered accidentally; and Hieronymus listened eagerly to Hippocrates and Epicydes, when they told him stories of their crossing the Rhone, of their passage of the Alps and Apennines, of the slaughter of the Romans at Thrasymenus, and of their late unequalled victory at Cannæ, of all which they had themselves been eye-witnesses<sup>27</sup>. And when they saw Hieronymus

He joins the  
Carthagi-  
nians,

<sup>26</sup> Polybius, VII. 34. Livy, XXIV. 6. See above, p. 182.

<sup>27</sup> Polybius, VII. 4.

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possessed with a vague longing that he too might achieve such great deeds, they asked him who had such claims as he to be king of all Sicily. His mother was the daughter of Pyrrhus; his father was Hiero's son; with this double title to the love and homage of all Sicilians, he should not be contented to divide the island either with Rome or Carthage: by his timely aid to Hannibal he might secure it wholly to himself. The youth accordingly insisted that the sovereignty of all Sicily should be ceded to him as the price of his alliance with Carthage; and the Carthaginians were well content to humour him, knowing that if they could drive the Romans out of the island, they had little to fear from the claims of Hieronymus<sup>28</sup>.

and deserts  
the Romans.

Appius Claudius, the Roman prætor in Sicily, aware of what was going on, sent some of his officers to Syracuse, to warn the king not to break off his grandfather's long friendship with Rome, but to renew the old alliance in his own name<sup>29</sup>. Hieronymus called his council together, and Hippocrates and Epicydes were present. His native subjects, afraid to oppose his known feelings, said nothing; but three of his council, who came from old Greece, conjured him not to abandon his alliance with Rome. Andranodorus alone, his uncle and guardian, urged him to seize the moment, and become sovereign of all Sicily. He listened, and then, turning to Hippocrates and Epicydes, asked them, "And what think

<sup>28</sup> Polybius, VII. 4. Livy, XXIV. 6. <sup>29</sup> Polybius, VII. 5. Livy, XXIV. 6.

you?" "We think," they answered, "with Andranodorus." "Then," said he, "the question is decided; we will no longer be dependent on Rome." He then called in the Roman ambassadors, and told them that "he was willing to renew his grandfather's league with Rome, if they would repay him all the money and corn with which Hiero had at various times supplied them; if they would restore the costly presents which he had given them, especially the golden statue of Victory, which he had sent to them only three years since, after their defeat at Thrasymenus; and finally, if they would share the island with him equally, ceding all to the east of the river Himeras<sup>30</sup>." The Romans considered this answer as a mockery, and went away without thinking it worthy of a serious reply. Accordingly from this moment Hieronymus conceived himself to be at war with Rome: he began to raise and arm soldiers, and to form magazines; and the Carthaginians, according to their treaty with him, prepared to send over a fleet and army to Sicily.

Meanwhile his desertion of the Roman alliance was most unwelcome to a strong party in Syracuse. A conspiracy had already been formed against his life, which was ascribed, whether truly or not, to the intrigues of this party<sup>31</sup>; and now that he had actually joined the Carthaginians, they became more bitter against him; and a second conspiracy was formed

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He is murdered by a conspiracy.

<sup>30</sup> Polybius, VII. 5. See Livy, XXII. 37.

<sup>31</sup> Polybius, VII. 2. Livy, XXIV. 5.



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with better success. He had taken the field to attack the cities in the Roman part of the island. Hippocrates and Epicycles were already in the enemy's country; and the king, with the main body of his army, was on his march to support them, and had just entered the town of Leontini<sup>32</sup>. The road, which was also the principal street of the city, lay through a narrow gorge, with abrupt cliffs on each side; and the houses ran along in a row, nestling under the western cliff, and facing towards the small river Lissus, which flowed through the gorge between the town and the eastern cliff<sup>33</sup>. An empty house in this street had been occupied by the conspirators: when the king came opposite to it, one of their number, who was one of the king's guards, and close to his person, stopped just behind him, as if something had caught his foot; and whilst he seemed trying to get free, he checked the advance of the following multitude, and left the king to go on a few steps unattended. At that moment the conspirators rushed out of the house and murdered him. So sudden was the act, that his guards could not save him: seeing him dead, they were seized with a panic, and dispersed. The murderers hastened, some into the market-place of Leontini, to raise the cry of liberty there, and others to Syracuse, to anticipate the king's friends, and secure the city for themselves and the Romans<sup>31</sup>.

Their tidings however had flown before them;

<sup>32</sup> Livy, XXIV. 7.

<sup>33</sup> Polybius, VII. 6.

<sup>31</sup> Livy, XXIV. 7.

and Andranodorus, the king's uncle, had already secured the island of Ortygia, the oldest part of Syracuse, in which was the citadel, and where Hiero and Hieronymus had resided <sup>35</sup>. The assassins arrived just at nightfall, displaying the bloody robe of Hieronymus, and the diadem which they had torn from his head, and calling the people to rise in the name of liberty. This call was obeyed: all the city, except the island, was presently in their power; and in the island itself a strong building, which was used as a great corn magazine for the supply of the whole city, was no sooner seized by those whom Andranodorus had sent to occupy it, than they offered to deliver it up to the opposite party <sup>36</sup>.

The general feeling being thus manifested, Andranodorus yielded to it. He surrendered the keys of the citadel and of the treasury; and in return he and Themistus, who had married a sister of Hieronymus, were elected among the captains-general of the commonwealth, to whom, according to the old Syracusan constitution, the executive government was to be committed. But their colleagues were mostly chosen from the assassins of Hieronymus; and between such opposites there could be no real union. Suspicions and informations of plots were not long wanting. An actor told the majority of the captains-general, that Andranodorus and Themistus were conspiring to massacre them and the other leaders of their party, and to re-establish the tyranny:

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Insurrection  
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Murder of  
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rus and  
Themistus,

<sup>35</sup> Livy, XXIV. 21.

<sup>36</sup> Livy, XXIV. 21, 22.

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the charge was made out to the satisfaction of those who were so well disposed to believe it: they stationed soldiers at the doors of the council-chamber; and as soon as Andranodorus and Themistus entered, the soldiers rushed in and murdered them<sup>37</sup>. The members of the council decided that they were rightfully slain; but the multitude were inclined to believe them less guilty than their murderers, and beset the council, calling for vengeance. They were persuaded however to hear what the perpetrators of the deed could say in its defence; and Sopater, one of the captains-general, who was concerned both in the recent murder and in that of Hieronymus, arose to justify himself and his party. The tyrannies in the ancient world were so hateful, that they were put by common feeling out of the pale of ordinary law: when Sopater accused Andranodorus and Themistus of having been the real authors of all the outrages committed by the boy Hieronymus; when he inveighed against their treacherous submission to their country's laws, and against their ingratitude in plotting the deaths of those who had so nobly forgiven all their past offences; and when he said, finally, that they had been instigated to all these crimes by their wives, that Hiero's daughter and granddaughter could not condescend to live in a private station; there arose a cry from some, probably of their own tutored partisans, which the whole multitude, in fear or in passion, immediately echoed, "Death to the

<sup>37</sup> Livy, XXIV. 23, 24.

whole race of the tyrants; not one of them shall be suffered to live<sup>38</sup>.”

They who had purposely roused the multitude to fury, were instantly ready to secure it for their own bloody ends. The captains-general proposed a decree for the execution of every person of the race of the tyrants; and the instant it was passed, they sent parties of soldiers to carry it into effect. Thus the wives of Andranodorus and Themistus were butchered: but there was another daughter of Hiero, the wife of Zoippus, who was so far from sharing in the tyranny of Hieronymus, that, when sent by him as his ambassador to Egypt, he had chosen to live there in exile. His innocent wife, with her two young maiden daughters, were included in the general proscription. They took refuge at the altar of their household gods, but in vain: the mother was dragged from her sanctuary and murdered; the daughters fled wildly into the outer court of the palace, in the hope of escaping into the street, and appealing to the humanity of the passers-by; but they were pursued and cut down by repeated wounds. Ere the deed was done, a messenger came to say that the people had revoked their sentence; which seems to show that the captains-general had taken advantage of some expressions of violence, and had done in the people's name what the people had never in earnest agreed to. At any rate, their rage was now loud against

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and of all  
the descend-  
ants of  
Hiero.

<sup>38</sup> Livy, XXIV. 25.

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their bloody government; and they insisted on having a free election of captains-general to supply the places of Andranodorus and Themistus; a demand which implies that some preceding resolutions or votes of the popular assembly had been passed under undue influence <sup>39</sup>.

The Carthaginian party rallies.

The party which favoured the Roman alliance had done all that wickedness could to make themselves odious. The reaction against them was natural; yet the same foreign policy which these butchers supported, had been steadily pursued by the wise and moderate Hiero. Every party in that corrupt city of Syracuse wore an aspect of evil: the partisans of Carthage were in nothing better than those of Rome. When Hieronymus had been murdered, Hippocrates and Epicydes were at the moment deserted by their soldiers, and returned to Syracuse as private individuals. There they applied to the government for an escort to convey them back to Hannibal in safety: but the escort was not provided immediately; and in the interval they perceived that they could serve Hannibal better by remaining in Sicily. They found many amongst the mercenary soldiers of the late king, and amongst the poorer citizens, who readily listened to them, when they accused the captains-general of selling the independence of Syracuse to Rome: and their party was so strengthened by the atrocities of the government, that, when the election was held to choose

<sup>39</sup> Livy, XXIV. 26.

two new captains-general in the place of Andranodorus and Themistus, Hippocrates and Epicydes were nominated and triumphantly elected <sup>40</sup>. Again therefore the government was divided within itself; and Hippocrates and Epicydes had been taught by the former conduct of their colleagues that one party or the other must perish.

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The Roman party had immediately suspended hostilities with Rome, obtained a truce from Appius Claudius renewable every ten days, and sent ambassadors to him to solicit the revival of Hiero's treaty. A Roman fleet of a hundred ships was lying off the coast a little to the north of Syracuse, which the Romans, on the first suspicion of the defection of Hieronymus, had manned by the most extraordinary exertions, and sent to Sicily. On the other hand, Himilco, with a small Carthaginian fleet, was at Pachynus, Rome and Carthage each anxiously watching the course of events in Syracuse, and each being ready to support its party there. Matters were nicely balanced; and the Roman fleet, in the hope of turning the scale, sailed to Syracuse, and stationed itself at the mouth of the great harbour <sup>41</sup>.

The Roman  
fleet sails to  
the mouth  
of the  
harbour.

Strengthened by this powerful aid, the Roman party triumphed; even moderate men not wishing to provoke an enemy, who was already at their gates. The old league with Rome was renewed, with the stipulation, that whatever cities in Sicily had been

The Roman  
party be-  
comes the  
more power-  
ful.

<sup>40</sup> Livy, XXIV. 23. 27.

<sup>41</sup> Livy, XXIV. 27.



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subject to king Hiero should now in like manner be under the dominion of the Syracusan people. It appears that, since the murder of Hieronymus, his kingdom had gone to pieces, many of the towns, and Leontini in particular, asserting their independence. These were, like Syracuse, in a state of hostility against Rome, owing to Hieronymus' revolt; but they had no intention of submitting again to the Syracusan dominion. Still, when the Romans threatened them, they sent to Syracuse for aid; and as the Syracusan treaty with Rome was not yet ratified or made public, the government could not decline their request. Hippocrates accordingly was sent to Leontini, with a small army, consisting chiefly of deserters from the Roman fleet: for, in the exigency of the time, the fleet had been manned by slaves furnished by private families in a certain proportion, according to their census; and the men thus provided, being mostly unused to the sea, and forced into the service, deserted in unusually large numbers, insomuch that there were two thousand of them in the party which Hippocrates led to the defence of Leontini <sup>42</sup>.

Marcellus arrives in Sicily: Leontini, the head of the Carthaginian party.

This auxiliary force did good service; and Appius Claudius, who commanded the Roman army, was obliged to stand on the defensive. Meanwhile M. Marcellus had arrived in Sicily, having been sent over thither, as we have seen, after the close of the campaign in Italy, to take the supreme command.

<sup>42</sup> Livy, XXIV. 28, 29.

As the negotiations with Syracuse were now concluded, Marcellus required that Hippocrates should be recalled from Leontini, and that both he and Epicydes should be banished from Sicily. Epicydes upon this, feeling that his personal safety was risked by remaining longer at Syracuse, went also to Leontini; and both he and his brother inveighed loudly against the Roman party who were in possession of the government; they had betrayed their country to Rome, and were endeavouring, with the help of the Romans, to enslave the other cities of Sicily, and to subject them to their own dominion. Accordingly, when some officers arrived from Syracuse, requiring the Leontines to submit, and announcing to Hippocrates and Epicydes their sentence of expulsion from Sicily, they were answered, that the Leontines would not acknowledge the Syracusan government, nor were they bound by its treaties. This answer being reported to Syracuse, the leaders of the Roman party called upon Marcellus to fulfil his agreement with them, and to reduce Leontini to submission<sup>43</sup>. That city was now the refuge and centre of the popular party in Sicily, as Samos had been in Greece, when the four hundred usurped the government of Athens; and Hippocrates and Epicydes looked upon their army as the true representative of the Syracusan people, just as Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus, and the Athenian fleet at Samos, regarded themselves, during the tyranny of the aristocratical party at home, as the true people of Athens.

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<sup>43</sup> Livy, XXIV. 29.

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A.C. 215.  
Marcellus  
takes Leonti-  
ni: his  
cruelties  
there

But, as we have noticed more than once before, nothing could less resemble the slowness and feebleness of Sparta than the tremendous energy of Rome. The prætor's army in Sicily at the beginning of the year consisted of two legions; and it is probable that Marcellus had brought one at least of the two legions which had formed his consular army. With this powerful force Marcellus instantly attacked Leontini, and stormed it; and in addition to the usual carnage on the sack of a town, he scourged and in cold blood beheaded two thousand of the Roman deserters, whom he found bearing arms in the army of Hippocrates; Hippocrates and his brother escaping only with a handful of men, and taking refuge in the neighbouring town of Herbessus<sup>44</sup>.

excite gene-  
ral indigna-  
tion.

For nearly thirty years war had been altogether unknown in Sicily; fifty years had passed since a hostile army had made war in the territory of Syracuse. All men therefore were struck with horror at the fate of Leontini: if Ætna had rolled down his lava flood upon the town, its destruction would scarcely have been more sudden and terrible. But with horror indignation was largely mingled: the bloodiness of the Romans in the sack of towns went far beyond the ordinary practice of the Greeks; the Syracusan government had betrayed their countrymen of Leontini to barbarians more cruel than the Mamertines.

<sup>44</sup> Livy, XXIV. 30.

The tidings spread far and wide, and met a Syracusan army, which two of the captains-general, Sosis and Dinomenes, both of them assassins of Hieronymus, and devoted to the cause of Rome, were leading out to co-operate with Marcellus. The soldiers, full of grief and fury, refused to advance a step farther: their blood, they said, would be sold to the Romans, like that of their brethren at Leontini. The generals were obliged to lead them back to Megara, within a few miles of Syracuse: then hearing that Hippocrates and Epicycles were at Herbessus, and dreading their influence at a moment like this, they led their troops to attack the town where they had taken refuge<sup>45</sup>.

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A.C. 215.  
The Syracusan army refuses to march,

Hippocrates and his brother threw open the gates of Herbessus, and came out to meet them. At the head of the Syracusan army marched six hundred Cretans, old soldiers in Hiero's service, whom he had sent over into Italy to act as light troops in the Roman army against Hannibal's barbarians, but who had been taken prisoners at Thrasymenus, and with the other allies or auxiliaries of Rome had been sent home by Hannibal unhurt. They now saw Hippocrates and Epicycles coming towards them with no hostile array, but holding out branches of olive tufted here and there with wool, the well known signs of a suppliant. They heard them praying to be saved from the treachery of the Syracusan generals, who were pledged to deliver up all foreign soldiers serving in Sicily to the vengeance of the

and to act against Hippocrates and Epicycles.

<sup>45</sup> Livy, XXIV. 30.

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Romans. The Cretans felt that the cause of Hippocrates and Epicydes was their own, and swore to protect them. In vain did Sosis and Dinomenes ride forward to the head of the column, and trying what could be done by authority, order the instant arrest of the two suppliants. They were driven off with threats; the feeling began to spread through the army; and the Syracusan generals had no resource but to march back to Megara, leaving the Cretan auxiliaries, it seems, with Hippocrates and Epicydes in a state of open revolt <sup>46</sup>.

Triumph of  
the popular  
party in  
Syracuse.

Meantime the Cretans sent out parties to beset the roads leading to Leontini; and a letter was intercepted, addressed by the Syracusan generals to Marcellus, congratulating him on his exploit at Leontini, and urging him to complete his work by the extermination of every foreign soldier in the service of Syracuse. Hippocrates took care that the purport of this letter should be quickly made known to the army at Megara; and he followed closely with the Cretans to watch the result. The army broke out into mutiny: Sosis and Dinomenes, protesting in vain that the letter was a mere forgery of the enemy, were obliged to escape for their lives to Syracuse: even the Syracusan soldiers were accused of sharing in their generals' treason, and were for a time in great danger from the fury of the foreigners, their comrades. But Hippocrates and Epicydes prevented this mischief,

<sup>46</sup> Livy, XXIV. 30, 31.



and being received as leaders by the whole army, set out forthwith for Syracuse. They sent a soldier before them, most probably a native Syracusan, who had escaped from the sack of Leontini, and could tell his countrymen as an eye-witness what acts of bloodshed, outrage, and rapine, the Romans had committed there. Even in moderate men, who for Hiero's sake were well inclined to Rome, the horrors of Leontini overpowered all other thoughts and feelings: within Syracuse and without, all followed one common impulse. When Hippocrates and Epicydes arrived at the gates, the citizens threw them open: the captains-general in vain endeavoured to close them; they fled to Achradina, the lower part of the city, with such of the Syracusan soldiers as still adhered to them, whilst the stream of the hostile army burst down the slope of Epipolæ, and, swelled by all the popular party, the foreign soldiers, and the old guards of Hiero and Hieronymus, came sweeping after them with irresistible might. Achradina was carried in an instant; some of the captains-general were massacred; Sosis escaped to add the betrayal of his country hereafter to his multiplied crimes. The confusion raged wild and wide; slaves were set free; prisoners were let loose; and amidst the horrors of a violent revolution, under whatever name effected, the popular party, the party friendly to Carthage, and adverse to aristocracy and to Rome, obtained the sovereignty of Syracuse<sup>47</sup>.

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<sup>47</sup> Livy, XXIV. 31, 32.



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A.U.C. 541.  
A. C. 213.  
Marcellus  
besieges  
Syracuse,

Sosis, now in his turn a fugitive, escaped to Leontini, and told Marcellus of the violence done to the friends of Rome. The fiery old man, as vehement at sixty against his country's enemies, as when he slew the Gaulish king in single combat in his first consulship, immediately moved his army upon Syracuse. He encamped by the temple of Olympian Jupiter, on the right bank of the Anapus, where two solitary pillars still remain, and serve as a seamark to guide ships into the great harbour. Appius Claudius with the fleet beset the city by sea; and Marcellus did not doubt that in the wide extent of the Syracusan walls some unguarded spot would be found, and that the punishment of Leontini would soon be effaced by a more memorable example of vengeance<sup>48</sup>.

by land and  
by sea;

Thus was commenced the last siege of Syracuse; a siege not inferior in interest to the two others which it had already undergone, from the Athenians, and from the Carthaginians. It should be remembered that the city walls now embraced the whole surface of Epipolæ, terminating, like the lines of Genoa, in an angle formed by the converging sides of the hill or inclined table-land, at the point where it becomes no more than a narrow ridge, stretching inland, and connecting itself with the hills of the interior. The Romans made their land attack on the south front of the walls, while their fleet, unable, as it seems, to enter the great harbour,

<sup>48</sup> Livy, XXIV. 33.

carried on its assaults against the sea-wall of Achradina.

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A.U.C. 541.  
A.C. 213.  
is baffled by  
Archimedes.

The land attack was committed to Appius Claudius, while Marcellus in person conducted the operations of the fleet. The Roman army is spoken of as large; but no details of its force are given: it cannot have been less than twenty thousand men, and was probably more numerous. No force in Sicily, whether of Syracusans or Carthaginians, could have resisted it in the field; and it had lately stormed the walls of Leontini as easily, to use the Homeric comparison, as a child tramples upon the sand of the sea-shore. But at Syracuse it was checked by an artillery such as the Romans had never encountered before, and which, had Hannibal possessed it, would long since have enabled him to bring the war to a triumphant issue. An old man of seventy-four, a relation and friend of king Hiero, long known as one of the ablest astronomers and mathematicians of his age, now proved that his science was no less practical than deep; and amid all the crimes and violence of contending factions, he alone won the pure glory of defending his country successfully against a foreign enemy. This old man was Archimedes<sup>49</sup>.

Many years before, at Hiero's request, he had contrived the engines which were now used so

<sup>49</sup> Livy, XXIV. 34. Polybius, VIII. 5.

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A.C. 213.  
His extraor-  
dinary en-  
gines to  
defend the  
city.

effectively <sup>50</sup>. Marcellus brought up his ships against the sea-wall of Achradina, and endeavoured by a constant discharge of stones and arrows to clear the walls of their defenders, so that his men might apply their ladders, and mount to the assault. These ladders rested on two ships lashed together broadside to broadside, and worked as one by their outside oars; and when the two ships were brought close up under the wall, one end of the ladder was raised by ropes passing through blocks affixed to the two mast heads of the two vessels, and was then let go, till it rested on the top of the wall. But Archimedes had supplied the ramparts with an artillery so powerful, that it overwhelmed the Romans before they could get within the range which their missiles could reach: and when they came closer, they found that all the lower part of the wall was loopholed; and their men were struck down with fatal aim by an enemy whom they could not see, and who shot his arrows in perfect security. If they still persevered, and attempted to fix their ladders, on a sudden they saw long poles thrust out from the top of the wall, like the arms of a giant; and enormous stones, or huge masses of lead, were dropped from these upon them, by which their ladders were crushed to pieces, and their ships were almost sunk. At other times machines like cranes, or such as are used at the turnpikes in Germany, and in the market-gardens round London, to draw water, were thrust out over

<sup>50</sup> Plutarch, Marcellus, 14.

the wall; and the end of the lever, with an iron grapple affixed to it, was lowered upon the Roman ships. As soon as the grapple had taken hold, the other end of the lever was lowered by heavy weights, and the ship raised out of the water, till it was made almost to stand upon its stern; then the grapple was suddenly let go, and the ship dropped into the sea with a violence which either upset it, or filled it with water. With equal power was the assault on the land side repelled; and the Roman soldiers, bold as they were, were so daunted by these strange and irresistible devices, that if they saw so much as a rope or a stick hanging or projecting from the wall, they would turn about and run away, crying "that Archimedes was going to set one of his engines at work against them." Their attempts indeed were a mere amusement to the enemy, till Marcellus in despair put a stop to his attacks; and it was resolved merely to blockade the town, and to wait for the effect of famine upon the crowded population within<sup>51</sup>.

Thus far, keeping our eyes fixed upon Syracuse only, we can give a clear and probable account of the course of events. But when we would extend our view farther, and connect the war in Sicily with that in Italy, and give the relative dates of the actions performed in the several countries involved in this great contest, we see the wretched charac-

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Difficulties  
in the his-  
tory of the  
Sicilian war.

<sup>51</sup> Polybius, VIII. 6—9. Livy, XXIV. 34. Plutarch, Marcellus, 15—17.

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ter of our materials, and must acknowledge that, in order to give a comprehensive picture of the whole war, we have to supply, by inference or conjecture, what no actual testimony has recorded. We do not know for certain when Marcellus came into Sicily, when he began the siege of Syracuse, or how long the blockade was continued. We read of Roman and Carthaginian fleets appearing and disappearing at different times in the Sicilian seas; but of the naval operations on either side we can give no connected report. Other difficulties present themselves, of no great importance, but perplexing because they shake our confidence in the narrative which contains them. So easy is it to transcribe the ancient writers; so hard to restore the reality of those events, of which they themselves had no clear conception.

Chronology  
of the war.

The first attacks on Syracuse are certainly misplaced by Livy, when he classes them among the events of the year 540<sup>52</sup>. The Sicilian war belongs to the year following, to the consulship of Q. Fabius, the dictator's son, and of Ti. Gracchus. Even when this is set right, it is difficult to reconcile Polybius' statement<sup>53</sup>, "that the blockade of Syracuse lasted eight months," with the account which places the capture of the city in the autumn of 542. Instead of eight months, the blockade would seem to have lasted for more than twelve: nor is there any other solution of this difficulty, than to suppose that the

<sup>52</sup> Livy, XXIV. 34.

<sup>53</sup> Polybius, VIII. 9.

blockade was not persevered in to the end, and was in fact given up as useless, as the assaults had been before. I notice these points, because the narrative which follows is uncertain and unsatisfactory, and no care can make it otherwise.

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The year 541 saw the whole stress of the war directed upon Sicily. Little or nothing, if we can trust our accounts, was done in Italy; there was a pause also in the operations in Spain; but throughout Sicily the contest was raging furiously. Four Roman officers were employed there: P. Cornelius Lentulus held the old Roman province, that is, the western part of the island; and his head quarters were at Lilybæum: T. Otacilius had the command of the fleet<sup>54</sup>: Appius Claudius and Marcellus carried on the war in the kingdom of Syracuse; the latter certainly as proconsul; the former as prætor, or possibly only as the lieutenant, legatus, of the proconsul. Marcellus however, as proconsul, must have had the supreme command over the island; and all its resources must have been at his disposal; so that the fleet which he conducted in person at the siege of Syracuse, was probably a part of that committed to T. Otacilius, Otacilius himself either serving under the proconsul, or possibly remaining still at Lilybæum. It is remarkable that, although he is said to have had the command of the fleet continued to him for five successive years<sup>55</sup>, yet his name never occurs as taking an active part in

Sicily be-  
comes  
the main  
seat of war.

<sup>54</sup> Livy, XXIV. 10.

<sup>55</sup> Livy, XXIII. 32. XXIV. 10. 44. XXV. 3. XXVI. 1.



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the siege of Syracuse; and how he employed himself we know not. Nor is it less singular, that he should have retained his naval command year after year, though he was so meanly esteemed by the most influential men in Rome, that his election to the consulship was twice stopped in the most decided manner, first by Q. Fabius in 540, and again by T. Manlius Torquatus in 544<sup>56</sup>. But the clue to this, as to other things which belong to the living knowledge of these times, is altogether lost.

Wise conduct of the senate towards the fugitives from Cannæ.

While the whole of Sicily was become the scene of war, an army of nine or ten thousand old soldiers was purposely kept inactive by the Roman government, and was not even allowed to take part in any active operations. These were the remains of the army of Cannæ, and a number of citizens who had evaded their military service: as we have seen, they had been all sent to Sicily in disgrace, not to be recalled till the end of the war<sup>57</sup>. Now however that there was active service required in Sicily itself, these condemned soldiers petitioned Marcellus that they might be employed in the field, and have some opportunity of retrieving their character. This petition was presented to him at the end of the first year's campaign in Sicily, and was referred by him to the senate. The answer was remarkable: "The senate could see no reason for entrusting the service of the commonwealth to men who had abandoned their comrades at Cannæ, while they were fighting to the

<sup>56</sup> Livy, XXIV. 9. XXVI. 22.

<sup>57</sup> Livy, XXIII. 25. See above, p. 209.

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death: but if M. Claudius thought differently, he might use his discretion; provided always that none of these soldiers should receive any honorary exemption or reward, however they might distinguish themselves, nor be allowed to return to Italy till the enemy had quitted it<sup>58</sup>." Here was shown the consummate policy of the Roman government, in holding out so high a standard of military duty, while, without appearing to yield to circumstances, they took care not to push their severity so far as to hurt themselves. Occasions might arise, when the services of these disgraced soldiers could not be dispensed with; in such a case Marcellus might employ them. Yet even then their penalty was not wholly remitted; it was grace enough to let them serve their country at all; nothing that they could do was more than their bounden duty of gratitude for the mercy shown them; they could not deserve exemption or reward. It was the glory and the happiness of Rome, that her soldiers could bear such severity. Sicily was full of mercenary troops, whose swords were hired by foreigners to fight their battles; and if these disgraced Romans had chosen to offer their services to Carthage, they might have enjoyed wealth and honours, with full vengeance on their unforgiving country. Greek soldiers at this time would have done so: the proudest of the nobility of France in the sixteenth century did not scruple to revenge his private wrongs by treason.

<sup>58</sup> Livy, XXV. 5—7.

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But these ten thousand Romans, although their case was not only hard, but grievously unjust, inasmuch as their rich and noble countrymen, who had escaped like them from Cannæ, had received no punishment, still bowed with entire submission to their country's severity, and felt that nothing could tempt them to forfeit the privilege of being Romans.

Use of these  
troops.

We must not suppose however that these men were useless, even while they were kept at a distance from the actual field of war. As soon as Syracuse became the enemy of Rome, it was certain that the Carthaginians would renew the struggle of the first Punic war for the dominion of Sicily; and the Roman province, from its neighbourhood to Carthage, was especially exposed to invasion. Lilybæum therefore and Drepanum, Eryx and Panormus, required strong garrisons for their security; and the soldiers of Cannæ, by forming these garrisons, set other troops at liberty who must otherwise have been withdrawn from active warfare. As it was, these towns were never attacked; and the keys of Sicily, Lilybæum at one end of the island, and Messana at the other, remained throughout in the hands of the Romans.

Efforts of  
the Cartha-  
ginians in  
Sicily.

Yet the example of Syracuse produced a very general effect. The cities which had belonged to Hiero's kingdom, mostly followed it, unless where the Romans secured them in time with sufficient garrisons. Himilcon, the Carthaginian commander, who had been sent over to Pachynus with a small fleet to watch the course of events, sailed back to

Carthage, as soon as the Carthaginian party had gained possession of Syracuse, and urged the government to increase its armaments in Sicily <sup>59</sup>. Hannibal wrote from Italy to the same effect; for Sicily had been his father's battle-field for five years; he had clung to it till the last moment; and his son was no less sensible of its importance. Accordingly Himilcon was supplied with an army, notwithstanding the pressure of the Numidian war in Africa; and landing on the south coast of Sicily, he presently reduced Heraclea Minoa and Agrigentum, and encouraged many of the smaller towns in the interior of the island to declare for Carthage. Hippocrates broke out of Syracuse and joined him. Marcellus, who had left his camp to quell the growing spirit of revolt amongst the Sicilian cities, was obliged to fall back again; and the enemy, pursuing him closely, encamped on the banks of the Anapus. Meanwhile a Carthaginian fleet ran over to Syracuse, and entered the great harbour; its object being apparently to provision the place, and thus render the Roman blockade nugatory <sup>60</sup>.

It was clear that Marcellus could not make head against a Carthaginian army supported by Syracuse and half the other cities of Sicily. The fleet also was unequal to the service required of it; many ships had probably been destroyed by Archimedes; Lilybæum could not be left unguarded, and some ships were necessarily kept there; and in the general

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Difficulties  
of the  
Romans.

<sup>59</sup> Livy, XXIV. 35.

<sup>60</sup> Livy, XXIV. 35, 36.

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revolt of the Sicilian cities, the Roman army could not always depend on being supplied by land, and would require corn to be brought sometimes from a distance by sea. Besides, the reinforcements which Marcellus so needed must be sent in ships, and embarked at Ostia; for Hannibal's army cut off all communication by the usual line, through Lucania to Rhegium, and over the strait to Messina. Thirty ships therefore had to sail back to Rome, to take on board a legion and transport it to Panormus; from whence, by a circuitous route along the south coast of the island, the fleet accompanying it all the way, it reached Marcellus' head quarters safely. And now the Romans again had the superiority by sea; but by land Himilcon was still master of the field; and the Roman garrison at Murgantia, a little to the north of Syracuse, was betrayed by the inhabitants into his hands <sup>61</sup>.

Massacre of  
 the inhabit-  
 ants of  
 Enna.

This example was no doubt likely to be followed, and should have increased the vigilance of the Roman garrisons. But it was laid hold of by L. Pinaris, the governor of Enna, as a pretence for repeating the crime of the Campanians at Rhegium, and of the Prænestines more recently at Casilinum. Standing in the centre of Sicily on the top of a high mountain platform, and fenced by precipitous cliffs on almost every side, Enna was a stronghold nearly impregnable, except by treachery from within; and whatever became of the Roman cause in Sicily, the

<sup>61</sup> Livy, XXIV. 36.

holders of Enna might hope to retain it, as the Mamertines had kept Messina. Accordingly Pinarius, having previously prepared his soldiers for what was to be done, on a signal given ordered them to fall upon the people of Enna when assembled in the theatre, and massacred them without distinction. The plunder of the town Pinarius and his soldiers kept to themselves, with the consent of Marcellus, who allowed the necessity of the times to be an apology for the deed <sup>62</sup>.

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The Romans alleged that the people of Enna were only caught in their own snare; that they had invited Hippocrates and Himilcon to attack the city, and had vainly tried to persuade Pinarius to give them the keys of the gates, that they might admit the enemy to destroy the garrison. But the Sicilians saw that, if the people of Enna had meditated treachery, the Romans had practised it: a whole people had been butchered, their city plundered, and their wives and children made slaves, when they were peaceably met in the theatre in their regular assembly; and this new outrage, added to the sack of Leontini, led to an almost general revolt. Marcellus, having collected some corn from the rich plains of Leontini, carried it to the camp before Syracuse, and made his dispositions for his winter quarters. Appius Claudius went home to stand for the consulship, and was succeeded in his command by T. Quinctius Crispinus, a brave soldier,

Revolt of  
the Sici-  
lians: Mar-  
cellus win-  
ters before  
Syracuse.

<sup>62</sup> Livy, XXIV. 37—39.



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who was afterwards Marcellus' colleague as consul, and received his death-wound by his side, when Marcellus was killed by Hannibal's ambush. Crispinus lay encamped near the sea, not far from the temple of Olympian Jupiter, and also commanded the naval force employed in the siege; while Marcellus, with the other part of the army, chose a position on the northern side of Syracuse, between the city and the peninsula of Thapsus, apparently for the purpose of keeping up his communications with Leontini<sup>63</sup>. As to the blockade of Syracuse, it was in fact virtually raised; all the southern roads were left open; and as a large part of the Roman fleet was again called away either to Lilybæum or elsewhere, supplies of all sorts were freely introduced into the town by sea from Carthage.

Intrigues of  
the Roman  
party in  
Syracuse.

The events of the winter were not encouraging to the Romans. Hannibal had taken Tarentum; and the Tarentine fleet was employed in besieging the Roman garrison, which still held the citadel. Thus the Roman naval force was still farther divided, as it was necessary to convey supplies by sea to the garrison; so that, when spring returned, Marcellus was at a loss what to attempt, and had almost resolved to break up from Syracuse altogether, and to carry the war to the other end of Sicily. But Sosis, and other Syracusans of the Roman party, were intriguing actively with their countrymen within the city; and although one conspiracy, in

<sup>63</sup> Livy, XXIV. 39.

which eighty persons were concerned, was detected by Epicydes, and the conspirators all put to death, yet the hopes they had held out of obtaining easy terms from the Romans were not forgotten; and the lawlessness of the Roman deserters, and of the other foreign soldiers, made many of the Syracusans long for a return of the happy times under Hiero, when Rome and Syracuse were friends <sup>64</sup>.

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Thus the spring wore away; and the summer had come, and had reached its prime, and yet the war in Sicily seemed to slumber: for the greater part of the cities which had revolted to Carthage, were undisturbed by the Romans; yet the Carthaginians were not strong enough to assail the heart of the Roman province, and to besiege Drepanum or Lilybæum. In this state of things, the Syracusans turned their eyes to Greece, and thought that the king of Macedon, who was the open enemy of Rome, and the covenanted ally of Carthage, might serve his own cause no less than theirs, by leaving his ignoble warfare on the coast of Epirus, and crossing the Ionian sea to deliver Syracuse. Damippus, a Lacedæmonian, and one of the counsellors of Hieronymus and of Hiero, was accordingly chosen as ambassador, and put to sea on his mission to solicit the aid of king Philip <sup>65</sup>.

The Syracusans send to solicit aid from Macedon.

Again the fortune of Rome interposed to delay the interference of Macedon in the contest. The ship which was conveying Damippus was taken by the

The Romans prepare to scale the walls at the festival of Diana.

<sup>64</sup> Livy, XXV. 23.

<sup>65</sup> Livy, XXV. 23.

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Romans on the voyage. The Syracusans valued him highly, and opened a negotiation with Marcellus to ransom him. The conferences were held between Syracuse and the Roman camp; and a Roman soldier, it is said, was struck with the lowness of the wall in one particular place, and having counted the rows of stones, and so computed the whole height, reported to Marcellus that it might be scaled with ladders of ordinary length. Marcellus listened to the suggestion; but the low point was for that very reason more carefully guarded, because it seemed to invite attack; he therefore thought the attempt too hazardous, unless occasion should favour it<sup>66</sup>. But the great festival of Diana was at hand, a three days' solemnity, celebrated with all honours to the guardian goddess of Syracuse. It was a season of universal feasting; and wine was distributed largely among the multitude, that the neighbourhood of the Roman army might not seem to have banished all mirth and enjoyment. One vast revel prevailed through the city; Marcellus, informed of all this by deserters, got his ladders ready; and soon after dark two cohorts were marched in silence and in a long thin column to the foot of the wall, preceded by the soldiers of one maniple, who carried the ladders, and were to lead the way to the assault.

They gain possession of Tyche and Neapolis;

The spot selected for this attempt was in the wall which ran along the northern edge of Epipolæ, where the ground was steep, and where apparently

<sup>66</sup> Livy, XXV. 23. Plutarch, Marcellus, 18. Polybius, Vol. V. p. 32, 33.

there was no gate, or regular approach to the city. But the vast lines of Syracuse enclosed a wide space of uninhabited ground; the new quarters of Tyche and Neapolis, which had been added to the original town since the great Athenian siege, were still far from reaching to the top of the hill; and what was called the quarter of Epipolæ only occupied a small part of the sloping ground known in earlier times by that name. Thus, when the Romans scaled the northern line, they found that all was quiet and lonely; nor was there any one to spread the alarm, except the soldiers who garrisoned the several towers of the wall itself. These however, heavy with wine, and dreaming of no danger, were presently surprised and killed; and the assailants, thus clearing their way as they went, swept the whole line of the wall on their right, following it up the slope of the hill towards the angle formed at the summit by the meeting of the northern line with the southern. Here was the regular entrance into Syracuse from the land side; and this point, being the key of the whole fortified enclosure, was secured by the strong work called Hexapylon, or the Six Gates; probably from the number of barriers which must be passed before the lines could be fully entered. To this point the storming party made their way in the darkness, not blindly however, nor uncertainly, for a Syracusan was guiding them,—that very Sosis<sup>67</sup>, who had been one of the assassins

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<sup>67</sup> Livy, XXVI. 21.

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of Hieronymus, and one of the murderers of Hiero's daughters, and who, when he was one of the captains-general of Syracuse, must have become acquainted with all the secrets of the fortifications. Sosis led the two Roman cohorts towards Hexapylon: from that commanding height a fire signal was thrown up, to announce the success of their attempt; and the loud and sudden blast of the Roman trumpets from the top of the walls called the Romans to come to the support of their friends, and told the bewildered Syracusans that the key of their lines was in the hands of the enemy<sup>68</sup>.

and take  
the Hexapy-  
lon.

Ladders were now set, and the wall was scaled in all directions; for the main gates of Hexapylon could not be forced till the next morning; and the only passage immediately opened was a small side gate at no great distance from them. But when daylight came, Hexapylon was entirely taken, and the main entrance to the city was cleared; so that Marcellus marched in with his whole army, and took possession of the summit of the slope of Epipola.

Marcellus,  
looking  
down on  
Syracuse,  
sheds tears.

From that high ground he saw Syracuse at his feet, and, he doubted not, in his power. Two quarters of the city, the new town as it was called, and Tyche, were open to his first advance; their only fortification being the general enclosure of the lines, which he had already carried. Below, just over-

<sup>68</sup> Livy, XXV. 24. Plutarch, Marcellus, 18.

hanging the sea, or floating on its waters, lay Achradina and the island of Ortygia, fenced by their own separate walls, which till the time of the first Dionysius had been the limit of Syracuse, the walls which the great Athenian armament had besieged in vain. Nearer on the right, and running so deeply into the land, that it seemed almost to reach the foot of the heights on which he stood, lay the still basin of the great harbour, its broad surface half hidden by the hulls of a hundred Carthaginian ships; while further on the right was the camp of his lieutenant T. Crispinus, crowning the rising ground beyond the Anapus, close by the temple of Olympian Jupiter. So striking was the view on every side, and so surpassing was the glory of his conquest, that Marcellus, old as he was, was quite overcome by it; unable to contain the feelings of that moment, he burst into tears <sup>69</sup>.

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A deputation from the inhabitants of Tyche and Neapolis approached him, bearing the ensigns of suppliants, and imploring him to save them from fire and massacre. He granted their prayer, but at the price of every article of their property, which was to be given up to the Roman soldiers as plunder. At a regular signal the army was let loose upon the houses of Tyche and Neapolis, with no other restriction than that of offering no personal violence. How far such a command would be heeded in such a season of license, we can only conjecture.

His troops  
plunder the  
captured  
parts of the  
city.

<sup>69</sup> Livy, XXV. 24.



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The Roman writers extol the humanity of Marcellus; but the Syracusans regarded him as a merciless spoiler, who had wished to take the town by assault, rather than by a voluntary surrender, that he might have a pretence for seizing its plunder<sup>70</sup>. Such a prize indeed had never before been won by a Roman army: even the wealth of Tarentum was not to be compared with that of Syracuse. But as yet the appetites of the Roman soldiers were fleshed rather than satisfied; less than half of Syracuse was in their power; and a fresh siege was necessary to win the spoil of Achradina and Ortygia. Still what they had already gained gave Marcellus large means of corruption; the fort of Euryalus, on the summit of Epipolæ, near Hexapylon, which might have caused him serious annoyance on his rear while engaged in attacking Achradina, was surrendered to him by its governor, Philodemus, an Argive; and the Romans set eagerly to work to complete their conquest. Having formed three camps before Achradina, they hoped soon to starve the remaining quarters of the city into a surrender<sup>71</sup>.

The Carthaginian army, attempting to relieve Syracuse, is destroyed by a fever.

Epicyles meanwhile showed a courage and activity worthy of one who had learned war under Hannibal. A squadron of the Carthaginian fleet put to sea one stormy night, when the Roman blockading ships were driven off from the mouth of the harbour, and ran across to Carthage to request fresh succours. These were prepared with the greatest expedition;

<sup>70</sup> Livy, XXVI. 30.

<sup>71</sup> Livy, XXV. 25.

while Hippocrates and Himilcon, with their combined Carthaginian and Sicilian armies, came from the western end of the island to attack the Roman army on the land side. They encamped on the shore of the harbour, between the mouth of the Anapus and the city, and assaulted the camp of Crispinus, while Epicydes sallied from Achradina to attack Marcellus. But Roman soldiers fighting behind fortifications were invincible; their lines at Capua in the following year repelled Hannibal himself; and now their positions before Syracuse were maintained with equal success against Hippocrates and Epicydes. Still the Carthaginian army remained in its camp on the shore of the harbour, partly in the hope of striking some blow against the enemy, but more to overawe the remains of the Roman party in Syracuse, which the distress of the siege, and the calamities of Neapolis and Tyche, must have rendered numerous and active. Meanwhile the summer advanced; the weather became hotter and hotter; and the usual malaria fevers began to prevail in both armies, and also in Syracuse. But the air here, as at Rome, is much more unhealthy without the city than within; above all, the marshy ground by the Anapus, where the Carthaginian army lay, was almost pestilential; and the ordinary summer fevers in this situation soon assumed a character of extreme malignity. The Sicilians immediately moved their quarters, and withdrew into the neighbouring cities; but the Carthaginians re-

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Their fleet  
fails in a like  
attempt.

mained on the ground, till their whole army was effectually destroyed. Hippocrates and Himilcon both perished with their soldiers<sup>72</sup>.

The Romans suffered less; for Marcellus had quartered his men in the houses of Neapolis and Tyche; and the high buildings and narrow streets of the ancient towns kept off the sun, and allowed both the sick and the healthy to breathe and move in a cooler atmosphere. Still the deaths were numerous; and as the terror of Archimedes and his artillery restrained the Romans from any attempts to batter or scale the walls, they had nothing to trust to save famine or treason. But Bomilcar was on his way from Carthage with 130 ships of war, and a convoy of seven hundred storeships, laden with supplies of every description; he had reached the Sicilian coast near Agrigentum, when prevailing easterly winds checked his farther advance, and he could not reach Pachynus. Alarmed at this most unseasonable delay, and fearing lest the fleet should return to Africa in despair, Epiicydes himself left Syracuse, and went to meet it, and to hasten its advance. The storeships, which were worked by sails, were obliged to remain at Heraclea; but Epiicydes prevailed on Bomilcar to bring on his ships of war to Pachynus, where the Roman fleet, though inferior in numbers, was waiting to intercept his progress. The east winds at length abated, and Bomilcar stood out to sea to double Pachynus. But when

<sup>72</sup> Livy, XXV. 26.

the Roman fleet advanced against him, he suddenly changed his plans, it is said; and having dispatched orders to the storeships at Heraclea to return immediately to Africa, he himself, instead of engaging the Romans, or making for Syracuse, passed along the eastern coast of Sicily without stopping, and continued his course till he reached Tarentum <sup>73</sup>.

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Here again the story in its present state greatly needs explanation. It is true that Hannibal was very anxious at this time to reduce the citadel of Tarentum; and he probably required a fleet to co-operate with him, in order to cut off the garrison's supplies by sea. But Bomilcar had been sent out especially to throw succours into Syracuse; and we cannot conceive his abandoning this object on a sudden, without any intelligible reason. The probability is, that the easterly winds still kept the storeships at Heraclea; and if they could not reach Syracuse, nothing was to be gained by a naval battle. And then, as the service at Tarentum was urgent, he thought it best to go thither, and to send back the convoy to Africa, rather than wait inactive on the Sicilian coast, till the wind became favourable. After all, Syracuse did not fall for want of provisions: the havoc caused by sickness, both in the city and in the Carthaginian camp on the Anapus, must have greatly reduced the number of consumers, and made the actual supply available for a longer period. It seems

Epiccydes  
quits the  
city, which  
becomes a  
prey to  
anarchy.

<sup>73</sup> Livy, XXV. 27.

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to have been a worse mischief than the conduct of Bomilear, that Epicycles himself, as if despairing of fortune, withdrew to Agrigentum, instead of returning to Syracuse; for from the moment of his departure the city seems to have been abandoned to anarchy. At first the remains of the Sicilian army, which now occupied two towns in the interior, not far from Syracuse, began to negotiate with Marcellus, and persuaded the Syracusans to rise on the generals left in command by Epicycles, and to put them to death. New captains-general were then appointed, probably of the Roman party; and they began to treat with Marcellus for the surrender of Syracuse, and for the general settlement of the war in Sicily<sup>74</sup>.

Insurrection  
 of the mer-  
 cenaries in  
 the city;

Marcellus listened to them readily: but his army was longing for the plunder of Achradina and Ortygia; and he knew not how to disappoint them: for we may be sure that no pay was issued at this period to any Roman army serving out of Italy; in the provinces, war was by fair means or foul to support war. Meanwhile the miserable state of affairs in Syracuse was furthering the wish of the Roman soldiers. A besieged city, with no efficient government, and full of foreign mercenaries, whom there was no native force to restrain, was like a wreck in mutiny: utter weakness and furious convulsions were met in the same body. The Roman deserters first excited the tumult, and persuaded all

<sup>74</sup> Livy, XXV. 28.

the foreign soldiers to join them; a new outbreak of violence followed; the Syracusan captains-general were massacred in their turn: and the foreign soldiers were again triumphant. Three officers, each with a district of his own, were appointed to command in Achradina, and three more in Ortygia <sup>75</sup>.

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The foreign soldiers now held the fate of Syracuse in their hands; and they began to consider that they might make their terms with the Romans, although the Roman deserters could not. Their blood was not called for by the inflexible law of military discipline; by a timely treachery they might earn not impunity merely, but reward. So thought Mericus, a Spaniard, who had the charge of a part of the sea-wall of Achradina. Accordingly he made his bargain with Marcellus, and admitted a party of Roman soldiers by night at one of the gates which opened towards the harbour. As soon as morning dawned, Marcellus made a general assault on the land front of Achradina; the garrison of Ortygia hastened to join in the defence; and the Romans then sent boats full of men round into the great harbour, and, effecting a landing under the walls, carried the island with little difficulty. Meanwhile Mericus had openly joined the Roman party, whom he had admitted into Achradina; and Marcellus, having his prey in his power, called off his soldiers from the assault, lest the royal treasures, which were kept in Ortygia, should be plundered in the general sack of the town <sup>76</sup>.

who betray  
it to the  
Romans.

<sup>75</sup> Livy, XXV. 29.

<sup>76</sup> Livy, XXV. 30.



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A.U.C. 542.  
A.C. 212.  
Syracuse is  
taken and  
plundered :  
Archimedes  
is slain.

In the respite thus gained, the Roman deserters found an opportunity to escape out of Syracuse. Whether they forced their way out, or whether the soldiers, hungry for plunder, and not wishing to encounter the resistance of desperate men, obliged Marcellus to connive at their escape, we know not: but with them all wish or power to hold out longer vanished from Syracuse; and a deputation from Achradina came once more to Marcellus, praying for nothing beyond the lives and personal freedom of the citizens and their families. This, it seems, was granted; but as soon as Marcellus had sent his quæstor to secure the royal treasures in Ortygia, the soldiers were let loose upon the city to plunder it at their discretion. They did not merely plunder however: blood was shed unsparingly, partly by the mere violence of the soldiers, partly by the axes of the lictors, as the punishment of rebellion against the majesty of Rome. Amidst the horrors of the sack of the city, Archimedes was slain<sup>77</sup>. The stories of his death vary; and which, if any of them, is the true one, we cannot determine. But Marcellus, who made it his glory to carry all the finest works of art from the temples of Syracuse to Rome<sup>78</sup>, would no doubt have been glad to have seen Archimedes walking amongst the prisoners at his triumph. He is said to have shown kindness to the relations of Archimedes for his sake<sup>79</sup>; and if this be true, he

<sup>77</sup> Livy, XXV. 31. Plutarch, IX. 10. Cicero, in Verrem, IV. Marcellus, 19. Valerius Maximus, VIII. 7. 7.

<sup>79</sup> Livy, XXV. 31. Plutarch, Marcellus, 19.

<sup>78</sup> Livy, XXV. 40. Polybius, Marcellus, 19.

earned a glory which few Romans ever deserved, that of honouring merit in an enemy.

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A.U.C. 542.  
A.C. 212.  
Miserable  
condition of  
the Syracu-  
sans.

Old as Archimedes was, the Roman soldier's sword dealt kindly with him, in cutting short his scanty term of remaining life, and saving him from beholding the misery of his country. It was a wretched sight to see the condition of Syracuse, when the sack was over, and what was called a state of peace and safety had returned. Every house was laid bare, every temple stript; and the empty pedestals showed how sweeping the spoilers' work had been. The Syracusans beheld their captive gods carried to the Roman quarters, or put on shipboard to be conveyed to Rome; the care with which they were handled, lest the conqueror's triumph should lose its most precious ornaments, only adding to the grief and indignation of the conquered. Those fathers and mothers, who were so happy as to gather all their children safe around them when the plunder was over, had escaped the sword indeed; and they and their sons and daughters were not yet sold as slaves; but their only choice was still between slavery or death. They had lost every thing. What food was still remaining in the besieged city, the sack had either carried off or destroyed; and if food had been at hand, they had no money to buy it. And this came upon them after a heavy visitation of sickness; when the body, reduced by that weakening malaria fever, needed all tender care and comfort to restore it, instead of being harassed by alarm and anxiety, and exposed to destitution

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and starvation. Many therefore sold themselves to the Roman soldiers, to escape dying by hunger; and the family circle, which the sack of the city had spared, was again broken up for ever. Those who, being unmarried and childless, had given no hostages to fortune, and who might yet hope to live in personal freedom, were only the more able to feel the ruin and degradation of their country<sup>80</sup>. Syracuse, who had led captive the hosts of Athens, and seen the invading armies of Carthage melt away by disease under her walls, till scarce any remained to fly,—Syracuse, where Dionysius had reigned, which Timoleon had freed, which Hiero had cherished and sheltered under his long paternal rule,—was now become subject to barbarians, whom she had helped in their utmost need, and who were repaying the unshaken friendship of Hiero, with the plunder of his city and the subjugation of his people. If there was a yet keener pang to be felt by every noble Syracusan, it was to behold their countrymen, who had fought in the Roman army, returning in triumph, establishing themselves in the empty houses of the slaughtered defenders of their country, and insulting the general misery by displaying the rewards of their treason. Among these was Sosis, assassin, murderer, and traitor, who was looking forward to the triumph of Marcellus, as one to whom the shame of his country was his glory, and her ruin the making of his fortune<sup>81</sup>.

<sup>80</sup> Diodorus, XXVI. Fragm. Mai.

<sup>81</sup> Livy, XXVI. 21.

Syracuse had fallen; and the cities in the eastern part of Sicily had no other hope now, than to obtain pardon, if it might be, from Rome, by immediate submission. But it was too late: they were treated as conquered enemies<sup>82</sup>; that is to say, Marcellus put to death those of their citizens who were most obnoxious, and imposed such forfeitures of land on the cities, and such terms of submission for the time to come, as he judged expedient. It became the fashion afterwards to extol his humanity, and even his refinement<sup>83</sup>, because he showed his taste for the works of Greek art by carrying the statues of the Syracusan temples to Rome. But his admiration of Greek art did not make him treat the Greeks themselves with less severity; and the Sicilians taxed him with perfidy as well as cruelty, and regarded him as the merciless oppressor of their country<sup>84</sup>.

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Cruelty of  
Marcellus.

Meantime Hannibal's comprehensive view had not lost sight of Sicily. When he heard of the havoc caused by the epidemic sickness, and of the death of Hippocrates, he sent over another of his officers to share with Epicydes, and with the general who came from Carthage, in the command of the war. This was Mutines, or Myttonus, a half-caste Carthaginian, excluded on that account from civil honours<sup>85</sup>; but Hannibal's camp recognized no such

Hannibal  
sends Mu-  
tines to  
Sicily: his  
successes.

<sup>82</sup> Livy, XXV. 40.

<sup>83</sup> Cicero, in Verrem, IV. 52—59.

<sup>84</sup> Livy, XXVI. 29—32. Plu-

tarch, Marcellus, 23.

<sup>85</sup> Livy, XXV. 40. Polybius, IX. 22.

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A. C. 211.

distinctions; and brave and able men, whatever was their race or condition, were sure to be employed and rewarded there. Mutines proved the unerring judgment of Hannibal in his choice of officers. His arrival in Sicily was equivalent to an army: being put at the head of the Numidian cavalry then serving under Epicydes and Hanno, he overran the whole island, encouraging the allies of Carthage, harassing those of Rome, and defying pursuit or resistance by the rapidity and skill of his movements. He renewed the system of warfare, which Hamilcar had maintained so long in the last war; and having the strong place of Agrigentum to retire to in case of need, he perplexed the Roman generals not a little. Marcellus was obliged to take the field, and march from Syracuse westward as far as the Himera, where the enemy's army lay encamped. But he met with a rough reception; the Numidian cavalry crossed the river, and came swarming round his camp, insulting and annoying his soldiers on guard, and confining his whole army to their intrenchments; and when on the next day, impatient of this annoyance, he offered battle in the field, Mutines and his Numidians broke in upon his lines with such fury, that he was fain to retreat with all speed, and seek the shelter of his camp again. It appears that other arms were then tried with better success: the Numidians were tampered with; their irregular habits and impatient tempers made them at all times difficult to manage; and a party of them having left the Carthaginian camp in disgust, Mutines went after

them to pacify and win them back to their duty, earnestly conjuring Hanno and Epicydes not to venture a battle till he should return. But Hanno was jealous of Hannibal's officers; and holding his own commission directly from the government of Carthage, he could not bare to be restrained by a half-caste soldier, sent to Sicily from Hannibal's camp, by the mere authority of the general. His rank probably gave him a casting vote, when only one other commander was present, so that Epicydes in vain protested against his imprudence<sup>86</sup>. A battle was ventured; and not only was the genius of Mutines wanting, but the Numidians whom he had left with Hanno, thinking their commander insulted, would take no active part in the action, and Hanno was defeated with loss.

Marcellus, rejoiced at having thus retrieved his honour, had no mind to risk another encounter with Mutines: he forthwith retreated to Syracuse<sup>87</sup>; and as the term of his command was now expired, his thoughts were all turned to Rome, and to his expected triumph. He left Sicily after the fall of Capua, towards the end of the summer of 543, and about a year after the conquest of Syracuse; but he was not allowed to carry his army home with him; and M. Cornelius Cethegus, one of the prætors, who succeeded him in his command, found that his province was far from being in a state of peace. The Carthaginians had reinforced their army; Mutines with his Numidians was scouring

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A.U.C. 543.  
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Marcellus  
returns to  
Rome.

<sup>86</sup> Livy, XXV. 40.

<sup>87</sup> Livy, XXV. 41.



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A.U.C. 544.  
A.C. 210.

the whole country; the soldiers were discontented because they had not been permitted to return home; and the Sicilians were driven desperate by the oppressions which Marcellus had commanded or winked at, and were ready to break out in revolt again <sup>88</sup>.

Lævinus is  
sent to  
Sicily.

In fact it appears that in the year 544, nearly two years after the fall of Syracuse, there were as many as sixty-six towns in Sicily in a state of revolt from Rome, and in alliance with Carthage <sup>89</sup>. So greatly had Mutines restored the Carthaginian cause, that it was thought necessary to send one of the consuls over with a consular army, to bring the war to an end. Accordingly M. Valerius Lævinus, who had been employed for the last three or four years on the coast of Epirus, conducting the war against Philip, and who was chosen consul with Marcellus in the year 544, carried over a regular consular army into Sicily; while L. Cincius, one of the new prætors, and probably the same man who is known as one of the earliest Roman historians, took the command of the old province, and of the soldiers of Cannæ who were still quartered there <sup>90</sup>. The army with which Marcellus had won Syracuse, was now at last disbanded; and the men were allowed to return home with as much of their plunder as they had not spent or wasted; but four legions were even now employed in Sicily, besides a fleet of 100 ships; and yet Mutines and his Numidians were overrunning all parts of

<sup>88</sup> Livy, XXVI. 21.

<sup>89</sup> Livy, XXVI. 40.

<sup>90</sup> Livy, XXVI. 28.

the island; and the end of the war seemed as distant as ever.

Lævinus advanced towards Agrigentum, with small hope however of taking the place; for Mutines sallied whenever he would, and carried back his plunder in safety whenever he would: whilst the neighbourhood of Carthage made relief by sea always within calculation, whatever naval force the Romans might employ in the blockade. In this state of things, Lævinus to his astonishment received a secret communication from Mutines, offering to put Agrigentum into his power. The half-caste African, the officer of Hannibal, the sole stay of the Carthaginian cause in Sicily, was on all these accounts odious to Hanno; and it is likely that Mutines did not bear his glory meekly, and that he expressed the scorn which Hannibal's soldier was likely to feel for the pride and incapacity of the general sent out by the government at home, and probably by the party opposed to Hannibal, and afraid of his glory. But whatever was the secret of the quarrel, its effects were public enough: Hanno ventured to deprive Mutines of his command. The Numidians however would obey no other leader, while him they would obey in every thing; and at his bidding they rose in open mutiny, took possession of one of the gates of the town, and let in the Romans. Hanno and Epicycles had just time to fly to the harbour, to hasten on board a ship, and escape to Carthage; but their soldiers, surprised and panic-struck, were cut to pieces with little resistance; and Lævinus won Agri-

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A.U.C. 544.  
A.C. 210.  
Mutines is  
insulted by  
Hanno, and  
betrays  
Agrigentum  
to the  
Romans.

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A.C. 210.

gentum. He treated it more severely than Marcellus had dealt with Syracuse: after executing the principal citizens, he sold all the rest for slaves, and sent the money which he received for them to Rome<sup>91</sup>.

Lævinus accomplishes the conquest of Sicily,

This blow was decisive. Twenty other towns, which still held with the Carthaginians, were presently betrayed to the Romans; either by their garrisons, or by some of their own citizens; six were stormed by the Roman army; and the remainder, to the number of forty, then submitted at discretion. The consul dealt out his rewards to the traitors who had betrayed their country; and his lictors scourged and beheaded the brave men who had persevered the longest in their resistance: thus at last he was able to report to the senate that the war in Sicily was at an end.

and reduces it to entire submission.

Four thousand adventurers of all descriptions, who in the troubled state of Sicily had taken possession of the town of Agathyrna on the north coast of the island, and were maintaining themselves there by robbery, Lævinus carried over into Italy at the close of the year, and landed them at Rhegium, to be employed in a plundering warfare in Bruttium. Having thus cleared the island of all open disturbers of its peace, he obliged the Sicilians, says Livy, to turn their attention to agriculture, that its fruitful soil might grow corn to supply the wants of Italy and of Rome<sup>92</sup>. And he assured the senate, at the end of the year, that the work was thoroughly done;

<sup>91</sup> Livy, XXVI. 40.

<sup>92</sup> Livy, XXVI. 40.

that not a single Carthaginian was left in Sicily; that the towns were re-peopled by the return of their peaceable inhabitants, and the land was again cultivated; that he had laid the foundation of a state of things equally happy for the Sicilians and for Rome<sup>93</sup>.

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A.U.C. 544.  
A.C. 210.

So Lævinus said; and so he probably believed. But with the return of peace to the island, there came a host of Italian and Roman speculators; who, in the general distress of the Sicilians, bought up large tracts of land at a low price, or became the occupiers of estates which had belonged to Sicilians of the Carthaginian party, and had been forfeited to Rome after the execution or flight of their owners. The Sicilians of the Roman party followed the example, and became rich out of the distress of their countrymen. Slaves were to be had cheap; and corn was likely to find a sure market, whilst Italy was suffering from the ravages of war. Accordingly Sicily was crowded with slaves, employed to grow corn for the great landed proprietors, whether Sicilian or Italian, and so ill-fed by their masters, that they soon began to provide for themselves by robbery. The poorer Sicilians were the sufferers from this evil; and as the masters were well content that their slaves should be maintained at the expense of others, they were at no pains to restrain their outrages. Thus, although nominally at peace, though full of wealthy proprietors, and though exporting

Deplorable  
condition of  
Sicily.

<sup>93</sup> Livy, XXVII. 5.

CHAP. corn largely every year, yet Sicily was teeming  
XLV. with evils, which, seventy or eighty years after,  
A.U.C. 544. broke out in the horrible atrocities of the Servile  
A.C. 210. War<sup>94</sup>.

<sup>94</sup> Diodorus, XXXIV. Excerpt. Valesii, p. 599. Florus, III. 19. Photii, p. 525, &c. and Excerpt.

## CHAPTER XLVI.

STATE OF ITALY. DISTRESS OF THE PEOPLE. TWELVE COLONIES REFUSE TO SUPPORT THE WAR. EIGHTEEN COLONIES OFFER ALL THEIR RESOURCES TO THE ROMANS. EVENTS OF THE WAR. DEATH OF MARCELLUS. FABIUS RECOVERS TARENTUM. MARCH OF HASDRUBAL INTO ITALY. HE REACHES THE COAST OF THE ADRIATIC. GREAT MARCH OF C. NERO FROM APULIA TO OPPOSE HIM. BATTLE OF THE METAURUS, AND DEATH OF HASDRUBAL. A.U.C. 543 TO A.U.C. 547.

IN following the war in Sicily to its conclusion we have a little anticipated the course of our narrative; for we have been speaking of the consulship of M. Lævinus, whilst our account of the war in Italy has not advanced beyond the middle of the preceding year. The latter part of the year 543 was marked however by no military actions of consequence; so great an event as the fall of Capua having, as was natural, produced a pause, during which both parties had to shape their future plans according to the altered state of their affairs and of their prospects.

CHAP.  
XLVI.  
A.U.C. 543.  
A.C. 211.  
Intermission  
of hostilities  
after the  
taking of  
Capua.



CHAP.  
XLVI.  
A.U.C. 543.  
A.C. 211.  
Hannibal  
abandons  
the west of  
Italy.

Hannibal on his side had retired, as we have seen, into Apulia, after his unsuccessful attempt upon Rhegium, and there allowed his soldiers to enjoy an interval of rest. The terrible example of Capua shook the resolution of his Italian allies, and made them consider whether a timely submission to Rome might not be their wisest policy; nay, it became a question whether their pardon might not be secured by betraying Hannibal's garrisons, and returning to their duty not empty-handed. Hannibal therefore neither dared to risk his soldiers by dispersing them about in small and distant towns; nor could he undertake, even if he kept his army together, to cover the wide extent of country which had revolted to him at different periods of the war. His men would be worn out by a succession of flying marches; and after all, the Roman armies were so numerous, that he would always be in danger of arriving too late at the point attacked. Accordingly he found it necessary to abandon many places altogether; and from some he obliged the inhabitants to migrate, and made them remove within the limits which he still hoped to protect. In this manner, it is probable, the western side of Italy, from the edge of Campania to Bruttium, was at once left to its fate; including what had been the territory of the Capuans on the shores of the Gulf of Salernum, the country of the Picentians, and Lucania; while Apulia and Bruttium were carefully defended. But in evacuating the towns which they could not keep, and still more in the compelled migrations of the inhabitants, Han-

nibal's soldiers committed many excesses; property was plundered, and blood was shed; and thus the minds of the Italians were still more generally alienated<sup>1</sup>.

CHAP.  
XLVI.  
A.U.C. 543.  
A.C. 211.

We have seen that, immediately after the fall of Capua, C. Nero, with a part of the troops which had been employed on the blockade, had been sent off to Spain<sup>2</sup>. Q. Fulvius remained at Capua with another part, amounting to a complete consular army<sup>3</sup>; and some were probably sent home. The two consuls marched into Apulia, which was to be their province<sup>4</sup>; but no active operations took place during the remainder of the season; and at the end of the year P. Sulpicius was ordered to pass over into Epirus, and succeed M. Lævinus in the command of the war against Philip. The home administration was left in the hands of C. Calpurnius Piso, the city prætor.

Movements  
of the Ro-  
man armies.

About the time that the two consuls took the command in Apulia, M. Cornelius Cethegus, who had obtained that province as prætor at the beginning of the year, was sent over to Sicily to command the army there, Marcellus having just left the island to return to Rome. Marcellus was anxious to obtain a triumph for his conquest of Syracuse: but the war in Sicily was still raging; and Mutines was in full activity. The senate therefore would not grant a triumph for an imperfect victory, but allowed Marcellus the honour of the smaller triumph or ovation.

Marcellus  
is unable to  
obtain a  
triumph:  
his splendid  
ovation.

<sup>1</sup> Livy, XXVI. 38.

<sup>2</sup> Livy, XXVI. 17.

<sup>3</sup> Livy, XXVI. 28.

<sup>4</sup> Livy, XXVI. 22.

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A.U.C. 543.  
A.C. 211.

He was highly dissatisfied at this, and consoled himself by going up in triumphal procession to the temple of Jupiter on the highest summit of the Alban hills, and offering sacrifice there, a ceremony which by virtue of his imperium he could lawfully perform: he might go in procession where he pleased, and sacrifice where he pleased, except within the limits of Rome itself. On the day after his triumph on the hill of Alba, he entered Rome with the ceremony of an ovation, walking on foot according to the rule, instead of being drawn in a chariot in kingly state, as in the proper triumph. But the show was unusually splendid; for a great picture of Syracuse with all its fortifications was displayed, and with it some of the very artillery which Archimedes had made so famous in his defence of them; besides an unwonted display of the works of art of a more peaceful kind, the spoils of Hiero's palace, and of the temples in his city, silver and bronze figures, embroidered carpets and coverings of couches, and, above all, some of the finest pictures and statues. Men also observed the traitor Sosis walking in the procession, with a coronet of gold on his head, as a benefactor of the Roman people: he was further to be rewarded with the Roman franchise, with a house at his own choice out of those belonging to the Syracusans who had remained true to their country, and with five hundred jugera of land, which had either been theirs, or part of the royal domain <sup>5</sup>.

<sup>5</sup> Livy, XXVI. 21.

At the end of the year Cn. Fulvius was summoned to Rome from Apulia to preside at the consular comitia. On the day of the election, the first century of the Veturian tribe, which had obtained the first voice by lot, gave its votes in favour of T. Manlius Torquatus and T. Otacilius Crassus. As the voice of the tribe first called was generally followed by the rest, Manlius, who was present, was immediately greeted by the congratulations of his friends: but instead of accepting them, he made his way to the consul's seat, and requested him to call back the century which had just voted, and allow him to say a few words. The century was summoned again, all men wondering what was about to happen. Manlius had been consul five and twenty years before, in the memorable year when the temple of Janus was shut in token of the ratification of peace with Carthage; twenty years had passed since he was censor; and though his vigour of body and mind was still great, he was an old man, and age had made him nearly blind. "I am unfit to command," he said; "for I can only see through the eyes of others. This is no time for incompetent generals; let the century make a better choice." But the century answered unanimously, "that they could not make a better; that they again named Manlius and Otacilius consuls." "Your tempers and my rule," said the old man, "will never suit. Give your votes over again; and remember that the Carthaginians are in Italy, and that their general is Hannibal." A murmur of admiration

CHAP.  
XLVI.  
A.U.C. 544.  
A.C. 210.  
Comitia:  
noble conduct of  
Manlius:  
Marcellus  
and Lævius  
are elected  
consuls.

CHAP.  
XLVI.  
A.U.C. 544.  
A.C. 210.

burst from all around; and the voters of the century were moved. They were the younger men of their tribe; and they besought the consul to summon the century of their elders, that they might be guided by their counsel. Fulvius accordingly summoned the century of elders of the Veturian tribe; and the two centuries retired to confer on the question. The elders recommended that Fabius and Marcellus should be chosen; or, if a new consul were desirable, that they should take one of these, and with him elect M. Lævinus, who for some years past had done good service in conducting the war against king Philip. Their advice was adopted; and the century gave its votes now in favour of Marcellus and Lævinus. All the other centuries confirmed their choice; and thus T. Otacilius was for the second time, by an extraordinary interference with the votes of the centuries, deprived of the consulship, to which some uncommonly amiable qualities, or some peculiar influence, had twice recommended him, in spite of his deficient ability<sup>6</sup>.

He probably never knew of this second disappointment; for scarcely was the election over, when news arrived from Sicily of his death<sup>7</sup>. Cn. Fulvius returned to his army in Apulia; and as M. Lævinus was still absent in Epirus, Marcellus on the usual day, the ides of March, entered upon the consulship alone. Q. Fulvius was still at Capua; but Q. Fabius and T. Manlius were at Rome; and their

<sup>6</sup> Livy, XXVI. 22.

<sup>7</sup> Livy, XXVI. 23.

counsels, together with those of Marcellus, were of the greatest influence in the senate, and probably directed the government.

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XLVI.  
A.U.C. 544.  
A.C. 210.

There was need of all their ability and all their firmness; for never had the posture of affairs been more alarming. Hannibal's unconquered and unconquerable army, although it had not saved Capua, had wasted Italy more widely than ever in the last campaign; and it had struck particularly at countries, which had hitherto escaped its ravages, the valleys of the Sabines, and the country of the thirty-five tribes themselves, up to the very gates of Rome. Many of the citizens had not only lost their standing crops, but their cattle had been carried off, and their houses burnt to the ground<sup>8</sup>. Actual scarcity was added to other causes of distress; insomuch that the modulus of wheat rose to nearly three denarii, which in a plentiful season eight years afterwards was sold at four asses, or the fourth part of one denarius<sup>9</sup>. The people were becoming unable to bear farther burdens; and some of the Latin colonies, which had hitherto been the firmest support of the commonwealth, were suspected to be not only unable, but unwilling. It was probably to meet the urgent necessity of the case that the armies were somewhat reduced this year, four legions, it seems, being disbanded<sup>10</sup>. But this fruit of the fall of Capua was in part neutralized by the necessity of raising fresh seamen; for unless the commonwealth maintained its naval superiority,

Alarming posture of Roman affairs. Patriotic proposition of Lævinus: self-devotion of the senators: their example followed by the whole people.

<sup>8</sup> Livy, XXVI. 26.

<sup>9</sup> Polybius, IX. 44. Livy, XXXI. 5.

<sup>10</sup> Livy, XXVI. 28.



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XLVI.  
A.U.C. 544.  
A.C. 210.

Sicily would be lost, and Philip might be expected on the coasts of Italy; and the supply of corn, which was looked for from Egypt in the failure of all nearer resources, would become very precarious<sup>11</sup>. Accordingly a tax was imposed, requiring all persons to provide a certain number of seamen, in proportion to the returns of their property at the last census, with pay and provisions for thirty days. But our own tax of ship-money did not excite more opposition, though on different grounds. The people complained aloud: crowds gathered in the forum, and declared that no power could force from them what they had not got; that the consuls might sell their goods, and lay hold on their persons, if they chose; but they had no means of payment<sup>12</sup>. The consuls,—for Lævinus was by this time returned home from Macedonia,—with that dignity which the Roman government never forgot for an instant, issued an order, giving the defaulters three days to consider their determination; thus seeming to grant as an indulgence, what necessity obliged them to yield. Meanwhile they summoned the senate; and when every one was equally convinced of the necessity of procuring seamen, and the impossibility of carrying through the tax, Lævinus, in his colleague's name and his own, proceeded to address the senators. He told them that, before they could call on the people to make sacrifices, they must set the example. "Let each senator," he said, "keep his gold ring, and the rings of his

<sup>11</sup> Polybius, IX. 10.

<sup>12</sup> Livy, XXVI. 35.

wife and children: let him keep the golden bulla worn by his sons under age, and one ounce of gold for ornaments for his wife, and an ounce for each of his daughters. All the rest of the gold which we possess, let us offer for the public service. Next, let all of us who have borne curule offices, reserve the silver used in the harness of our war-horses; and let all others, including those just mentioned, keep one pound of silver, enough for the plate needful in sacrifices, the small vessel to hold the salt, and the small plate or basin for the libation; and let us each keep five thousand asses of copper money. With these exceptions, let us devote all our silver and copper to our country's use, as we have devoted all our gold. And let us do this without any vote of the senate, of our own free gift, as individual senators, and carry our contributions at once to the three commissioners for the currency. Be sure that first the equestrian order, and then the mass of the people, will follow our example." He spoke to hearers who so thoroughly shared his spirit, that they voted their thanks to the consuls for this suggestion. The senate instantly broke up; the senators hastened home, and thence came crowding to the forum, their slaves bearing all their stores of copper and silver and gold, each man being anxious to have his contribution recorded first; so that, Livy says, neither were there commissioners enough to receive all the gifts that were brought, nor clerks enough to record them. The example, as the consuls knew, was irresistible: the equestrian order

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XLVI.  
A.U.C. 544.  
A.C. 210.

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XLVI.  
A.U.C. 544.  
A.C. 210.

and the commons poured in their contributions with equal zeal; and no tax could have supplied the treasury so plentifully as this free-will offering of the whole people<sup>13</sup>.

Value of  
these sacri-  
fices.

There is no doubt that the money thus contributed was to be repaid to the contributors, when the republic should see better days; but the sacrifice consisted in this, that, while the prospect of payment was distant and uncertain, the whole profit of the money in the mean time was lost: for the Roman state creditors received no interest on their loans. Therefore it was at their own cost mainly, and not at the cost of posterity, that the Romans maintained their great struggle; and from our admiration of their firmness and heroic devotion to their country's cause, nothing is in this case to be abated.

Complaints  
of the severe-  
ity of Ful-  
vius and  
Marcellus.

Nor is it less striking, that the senate at this very moment listened to accusations brought by vanquished enemies against their conquerors, and these conquerors men of the highest name and greatest influence in the commonwealth, Marcellus and Q. Fulvius. When Lævinus passed through Capua on his way to Rome, he was beset by a multitude of the Capuans, who complained of the intolerable misery of their condition under the dominion of Q. Fulvius, and besought him to take them with him to Rome, that they might implore the mercy of the senate. Fulvius made them swear that they would return to Capua within five days after they received their answer, telling

<sup>13</sup> Livy, XXVI. 36.

Lævinus that he dared not let them go at liberty; for if any Capuan escaped from the city, he instantly became a brigand, and scoured the country, burning, robbing, and murdering all that fell in his way; even at Rome, Lævinus would find the traces of Capuan treason; for the late destructive fire in the city was their work. So a deputation of Campanians, thus hardly allowed to go, followed Lævinus towards Rome: and when he approached the city, a similar deputation of Sicilians came out to meet him, with like complaints against Marcellus<sup>14</sup>.

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A.U.C. 544.  
A.C. 210.

The provinces assigned to the consuls were this year to be the conduct of the war with Hannibal, and Sicily; and Sicily fell by lot to Marcellus. The Sicilians present were thrown into despair, when this was announced to them: they put on mourning and beset the senate-house, weeping and bewailing their hard fate, and saying that it would be better for their island to be sunk in the sea, or overwhelmed with the lava floods of Ætna, than given up to the vengeance of Marcellus. Their feeling met with much sympathy in the senate; and this was made so intelligible, that Marcellus, without waiting for any resolution on the subject, came to an agreement with his colleague; and they exchanged their provinces<sup>15</sup>.

The Sicilians entreat that Marcellus may not be sent into Sicily.

This having been settled, the Sicilians were admitted into the senate, and brought forward their complaint. It turned principally on the cruelty of making them responsible for the acts, first of Hiero-

Their complaint is heard by the senate: counter-statement of Marcellus.

<sup>14</sup> Livy, XXVI. 27.

<sup>15</sup> Livy, XXVI. 29.

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XLVI.  
A.U.C. 544.  
A.C. 210.

nymus, and then of a mercenary soldiery which they had no means of resisting; while the long and tried friendship of Hiero, proved by the Romans in the utmost extremity of their fortune, had been forgotten. Marcellus insisted that the deputation should remain in the senate, and hear his statement,—answer he would not call it, and far less defence, as if a Roman consul could plead to the accusations of a set of vanquished Greeks,—but his statement of their offences, which had justly brought on all that they had suffered. He said that they had acted as enemies, had rejected his frequent offers of peace, and had resisted his attacks with all possible obstinacy, instead of doing as Sosis, whom they called a traitor, had done, and surrendering their city into his hands. He then left the senate-house together with the Sicilians, and went to the capitol to carry on the enlistment of the newly raised legions<sup>16</sup>.

Decree of  
the senate.  
Marcellus  
becomes the  
patronus of  
Syracuse.

There was a strong feeling in the senate that Syracuse had been cruelly used; and old T. Manlius expressed this as became him, especially urging the unworthy return which had been made to the country of Hiero for all his fidelity to Rome. But a sense of Marcellus' signal services, and of the urgency of the times, prevailed; and a resolution was passed, confirming all that he had done, but declaring that for the time to come the senate would consult the welfare of the Syracusans, and would commend them especially to the care of Lævi-

<sup>16</sup> Livy, XXVI. 30, 31.

nus. A deputation of two senators was then sent to the consul, to invite him to return to the senate: the Syracusans were called in, and the decree was read. Then the Syracusan deputies threw themselves at the feet of Marcellus, imploring him to forgive all that they had said against him, to receive them under his protection, and to become the patronus of their city<sup>17</sup>. He gave them a gracious answer, and accepted the office; and from that time forward the Syracusans found it their best policy to extol the clemency of Marcellus; and later writers echoed their language, not knowing, or not remembering, that these expressions of forced praise were their own strongest refutation.

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A.C. 210.

The Campanian deputation was heard with less favour; but still it was heard; and the senate took their complaint into consideration. But in this case no mercy was shown; and it was now that those severe decrees were passed, fixing the future fate of the Campanian people, which I have already mentioned by anticipation, at the end of the story of the siege of Capua<sup>18</sup>.

Severe  
treatment of  
the Cam-  
panians.

The military history of this year is again difficult to comprehend, owing to the omissions and incoherence in Livy's narrative. Two armies, as we have seen, were employed against Hannibal; that of Cn. Fulvius, the consul of the preceding year, in Apulia; and that of Marcellus in Samnium. Where Hannibal had passed the winter, or the end of the pre-

Opening of  
the cam-  
paign: the  
army of  
Fulvius is  
destroyed by  
Hannibal.

<sup>17</sup> Livy, XXVI. 32.

<sup>18</sup> Above, p. 253, foll. Livy, XXVI. 33.



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XLVI.  
A.U.C. 544.  
A.C. 210.

ceding summer, we know not; not a word being said of his movements after his ineffectual attempt upon Rhegium, till we hear of his march against Fulvius. We may suppose however that he had wintered in Apulia; and we are told that, Salapia having been betrayed to the Romans, and a detachment of Numidians having been cut off in it, Hannibal again retreated into Bruttium<sup>19</sup>. With two armies opposed to him, it was of importance not to let either of them advance to attack Tarentum and the towns on the coast, while he was engaged with the other. He was obliged therefore to abandon his garrisons in Samnium and Apulia to their own resources, and kept his army well in hand, ready to strike a blow whenever opportunity should offer. As usual, he received perfect information of the enemy's proceedings through his secret emissaries; and having learned that Fulvius was in the neighbourhood of Herdonea, trying to win the place, and that, relying on his distance from the Carthaginian army, he was not sufficiently on his guard, Hannibal conceived the hope of destroying this army by an unexpected attack. Again the details are given variously; but the result was, that Hannibal's attempt was completely successful. The army of Fulvius was destroyed, and the proconsul killed; and Hannibal, having set fire to Herdonea, and executed those citizens who had been in correspondence with the enemy, sent away the rest of the population

<sup>19</sup> Livy, XXVII. 1.

into Bruttium, and himself crossed the mountains into Lucania, to look after the army of Marcellus<sup>20</sup>.

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A.U.C. 544.  
A.C. 210

Marcellus, on the news of his colleague's defeat, left Samnium, and advanced into Lucania: his object now was to watch Hannibal closely, lest he should again resume the offensive; all attempts to recover more towns in Samnium or elsewhere must for the time be abandoned. And this service he performed with great ability and resolution, never leaving Hannibal at rest, and taking care not to fall into any ambush, but unable, notwithstanding the idle stories of his victories, to do any thing more than keep his enemy in sight, as Fabius had done in his first dictatorship. Thus the rest of the season passed away unmarked by any thing of importance: Marcellus wintered apparently at Venusia; Hannibal in his old quarters, in the warm plains near the sea<sup>21</sup>.

Marcellus  
adopts the  
policy of  
Fabius.

In spite therefore of the reduction of Capua, the Roman affairs in Italy had made no progress. On the contrary, another army had been totally destroyed; and the war with all its burthens seemed interminable. But in other quarters, this year had been more successful: Lævinus had ended the war in Sicily; and the resources of that island were now at the disposal of the Romans; while the Carthaginian fleets had no point nearer than Carthage itself, to carry on their operations, whether to the

Advantages  
gained by  
the Romans  
out of Italy.

<sup>20</sup> Livy, XXVII. 1.

<sup>21</sup> Livy, XXVII. 2. 4. 12--14. 20.

CHAP.  
XLVI.  
A.U.C. 544.  
A.C. 210.

annoyance of the enemy's coasts, or the relief of their own garrisons at Tarentum, and along the southern coast of Italy. In addition to this, the alliance which Lævinus had concluded with the Ætolians before he quitted Epirus, had left a far easier task to his successor P. Sulpicius, and removed all danger of Philip's co-operating with Hannibal. Meanwhile Lævinus was summoned home to hold the comitia, Marcellus being too busily employed with Hannibal to leave his army; and accordingly he crossed over directly from Lilybæum or Panormus to Ostia, accompanied by the African Mutines, who was now to receive the reward of his desertion, in being made a citizen of Rome by a decree of the people<sup>22</sup>.

Alarming  
news from  
Africa.

Before his departure from Sicily, Lævinus had sent the greater part of his fleet over to Africa, partly to make plundering descents on the coast, but chiefly to collect information as to the condition and plans of the enemy. Messalla, who had succeeded to T. Otacilius in the command of the fleet, accomplished this expedition in less than a fortnight; and the information which he collected was so important, that, finding Lævinus was gone to Rome, he forwarded it to him without delay. Its substance bore, that the Carthaginians were collecting troops with great diligence, to be sent over into Spain; and that the general report was, that these soldiers were to form the army of Hasdrubal, Hannibal's

<sup>22</sup> Livy, XXVII. 5.

brother, and were to be led by him immediately into Italy. This intelligence so alarmed the senate, that they would not detain the consul to hold the comitia, but ordered him to name a dictator for that purpose, and then to return immediately to his province <sup>23</sup>.

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A.U.C. 545.  
A.C. 209.

With all the patriotism of the Romans, it was not possible that personal ambition and jealousy should be wholly extinct among them; and the influence exercised at the present crisis by Q. Fabius, and his preference of Q. Fulvius and Marcellus to all other commanders, was no doubt regarded by some as excessive and overbearing. The magistrate who presided at the comitia enjoyed so great a power over the elections, that the choice of the dictator on this occasion was of some consequence; and Lævinus intended to name the commander of his fleet, M. Messalla, not without some view possibly to his own re-election, if the comitia were held under the auspices of a man not entirely devoted to Fabius and Fulvius. But when he declared his intention to the senate, it was objected that a person out of Italy could not be named dictator; and the consul was ordered to take the choice of the people, and to name whomsoever the people should fix upon. Indignant at this interference with his rights as consul, Lævinus refused to submit the question to the people, and forbade the prætor, L. Manlius Acidinus, to do so. This however availed him nothing; for the tribunes called the assembly; and the people

A dictator appointed to hold the comitia: Fabius and Fulvius chosen consuls.

<sup>23</sup> Livy, XXVII. 5.

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A.C. 209.

resolved that the dictator to be named should be Q. Fulvius. Lævinus probably expected this, and, as his last resource, had left Rome secretly on the night before the decision, that he might not be compelled to go through the form of naming his rival dictator. Here was a new difficulty; for the dictator could only be named by one of the consuls: so it was necessary to apply to Marcellus; and he nominated Q. Fulvius immediately<sup>24</sup>. The old man left Capua forthwith, and proceeded to Rome to hold the comitia, at which the century first called gave its votes in favour of Fulvius himself and Fabius. This no doubt had been preconcerted: but two of the tribunes shared the feelings of Lævinus, and objected to such a monopoly of office in the hands of two or three men; they also complained of the precedent of allowing the magistrate presiding at the election to be himself elected. Fulvius, with no false modesty, or what in our notions would be real delicacy, maintained that the choice of the century was good, and justified by precedents; and at last the question was submitted by common consent to the senate. The senate determined that, under actual circumstances, it was important that the ablest men and most tried generals should be at the head of affairs; and they therefore approved of the election. Accordingly Fabius and Fulvius were once more appointed consuls; the former for the fifth time, the latter for the fourth<sup>25</sup>.

<sup>24</sup> Livy, XXVII. 5.

<sup>25</sup> Livy, XXVII. 6.

Thus was the great object gained of employing the three most tried generals of the republic, Fabius, Fulvius, and Marcellus, against Hannibal in the approaching campaign. Each was to command a full consular army, Marcellus retaining that which he now had, with the title of proconsul; and the plan of operations was, that, while Marcellus occupied Hannibal on the side of Apulia, a grand movement should be made against Tarentum and the other towns held by the enemy on the southern coast. Fabius was to attack Tarentum, while Fulvius was to reduce the garrisons still retained by Hannibal in Lucania<sup>26</sup>, and then to advance into Brutium; and that band of adventurers from Sicily, which Lævinus had sent over to Rhegium to do some service in that quarter, was to attempt the siege of Caulon, or Caulonia. Every exertion was to be made to destroy Hannibal's power in the south, before his brother could arrive in Italy to effect a diversion in the north<sup>27</sup>. Lævinus, it seems, paid the penalty of his opposition to Fulvius' election, in being deprived of his consular army, which he was ordered to send over to Italy to be commanded by Fulvius himself; and he and the pro-prætor L. Cincius were left to defend Sicily with the old soldiers of Cannæ, and the remains of the defeated armies of the two Fulvii, the prætor and the proconsul, which had been condemned to the same banishment, together with the forces which they had themselves raised within the

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Plan for  
the cam-  
paign.

<sup>26</sup> Livy, XXVII. 7.

<sup>27</sup> Livy, XXVII. 12.



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island, partly native Sicilians, and partly Numidians, who had come over to the Romans with Mutines <sup>28</sup>. With these resources, and with a fleet of seventy ships, Sicily was firmly held; and Lævinus, it is said, was able in the course of the year to send supplies of corn to Rome, and also to the army of Fabius before Tarentum <sup>29</sup>.

Twelve of  
the Latin  
colonies re-  
fuse fresh  
supplies.

But before the consuls could take the field, a storm burst forth more threatening than any which the republic had yet experienced. The soldiers of the army defeated at Herdonea, who were now to be sent over to Sicily, were in a large proportion Latins of the colonies; and as they were to be banished for the whole length of the war, fresh soldiers were to be levied to supply their place in Italy. This new demand was the drop which made the full cup overflow. The deputies of twelve of the colonies, who were at Rome as usual to receive the consul's orders, when they were required to furnish fresh soldiers, and to raise money for their payment, replied resolutely that they had neither men nor money remaining <sup>30</sup>.

The consuls  
remonstrate  
with them  
in vain.

“The Roman people,” says Livy, “had at this period thirty colonies;” of which number twelve thus refused to support the war any longer. The number mentioned by the historian has occasioned great perplexity; but its coincidence with the old number of the states of the Latin confederacy leaves no doubt of its genuineness; and when the maritime

<sup>28</sup> Livy, XXVII. 7.

<sup>29</sup> Livy, XXVII. 8.

<sup>30</sup> Livy, XXVII. 9.

colonies are excepted, which stood on a different footing, as not being ordinarily bound to raise men for the regular land service, it agrees very nearly with the list which we should draw up of all the Latin colonies mentioned to have been founded before this period. But what particular causes determined the twelve recusant colonies more than the rest to resist the commands of Rome, we cannot tell. Amongst them we find the name of Alba, which two years before had shown such zeal, in hastening to the assistance of Rome unsummoned, when Hannibal threatened its very walls: we also find some of the oldest colonies, Circeii, Ardea, Cora, Nepete, and Sutrium; Cales, which had so long been an important position during the revolt of Capua, Carseoli, Suessa, Setia, Narnia, and Interamna, on the Liris. The consuls, thunderstruck at their refusal, attempted to shame them from their purpose by rebuke. "This is not merely declining to furnish troops and money," they said; "it is open rebellion. Go home to your colonies; forget that so detestable a thought ever entered your heads; remind your fellow-citizens that they are not Campanians nor Tarentines, but Romans, Roman born, and sent from Rome to occupy lands conquered by Romans, to multiply the race of Rome's defenders. All duty owed by children to their parents, you owe to the senate and people of Rome." But in vain did Fabius and Fulvius, with all the authority of their years and their great name, speak such language to the deputies. They were coldly answered, "that it was use-

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less to consult their countrymen at home; the colonies could not alter their resolution; for they had no men nor money left." Finding the case hopeless, the consuls summoned the senate, and reported the fatal intelligence. The courage, which had not yielded to the slaughter of Cannæ, was shaken now. "At last," it was said, "the blow is struck, and Rome is lost: this example will be followed by all our colonies and allies: there is doubtless a general conspiracy amongst them to give us up bound hand and foot to Hannibal <sup>31</sup>."

Patriotic spirit of the other eighteen colonies: the senate resolves to take no notice of the twelve.

The consuls bade the senate take courage: the other colonies were yet true; "even these false ones will return to their duty, if we do not condescend to entreat them, but rather rebuke them for their treason." Every thing was left to the consuls' discretion; they exerted all their influence with the deputies of the other colonies privately; and having ascertained their sentiments, they then ventured to summon them officially, and to ask, "Whether their appointed contingents of men and money were forthcoming?" Then M. Sextilius of Fregellæ stood up and made answer in the name of the eighteen remaining colonies: "They are forthcoming; and if more are needed, more are at your disposal. Every order, every wish of the Roman people, we will with our best efforts fulfil: to do this we have means enough, and will more than enough." The consuls replied, "Our thanks are all too little for your

<sup>31</sup> Livy, XXVII. 9.

desert: the whole senate must thank you themselves." They led the deputies into the senate-house; and thanks were voted to them in the warmest terms. Then the consuls were desired to lead them before the people, to remind the people of all the services which the colonies had rendered to them and to their fathers, services all surpassed by this last act of devotion. The thanks of the people were voted no less heartily than those of the senate. "Nor shall these eighteen colonies even now," says Livy, "lose their just glory. They were the people of Signia, of Norba, of Saticula, of Brundisium, of Fregellæ, of Luceria, of Venusia, of Hadria, of Firmum, and of Ariminum; and from the lower sea, the people of Pontia, and of Paestum, and of Cosa; and from the midland country, the people of Beneventum, and of Æsernia, and of Spoletum, and of Placentia, and of Cremona." The aid of these eighteen colonies on that day saved the Roman empire. Satisfied now, and feeling their strength invincible, the senate forbade the consuls to take the slightest notice of the disobedient colonies; they were neither to send for them, nor to detain them, nor to dismiss them; they were to leave them wholly alone<sup>32</sup>.

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It is enough for the glory of any nation, that its history in two successive years should record two such events as the magnanimous liberality of the senate in sacrificing their wealth to their country,

Magnanimity of their conduct.  
Singular coincidence in the subsequent destinies of the house of Fulvius and of Fregellæ.

<sup>32</sup> Livy, XXVII. 10.

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and the no less magnanimous firmness and wisdom of their behaviour towards their colonies. An aristocracy endowed with such virtues deserved its ascendancy: for its inherent faults were now shown only towards the enemies of Rome; its nobler character alone was displayed towards her citizens. But when M. Sextilius of Fregellæ was standing before Q. Fulvius, promising to serve Rome to the death, and the old consul's stern countenance was softened into admiration and joy, and his lips, which had so remorselessly doomed the Capuan senators to a bloody death, were now uttering thanks and praises to Rome's true colonists, how would each have started, could he have looked for a moment into futurity, and seen what events were to happen, before a hundred years were over! By a strange coincidence, each would have seen the selfsame hand red with the blood of his descendants, and extinguishing the country of the one and the family of the other. Within ninety years, the Roman aristocracy were to become utterly corrupted; and its leader, L. Opimius, as base personally as he was politically cruel, was to destroy Fregellæ, and treacherously in cold blood to slay an innocent youth, the last direct representative of the great Q. Fulvius, after he had slain M. Fulvius, the youth's father, in civil conflict within the walls of Rome<sup>33</sup>. Fregellæ, to whose citizens Rome at this time owed her safety, was within ninety years to be so utterly destroyed by the

<sup>33</sup> Velleius, II. 6. 4. II. 7. 2. Plutarch, C. Gracchus, c. xvi. Appian B. C. I. 26.

Roman arms, that at this day its very site is not certainly known: the most faithful of colonies has perished more entirely than the rebellious Capua <sup>34</sup>.

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Rome could rely on the fidelity of the majority of her colonies; but their very readiness made it desirable to spare them to the utmost. Therefore a treasure, which was reserved in the most sacred treasury for the extremest need, was now brought out; amounting, it is said, to four thousand pounds' weight of gold; and which had been accumulating during a period of about 150 years, being the produce of the tax of five per cent. on the value of every emancipated slave, paid by the person who gave him his liberty. With this money the military chests of the principal armies were well replenished; and supplies of clothing were sent to the army in Spain, which P. Scipio was now commanding, and was on the point of leading to the conquest of New Carthage <sup>35</sup>.

The sacred  
treasure is  
brought out.

At length the consuls took the field. Marcellus, according to the plan agreed upon, broke up from his quarters at Venusia, and proceeded to watch and harass Hannibal; while Fabius advanced upon Tarentum, and Fulvius marched into Lucania. Caulonia at the same time was besieged by the band of adventurers from Sicily. The mass of forces thus employed was overwhelming; and Hannibal, while he clung to Apulia and to Bruttium, was unable to retain his hold on Samnium and Lucania. Those

Samnium  
and Lucania  
submit to  
the Romans:  
the Brut-  
tians treat  
about sub-  
mission.

<sup>34</sup> Velleius, II. 6. 4. Strabo, V. p. 363. Auctor ad Herennium, IV. 15.

<sup>35</sup> Livy, XXVII. 10.



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great countries, or rather the powerful party in both, which had hitherto been in revolt from Rome, now made their submission to Q. Fulvius, and delivered up such of Hannibal's soldiers as were in garrison in any of their towns. They had apparently chosen their time well; and by submitting at the beginning of the campaign they obtained easy terms. Even Fulvius, though not inclined to show mercy to revolted allies, granted them a full indemnity: the axes of his lictors were suffered this time to sleep unstained with blood. This politic mercy had its effect on the Bruttians also: some of their leading men came to the Roman camp to treat concerning the submission of their countrymen on the terms which had been granted to the Samnites and Lucanians; and the base of all Hannibal's operations, the southern coast of Italy, was in danger of being torn away from him, if he lingered any longer in Apulia <sup>36</sup>.

Hannibal's  
brilliant  
exploits.  
Tarentum  
is betrayed  
to the  
Romans.

Then his indomitable genius and energy appeared once more in all its brilliancy. He turned fiercely upon Marcellus, engaged him twice, and so disabled him, that Marcellus, with all his enterprise, was obliged to take refuge within the walls of Venusia, and there lay helpless during the remainder of the campaign <sup>37</sup>. Freed from this enemy, Hannibal flew into Bruttium: the strength of Tarentum gave him no anxiety for its immediate danger; so he hastened to deliver Caulonia. The motley band who were

<sup>36</sup> Livy, XXVII. 15.

<sup>37</sup> Livy, XXVII. 12—14.

besieging it fled at the mere terror of his approach, and retreated to a neighbouring hill; thither he pursued them, and obliged them to surrender at discretion<sup>38</sup>. He then marched back with speed to Tarentum, hoping to crush Fabius, as he had crushed Marcellus. He was within five miles of the city, when he received intelligence that it was lost. The Bruttian commander of the garrison had betrayed it to Fabius: the Romans had entered it in arms: Carthalo, the Carthaginian commander, and Nico and Philemenus, who had opened its gates to Hannibal, had all fallen in defending it: the most important city and the best harbour in the south of Italy were in the hands of the Romans<sup>39</sup>.

The news of the fall of Paris, when Napoleon was hastening from Fontainebleau to deliver it, can scarcely have been a heavier disappointment to him, than the news of the loss of Tarentum was to Hannibal. Yet, always master of himself, he was neither misled by passion nor by alarm: he halted and encamped on the ground, and there remained quiet for some days, to show that his confidence in himself was unshaken by the treason of his allies. Then he retreated slowly towards Metapontum, and contrived that two of the Metapontines should go to Fabius at Tarentum, offering to surrender their town and the Carthaginian garrison, if their past revolt might be forgiven. Fabius, believing the proposal to be genuine, sent back a favourable answer, and fixed

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Hannibal  
tries to  
draw Fabius  
into a snare,  
but fails.

<sup>38</sup> Livy, XXVII. 15, 16.

<sup>39</sup> Livy, XXVII. 15, 16.

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the day on which he would appear before Metapontum with his army. On that day Hannibal lay in ambush close to the road leading from Tarentum, ready to spring upon his prey. But Fabius came not: his habitual caution made him suspicious of mischief; and it was announced that the omens were threatening: the haruspex, on inspecting the sacrifice, which was offered to learn the pleasure of the gods, warned the consul to beware of hidden snares, and of the arts of the enemy. The Metapontine deputies were sent back to learn the cause of the delay; they were arrested, and, being threatened with the torture, disclosed the truth <sup>40</sup>.

He remains  
master of  
the field.

The remaining operations of the campaign are again unknown: the Romans however seem to have attempted nothing farther; and Hannibal kept his army in the field, marching whither he would without opposition, and again laying waste various parts of Italy with fire and sword <sup>41</sup>. So far as we can discover, he returned at the end of the season to his old winter quarters in Apulia.

Dissatisfac-  
tion at  
Rome: com-  
plaints  
against Mar-  
cellus, who  
nevertheless  
is elected  
consul.

It is not wonderful that this result of a campaign, from which so much had been expected, should have caused great disappointment at Rome. However much men rejoiced in the recovery of Tarentum, they could not but feel that even this success was owing to treason; and that Hannibal's superiority to all who were opposed to him was more manifest than ever. This touched them in a most tender point;

<sup>40</sup> Livy, XXVII. 16.

<sup>41</sup> Livy, XXVII. 20. "Vagante per Italiam Hannibale."

because it enabled him to continue his destructive ravages of Italy, and thus to keep up that distress which had long been felt so heavily. Above all, indignation was loud against Marcellus<sup>42</sup>: and if in his lifetime he indulged in that braggart language, which his son used so largely after his death, the anger of the people against him was very reasonable. If he called his defeats victories, as his son no doubt called them afterwards, and as the falsehood through him has struck deep into Roman history, well might the people be indignant at hearing that a victorious general had shut himself up all the summer within the walls of Venusia, and had allowed the enemy to ravage the country at pleasure. The feeling was so strong, that C. Publicius, one of the tribunes, a man of an old and respected tribunician family, brought in a bill to the people to deprive Marcellus of his command. Marcellus returned home to plead his cause, when Fulvius went home also to hold the comitia; and the people met to consider the bill in the Flaminian circus, without the walls, to enable Marcellus to be present; for his military command hindered his entering the city. It is likely that the influence of Fulvius was exerted strongly in his behalf; and his own statement, if he told the simple truth, left no just cause of complaint against him. He had executed his part of the campaign to the best of his ability: twice had he fought with Hannibal to hinder him

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<sup>42</sup> Livy, XXVII. 20.

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from marching into Bruttium; and it was not his fault, if the fate of all other Roman generals had been his also; he had but failed to do what none had done, or could do. The people felt for the mortification of a brave man, who had served them well from youth to age, and in the worst of times had never lost courage: they not only threw out the bill, but elected Marcellus once more consul, giving him, as his colleague, his old lieutenant in Sicily, T. Quintius Crispinus, who was now prætor, and during the last year had succeeded to Fulvius in the command at Capua<sup>43</sup>.

Julius  
Cæsar  
prætor.

It marks our advance in Roman history, that among the prætors of this year we find the name of Sex. Julius Cæsar; the first Cæsar who appears in the Roman Fasti.

Doubts  
about the  
fidelity of  
Etruria.

For some time past the Romans seem to have mistrusted the fidelity of the Etruscans; and an army of two legions had been regularly stationed in Etruria, to check any disposition to revolt. But now C. Calpurnius Piso, who commanded in Etruria, reported that the danger was becoming imminent, and he particularly named the city of Arretium as the principal seat of disaffection<sup>44</sup>. Why this feeling should have manifested itself at this moment, we can only conjecture. It is possible that the fame of Hasdrubal's coming may have excited the Etruscans. It is possible that Hannibal may have had some correspondence with them, and persuaded

<sup>43</sup> Livy, XXVII. 20, 21.

<sup>44</sup> Livy, XXVII. 21.

them to co-operate with his brother. But other causes may be imagined; the continued pressure of the war upon all Italy, and the probability that the defection of the twelve colonies must have compelled the Romans to increase the burdens of their other allies. If, as Niebuhr thinks<sup>45</sup>, the Etruscans were not in the habit of serving with the legions in the regular infantry, their contributions in money, and in seamen for the fleets, would have been proportionably greater; and both these would fall heavily on the great Etruscan chiefs, or Lucumones, from whose vassals the seamen would be taken, as their properties would have to furnish the money. Again, in the year 544, when corn was at so enormous a price, we read of a large quantity purchased in Etruria by the Roman government for the use of their garrison in the citadel of Tarentum<sup>46</sup>. This corn the allied states were bound to sell at a fixed price; so that the Etruscan landowners would consider themselves greatly injured, in being forced to sell at a low price, what in the present condition of the markets was worth four or five times as much. But whatever was the cause, Marcellus was sent into Etruria, even before he came into office as consul, to observe the state of affairs, that, if necessary, he might remove the seat of war from Apulia to Etruria. The report of his mission seemed satisfactory; and it did not appear necessary to bring his army from Apulia<sup>47</sup>.

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<sup>45</sup> Vol. III. p. 505.

<sup>46</sup> Livy, XXV. 15.

<sup>47</sup> Livy, XXVII. 21.



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Disaffection  
of Arretium.

Yet some time afterwards, before Marcellus left Rome to take the field, the reports of the disaffection of Arretium became more serious; and C. Hostilius, who had succeeded Calpurnius in the command of the army stationed in Etruria, was ordered to lose no time in demanding hostages from the principal inhabitants. C. Terentius Varro was sent to receive them, to the number of 120, and to take them to Rome. Even this precaution was not thought sufficient; and Varro was sent back to Arretium to occupy the city with one of the home legions, while Hostilius, with his regular army, was to move up and down the country, that any attempt at insurrection might be crushed in a moment<sup>48</sup>. It appears also that, besides the hostages, several sons of the wealthy Etruscans were taken away to serve in the cavalry of Marcellus' army, to prevent them at any rate from being dangerous at home<sup>49</sup>.

Disposition  
of the  
Roman  
armies.  
Fabius  
retires from  
military  
service.

The two consuls were to conduct the war against Hannibal, whilst Q. Claudius, one of the prætors, with a third army, was to hold Tarentum, and the country of the Sallentines. Fulvius with a single legion resumed his old command at Capua. Fabius returned to Rome, and from this time forward no more commanded the armies of his country, although he still in all probability directed the measures of the government<sup>50</sup>.

Plan of the  
campaign.

Crispinus had left Rome before his colleague, and, with some reinforcements newly raised, proceeded to

<sup>48</sup> Livy, XXVII. 24.

<sup>49</sup> Livy, XXVII. 26.

<sup>50</sup> Livy, XXVII. 22.

Lucania, to take the command of the army which had belonged to Fulvius. His ambition was to rival the glory of Fabius, by attacking another of the Greek cities on the southern coast. He fixed upon Locri, and having sent for a powerful artillery from Sicily, with a naval force to operate against the sea front of the town, commenced the siege. Hannibal's approach however forced him to raise it; and as Marcellus had now arrived at Venusia, he retreated thither to co-operate with his colleague. The two armies were encamped apart, about three miles from each other: two consuls, it was thought, must at any rate be able to occupy Hannibal in Apulia, while the siege of Locri was to be carried on by the fleet and artillery from Sicily, with the aid of one of the two legions commanded by the prætor Q. Claudius at Tarentum. Such was the Roman plan of campaign for the year 546, the eleventh of this memorable war <sup>51</sup>.

The two armies opposed to Hannibal must have amounted at least to 40,000 men: he could not venture to risk a battle against so large a force: but his eye was everywhere; and he was neither ignorant nor unobservant of what was going on in his rear, and of the intended march of the legion from Tarentum to carry on the siege of Locri by land. So confident was he in his superiority, that he did not hesitate to detach a force of 3000 horse and 2000 foot from his already inferior numbers, to intercept

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Hannibal  
destroys a  
legion sent  
to besiege  
Locri.

<sup>51</sup> Livy, XXVII. 25.

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these troops on their way: and while the Romans marched on in confidence, supposing that Hannibal was far away in Apulia, they suddenly found their road beset; and Hannibal's dreaded cavalry broke in upon the flanks of their column. The rout was complete in an instant; the whole Roman division was destroyed or dispersed; and the fugitives, escaping over the country in all directions, fled back to Tarentum<sup>52</sup>. The fleet from Sicily were obliged therefore to carry on the siege of Locri as well as they could, with no other help.

Position of  
the two  
armies.  
Marcellus  
is killed in  
an ambush.

This signal service rendered, Hannibal's detachment returned to his camp, bringing back their numerous prisoners. Frequent skirmishes took place between the opposed armies; and Hannibal was continually hoping for some opportunity of striking a blow. A hill covered with copsewood rose between the two armies, and had been occupied hitherto by neither party; only Hannibal's light cavalry were used to lurk amongst the trees at its foot, to cut off any stragglers from the enemy's camp. The consuls, it seems, wished to remove their camp—for the two consular armies were now encamped together—to this hill; or at any rate to occupy it as an entrenched post, from which they might command the enemy's movement. But they resolved to reconnoitre the ground for themselves; and accordingly, they rode forward with two hundred cavalry, and a few light-armed soldiers, leaving their

<sup>52</sup> Livy, XXVII. 26.

troops behind in the camp, with orders to be in readiness on a signal given to advance and take possession of the hill <sup>53</sup>. The party ascended the hill without opposition, and rode on to the side towards the enemy, to take a view of the country in that direction. Meantime the Numidians, who had always one of their number on the look-out, to give timely notice of any thing that approached, as they were lurking under the hill, were warned by their scout, that a party of Romans were on the heights above them. No doubt he had marked the scarlet war-cloaks of the generals, and the lictors who went before them, and told his companions of the golden prize that fortune had thrown into their hands. The Numidians stole along under the hill, screened by the trees, till they got round it, between the party on the summit and the Roman camp: then they charged up the ascent, and fell suddenly upon the astonished enemy. The whole affair was over in an instant: Marcellus was run through the body with a spear, and killed on the spot; his son and Crispinus were desperately wounded; the Etruscan horsemen, who formed the greater part of the detachment, had no inclination to fight in a service which they had been forced to enter; the Fregellans, who formed the remainder of it, were too few to do any thing; all were obliged to ride for their lives, and to leap their horses down the broken ground on the hill sides to escape to their camp. The

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<sup>53</sup> Livy, XXVII. 26.

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legions in the camp saw the skirmish, but could not come to the rescue in time. Crispinus and the young Marcellus rode in covered with blood, and followed by the scattered survivors of the party; but Marcellus, six times consul, the bravest and stoutest of soldiers, who had dedicated the spoils of the Gaulish king, slain by his own hand, to Jupiter Feretrius in the capitol, was lying dead on a nameless hill; and his arms and body were Hannibal's <sup>54</sup>.

The Roman  
army re-  
treats: Han-  
nibal raises  
the siege of  
Locri.

The Numidians, hardly believing what they had done, rode back to their camp to report their extraordinary achievement. Hannibal instantly put his army in motion, and occupied the fatal hill. There he found the body of Marcellus, which he is said to have looked at for some time with deep interest, but with no word or look of exultation: then he took the ring from the finger of the body, and ordered, as he had done before in the case of Flaminius and Gracchus, that it should be honourably burned, and that the ashes should be sent to Marcellus' son <sup>55</sup>. The Romans left their camp under cover of the night, and retreated to a position of greater security: they no longer thought of detaining Hannibal from Bruttium; their only hope was to escape out of his reach. Then Hannibal flew once more to the relief of Locri: the terror of the approach of his Numidian cavalry drove the Romans to their ships; all their costly artillery and engines were abandoned; and the siege of Locri, no less dis-

<sup>54</sup> Livy, XXVII. 27.

<sup>55</sup> Plutarch, Marcellus, c. 20.

astrous to the Roman naval force than to their land army, was effectually raised <sup>56</sup>.

During the rest of the season the field was again left free to Hannibal; and his destructive ravages were carried on, we may be sure, more widely than even in the preceding year. The army of Marcellus lay within the walls of Venusia; that of Crispinus retreated to Capua <sup>57</sup>; officers having been sent by the senate to take the command of each provisionally. Crispinus was desired to name a dictator for holding the comitia; and he accordingly nominated the old T. Manlius Torquatus; soon after which he died of the effect of his wounds; and the republic, for the first time on record, was deprived of both its consuls, before the expiration of their office, by a violent death <sup>58</sup>.

The public anxiety about the choice of new consuls was quickened in the highest degree by the arrival of an embassy from Massilia. The Massilians, true to their old friendship with Rome, made haste to acquaint their allies with the danger that was threatening them. Hasdrubal, Hannibal's brother, had suddenly appeared in the interior of Gaul; he had brought a large treasure of money with him, and was raising soldiers busily. Two Romans were sent back to Gaul with the Massilian ambassadors to ascertain the exact state of affairs; and these officers, on their return to Rome, informed the senate, that, through the connexions of Massilia with some of the chiefs

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He continues master of the field: the consul Crispinus dies of his wounds.

The Massilians send tidings of Hasdrubal's being in Gaul.

<sup>56</sup> Livy, XXVII. 28.    <sup>57</sup> Livy, XXVII. 29.    <sup>58</sup> Livy, XXVII. 33.



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in the interior, they had made out that Hasdrubal had completed his levies, and was only waiting for the first melting of the snows to cross the Alps. The senate therefore must expect in the next campaign to see two sons of Hamilcar in Italy<sup>59</sup>.

His route  
out of Spain,  
through  
Gaul.

Reserving the detail of the war in Spain for another place, I need only relate here as much as is necessary for understanding Hasdrubal's expedition. Early in the season of 546, while the other Carthaginian generals were in distant parts of the peninsula, Hasdrubal had been obliged with his single army to give battle to Scipio at Bœcula, a place in the south of Spain, in the upper part of the valley of the Bætis; and having been defeated there, had succeeded nevertheless in carrying off his elephants and money, and had retreated first towards the Tagus, and then towards the western Pyrenees, whither Scipio durst not follow him, for fear of abandoning the sea-coast to the other Carthaginian generals<sup>60</sup>. By this movement Hasdrubal masked his projects from the view of the Romans; they did not know whether he had merely retired to recruit his army in order to take the field against Scipio, or whether he was preparing for a march into Italy<sup>61</sup>. But even if Italy were his object, it was supposed that he would follow the usual route, by the eastern Pyrenees along the coast of the Mediterranean; and Scipio accordingly took the precaution of securing the passes of the moun-

<sup>59</sup> Livy, XXVII. 36.

<sup>61</sup> Polybius, X. 39. 7. Livy,

<sup>60</sup> Livy, XXVII. 18, 19. Polybius, X. 38, 39.

tains in this direction, on the present road between Barcelona and Perpignan<sup>62</sup>; perhaps also he secured those other passes more inland, leading from the three valleys which meet above Lerida, into Languedoc, and to the streams which feed the Garonne. But Hasdrubal's real line of march was wholly unsuspected: for passing over the ground now so famous in our own military annals, near the highest part of the course of the Ebro, he turned the Pyrenees at their western extremity, and entered Gaul by the shores of the ocean, by the Bidassoa and the Adour<sup>63</sup>. Thence striking eastward, and avoiding the neighbourhood of the Mediterranean, he penetrated into the country of the Arverni; and so would cross the Rhone near Lyons, and join Hannibal's route for the first time in the plains of Dauphiné, at the very foot of the Alps. This new and remote line of march concealed him so long, even from the knowledge of the Massilians, and obliged them to seek intelligence of his movements from the chiefs of the interior<sup>64</sup>.

Now then the decisive year was come, the point of the great struggle so long delayed, but which the Carthaginians had never lost sight of, when Italy was to be assailed at once from the north and from the south, by two Carthaginian armies, led by two sons of Hamilcar. And at this moment Marcellus, so long the hope of Rome, was gone; Fabius and Fulvius were enfeebled by age; Lævinus, whose

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Doubts at  
Rome about  
the choice of  
consuls.

<sup>62</sup> Polybius, X. 40. 11.

<sup>63</sup> Livy, XXVII. 20.

<sup>64</sup> Livy, XXVII. 39.

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services in Macedonia and Sicily had been so important, had offended the ruling party in the senate by his opposition to the appointment of Fulvius as dictator two years before; and no important command would as yet be intrusted to him. In this state of things the general voice pronounced that the best consul who could be chosen was C. Claudius Nero <sup>65</sup>.

C. Nero.

C. Nero came of a noble lineage, being a patrician of the Claudian house, and a great-grandson of the famous censor, Appius the blind. He had served throughout the war, as lieutenant to Marcellus in 540; as prætor and proprætor at the siege of Capua, in 542 and 543; as proprætor in Spain in 544; and lastly as lieutenant of Marcellus in 545 <sup>66</sup>. Yet it is strange that the only mention of him personally before his consulship which has reached us, is unfavourable: he is said to have shown a want of vigour when serving under Marcellus in 540, and a want of ability in his command in Spain <sup>67</sup>. But these stories are perhaps of little authority; and if they are true, Nero must have redeemed his faults by many proofs of courage and wisdom; for his countrymen were not likely to choose the general rashly, who was to command them in the most perilous moment of the whole war; and we know that their choice was amply justified by the event.

M. Livius.

But if Nero were one consul, who was to be his

<sup>65</sup> Livy, XXVII. 34.

<sup>66</sup> Livy, XXIV. 17. XXV. 2, 3. 22. XXVI. 17. XXVII. 14.

<sup>67</sup> Livy, XXIV. 17. XXVII. 14.

colleague? It must be some one who was not a patrician, to comply with the Licinian law, and the now settled practice of the constitution. But there was no Decius living, no Curius, no Fabricius; and the glory of the great house of the Metelli had hitherto, during the second Punic war, been somewhat in eclipse, bearing the shame of that ill-advised Metellus, who dared after the rout of Cannæ to speak of abandoning Italy in despair. The brave and kindly Gracchus, the bold Flaminius, the unwearied and undaunted Marcellus, had all fallen in their country's cause. Varro was living, and had learnt wisdom by experience, and was serving the state well and faithfully; but it would be of evil omen to send him again with the last army of the commonwealth to encounter a son of Hamilcar. At last men remembered a stern and sullen old man, M. Livius, who had been consul twelve years before, and had then done good service against the Illyrians, and obtained a triumph, the last which Rome had seen<sup>68</sup>; but whose hard nature had made him generally odious, and who, having been accused before the people of dividing the Illyrian spoil amongst his soldiers unfairly, had been found guilty and fined<sup>69</sup>. The shame and the sense of wrong had so struck him,—for though ungracious and unjust from temper, he was above corruption,—that for some years he lived wholly in the country; and though he had since returned to Rome, and the last censors had

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<sup>68</sup> See above, p. 61, 2.

<sup>69</sup> Frontinus, IV. 1. 45.

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obliged him to resume his place in the senate, yet he had never spoken there, till this very year, when the attacks made on his kinsman, the governor of Tarentum, had induced him to open his lips in his defence. He was misanthropical to all men, and especially at enmity with C. Nero: yet there were qualities in him well suited to the present need; and the senators suggested to their friends and tribesmen and dependents, that no better consuls could be appointed than C. Nero and M. Livius<sup>70</sup>.

He consents  
reluctantly  
to be chosen  
consul;

The people might agree to choose Livius, but would he consent to be chosen? At first he refused altogether: "If he were fit to be consul, why had they condemned him? if he had been justly condemned, how could he deserve to be consul?" But the senators reproved him for this bitterness, telling him "that his country's harshness was to be borne like a parent's, and must be softened by patient submission." Overpowered, but not melted, he consented to be elected consul.

and is re-  
conciled to  
Nero.

Then the senators, and especially Q. Fabius, besought him to be reconciled to his colleague. "To what purpose?" he replied: "we shall both serve the commonwealth the better, if we feel that an enemy's eye is watching for our faults and negligences." But here again the senate's authority prevailed; and the consuls were publicly reconciled<sup>71</sup>. Yet the vindictive temper of Livius still burnt within him so fiercely, that, before he took the field, when Q. Fabius was

<sup>70</sup> Livy, XXVII. 34.

<sup>71</sup> Livy, XXVII. 35. Valerius Maximus, IV. 2. 2. VII. 2. 6.

urging him not to be rash in hazarding a battle, until he had well learnt the strength of his enemy, he replied, "that he would fight as soon as ever he came in sight of him:" and when Fabius asked him why he was so impatient, he answered, "Because I thirst either for the glory of a victory, or for the pleasure of seeing the defeat of my unjust countrymen <sup>72</sup>."

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It is worth while to remark what gigantic efforts the Romans made for this great campaign. One consul was to have Cisalpine Gaul for his province, the other Lucania and Bruttium; each with the usual consular army of two legions, and an equal force of Italian allies. The army of the north was supported by two others of equal force; one, commanded by L. Porcius, one of the prætors, was to co-operate with it in the field; the other, commanded by C. Varro, was to overawe Etruria, and form a reserve. In like manner the consul of the army of the south had two similar armies at his disposal, besides his own; one in Bruttium, of which old Q. Fulvius once more took the command, and another in the neighbourhood of Tarentum. Besides these twelve legions, one legion occupied Capua, and two new home legions were raised for the immediate defence of Rome. Thus fifteen legions, containing 75,000 Roman citizens, besides an equal number of Italian allies, were in arms this year for

Enormous  
armament  
of the Ro-  
mans.

<sup>72</sup> Livy, XXVII. 40. Valerius Maximus, IX. 3. 1.



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the protection of Italy. In this same year the return of the whole population of Roman citizens of an age to bear arms according to the census, amounted only to 137,108; and in addition to the forces employed in Italy, eight legions were serving abroad; two in Sicily, two in Sardinia, and four in Spain <sup>73</sup>.

Means  
taken to  
raise troops.

Soldiers were raised with a strictness never known before; insomuch that even the maritime colonies were called upon to furnish men for the legions, although ordinarily exempted from this service, on the ground that their citizens were responsible for the defence of the sea-coast in their neighbourhood. Only Antium and Ostia were allowed to retain their customary exemption; and the men within the military age in both these colonies were obliged to swear that they would not sleep out of their cities more than thirty nights, so long as the enemy should be in Italy. The slaves also were again invited to enlist; and two legions were composed out of them; and after all, so perilous was the aspect of affairs in the north from the known disaffection of Etruria, and even of Umbria, that P. Scipio is said to have draughted 10,000 foot and 1000 horse from the forces of his province, and sent them by sea to reinforce the army of the north; while the prætor commanding in Sicily sent 4000 archers and slingers for the army of the

<sup>73</sup> Livy, XXVII. 36.

south. The lot decided that M. Livius was to be opposed to Hasdrubal, C. Nero to Hannibal <sup>74</sup>.

Meantime Hasdrubal had begun his march from the plains between the Rhone and the Isere, and proceeded to cross the Alps by the route formerly followed by his brother. It is said that he found the obstacles of all kinds, both those presented by nature, and those offered by the hostility of the inhabitants, far less than had been experienced by Hannibal. The inhabitants were now aware that the stranger army meant them no ill; that it was merely passing through their valleys on its way to a distant land, to encounter its enemies there. Nay, it is added that traces of Hannibal's engineering were still in existence, that the roads which he had built up along the steep mountain sides, and the bridges which he had thrown over the torrents, and the cuttings which he had made through the rocks, after having been exposed for eleven years to the fury of the avalanches, and the chafing of the swollen streams, were even now serviceable to Hasdrubal. At any rate Hasdrubal appeared in Italy sooner than either friend or foe had expected him <sup>75</sup>; and having issued from the Alpine valleys, and crossed the Po, he descended along its right bank, and sat down before the Latin colony of Placentia. But the colony was one of the faithful eighteen, and did not forget its duty. It closed its gates; and Hasdrubal had no artillery to batter down its walls; he only

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Hasdrubal  
crosses the  
Alps, and  
advances  
upon Ari-  
minum.

<sup>74</sup> Livy, XXVII. 38.

<sup>75</sup> Livy, XXVII. 39. Appian, VII. 52.

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lay before it therefore long enough for the Cisalpine Gauls and Ligurians to join him, and then pressed forward on his march by the line of the later Æmilian road, towards Ariminum and the shores of the Adriatic. The prætor L. Porcius retreated before him; and Hasdrubal sent off four Gaulish horsemen and two Numidians to his brother, to announce his approach, and to propose that they should unite their two armies in Umbria, and from thence advance by the Flaminian road straight upon Rome <sup>76</sup>. Livius had by this time arrived on the scene of action, and had effected his junction with L. Porcius: yet their combined forces were unable to maintain their ground on the frontier of Italy; Ariminum was abandoned to its fate; they fell back behind the Metaurus; and still keeping the coast road,—for the later branch of the Flaminian road, which ascends the valley of the Metaurus, was not yet constructed,—they encamped about fourteen miles farther to the south, under the walls of the maritime colony of Sena <sup>77</sup>.

Nero encamps at Venusia.

On the other side of Italy, C. Nero, availing himself of the full powers with which the consuls were invested for this campaign, had incorporated the two legions, which Q. Fulvius was to have commanded in Bruttium, with his own army, leaving Fulvius at the head of a small army of reserve at Capua. With an army thus amounting to 40,000 foot and 2500 horse, Nero fixed his head quarters

<sup>76</sup> Livy, XXVII. 43.

<sup>77</sup> Appian, VII. 52.

at Venusia; his object being by all means to occupy Hannibal, and to hinder him from moving northwards to join his brother <sup>78</sup>.

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At no part of the history of this war do we more feel the want of a good military historian, than at the opening of this memorable campaign. What we have in Livy is absolutely worthless; it is so vague, as well as so falsified, that the truth from which it has been corrupted can scarcely be discovered. We are told that Hannibal moved later from his winter quarters than he might have done, because he thought that his brother could not arrive in Cisalpine Gaul so early as he actually did; and we are told that he received information of his having reached Placentia <sup>79</sup>. Yet, after having heard this, he wastes much time in moving about in the south, first into Lucania, then to Apulia, thence falling back into Bruttium, and finally advancing again into Apulia, and there remaining idle, till the fatal blow had been struck in the north. It is added, that in the course of these movements he was several times engaged with the Romans, and lost nearly 15,000 men, killed or taken <sup>80</sup>. Putting aside these absurdities, in which we cannot but recognize the perversions of Valerius Antias, or some annalist equally untrustworthy, we must endeavour as far as possible to conjecture the outline of the real story.

With 40,000 men under an active general opposed to him in the field, and with 20,000 more in his

Hannibal's  
movements.

<sup>78</sup> Livy, XXVII. 40.

<sup>79</sup> Livy, XXVII. 39.

<sup>80</sup> Livy, XXVII. 41, 42.

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rear in the neighbourhood of Tarentum, Hannibal could only act on the offensive by gathering all his remaining garrisons into one mass, and by raising additional soldiers, if it were possible, amongst the allies who yet adhered to him. This was to be accomplished in the face of a superior enemy, and, as Hasdrubal was already arrived on the Po, without loss of time. It was for this object apparently that he entered Lucania, to raise soldiers amongst his old partizans there; with this view he crossed back into Apulia, and then moved into Brutium to join the new Bruttian levies, which had been collected by Hanno, the governor of Metapontum. All this he effected, baffling the pursuit of Nero, or beating off his attacks; and having amassed a force sufficient for his purpose, he again turned northwards, re-entered Apulia, advanced, followed closely by Nero, to his old quarters near Canusium, and there halted <sup>81</sup>. Whether he was busy in collecting corn for his farther advance, or whether he was waiting for more precise intelligence from his brother, we know not; but we do not find that he moved his army beyond Canusium.

He waits for tidings from his brother.

Admitting however that Hannibal was aware of Hasdrubal's arrival before Placentia, we can understand why his own movements could not but be suspended, after he had collected all his disposable force together, till he should receive a fresh communication from his brother. For from Placentia

<sup>81</sup> Livy, XXVII. 42.

Hasdrubal had a choice of roads before him; and it was impossible for Hannibal to know beforehand which he might take. But on this knowledge his own plans were to depend: if Hasdrubal crossed the Apennines into Etruria, in order to rally the disaffected Etruscans around him, Hannibal might then advance into Samnium and Campania: if on the other hand, Hasdrubal were to move eastward towards the Adriatic, thinking it desirable that the two armies should act together, then Hannibal also would keep near the coast, and retracing the line of his own advance after the battle of Thrasymenus, would be ready to meet his brother in Picenum, or in Umbria. And it was in order to determine Hannibal's movements, that Hasdrubal, when he left Placentia, sent off the six horsemen, as has been already mentioned, to say that he was marching upon Ariminum, instead of upon Etruria, and that the two brothers were to effect their junction in Umbria.

With marvellous skill and good fortune Hasdrubal's horsemen made their way through the whole length of Italy. But Hannibal's rapid movement into Bruttium disconcerted them: they attempted to follow him thither; but mistaking their way, and getting too near to Tarentum, they fell in with some foragers of the army of Q. Claudius, and were made prisoners. The prætor instantly sent them under a strong escort to Nero. They were the bearers of a letter from Hasdrubal to his brother, containing the whole plan of their future operations: it

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Hasdrubal's  
messengers  
are taken  
prisoners,  
and brought  
to Nero.



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was written, not in cypher, but in the common Carthaginian language and character; and the interpreter read its contents in Latin to the consul <sup>82</sup>.

Nero leaves  
his camp,

Nero took his resolution on the instant. He dispatched the letter to the senate, urging the immediate recall of Fulvius with his army from Capua to Rome, the calling out every Roman who could bear arms, and the marching forward the two home legions to Narnia, to defend that narrow gorge of the Flaminian road against the invader. At the same time he told the senate what he was going to do himself. He picked out 7000 men, of whom 1000 were horse, the flower of his whole army; he ordered them to hold themselves in readiness for a secret expedition into Lucania, to surprise one of Hannibal's garrisons; and as soon as it was dark, he put himself at their head, leaving his lieutenant, Q. Catius, in the command of the main army, and began his march <sup>83</sup>.

and marches  
to join  
Livius.

His march was not towards Lucania. Already before he left his camp had he sent forward horsemen on the road leading to Picenum and Umbria, with the consul's orders, that all the provisions of the country should be brought down to the road-side, that all horses and draught cattle should be led thither also, and carriages for the transport of the weaker or wearied soldiers. Life and death were upon his speed, the life and death of his country. His march was towards the camp of his colleague,

<sup>82</sup> Livy, XXVII. 43.

<sup>83</sup> Livy, XXVII. 43.

before Sena; his hope was to crush Hasdrubal with their combined and overwhelming forces, whilst Hannibal, waiting for that letter which he would never receive, should remain still in Apulia.

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When Nero had reached a sufficient distance from Hannibal, he disclosed the secret of his expedition to his soldiers. They felt the glory of their mission, and shared the spirit of their leader. Nor was it a little thing to witness the universal enthusiasm which every where welcomed their march. Men and women, the whole population of the country, crowded to the road side; meat, drink, clothing, horses, carriages, were pressed upon the soldiers; and happy was the man from whom they would accept them. Every tongue blessed them as deliverers; incense rose on hastily built altars, where the people, kneeling as the army passed, poured forth prayers and vows to the gods for their safe and victorious return. The soldiers would scarcely receive what was offered to them: they would not halt; they ate standing in their ranks: night and day they hastened onwards, scarcely allowing themselves a brief interval of rest <sup>84</sup>. In six or seven days the march was accomplished: Livius had been forewarned of his colleague's approach; and according to his wish Nero entered the camp by night, concealing his arrival from Hasdrubal no less successfully than he had hidden his departure from Hannibal <sup>85</sup>.

Nero joins  
Livius.

The new comers were to be received into the tents

They determine to fight without delay.

<sup>84</sup> Livy, XXVII. 45.

<sup>85</sup> Livy, XXVII. 46.

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of Livius' soldiers; for any enlargement of the camp would have betrayed the secret; and they were more than seven thousand men: for their numbers had been swelled on their march; veterans who had retired from war, and youths too young to be enlisted, having pressed Nero to let them share in his enterprise. A council was held the next morning; and though Livius and L. Porcius, the prætor, urged Nero to allow his men some rest before he led them to battle, he pleaded so strongly the importance of not losing a single day, lest Hannibal should be upon their rear, that it was agreed to fight immediately. The red ensign was hoisted as soon as the council broke up; and the soldiers marched out and formed in order of battle<sup>86</sup>.

Hasdrubal  
retreats,

The enemy, whose camp, according to the system of ancient warfare, was only half a mile distant from that of the Romans, marched out and formed in line to meet them. But as Hasdrubal rode forward to reconnoitre the Roman army, their increased numbers struck him; and other circumstances, it is said, having increased his suspicions, he led back his men into their camp, and sent out some horsemen to collect information. The Romans then returned to their own camp; and Hasdrubal's horsemen rode round it at a distance to see if it were larger than usual, or in the hope of picking up some stragglers. One thing alone, it is said, revealed the secret: the trumpet, which gave the signal for the

<sup>86</sup> Livy, XXVII. 46.

several duties of the day, was heard to sound as usual once in the camp of the prætor, but twice in that of Livius. This, we are told, satisfied Hasdrubal that both the consuls were before him: unable to understand how Nero had escaped from Hannibal, and dreading the worst, he resolved to retire to a greater distance from the enemy; and having put out all his fires, he set his army in motion as soon as night fell, and retreated towards the Metaurus<sup>87</sup>.

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Whose narrative Livy has followed here, we cannot tell: it is not that of Polybius, except in part: and some points speak ill for the credibility of its author. According to this account, Hasdrubal marched back fourteen miles to the Metaurus: but his guides deserted him and escaped unobserved in the darkness, so that, when the army reached the Metaurus, they could not find the fords, and began to ascend the right bank of the river, in the hope of passing it easily when daylight came, and they should be arrived at a higher part of its course. But the windings of the river, it is said, delayed him: as he ascended further from the sea, he found the banks steeper and higher; and no ford was to be gained<sup>88</sup>.

along the  
banks of the  
Metaurus.

The Metaurus, in the last twenty miles of its course, flows through a wide valley or plain, the ground rising into heights rather than hills, while the mountains from which it has issued ascend far

Description  
of the course  
of the Me-  
taurus.

<sup>87</sup> Livy, XXVII. 47.

<sup>88</sup> Livy, XXVII. 47.

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off in the distance, and bound the low country near the sea with a gigantic wall. But, as is frequently the case in northern Italy, the bed of the river is like a valley within a valley, being sunk down between steep cliffs, at a level much below the ordinary surface of the country; which yet would be supposed to be the bottom of the plain by those who looked only at the general landscape, and did not observe the kind of trough in which the river was winding beneath them. Yet this lower valley is of considerable width; and the river winds about in it from one side to the other, at times running just under its high banks, at other times leaving a large interval of plain between it and the boundary. The whole country, both in the lower valley and in the plain above, is now varied with all sorts of cultivation, with scattered houses and villages, and trees; an open, joyous, and habitable region, as can be found in Italy. But when Hasdrubal was retreating through it, the dark masses of uncleared wood still no doubt in many parts covered the face of the higher plain, overhanging the very cliffs of the lower valley; and the river below, not to be judged of by its present scanty and loitering stream, ran like the rivers of a half cleared country, with a deep and strong body of waters.

The Romans  
overtake  
Hasdrubal;

These steep cliffs would no doubt present a serious obstacle to an army wishing to descend to the edge of the river; and if their summits were covered with wood, they would at once intercept the view, and make the march more difficult. Thus Hasdrubal was

overtaken by the Romans, and obliged to fight. It is clear from Polybius that he had encamped for the night after his wearisome march; and retreat being fatal to the discipline of barbarians, the Gauls became unmanageable, and indulged so freely in drinking, that, when morning dawned, many of them were lying drunk in their quarters, utterly unable to move<sup>89</sup>. And now the Roman army was seen advancing in order of battle; and Hasdrubal, finding it impossible to continue his retreat, marched out of his camp to meet them<sup>90</sup>.

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No credible authority tells us what was the amount of his army: that the Roman writers extravagantly magnified it, is certain; and that he was enormously outnumbered by his enemy is no less so. Polybius<sup>91</sup> says, that he deepened his lines, diminishing their width, and drawing up his whole force in a narrow space, with his ten elephants in front. We hear nothing of his cavalry, the force with which his brother had mainly won his victories; and he had probably brought scarcely any African horse from Spain: what Gaulish horsemen had joined him since he had crossed the Alps, we know not. His Gaulish infantry, as many as were fit for action, were stationed on his left, in a position naturally so strong as to be unassailable in front; and its flank would probably be covered by the river. He himself took part with his Spanish infantry, and attacked

who draws  
up his army  
for battle.

<sup>89</sup> Polybius, XI. 3.

<sup>90</sup> Livy, XXVII. 48.

<sup>91</sup> Polybius, XI. 1.



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the left wing of the Roman army, which was commanded by Livius. Nero was on the Roman right, the prætor in the centre<sup>92</sup>.

He is de-  
feated and  
slain.

Between Hasdrubal and Livius the battle was long and obstinately disputed, the elephants being, according to Polybius, an equal aid, or rather an equal hindrance, to both parties<sup>93</sup>; for, galled by the missiles of the Romans, they broke sometimes into their own ranks, as well as into those of the enemy. Meanwhile Nero, seeing that he could make no progress on his front, drew off his troops out of the line, and passing round on the rear of the prætor and of Livius, fell upon the right flank and the rear of the enemy. Then the fate of the day was decided; and the Spaniards, outnumbered and surrounded, were cut to pieces in their ranks, resisting to the last. Then too, when all was lost, Hasdrubal spurred his horse into the midst of a Roman cohort, and there fell sword in hand, fighting, says Livy with honourable sympathy, as became the son of Hamilcar and brother of Hannibal<sup>94</sup>.

Effects of  
the victory.

The conquerors immediately stormed the Carthaginian camp, and there slaughtered many of the Gauls, whom they found still lying asleep in the helplessness of brute intoxication<sup>95</sup>. The spoil of the camp was rich, amounting in value to 300 talents: of the elephants, six were killed in the action; the other four were taken alive. All the Carthaginian citizens who had followed Hasdrubal, were either

<sup>92</sup> Livy, XXVII. 48.

<sup>93</sup> XI. 1.

<sup>94</sup> Livy, XXVII. 49. Polybius, XI. 2.

<sup>95</sup> Polybius, XI. 3.

killed or taken; and 3000 Roman prisoners were found in the camp, and restored to liberty. The loss of men on both sides was swelled prodigiously by the Roman writers, ambitious, it seems, of making the victory an exact compensation for the defeat of Cannæ: but Polybius<sup>96</sup> states it at 10,000 men on the side of the vanquished, and 2000 on that of the Romans; a decisive proof that Hasdrubal's army actually engaged cannot have been numerous; for of those in the field few can have escaped. But the amount of slain mattered little: Hasdrubal's army was destroyed, and he himself had perished; and Hannibal was left to fight out the war with his single army, which, however unconquerable, could not conquer Italy.

Polybius<sup>97</sup> praises the heroic spirit of Hasdrubal, saying that he knew when it was time for him to die; that, having been careful of his life, so long as there was any hope of accomplishing his grand enterprise, when all was lost, he gave his country, what Pericles calls the greatest and noblest gift of a true citizen, the sacrifice of his own life. And doubtless none can blame the spirit of self-devotion to the highest known duty: Hasdrubal was true to his country in his death as in his life. Yet the life of a son of Hamilcar was to Carthage of a value beyond all estimate: Hasdrubal's death outweighed the loss of many armies; and had he deigned to survive his defeat, he might again have served his country, not

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Value of  
Hasdrubal's  
life.

<sup>96</sup> XI. 3.

<sup>97</sup> XI. 2.

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only in peace as Hannibal did after his defeat at Zama, but as the leader of a fresh army of Gauls and Ligurians, of Etruscans and Umbrians, co-operating with his brother in marching upon Rome.

Hannibal  
receives  
intelligence  
of his bro-  
ther's death.

With no less haste than he had marched from Apulia, Nero hastened back thither to rejoin his army. All was quiet there: Hannibal still lay in his camp, waiting for intelligence from Hasdrubal. He received it too soon, not from Hasdrubal, but from Nero: the Carthaginian prisoners were exhibited exultingly before his camp; two of them were set at liberty, and sent to tell him the story of their defeat; and a head was thrown down in scorn before his outposts, if his soldiers might know whose it was. They took it up, and brought to Hannibal the head of his brother<sup>98</sup>. He had not dealt so with the remains of the Roman generals: but of this Nero reeked nothing; as indifferent to justice and humanity in his dealings with an enemy, as his imperial descendants showed themselves towards Rome, and all mankind.

Anxiety and  
joy at Rome.

Meanwhile, from the moment that Nero's march from the south had been heard of at Rome, intense anxiety possessed the whole city. Every day the senate sat from sunrise to sunset; and not a senator was absent: every day the forum was crowded from morning till evening, as each hour might bring some great tidings; and every man wished to be among the first to hear them. A

<sup>98</sup> Livy, XXVII. 51.

doubtful rumour arose, that a great battle had been fought, and a great victory won only two days before: two horsemen of Narnia had ridden off from the field to carry the news to their home; it had been heard and published in the camp of the reserve army, which was lying at Narnia to cover the approach to Rome. But men dared not lightly believe what they so much wished to be true: and how, they said, could a battle fought in the extremity of Umbria be heard of only two days after at Rome? Soon however it was known that a letter had arrived from L. Manlius Acidinus himself, who commanded the army at Narnia: the horsemen had certainly arrived there from the field of battle, and brought tidings of a glorious victory. The letter was read first in the senate, and then in the forum from the rostra: but some still refused to believe: fugitives from a battle-field might carry idle tales of victory to hide their own shame: till the account came directly from the consuls it was rash to credit it<sup>99</sup>. At last word was brought that officers of high rank in the consul's army were on their way to Rome; that they bore a despatch from Livius and Nero. Then the whole city poured out of the walls to meet them, eager to anticipate the moment which was to confirm all their hopes. For two miles, as far as the Milvian bridge over the Tiber, the crowd formed an uninterrupted mass; and when the officers appeared,

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<sup>99</sup> Livy, XXVII. 50.

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they could scarcely make their way to the city, the multitude thronging around them, and overwhelming them and their attendants with eager questions. As each man learnt the joyful answers, he made haste to tell them to others: "the enemy's army is destroyed; their general slain; our own legions and both the consuls are safe." So the crowd re-entered the city; and the three officers, all men of noble names, L. Veturius Philo, P. Licinius Varus, and Q. Metellus, still followed by the thronging multitude, at last reached the senate-house. The people pressed after them into the senate-house itself: but even at such a moment the senate forgot not its accustomed order; the crowd was forced back; and the consuls' despatch was first read to the senators alone. Immediately afterwards the officers came out into the forum: there L. Veturius again read the despatch; and as its contents were short, and it told only the general result of the battle, he himself related the particulars of what he had seen and done. The interest of his hearers grew more intense with every word; till at last the whole multitude broke out into a universal cheer, and then rushed from the forum in all directions to carry the news to their wives and children at home, or ran to the temples to pour out their gratitude to the gods. The senate ordered a thanksgiving of three days; the prætor announced it in the forum; and for three days every temple was crowded; and the Roman wives and mothers in their gayest dresses, took their children with them, and

poured forth their thanks to all the gods for this great deliverance. It was like the burst of all nature, when a long frost suddenly breaks up, and the snow melts, and the ground resumes its natural colouring, and the streams flow freely. The Roman people seemed at last to breathe and move at liberty: confidence revived; and with it the ordinary business of life regained its activity: he who wanted money found that men were not afraid to lend it; what had been hoarded came out into circulation; land might be bought without the dread that the purchase would be rendered worthless by Hannibal's ravages; and in the joy and confidence of the moment, men almost forgot that their great enemy with his unbroken army was still in Italy<sup>100</sup>.

At the end of the year both consuls returned to Rome, and triumphed. Many years had passed since this spectacle had been exhibited in its full solemnity; for Marcellus had only obtained the smaller triumph, or ovation, in which the general passed through the streets on foot. But now the kingly chariot once more carried a Roman consul in the pomp of kingly state up to the temple of the Capitoline Jupiter; and the streets once more resounded with the shouts and rude jests of the victorious soldiers, as they moved in long array after their general. The spoil of Hasdrubal's camp was large; each soldier received a donative of three denarii and a half; and three millions of sesterces in silver, besides 80,000

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The consuls  
triumph.

<sup>100</sup> Livy, XXVII. 51.



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pounds of the old Italian copper money, were carried into the treasury. Nero rode on horseback by the side of his colleague's chariot; a distinction made between them, partly because Livius had happened to have the command on the day of the battle, and partly because Nero had come without his army; his province still requiring its usual force, as Hannibal was there. But the favour of the multitude, if we can trust the writers under Augustus, when they speak of his adopted son's ancestor, amply compensated to Nero for this formal inferiority: they said that he was the real conqueror of Hasdrubal, while his name, even in absence, had overawed Hannibal<sup>101</sup>. One thing however is remarkable, that Nero was never employed again in a military command: we only hear of him after his consulship as censor. Fabius and Fulvius and Marcellus had been sent out year after year against Hannibal; whilst the man, whose military genius eclipsed all the Roman generals hitherto engaged in Italy, was never opposed to him again. Men's eyes were turned in another direction; and the conqueror of the Metaurus was less regarded than a young man whose career of success had been as brilliant as it was uninterrupted, and who was now almost entitled to the name of conqueror of all Spain. It is time that we should trace the events of the war in the west, and describe the dawn of the glory of Scipio.

<sup>101</sup> Livy, XXIX. 37.

## CHAPTER XLVII.

P. CORNELIUS SCIPIO. HIS OPERATIONS IN SPAIN. SIEGE AND CAPTURE OF NEW CARTHAGE. BATTLE OF BÆCULA. THE CARTHAGINIANS EVACUATE THE SPANISH PENINSULA. SCIPIO RETURNS TO ROME, AND IS ELECTED CONSUL.—A.U.C. 543 TO A.U.C. 548.

THREE generations of Scipios have already been distinguished in Roman history; L. Scipio Barbatus, who was actively engaged in the third Samnite war; L. Scipio, his son, who was consul early in the first Punic war, and obtained a triumph; and Publius and Cnæus Scipio, the sons of L. Scipio, who served their country ably in Spain in the second Punic war, and, as we have seen, were at last cut off there by the enemy, towards the end of the siege of Capua. Publius Scipio, who was killed in Spain, left two sons behind him, Lucius and Publius: of these, Lucius, the elder, became afterwards the conqueror of king Antiochus; Publius, the younger, was the famous Scipio Africanus.

Athens abounded in writers at the time of the Peloponnesian war; but, had not Thucydides been

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the Scipios.

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one of them, how hard would it be rightly to estimate the characters of the eminent men of that period! And even Thucydides seems in one instance to have partaken of the common weaknesses of humanity: his personal gratitude and respect for Antiphon has coloured, not indeed his statement of his actions, but his general estimate of his worth: he attributes an over-measure of virtue to the conspirator, who scrupled not to use assassination as a means of overthrowing the liberty and independence of his country. But Polybius, whose knowledge of Rome was that of a foreigner, and for a long time of a prisoner, could not be to Roman history what Thucydides is to that of Greece, even if in natural powers he had approached more nearly to him; and all his accounts of the Scipios are affected by his intimacy with the younger Africanus, and are derived from partial sources, the anecdotes told by the elder Lælius, or the funeral orations and traditions of the family. On the other hand, there was a large party in Rome, to whom Scipio was personally and politically obnoxious; and their writers would naturally circulate stories unfavourable to him. Hence, the accounts of his early life and character are varying, and sometimes contradictory; and points apparently the most notorious are stated very differently, so that we know not what to believe. His friend and companion, Lælius, told Polybius<sup>1</sup>, that in his first battle, when only seventeen, he saved his father's life;

<sup>1</sup> X. 3.

but Cœlius Antipater said that this was a false pretension; that the consul, P. Scipio, was saved, not by his son, but by the fidelity of a Ligurian slave<sup>2</sup>. By his friends again Scipio is represented as one who, amid all temptations of youth and power, maintained the complete mastery over his passions<sup>3</sup>: while his enemies said that his youth was utterly dissolute; and that the famous story of his noble treatment of the Spanish captive maiden was invented to veil conduct which had really been of the very opposite nature<sup>4</sup>. His common admirers extolled his singular devotion to the gods: he delighted, it was said, to learn their pleasure, and to be guided by their counsel; nor would he ever engage in any important matter, public or private, till he had first gone up to the capitol, and entered the temple of Jupiter, and there sat for a time alone, as it seemed, in the presence of the god, and doubtless enjoying unwonted communications from his divine wisdom<sup>5</sup>. But Polybius, by temper and by circumstances a rationalist, is at great pains to assure his readers, that Scipio owed no part of his greatness to the gods, and that his true oracle was the clear judgment of his own mind<sup>6</sup>. According to him, Scipio did but impose upon and laugh at the credulity of the vulgar; speaking of the favour shown him by the gods, while he knew the gods to be nothing. Livy,

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<sup>2</sup> Livy, XXI. 46.

<sup>3</sup> Polybius, X. 18, 19. Livy, XXVI. 49, 50.

<sup>4</sup> Cn. Nævius and Valerius An-

tias, quoted by A. Gellius, VI. 8.

<sup>5</sup> Polybius, X. 2. 5. 11. Livy, XXVI. 19.

<sup>6</sup> Polybius, X. 2. 5. 7.

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with a truer feeling, which taught him that a hero cannot be a hypocrite, suggests a doubt, though timidly, as if in fear of the scepticism of his age, whether the great Scipio was not really touched by some feelings of superstition<sup>7</sup>, whether he did not in some degree speak what he himself believed.

His religious  
spirit.

A mind like Scipio's, working its way under the peculiar influences of his time and country, cannot but move irregularly; it cannot but be full of contradictions. Two hundred years later, the mind of the dictator Cæsar acquiesced contentedly in Epicureanism: he retained no more of enthusiasm than was inseparable from the intensity of his intellectual power, and the fervour of his courage, even amidst his utter moral degradation. But Scipio could not be like Cæsar. His mind rose above the state of things around him; his spirit was solitary and kingly; he was cramped by living among those as his equals, whom he felt fitted to guide as from some higher sphere; and he retired at last to Liternum to breathe freely<sup>8</sup>, to enjoy the simplicity of childhood, since he could not fulfil his natural calling to be a hero king. So far he stood apart from his countrymen, admired, revered, but not loved. But he could not shake off all the influences of his time; the virtue, public and private, which still existed at Rome, the reverence paid by the wisest and best men to the religion of their fathers, were elements too congenial to his nature,

<sup>7</sup> XXVI. 19. Sive et ipse <sup>8</sup> Livy, XXXVIII. 52, 53. Vapti quadam superstitione animi. Ierius Maximus, V. 3. 2.

not to retain their hold on it: they cherished that nobleness of soul in him, and that faith in the invisible and divine, which two centuries of growing unbelief rendered almost impossible in the days of Cæsar. Yet how strange must the conflict be, when faith is combined with the highest intellectual power, and its appointed object is no better than Paganism! Longing to believe, yet repelled by palpable falsehood, crossed inevitably with snatches of unbelief, in which hypocrisy is ever close at the door, it breaks out desperately, as it may seem, into the region of dreams and visions, and mysterious communings with the invisible, as if longing to find that food in its own creations, which no outward objective truth offers to it. The proportions of belief and unbelief in the human mind in such cases, no human judgment can determine: they are the wonders of history; characters inevitably misrepresented by the vulgar, and viewed even by those who in some sense have the key to them as a mystery, not fully to be comprehended, and still less explained to others. The genius which conceived the incomprehensible character of Hamlet, would alone be able to describe with intuitive truth the character of Scipio or of Cromwell.

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In both these great men, the enthusiastic element which clearly existed in them, did but inspire a resistless energy into their actions, while it in no way interfered with the calmest and keenest judgment in the choice of their means: nor in the case of Scipio did it suggest any other end of life, than such

Its effect on  
his life.



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as was appreciated by ordinary human views of good. Where religion contained no revelation of new truth, it naturally left men's estimate of the end of their being exactly what it had been before, and only furnished encouragement to the pursuit of it. It so far bore the character of magic, that it applied superhuman power to the furtherance of human purposes: the gods aided man's work; they did not teach and enable him to do theirs.

Charge  
against him.

The charge of early dissoluteness brought against Scipio by his enemies is likely to have been exaggerated, like the stories of our Henry V. Yet the sternest and firmest manhood has sometimes followed a youth marked with many excesses of passion: and what was considered an unbecoming interruption to the cares of public business, was held to be in itself nothing blameable. That sanction of inherited custom, which at Rome at this period was the best safeguard of youthful purity, Scipio was not inclined implicitly to regard.

Comparison  
between his  
character  
and Hanni-  
bal's.

With all his greatness there was a waywardness in him, which seems often to accompany genius; a self-idolatry, natural enough where there is so keen a consciousness of power and of lofty designs; a self-dependence, which feels even the most sacred external relations to be unessential to its own perfection. Such is the Achilles of Homer, the highest conception of the individual hero, relying on himself, and sufficient to himself. But the same poet who conceived the character of Achilles, has also drawn that of Hector; of the truly noble, because unselfish

hero, who subdues his genius to make it minister to the good of others, who lives for his relations, his friends, and his country. And as Scipio lived in himself and for himself, like Achilles, so the virtue of Hector was worthily represented in the life of his great rival Hannibal, who, from his childhood to his latest hour, in war and in peace, through glory and through obloquy, amid victories and amid disappointments, ever remembered to what purpose his father had devoted him, and withdrew no thought or desire or deed from their pledged service to his country.

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Scipio had fought at Cannæ, and after the battle, had been forward, it was said, in putting down that dangerous spirit, which showed itself among some of high birth and name, when they were purposing to abandon Italy in despair, and seek their fortune in Greece or Egypt or Asia<sup>9</sup>. His early manhood had attracted the favour of the people; and although the details are variously given, it is certain that he was made curule ædile at an early age, and with strong marks of the general good will<sup>10</sup>. But he had filled no higher office than the ædileship, when his father and uncle were killed in Spain, and when C. Nero, after the fall of Capua, was sent out as proprætor to command the wreck of their army, and joining it to the force which he brought from Italy, to maintain the almost desperate cause of the Roman arms in the west.

His first  
offices.

A.U.C. 543.

<sup>9</sup> Livy, XXII. 53. See above, <sup>10</sup> Polybius, X. 4. Livy, XXV. 2. p. 14<sup>o</sup>.

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A.C. 210.  
War in  
Spain after  
the death of  
the Scipios.

He held his ground, and even ventured, if we may believe a story overrun with improbabilities, to act on the offensive, and to penetrate into the south of Spain, as far as the Bætis<sup>11</sup>. The faults of the Carthaginian generals were ruining their cause, and vexing the spirit of Hasdrubal, the son of Hamilcar, who alone knew the value of the present opportunity, and was eager to make use of it. But the other Hasdrubal and Mago thought their work was done, and were only anxious to enrich themselves out of the plunder of Spain. They disgusted the Spanish chiefs by their insolence and rapacity, while they were jealous of each other, and both, as was natural, hated and dreaded the son of Hamilcar<sup>12</sup>. Accordingly all concert between the Carthaginian generals was at an end; they engaged in separate enterprises in different parts of the country: Hasdrubal, the son of Gisco, and Mago, moved off to the extreme west of the peninsula, to subdue and plunder the remoter Spanish tribes; and only Hasdrubal, the son of Hamilcar, remained to oppose the Romans. Nero therefore, whether he acted on the offensive or no, was certainly unassailed behind the Iberus; and at the end of the year 544, eighteen months at least after the defeat of the Scipios, the Roman arms had met with no fresh disaster; and the coast of the Mediterranean between the Pyrenees and the Iberus still acknowledged the Roman dominion.

The Romans  
resolve to  
prosecute it  
with more  
vigour.

It was at this period that the government resolved

<sup>11</sup> Livy, XXVI. 17.

<sup>12</sup> Polybius, IX. 11. X. 36.

to increase its efforts in Spain, to employ a larger army there, and to place it under the command of an officer of higher rank than Nero, who was only proprætor. It is probable that Hasdrubal's expedition to Italy was now seriously meditated, and that the Romans, being aware of this, were anxious to detain him in Spain: but, even without this special object, the importance of the Spanish war was evident; and it was not wise to leave the Roman cause in Spain in its present precarious state, in which it was preserved only by the divisions and want of ability of the enemy's generals. Accordingly, the tribes were to meet to appoint a proconsul, who should carry out reinforcements to Spain, and, with a proprætor acting under him, take the supreme command of the Roman forces in that country.

To the surprise of the whole people, P. Scipio, then only in his twenty-seventh year, and who had filled no higher office than that of curule ædile, came forward as a candidate<sup>13</sup>. It is said that he had no competitors, all men being deterred from undertaking a service which seemed so unpromising; whereas Scipio himself had formed a truer judgment of the state of affairs in Spain, and felt that they might be restored, and that he himself was capable of restoring them. He expressed this confidence strongly in all his addresses to the people; and there was that in him which distinguished his boldness from a young man's idle boastings, and communi-

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Scipio is  
elected pro-  
consul for  
the Spanish  
war,

<sup>13</sup> Livy, XXVI. 18. Polybius, X. 6.

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cated his hope to his hearers<sup>14</sup>. At the same age, and nearly under the same circumstances, in which Napoleon was appointed in 1796 to take the command of the French army of Italy, was P. Scipio chosen by the unanimous voice of the Roman people, to take the command of their army in Spain. And great as were the consequences of the appointment of Napoleon, those which followed the appointment of Scipio were greater and far more lasting.

and goes  
with large  
reinforce-  
ments to  
Spain.

At the same time a new proprætor was to be sent out in the room of C. Nere, whose year of command was come to an end. His successor was M. Junius Silanus<sup>15</sup>, who had been prætor two years before, and since that time had been employed in overawing the party disaffected to Rome in Etruria. The two new generals were to take with them large reinforcements, amounting to 10,000 foot, 1000 horse, and a fleet of thirty quinqueremes. The troops were embarked at the mouth of the Tiber; and the fleet proceeded along the coasts of Etruria, Liguria, and Gaul, till it arrived safely at Emporia, a Massalio colony, lying immediately on the Spanish side of the Pyrenees. Here the soldiers were disembarked, and proceeded by land to Tarraco; the fleet followed; and the head quarters of the proconsul were established at Tarraco for the winter, as it was too late in the season to admit of any active operations immediately<sup>16</sup>.

View of  
Spain.

And now that Spain has received that general

<sup>14</sup> Livy, XXVI. 19. Polybius,  
X. 6.

<sup>15</sup> Livy, XXVI. 19.

<sup>16</sup> Livy, XXVI. 19, 20.

and that army, by whom her fate was fixed through all after time,—for the expulsion of the Carthaginians from the peninsula decided its subjection to the Romans, and though the work of conquest was slow, and often interrupted, it was not the less sure,—let us for a moment survey the earliest known state of this great country; what Spain was, and who were the earliest Spaniards, before Romans, Goths, and Moors, had filled the land with stranger races, and almost extirpated the race and language of its original people.

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The Spanish peninsula, joined to the main body of Europe by the isthmus of the Pyrenees, may be likened to one of the round bastion towers which stand out from the walls of an old fortified town, lofty at once and massy. Spain rises from the Atlantic on one side, and the Mediterranean on the other, not into one or two thin lines of mountains divided by vast tracts of valleys or low plains, but into a huge tower, as I have called it, of table land, from which the mountains themselves rise again like the battlements on the summit. The plains of Castile are mountain plains, raised nearly 2000 feet above the level of the sea; and the elevation of the city of Madrid is nearly double that of the top of Arthur's seat, the hill or mountain which overhangs Edinburgh. Accordingly the centre of Spain, notwithstanding its genial latitude, only partially enjoys the temperature of a southern climate; while some of the valleys of Andalusia, which lie near the sea, present the vegetation of the tropics, the palm tree, the banana, and the sugar cane. Thus the southern

Description  
of the  
Spanish  
peninsula.



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coast seemed to invite an early civilization; while the interior, with its bleak and arid plains, was fitted to remain for centuries the stronghold of barbarism.

Early Phœnician settlements in Spain. The Basques, a remnant of the aboriginal inhabitants.

Accordingly the first visits of the Phœnicians to Spain are placed at a very remote period. Some stories ascribed the foundation of Gades to Arche-laus, the son of Phœnix,—Phœnix and Cadmus being the supposed founders of Tyre and Sidon, and belonging to the earliest period of Greek tradition; while other accounts of a more historical character made the origin of Gades contemporary with the reign of the Athenian Codrus, that is, about a thousand years before the Christian era<sup>17</sup>. Three hundred years later, the prophet Isaiah<sup>18</sup> describes the downfall of Tyre as likely to give deliverance to the land of Tarshish; that is, to the south of Spain, where the Phœnicians had established their dominion. In the time of Ezekiel, the Tyrian trade with Spain was most flourishing; and the produce of the Spanish mines, silver, iron, tin, and lead, are especially mentioned as the articles which came from Tarshish to the Phœnician ports<sup>19</sup>. Nor did the Phœnicians confine themselves to a few points on the sea coast: they were spread over the whole south of Spain; and the greatest number of the towns of Turditanian were still inhabited in Strabo's time by people of Phœnician origin<sup>20</sup>. They communicated many of the arts of life to the natives, and among the rest the early use of letters; for the characters which

<sup>17</sup> Velleius, I. II. 5.

<sup>18</sup> XXIII. 10.

<sup>19</sup> XXVII. 12.

<sup>20</sup> III. p. 149.

the Iberians used in their writing before the time of the Romans<sup>21</sup>, can scarcely have been any other than Phœnician. The Phœnicians visited Spain at a very remote period; but they found it already peopled. Who the aboriginal inhabitants were, and from whence they came, it is impossible to determine. The Greeks called them Iberians, and said that, although they were divided into many tribes, and spoke many various dialects, they yet all belonged to the same race<sup>22</sup>. It cannot be doubted that their race and language still exist; that the Basques, who inhabit the Spanish provinces of Guipuscoa, Biscay, Alava, and Navarre, and who in France occupy the country between the Adour and the Bidassoa, are the genuine descendants of the ancient Iberians. Their language bears marks of extreme antiquity; and its unlikeness to the other languages of Europe is very striking, even when compared with Welsh, or with Slavonic. The affinities of the Welsh numerals with those of the Teutonic languages, and the Greek and Latin, are obvious at the first glance; and the same may be said of most of the Slavonic numerals: but the Basque are so peculiar, that it is difficult to identify any one of them, except "sei," "six," with those of other languages<sup>23</sup>. And an evidence of its great antiquity seems furnished by the fact, that the in-

<sup>21</sup> Strabo, III. p. 139.

<sup>22</sup> Herodorus, in a fragment of Stephanus Byzantinus, v. Ἰβηρίαί, preserved by Constantine Porphyrogenitus, and given by Berkelius: Τὸ Ἰβηρικὸν γένος—διώρισται ὀνόμασιν, ἐν γένος ἔον, κατὰ φύλα.

<sup>23</sup> I give the Welsh from Pughe's Welsh grammar, Denbigh, 1832; the Slavonic (Bohemian), from Dobrowsky, Lehrgebäude der Böh-

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flexions of the nouns and verbs are manifestly so many distinct words, inasmuch as they exist in a separate form as such. We suspect this reasonably of the terminations of the nouns and verbs of Greek and Latin; but in the Basque language it can be proved beyond question<sup>24</sup>.

Various traditions of early settlements.

We have seen that the Phœnicians were settled amongst the Iberians in the south; and Keltic tribes were said to be mixed up with them in parts of the north and centre, forming a people, whom the Greeks called Keltiberians. How far strangers of other races were to be found in Iberia, it is difficult to decide. One or two Greek colonies from Massalia, such as Rhoda and Emporiæ, were undoubtedly planted on the shore of the Mediterranean, just within the limits of Iberia, immediately to the south of the Pyrenees<sup>25</sup>. These belong to the times of certain history; but stories are told of invasions of Spain, and of colonies founded on its territory, on

mischen Sprache, Prag, 1819; the Basque from Larramendi, *Arte de la Lingua Bascongada*, Salamanca, 1729.

Numerals from 1 to 10.

	WELSH.	SCLAVONIC.	BASQUE.
One	Un	Geden	Bat
Two	Dau	Dwa	Bi
Three	Tri	Tri	Hirú
Four	Pedwar	Etyu	Lau
Five	Pump	Pét	Bost
Six	Chwech	Ssest	Sei
Seven	Saith	Sedm	Zazpi
Eight	Wyth	Osm	Zortzi
Nine	Naw	Dewēt	Bederatzi
Ten	Deg	Deset	Amár.

<sup>24</sup> See W. Humboldt's *Dissertation on the Basque Language* in Adelung's *Mithridates*, vol. iv. pp. 314—332.

<sup>25</sup> Strabo, III. pp. 159, 160.

which in their present form we can place no reliance. Carthaginian writers spoke of a great expedition of the Tyrian Hercules into Spain, at the head of an army of Medes, Persians, Armenians, and other nations of the east<sup>26</sup>. Megasthenes<sup>27</sup>, the Greek traveller and historian of India, said that Tearco, king of Æthiopia, and Nabuchodonosor, king of the Chaldæans, had both carried their arms as far as Spain. Amongst the innumerable countries which were made the scene of the adventures of the Greek chiefs on their return from Troy, after they had been scattered by the famous storm, the coasts of Iberia, and even its coasts upon the ocean, are not forgotten<sup>28</sup>. Other stories, as we have seen, claimed a Greek origin for Saguntum; while others again called it a Rutulian colony, from the Tyrrheno-Pelasgian city of Ardea<sup>29</sup>. The settlements of the Greek chiefs on their way home from Troy are mere romances, as unreal as the famous siege of Paris by the Saracens in the days of Charlemagne, or as the various adventures and settlements of Trojan exiles, which were invented in the middle ages. Whether any real events are disguised in the stories of the expeditions of Hercules, of Tearco, and of Nabuchodonosor, is a question more difficult to answer: for the early migrations from the east to

<sup>26</sup> Sallust, Jugurth. c. XVIII.<sup>27</sup> Quoted by Strabo, XV. 1. § 6. p. 687, and by Josephus, Antiq. X. 11. § 1. and contr. Apion. I. 20. Strabo's character of Megasthenes is not favourable:

διαφερόντως ἀπιστεῖν ἄξιον Δηϊμάχῳ τε καὶ Μεγασθένει. II. 1. p. 70.

<sup>28</sup> Strabo, III. pp. 149, 150.<sup>29</sup> Livy, XXI. 7. See Niebuhr, vol. i. note 127.

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the west are buried in impenetrable obscurity. But the Persians and Æthiopians may have made their way into Spain before historical memory, as the Vandals and Arabs invaded it in later times: the fact itself is not incredible, if it rested on any credible authority.

State of  
agriculture  
in Spain.

Not knowing then what strange nations may at one time or other have invaded or settled in Spain, we cannot judge how much the Iberian character and manners were affected by foreign influence. Agriculture was practised from a period beyond memory: but the vine and olive, and perhaps the flax, were first introduced into the south of Spain by the Phœnicians, and only spread northwards gradually, the vine and fig advancing first, and the olive, as becomes its greater tenderness, following them more slowly and cautiously. Even in Strabo's time the vine had scarcely reached the northern coast of Spain; and the olive, when Polybius wrote, appears not to have been cultivated north of the Sierra Morena<sup>30</sup>. Butter supplied the place of oil to the inhabitants of the northern coast, and beer that of wine<sup>31</sup>.

Character of  
the Iberians.

In the character of the people some traits may be recognised, which even to this day mark the Spaniard. The grave dress<sup>32</sup>, the temperance and sobriety, the unyielding spirit, the extreme indolence, the perseverance in guerilla warfare, and the remarkable absence of the highest military qualities,

<sup>30</sup> III. p. 164.

<sup>31</sup> Strabo, III. p. 155. Polybius in Athenæus, I. 28.

<sup>32</sup> Strabo, III. p. 145. *μελαεΐ-  
μονες ἅπαντες.*

ascribed by the Greek and Roman writers to the ancient Iberians, are all more or less characteristic of the Spaniards of modern times. The courtesy and gallantry of the Spaniard to women has also come down to him from his Iberian ancestors: in the eyes of the Greeks, it was an argument of an imperfect civilisation, that among the Iberians the bridegroom gave, instead of receiving, a dowry; that daughters sometimes inherited to the exclusion of sons, and, thus becoming the heads of the family, gave portions to their brothers, that they might be provided with suitable wives<sup>33</sup>. In another point, the great difference between the people of the south of Europe, and those of the Teutonic stock, was remarked also in Iberia: the Iberians were ignorant, but not simple-hearted; on the contrary, they were cunning and mischievous, with habits of robbery almost indomitable, fond of brigandage, though incapable of the great combinations of war<sup>34</sup>. These, in some degree, are qualities common to almost all barbarians; but they offer a strong contrast to the character of the Germans, whose words spoke what was in their hearts, and of whose most powerful tribe it is recorded, that their ascendancy was maintained by no other arms than those of justice<sup>35</sup>.

Spanish soldiers had for more than two centuries formed one of the most efficient parts of the Car-

Importance  
of Spain to  
the Cartha-  
ginians.

<sup>33</sup> Strabo, III. p. 165.

<sup>34</sup> Strabo, III. p. 154.

<sup>35</sup> Tacitus, German. 22. 35.



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thaginian armies <sup>36</sup>; and on this account the Carthaginian government set a high value on its dominion in Spain. But this dominion furnished Carthage with money, no less than with men. The Spanish mines had been worked for some centuries; first by the Phœnicians of Asia, and latterly by their Carthaginian descendants; yet they still yielded abundantly. And some of them have been worked for two thousand years since the Carthaginians were driven out of the country; and to this hour their treasures are unexhausted <sup>37</sup>.

Spanish  
mines.

These mines existed for the most part in the mountains which divide the streams running to the Guadiana from those which feed the Guadalquivir<sup>38</sup>. This is the chain so well known by the name of the Sierra Morena; but the several arms which it pushes out towards the sea eastward and southward, were also rich in precious metals; and some mines were worked in the valley of the Guadalquivir itself, as low down as Seville. The streams moreover, which flowed from these mountains, brought down gold mingled with their sand and gravel<sup>39</sup>; and this was probably collected long before the working of the regular mines began. But in the time of the second Punic war the mines were worked actively; and a hundred years earlier, the cinnabar, or sulphuret of quicksilver, of the famous mines of Almaden, was well known in the markets of Greece<sup>40</sup>.

<sup>36</sup> Herodotus, VII. 165.

<sup>37</sup> Strabo, III. 146—148.

<sup>38</sup> Strabo, III. p. 142.

<sup>39</sup> Strabo, III. p. 146.

<sup>40</sup> Strabo, III. p. 147.

The Carthaginians honoured as a hero or demi-god, the man who first discovered the most productive silver mines; and one of these was in the immediate neighbourhood of New Carthage itself<sup>41</sup>. Others were nearer the Guadalquivir, at Castulo and Ilipa; or on the feeders of the Guadiana, as at Sisapo<sup>42</sup>, the ancient name of the place near to which the great quicksilver mines were worked, now known as the mines of Almaden. One large and most productive silver mine, yielding three hundred pounds daily, is said to have been opened by Hannibal himself<sup>43</sup>, who, while he was in Spain, had married the daughter of one of the chiefs of Castulo<sup>44</sup>, and perhaps had acquired some possessions through her in the mining district, as Thucydides had through his wife in Thrace.

The immense resources which the Carthaginians derived from their Spanish dominion, seemed now more than ever secured to them, by the destruction of the Roman army under the two Scipios, and the consequent retreat of the Romans behind the Iberus. But the divisions between their generals, and the arrogance with which their officers now treated the Spaniards, as if it was no longer worth while to conciliate them, had made a fatal opening, exposing their power to the most deadly blow which it had yet sustained. Scipio, with intuitive sagacity, observed this opening, and with decision no less admira-

Scipio's first  
measures  
in Spain.

<sup>41</sup> Polybius, X. 10, 11. Strabo, III. p. 142.  
III. p. 148.

<sup>43</sup> Pliny, XXXIII. 31.

<sup>42</sup> Polybius, X. 38. 7. Strabo, <sup>44</sup> Livy, XXIV. 41.

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ble struck his blow to the heart of his enemy. He formed his plans at Tarraco during the winter; as soon as the season allowed his fleet to co-operate with him, he put it and his army in motion; and while the three Carthaginian generals were in places equally remote from one another, and from the point threatened by the enemy, Scipio crossed the Iberus, and led his land and sea forces to besiege New Carthage<sup>45</sup>.

He marches  
against New  
Carthage.

His early and most intimate friend C. Lælius commanded the fleet; the proprætor, M. Silanus, was left behind the Iberus with 3000 foot and 500 horse, to protect the country of the allies of Rome, while Scipio himself led 25,000 foot and 2500 horse on his expedition. Polybius declares that the march from the Iberus to New Carthage was performed in seven days; but as, according to his own reckoning, the distance was not less than 325 Roman miles, the accuracy of one or both of his statements may well be questioned<sup>46</sup>. Three degrees of latitude divide Carthagera from the Ebro; and the ordinary windings and difficulties of a road in such a distance must make it all but an impossibility that an army with its baggage should have marched over it in a single week. However the march was undoubtedly rapid; and the Roman army established itself under the walls of New Carthage, while all succour was far distant, and when the actual garrison of a place so impor-

<sup>45</sup> Polybius, X. 6—9. Livy, <sup>46</sup> Polybius, X. 9. 7. III. 39. 5. XXVI. 42.

tant did not exceed a thousand men. To the protection of a force so small was committed the capital of the Carthaginian dominion in Spain, the base of their military operations, their point of communication with Africa, their treasures and magazines, and the hostages taken from the different Spanish tribes to secure their doubted fidelity <sup>47</sup>.

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The present town of Carthage stands at the head of its famous harbour, built partly on some hills of tolerable height, and partly on the low ground beneath them, with a large extent of marshy ground behind it, which is flooded after rains, and its inner port surrounded by the buildings of the arsenal, running deeply into the land on its western side. But in the times of the second Punic war, the marshy ground behind was all a lagoon, and its waters communicated artificially with those of the port of the arsenal; so that the town was on a peninsula, and was joined to the main land only by a narrow isthmus, which had itself been cut through in one place, to allow the lagoon-water to find an outlet <sup>48</sup>. Scipio then encamped at the head of this isthmus; and having fortified himself on the rear, with the lagoon covering his flank, he left his front open, that nothing might obstruct the free advance of his soldiers to storm the city <sup>49</sup>.

Position of  
New Car-  
thage.

Accordingly, without delay, he was preparing to lead on his men to the assault, when he was himself

Scipio  
attacks it,

<sup>47</sup> Polybius, X. 8.

<sup>48</sup> Polybius, X. 10. Livy, XXVI. 42.

<sup>49</sup> Polybius, X. 11.

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assailed by Mago, who with his scanty garrison made a desperate sally along the isthmus against the Roman camp. After an obstinate struggle, the besieged were beaten back into the town with loss; and the Romans, following them, fixed their ladders to the walls, and began to mount. But the height of the walls was so great, that the long ladders necessary to reach their summit broke in some instances under the weight of the soldiers who crowded on them; and the enemy made their defence so good, that towards afternoon Scipio found it expedient to recall his men from the assault <sup>50</sup>.

and carries  
the walls.

He had told his men before the assault began, that the god Neptune had appeared to him in his sleep, and had promised to give him aid in the hour of need, so manifest, that all the army should acknowledge his interposition <sup>51</sup>. For the lagoon, it seems, was so shallow, that even the slight fall of the tide in the Mediterranean was sufficient to leave much of it uncovered, as is the case at this day in parts of the harbour of Venice. This would take place in the afternoon, and Scipio ordered five hundred men to be ready with ladders, to march across the lagoon as soon as the ebb began. Then he renewed his assault by the isthmus; and whilst this in itself discouraged the enemy, who had hoped that their work for the day was over, and whilst the soldiers again swarmed up the ladders, and the missiles of the

<sup>50</sup> Polybius, X. 12, 13. Livy, XXVI. 45.

<sup>51</sup> Polybius, X. 11. Livy, XXVI. 45.

besieged were beginning to fail, the five hundred men who were in readiness, boldly rushed across the lagoon, and, having guides to show them the hardest parts of it, reached the foot of the walls in safety, applied their ladders where there were no defenders, and mounted without opposition <sup>52</sup>.

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No sooner had they won the walls, than they hastened to the main gate of the city, towards the isthmus; and when they had burst it open, their comrades from without rushed in like a torrent. At the same moment the scaling parties on each side of the main gate overbore the defenders, and were now overflowing the ramparts. Mago reached the citadel in safety; but Scipio in person pushed thither with a thousand picked men; and the governor, seeing the city lost, surrendered. The other heights in the town were stormed with little difficulty; and the soldiers, according to the Roman practice, commenced a deliberate massacre of every living creature they could find, whether man or beast, till, after the citadel had surrendered, a signal from their general called them off from slaughter, and turned them loose upon the houses of the town to plunder. Yet it marks the Roman discipline, that, even before night fell, order was restored. Some of the soldiers marched back to the camp, from whence the light troops were sent for to occupy one of the principal heights of the town; Scipio himself, with a thousand men, went to the citadel; and the tribunes got the

The town is  
taken and  
plundered.

<sup>52</sup> Polybius, X. 14. Livy, XXVI. 46.



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soldiers out of the houses, and made them bring all their plunder into one heap in the market-place, and pass the night there quietly, waiting for the regular division of the spoil, which was to take place on the following morning<sup>53</sup>.

Scipio's conduct to the prisoners.

When the morning came, whilst the usual distribution of the money arising from the sale of the plunder was made by the tribunes, Scipio proceeded to inspect his prisoners. All were brought before him together, to the number of nearly 10,000. He first caused them to be divided into three classes. One consisted of all the citizens of New Carthage, with their wives and families: all these Scipio set at liberty, and dismissed them to their homes unhurt. The second class contained the workmen of handicraft trades, who were either slaves, or, if free, only sojourners in the city, enjoying no political rights. These men were told, that they were now the slaves of the Roman people, but that, if they worked well and zealously in their several callings, they should have their liberty at the end of the war. Meantime they were all to enter their names with the quæstor; and a Roman citizen was set over every thirty of them as an overseer. These workmen were in all about two thousand. The third class contained all the rest of the prisoners, domestic slaves, seamen, fishermen, and the mixed populace of the city; and from these Scipio picked out the most able-bodied, and employed them in manning

<sup>53</sup> Polybius, X. 15. Livy, XXVI. 46.

his fleet: for he found eighteen ships of the enemy at New Carthage; and these he was enabled to add to his own naval force immediately, by putting some of his own seamen into them, and filling up their places with some of the captives, taking care however that the number of these should never exceed a third of the whole crew. The seamen thus employed were promised their liberty at the end of the war, like the workmen, if they did their duty faithfully <sup>54</sup>.

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The Carthaginian prisoners and the Spanish hostages were still to be attended to. The former were committed to the care of Lælius, to be taken forthwith to Rome; and there were amongst them fifteen members of the great or ordinary council of Carthage, and two members of the council of elders. The Spanish hostages were more than three hundred; and amongst them were many young boys. To show kindness to these was an obvious policy: accordingly Scipio made presents to them all, and desired them to write home to their friends, and assure them that they were well and honourably treated, and that they would all be sent back safely to their several countries, if their countrymen were willing to embrace the Roman alliance. Particular attention was shown to the wife of a Spanish chief of high rank, who had been recently seized as a hostage by Hasdrubal Gisco, because her husband had refused to comply with his demands for money.

His kind  
treatment of  
the Spanish  
hostages.

<sup>54</sup> Polybius, X. 16, 17. Livy, XXVI. 47.

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Her treatment had been rude and insolent, if not worse; but Scipio assured her that he would take as delicate care of her and of the other Spanish women, as he would of his own sisters or daughters. This honourable bearing of the young conqueror, for Scipio was not more than twenty-seven years of age, produced a deep impression all over Spain <sup>55</sup>.

Magazines  
taken in the  
city.

After this important conquest, Scipio remained for a time at New Carthage, and busied himself in exercising his soldiers and seamen, and in setting his workmen to labour in manufacturing arms <sup>56</sup>. He had taken a considerable artillery in the place, a large sum of money, abundant magazines of corn, and about sixty-three merchant-ships in the harbour, with their cargoes; so that, according to Livy, the least valuable part of the conquest of New Carthage was New Carthage itself <sup>57</sup>.

Lælius  
carries the  
news of this  
conquest to  
Rome.

Lælius with his prisoners arrived at Rome after a voyage of thirty-four days, and brought the welcome news of this great restoration of the Roman affairs in Spain <sup>58</sup>. Amidst the confusions of the chronology of the Spanish war, it is not easy to ascertain the exact time at which Lælius reached Rome. But it is probable that he arrived there early in the year 545, perhaps at that critical moment when the disobedience of the twelve colonies excited such great alarm, and when the destruction of the army of Cn. Fulvius at Herdonea was still fresh in men's memo-

<sup>55</sup> Polybius, X. 18. Livy, XXVI.  
47. 49.

<sup>56</sup> Polybius, X. 20.

<sup>57</sup> XXVI. 47. Polybius, X. 19.

<sup>58</sup> Livy, XXVII. 7.

ries. Scipio's victory was therefore doubly welcome; and his requests for supplies were favourably listened to: for his army, although victorious, was still in want of many things, the old soldiers especially, who had been ill clothed and worse paid during several years. Accordingly we find that a sum of fourteen hundred pounds' weight of gold was brought out from the treasure reserved for the most extraordinary occasions, and expended in purchasing clothing for the army in Spain<sup>59</sup>.

Scipio himself returned from New Carthage to Tarraco, taking his Spanish hostages with him<sup>60</sup>. It was early in the season; but we hear of no other military action during the remainder of the year. This on Scipio's part is easily intelligible: his army was too weak to hold the field against the combined forces of the enemy; and it was his object to strengthen himself by alliances with the natives, and to draw them off from the service of Carthage, if he could not induce them to enter that of Rome. He had struck one great blow with vigour, surprising the enemy by his rapidity: but what had been won by vigour might be lost by rashness; and after so great an action as the conquest of New Carthage, he could well afford to lie quiet for the rest of the year, waiting for his supplies of clothing from Rome, and strengthening his interest amongst the chiefs of Spain. The inactivity of the Carthaginian generals would be more surprising, if we did not make allow-

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The rest of  
the year  
passes in  
inaction.

<sup>59</sup> Livy, XXVII. 10.

<sup>60</sup> Livy, XXVII. 17. Polybius, X. 34.

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ance for the paralysing effect of their mutual jealousies. No efficient co-operation could be contrived between them; and Hasdrubal, Hannibal's brother, was too weak to act alone, and, disgusted with the conduct of his colleagues, was probably anxious to husband his own army carefully, looking forward now more than ever to the execution of his long-projected march upon Italy. Thus there was a pause from all active operations in Spain for several months; whilst in Italy Fabius had recovered Tarentum, and he and Fulvius were on the point of being succeeded in the consulship by Marcellus and Crispinus.

Decline of  
the Cartha-  
ginian in-  
fluence in  
Spain.

The loss of Tarentum made it more important than ever, that Hasdrubal should join his brother in Italy; while the growing disposition of the Spaniards to revolt to Rome rendered the prospect of success in Spain less encouraging. But with no Carthaginian accounts remaining, and amidst the confusions, omissions, and contradictions, of the Roman historians, it is almost impossible to give a satisfactory explanation of the events of the ensuing year, 546, in Spain. Massinissa, then a very young man, the son of a Numidian king, named Gala, was sent over from Africa with a large body of Numidian cavalry to reinforce Hasdrubal, the son of Hamilcar, principally, it is said, in order to his march into Italy<sup>61</sup>. Still Hasdrubal made no forward movement, but remained in a very strong position near a place called variously Bæcula or Bebula, situated in the upper valley of the Guadal-

<sup>61</sup> Livy, XXIV. 49. XXV. 34.

quiver, near the mining district; and there he seemed rather disposed to await Scipio's attack, than to assume the offensive<sup>62</sup>. He saw that the fidelity of the Spaniards to Carthage was deeply shaken, not only by the loss of their hostages, but by the encouraging treatment which the hostages themselves had received from the Romans. This feeling had been working ever since the fall of New Carthage; and now its fruits were daily becoming more manifest; insomuch that, when the time at which Scipio was expected to take the field drew near, Mandonius and Indibilis, two of the most influential of the Spanish chiefs, retired with all their followers from Hasdrubal's camp, and established themselves in a strong position, from which they might join the Romans, as soon as their army should appear in the south<sup>63</sup>. On the other hand, Scipio's Roman force was strengthened, by his having laid up his fleet, and draughted the best of his seamen into the legions, to increase the number of his soldiers. And although a combined effort of the three Carthaginian generals might yet have recovered New Carthage, or at any rate kept Scipio behind the Iberus, nothing of this sort was attempted; and Hasdrubal Gisco, jealous, it seems, both personally and politically of Hannibal's brother, left him unaided to sustain the first assault of the enemy.

Hasdrubal, the son of Hamilcar, therefore, under

Hasdrubal  
leaves Spain.

<sup>62</sup> Polybius, X. 38. Livy, XXVII. 18. Appian VI. 24.

<sup>63</sup> Polybius, X. 35. Livy, XXVII. 17.



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these circumstances, was doubtless anxious to carry into effect his expedition into Italy. Yet, not wishing it to be said that he had abandoned his colleagues, he resolved first to try his strength with Scipio, to see what Spanish tribes would actually join him, and whether, by offering battle in a favourable position, he could repulse the enemy, and thus break that spell of Scipio's fortune which was working so powerfully. But in this hope he was disappointed. Scipio advanced from the Iberus to the valley of the Bætis, or Guadalquiver, before Hasdrubal saw any thing of the armies of his colleagues hastening to his aid: many Spanish tribes joined the Roman army at the Iberus; Mandonius and Indibilis hastened to it as soon as it approached the place where they were posted; and Hasdrubal, unable to maintain his strong position, and, if we believe Scipio's statement, seeing it in the act of being carried by the enemy at the close of a successful assault, retreated accordingly, not towards the southern sea, nor towards the western ocean, but northwards towards the Tagus<sup>64</sup>, and from thence, as we have seen, towards the western Pyrenees; there recruiting his army from those tribes which had not yet come under the influence of Rome, and preparing for that great expedition to Italy, of which we have already related the progress and the event.

Increase of  
Scipio's  
influence.

Before Hasdrubal finally retreated, he had lost many prisoners. All those who were Spaniards,

<sup>64</sup> Polybius, X. 38, 39. Livy, XXVII. 17, 18. Appian, VI. 25—28.

were sent home free without ransom by the politic conqueror; and he liberally rewarded those Spanish chiefs who had already come over to his side. They on their part saluted him with the title of king. The first Hasdrubal, the founder of New Carthage, had lived in kingly state amongst the Spaniards; and they probably thought that Scipio meant to do the same, and would pass the rest of his life in their country. But the name of king, although perhaps not ungrateful to Scipio's ears, was intolerable to those of his countrymen; nor would he have been contented to reign in Spain over barbarians: his mind was already turned towards Africa, and anticipated the glory of conquering Carthage. So he repressed the homage of the Spanish chiefs, and desired them to call him, not king, but general. He then took possession of the strong position which Hasdrubal had evacuated; and there he remained during the rest of the season, watching, so it is said, the movements of Hasdrubal Gisco, and Mago, who were now come upon the scene of action. On the approach of winter he again returned to Tarraco<sup>65</sup>.

Such is the account given by Polybius of the events of the war in Spain during the summer of the year 545; and such, no doubt, was the statement given by Scipio himself, and obtained by Polybius from Scipio's old friend and companion, C. Lælius. What Silenus said of these same events, we know

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<sup>65</sup> Polybius, XXXVIII. 40. Livy, XXVII. 19.

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not; and it is possible that Hasdrubal's account of them was never known, owing to his subsequent fate, so that Silenus may have had no peculiar information about them, and may have passed them over slightly. It is evident, that Scipio's pretended victory at Bœcula was of little importance. Hasdrubal carried off all his elephants, all his treasure, and a large proportion of his infantry: he was not pursued; he retreated in the direction which best suited his future movements; and these movements he effected without the slightest interruption from the enemy. Scipio did not follow him, says Polybius<sup>66</sup>, because he dreaded the arrival of the other Hasdrubal and Mago: he remained in the south, therefore, to keep them in check, and to prevent them from attacking New Carthage; and not doubting that Hasdrubal would follow his brother's route, and attempt to enter Gaul by the eastern Pyrenees, he detached some troops from his army to secure the passes of the mountains, and other defensible positions between the Iberus and the frontiers of Gaul<sup>67</sup>. It is probable that his notions of the geography of the western parts of Spain and Gaul were so vague, that he had no conception of the possibility of Hasdrubal's marching towards the Alps without coming near the Mediterranean. The line which he actually took from the western Pyrenees to the upper part of the course of the Rhone, through the interior of Gaul, was one

<sup>66</sup> X. 39.

<sup>67</sup> Polybius, X. 40.

of which Scipio in all probability did not even suspect the existence.

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Reasons for  
Hasdrubal's  
delay.

It may be asked why Hasdrubal, whose great object was to reach Italy, did not commence his march at the beginning of the year, without waiting so long at Bæcula; especially after the desertion of Mandonius and Indibilis had taught him that the Spaniards were no longer to be relied on. But he had himself on a former occasion won over the Celtiberians from the army of Scipio's father; and any reverse sustained by the Romans might tempt the Spanish chiefs to return to their old alliance. It is possible also that he waited so long at Bæcula for another reason, because he wished to carry with him as large a sum of money as possible; and he was daily drawing a supply from the abundant silver mines in the neighbourhood. The success of his expedition depended on his being able to raise soldiers amongst the Cisalpine Gauls, as well as amongst the tribes of north-western Spain; and for both these purposes ready money was most desirable.

A more inexplicable point in the story of these transactions is the alleged discord between Hasdrubal and the other Carthaginian generals; when one of them, Mago, was his own brother, and was not only a soldier of tried ability, but is expressly said to have conducted the war in Spain in accordance with Hannibal's directions, after Hasdrubal had marched into Italy<sup>65</sup>. Whether Mago was placed under Hasdrubal Gisco's orders, and could not act inde-

Jealousies  
of the Car-  
thaginian  
generals.

<sup>65</sup> Polybius, IX. 22.

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pently, or whether jealousy, or any other cause, really made him careless of his brother's success and safety, we cannot pretend to determine: the interior of a Carthaginian camp, and still more the real characters and feelings of the Carthaginian generals, are entirely unknown to us.

Ascendency  
of Scipio  
over the  
minds of the  
Spaniards.

The one great advantage possessed by Scipio, far more important than his pretended victory at Bæcula, was the remarkable ascendancy which he had obtained over the minds of the Spaniards. Every thing in him was at once attractive and imposing; his youth, and the mingled beauty and majesty of his aspect; his humanity and courtesy to the Spanish hostages and to their friends; his energy and ability at the head of his army. Above all, there was manifest in him that consciousness of greatness, and that spirit, at once ardent, lofty, and profound, which naturally bows the hearts and minds of ordinary men, not to obedience only and respect, but to admiration, and almost to worship. The Carthaginian generals felt, it is said, that no Spanish troops could be trusted, if brought within the sphere of his influence; Mago must go over to the Balearian islands, and raise soldiers there, who might be strangers to the name of Scipio; while Massinissa should follow the course pursued by Mutines in Sicily, and scour the whole country with his Numidian cavalry, relieving the allies of Carthage, and harassing the states which had revolted<sup>69</sup>. But

<sup>69</sup> Livy, XXVII, 20.

Massinissa himself was not secure from Scipio's ascendancy: his nephew had been made prisoner at Bæcula, and had been sent back to him without ransom <sup>70</sup>: some conciliatory messages were probably addressed to him at the same time; and Scipio never lost sight of him, till two years afterwards he gratified the Numidian's earnest wish for a personal interview, and then attached him for ever to the interests of Rome <sup>71</sup>.

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Meanwhile that memorable year was come, when the fortune of Rome was exposed to its severest trial, and rose in the issue signally triumphant. Vainly did Scipio's guards keep vigilant watch in the passes of the eastern Pyrenees, looking out for the first signs of Hasdrubal's approach, and hoping to win the glory of driving him back defeated, and of marring his long-planned expedition to Italy. They sat on their mountain posts, looking earnestly southwards, while he for whom they waited was passing far on their rear northwards, winning his way through the deep valleys of the chain of Cebenna, or the high and bleak plains of the Arverni, till he should descend upon the Rhone, where it was as yet unknown to the Massaliot traders, flowing far inland in the heart of Gaul. Hasdrubal had accomplished his purpose: his Spanish soldiers were removed out of the reach of Scipio's ascendancy; the accumulated treasures of his Spanish mines had purchased the aid of a numerous band of Gauls; and the Alps had

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Hasdrubal  
evades  
Scipio, and  
marches into  
Italy.

<sup>70</sup> Livy, XXVII. 19.

<sup>71</sup> Livy, XXVIII. 35.



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seemed to smooth their rugged fastnesses to give him an easy passage. All the strength which Rome could gather was needed for the coming struggle; and Scipio, as we have seen, sent a large detachment from his own army, both of Roman soldiers and of Spaniards, to be conveyed by sea from Tarraco to Etruria, and to assist in conquering the enemy in Italy, whose march he had been unable to stop in Spain.

The campaign of 547 not marked by any decisive events.

Thus, with Hasdrubal's army taken away from the Carthaginian force in Spain, and with the Roman army weakened by its contributions to the defence of Italy, the Spanish war was carried on but feebly during the summer of the year 547. A new general of the name of Hanno had been sent over to take Hasdrubal's place; and he and Mago proceeded to raise soldiers amongst the Celtiberians in the interior<sup>72</sup>, while Hasdrubal Gisco was holding Bætica, and while Scipio was still in his winter quarters at Tarraco. But some Celtiberian deserters informed Scipio of the danger; and he sent M. Silenus with a division of his army to put it down. A march of extreme rapidity enabled him to surprise the enemy; the best of Hanno's new levies were cut to pieces, the rest dispersed. Hanno himself was made prisoner; but Mago carried off his cavalry and his old infantry without loss, and joined Hasdrubal Gisco safely in Bætica<sup>73</sup>. The formation of a Carthaginian army in the centre of Spain was thus effectually prevented;

<sup>72</sup> Livy, XXVIII. 1.

<sup>73</sup> Livy, XXVIII. Appian, VI. 31.

and Scipio, encouraged by this success, ventured to resume the offensive, and to advance in pursuit of Hasdrubal Gisco into the south. Hasdrubal, instead of risking a general action, broke up his army into small detachments, with which he garrisoned the more important towns. Scipio shrunk from the tedious and difficult service of a series of sieges, in a country at a distance from his resources, and where Mago and Masinissa with their cavalry would be sure to obstruct, if not destroy, all his communications. But to avoid the discredit of retreating without having done any thing, he singled out one of the wealthiest and strongest of the towns thus garrisoned against him, by name Oringis, and sent his brother, L. Scipio, with a large division of his army to attack it. It was stormed after an obstinate resistance; and the conqueror, true to his brother's policy, after carrying off his Carthaginian prisoners in the garrison, restored the town unplundered to its Spanish inhabitants<sup>74</sup>. Thus much having been achieved for the honour of the Roman arms, Scipio carried back his whole army behind the Iberus, sent off L. Scipio to Rome, with Hanno and his other prisoners of distinction, and himself went into winter quarters as usual at Tarraco<sup>75</sup>.

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But before the end of the season he must have received intelligence of the battle of the Metaurus. The troops which he had sent to Italy were probably, in part at least, sent back to him; and every motive

Scipio becomes anxious for a decisive action.

<sup>74</sup> Livy, XXVIII. 3.

<sup>75</sup> Livy, XXVIII. 4.

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combined to make him desirous of marking the next campaign by some decisive action. Nero, whom he had succeeded in Spain, had won the greatest glory by his victory over Hasdrubal: it became Scipio to show that he too could serve his country no less effectively.

Strength and  
position of  
the two  
armies.

The Carthaginian general, whether he had been reinforced from Africa, or whether he had used extraordinary vigour in his levies of soldiers in western Spain, took the field early in the spring of the year 548, with an army greatly superior to that of his enemy. If Polybius, or rather Scipio, may be trusted, he had 70,000 foot, 4000 horse, and thirty-two elephants; while the Roman army, with all the aids which Scipio could gather from the Spanish chiefs in the Roman alliance, did not exceed 45,000 foot, and 3000 horse<sup>76</sup>. Hasdrubal took up a position in the midst of the mining district, near a town, which is variously called Elinga, and Silpia<sup>77</sup>; but neither its real name nor its exact situation can be determined. His camp lay on the last hills of the mountain country, with a wide extent of open plain in front of it. He wished to fight, and if possible on this ground, favourable at once to his superior numbers, and to his elephants.

Preparations  
for battle.

Scipio, no less anxious to bring on a general battle, marched straight towards the enemy. But when he saw their numbers, he was uneasy lest the

<sup>76</sup> Polybins, XI. 20. Livy, XXVIII. 12.

<sup>77</sup> Elinga in the MS. and old text of Polybius has been altered

into Ilipa, on the authority of Strabo: in the text of Livy the name stands Silpia.

faith of his Spanish allies should fail, as it had towards his father: he dared not lay much stress on them; yet without them his numbers were too weak for him to risk a battle. His object therefore was to use his Spaniards for show, to impose upon the enemy, while he won the battle with his Romans. And thus, when the day came, on which he proposed to fight, he suddenly changed his dispositions. For some days previously, both armies had been drawn up in order of battle before their camps; and their cavalry and light troops had skirmished in the interval between. All this time the Roman troops had formed the centre of Scipio's line, opposite to Hasdrubal's Africans, while the Spanish auxiliaries in both armies were on the wings. But on the day of the decisive battle, the Spaniards formed the centre of Scipio's army, while his Roman and Italian soldiers were on the right and left. The men had eaten their breakfast before day; and the cavalry and light troops pushed forward close under the camp of the enemy, as if challenging him to come out and meet them. Behind this cloud of skirmishers, the infantry were fast forming, and advancing to the middle of the plain; and when the sun rose, it shone upon the Roman line with its order completed; the Spaniards in the centre, the Romans and Italians on the right and left; the left commanded by M. Silanus and L. Marcius, Scipio in person leading his right<sup>78</sup>.

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<sup>78</sup> Polybius, XI. 22. Livy, XXVIII. 14.

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The armies  
engage.

The assault of the Roman cavalry and light troops called out Hasdrubal's army; the Carthaginians poured forth from their camp without waiting to eat, just as the Romans had done at the Trebia; their cavalry and light troops engaged the enemy; while their infantry formed in its usual order, with the Spanish auxiliaries on the wings, and the Africans in the centre. In this state the infantry on both sides remained for a time motionless; but when the day was advanced, Scipio called off his skirmishers, sent them to the rear, through the intervals of his maniples, and formed them behind his infantry on both wings; the light infantry immediately behind the regular infantry, and the cavalry covering all.

Scipio gains  
a complete  
victory.

For a few moments the Roman line seemed advancing evenly to meet the line of the enemy. But suddenly the troops on the right wing began to wheel round to the left, and those on the left wing wheeled to the right, changing their lines into columns; while the cavalry moved round from the rear, and took up its position on the outside of the columns; and both infantry and cavalry now advanced with the utmost fury against the enemy. Thus the centre of the Roman army was held back by the rapid advance of its wings; and the Africans in Hasdrubal's centre were standing idle, doing nothing, whilst the battle was raging on their right and left, and yet not venturing to move from their position to support their wings, because of the enemy in their front, who threatened every moment to

attack, yet still advanced as slowly as possible, to give time for the attacks on the two wings to complete their work. And this work was not long: Roman and Italian veterans were opposed to newly raised Spaniards; men well fed to men exhausted by their long fast; men perfect in all their movements, and handled by their general with masterly skill, to barbarians confused by evolutions which neither they nor their officers could deal with. As usual, the elephants did as much mischief to friends as to foes; and the Carthaginian wings, broken and slaughtered, began to fly. Then the Africans in the centre commenced their retreat also; slowly at first, as men who had not themselves been beaten; but the flight of their allies infected them; and the Romans pressed them so hardly, that they too rushed towards their camp with more haste than order<sup>79</sup>. The battle was won; and Scipio said that the camp would have been won also, had not a violent storm suddenly burst on the field of battle, and the rain fallen in such a deluge, that the Romans could not stand against it, but were obliged to seek the shelter of their own camp. Their work however was done; not least probably by the effect which the battle would have on the minds of the Spaniards. In the Carthaginian army their countrymen had been exposed to defeat and slaughter, while the Africans had looked on tamely, and moved neither hand nor foot to aid them; on the other hand, the Spaniards

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<sup>79</sup> Polybius, XI. 23, 24. Livy, XXVIII. 15, 16.



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Destruction  
of the Car-  
thaginian  
dominion in  
Spain.

in Scipio's army had obtained a victory, with no loss to themselves: it had been purchased altogether by the blood of the Romans.

Accordingly the Carthaginian generals found that the contest in Spain was virtually ended. The Spanish soldiers in their army went over in large bodies to the enemy; the Spanish towns opened their gates to the Romans, and put the Carthaginian garrisons into their hands. Hasdrubal and Mago, closely followed by the enemy, retreated by the right bank of the Bætis to the shores of the ocean, and effected their escape by sea to Gades. Masinissa left them, and went home to Africa, not, it is said, without having a secret interview with M. Silanus, and settling the conditions and manner of his defection. Scipio himself returned by slow marches to Tarraco, enquiring by the way into the merits or demerits of the various native chiefs, who came crowding round him to plead their services, and to propitiate the favour of the new conqueror of Spain. Silanus, whom he had left behind in the south, to witness the final dispersion of the army of Hasdrubal, soon after rejoined him at Tarraco, and reported to him that the war was over, that no enemy was to be found in the field, from the Pyrenees to the Pillars of Hercules<sup>80</sup>. Scipio therefore sent off his brother to Rome, to announce the completion of his work.

His own mind was already turned to another

<sup>80</sup> Livy, XXVIII. 16.

field of action: the expulsion of the Carthaginians from Spain seemed to him only to be valued as it might enable him the easier to carry the war into Africa. He had already won the support of Masinissa: but he desired to secure a more powerful ally; and accordingly he sent Lælius over to Africa, to sound the dispositions of the Masæsylian king, Syphax, the most powerful of all the African princes, and who, although at present in alliance with the Carthaginians, had been, not many years since, their enemy. Syphax told Lælius that he would negotiate only with the Roman general in person; and Scipio, relying on his own personal ascendancy, and affecting in all things what was extraordinary, did not hesitate to leave his province, and to cross over from New Carthage to Africa, with only two quinqueremes, in order to visit the Masæsylian king. No less fortunate than Napoleon, when returning from Egypt to France in his solitary frigate, Scipio crossed the sea without accident, and entered the king's port in safety, with the wind so brisk and fair as to carry him into the harbour in a straight course, in a very short time after his ships had first been seen from the shore<sup>81</sup>. In the harbour, by the strangest of chances, were seven ships of the Carthaginians, which had just brought Hasdrubal from Spain with the very same object as Scipio, to secure the alliance of king Syphax; it having been known probably, that a Roman

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Scipio  
crosses to  
Africa, and  
negotiates  
with Sy-  
phax.

<sup>81</sup> Livy, XXVIII. 17.

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officer had lately visited his court, with purposes which could not be doubtful. Hasdrubal and Scipio met under the roof of Syphax; and by his special request, they were present at the same entertainment<sup>82</sup>. Lælius, who had accompanied his friend to Africa, magnified the charms of his address and conversation, according to his usual practice, and told Polybius many years afterwards, that Hasdrubal had expressed to Syphax his great admiration of Scipio's genius, which, he said, appeared to him more dangerous in peace than in war<sup>83</sup>. Lælius further declared that Syphax was so overcome by Scipio's influence, as to conclude a treaty of alliance with him<sup>84</sup>, which treaty however, we may be very sure, was not one of those which Polybius found preserved in the capitol. It is very possible that Syphax amused Scipio with fair promises; but in reality Hasdrubal negotiated more successfully than his Roman rival; and the beauty of his daughter, Sophonisba, was more powerful over the mind of Syphax, than all the fascinations of Scipio's eloquence and manners<sup>85</sup>. Scipio, however, was satisfied with the success of his mission, and returned again to New Carthage.

Insurrection  
of the  
Spaniards.

It is manifest that, when Scipio and Silanus returned from the south of Spain to Tarraco, after the dispersion of the Carthaginian army, they imagined that their work was done; and they cannot have

<sup>82</sup> Livy, XXVIII. 18.

<sup>83</sup> XI. Fragm. Mai. Livy,

<sup>84</sup> Livy, XXVIII. 18.

<sup>85</sup> Livy, XXIX. 23.

XXVIII. 18.

expected to be called out again to active operations in the same year. But, after Scipio's return from his voyage to Africa, we find him again taking the field in the south; we find a general revolt of the Spanish chiefs, who had so lately joined him; and what is most startling, we find his own Roman army breaking out into an alarming mutiny. Livy's explanation is simply, that the present appeared a favourable opportunity to punish those Spanish towns, which had made themselves most obnoxious to Rome in the course of the war, and on which it would not have been expedient to take vengeance earlier<sup>86</sup>. But surely, if any such intention had been entertained a few weeks sooner, the Roman army would never have been marched back behind the Iberus, but would have proceeded at once to attack the obnoxious towns, as soon as Hasdrubal and Mago had retired to Gades, and the Carthaginian army was broken up. Either the Spaniards must have given some new provocation, which called Scipio again into the field; or some new motive must have influenced him, which hitherto he had not felt, and, outweighing all other considerations, forced him to retrace his steps to the south.

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Either of these cases is sufficiently probable. Mago had by this time received instructions from Hannibal; and acting under such direction, he was not likely to abandon Spain to the Romans without another struggle. We read of a Carthaginian garrison

Probable  
causes of it.

<sup>86</sup> Livy, XXVIII. 19.

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son in Castulo, which is said to have fled thither after the dispersion of Hasdrubal's army<sup>87</sup>; but it may also have been sent thither by Mago from Gades, to assist in organizing a new rising against the Romans. The mines were still in his hands; and he probably employed their treasures liberally. Nor were causes wanting to rouse the Spaniards, without any foreign instigation. If they had admired Scipio, they had since found that his virtues did not restrain the licence of his army: the Roman soldiers had fleshed themselves with the plunder of Spain, and were likely to return after a moment's respite, and fall again upon their prey. On the other hand, the Roman army, like the Spaniards afterwards in America, may have been so eager to prosecute their conquest, and to win more of the wealth of Spain, that their general found it impossible not to gratify them; or they may have shown symptoms of licence and turbulence, which made it desirable to keep them actively employed, that they might not have leisure to contrive mischief: whatever was the cause, the Roman army again marched into the south of Spain. L. Marcius was ordered to attack Castulo; Scipio himself laid siege to Illiturgi.

Situation  
and state of  
Illiturgi.

Illiturgi stood on the north, or right bank of the Bætis, near to the site of the present town of Andujar, and not far therefore from Baylen, and from the scene of the almost solitary triumph of the Spanish

<sup>87</sup> Livy, XXVIII. 20.

arms in the war with Napoleon. Its people had been allies of the Carthaginians, and had revolted to Rome, when the two Scipios first advanced into the south of Spain <sup>88</sup>; but after their defeat and death, Illiturgi had gone back to the alliance of Carthage; and the Roman fugitives from the rout of the two Scipios, who escaped to Illiturgi, were either cut off by the inhabitants, or given up by them to the Carthaginians. Such was the Roman account of the matter; and Castulo was charged with a similar defection after the defeat of the Scipios, a defection however not aggravated, as at Illiturgi, by any particular acts of hostility <sup>89</sup>.

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Vengeance was now to be taken for this alleged treason. Without any terms of peace offered or solicited on either side, the Romans prepared to attack Illiturgi, and the Spaniards with all their national obstinacy to defend it. They fought so stoutly, that the Romans were more than once repulsed; and Scipio was at last obliged to offer to lead the assault in person, and was preparing to mount the first ladder, when a general shout of his soldiers called upon him to forbear: with an overwhelming rush of numbers they crowded up the ladders in many places at once, and drove the defenders by main force from the ramparts. At the same moment, Lælius scaled the walls on the opposite side of the city; and some African deserters, who were now in the Roman service, men trained to all

Its capture  
and de-  
struction.

<sup>88</sup> Livy, XXIII. 49.

<sup>89</sup> Livy, XXVIII. 19.



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feats of daring activity, climbed up the almost precipitous cliff on which the citadel was built, and surprised it without resistance<sup>90</sup>. Then followed a horrible massacre, in which neither age nor sex was spared; and when the sword had done its work upon the people, fire was let loose upon the buildings of the city, and Illiturgi was totally destroyed.

Capture of  
Castulo;

Scipio then marched to Castulo to support L. Marcius, who had been able, it seems, to make no impression with the force under his separate command. But Scipio's arrival, fresh from the storming of Illiturgi, struck terror into the besieged; and the Spaniards hoped to make their peace by surrendering, not their town only, but a Carthaginian garrison, which was engaged jointly with them in its defence. The Romans treated Castulo, says Livy, more mildly than they had treated Illiturgi; which seems to imply that even at Castulo blood was shed after the town was taken, though it did not amount to an indiscriminate massacre<sup>91</sup>.

of Astapa:  
self-devotion  
of its in-  
habitants.

After this second conquest, Scipio left it to L. Marcius to complete the work, whether of vengeance or of ambition, by the subjugation of the other towns of Bætica, while he himself returned to New Carthage<sup>92</sup>. Marcius crossed the Bætis, and received the submission of some of the towns on the left bank; but the inhabitants of one place, Astapa, which had rendered itself obnoxious, by carrying on

<sup>90</sup> Livy, XXVIII. 19, 20.

<sup>92</sup> Livy, XXVIII. 21.

<sup>91</sup> Livy, XXVIII. 20.

an active guerilla warfare against the Roman detached parties and communications, exhibited one of those shocking instances of desperation, which testify so painfully to the miserable lot of the vanquished in ancient warfare. They erected a great pile in the middle of their city, on which they threw all their ornaments and most valuable property, and then bade their wives and children ascend it, and sit down quietly on the top. Fifty chosen men were left to keep watch beside the pile, while the rest of the citizens sallied out against the Romans, determined to fight till they were cut to pieces. They fell to a man, selling their lives dearly: in the meanwhile the fifty men left by the pile performed their dreadful task; they set it on fire; they butchered the women and children who were placed on it, and then threw themselves into the flames. The Roman soldiers lost their plunder, and exclaimed against the desperate ferocity of the people of Astapa<sup>93</sup>.

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After this tragedy, the neighbouring towns submitted; and Marcius returned to his general at New Carthage. But he was not allowed to rest: for a secret deputation came to Scipio from Gades, offering to surrender the city to him, along with the Carthaginian fleet and garrison employed in maintaining it, and Mago their general, Hannibal's brother. Again therefore Marcius took the field with a light division of the army; and Lælius accompanied him

Offer to  
surrender  
Gades.

<sup>93</sup> Livy, XXVIII. 22, 23. Appian, VI. 33.

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Scipio's ill-  
ness:  
mutiny in  
the Roman  
army.

by sea with a small squadron, to ascertain whether the offer could really be executed <sup>94</sup>.

It was now late in the summer; and the season, combined with the fatigue and excitement which he had undergone, brought on a serious illness upon Scipio, which rumour magnified, spreading the tidings over Spain that the great Roman general could not live. At once, it is said, the fidelity of the Spanish chiefs was shaken: Mandonius and Indibilis, who had regarded Scipio with such extreme veneration, cared nothing for the Roman people, and prepared to assert their country's independence, by driving out the Roman army <sup>95</sup>. But a worse mischief was threatening: a division of eight thousand Roman or Italian soldiers, who were quartered in a stationary camp on the Sucro, at once as a reserve for the army engaged in the field, and as a covering force to keep the more northern parts of Spain quiet, broke out into open mutiny; and having driven their tribunes from the camp, they conferred the command on two private soldiers, the one C. Atrius, of the allied people of the Umbrians, and the other C. Albius, of the Latin colony of Cales. It is probable that this division of Scipio's army consisted almost entirely of Latins and Italian allies; and the generals chosen accordingly represented both of these, and assumed the full state of Roman generals, causing the lictors to go before them, and to bear the rods and axes, which were the symbol of

<sup>94</sup> Livy, XXVIII. 23.

<sup>95</sup> Livy, XXVIII. 24.

the consul's imperium, his absolute power of life and death <sup>96</sup>.

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Its causes :  
Scipio's  
recovery.

The alleged grievance of the mutinous soldiers was, that their pay was greatly in arrears. This indeed was likely to be the case, the treasury of Rome being ill able to meet the numerous demands for the public service ; and as the Spanish army had avowedly been left to its own resources as to money, it is probable that the soldiers were allowed to plunder the more freely, in order to reconcile them to their not being paid in the regular manner. Scipio himself was charged with injuring the discipline of his army by his indulgence : here, as in other things, it was in his character to rely on his own personal ascendancy ; and he thought that he might dispense with the constant strictness necessary to ordinary men, as he was sure that his soldiers would never be disobedient to him. But however lax his discipline was, troops at a distance from the seat of war, and quartered amongst a friendly or submissive people, must be somewhat restrained in their licence of plunder ; and accordingly, even before Scipio's illness, the soldiers on the Sucro complained that they were neither paid regularly as in peace, nor allowed to provide for themselves as in war. And when they heard that Scipio was at the point of death, and that the Spaniards in the north were revolting from Rome, they hoped to draw their own profit out of these troubled waters, and, following the example of

<sup>96</sup> Livy, XXVIII. 25.

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the Campanians at Rhegium, to secure a city for themselves, and to live in luxury upon the plunder and the tributes of the surrounding people<sup>97</sup>. It is said that Mago from Gades sent them money, to prevail on them to enter into the service of Carthage, and that they took the money, but did no more than appoint their own generals, take oaths of fidelity to one another, and remain in a state of open revolt from Rome<sup>98</sup>. They probably thought that they might establish themselves in Spain without serving any government at all; and that their own swords were more to be relied on than Mago's promises. While this was the state of affairs on the Sucro, tidings came, not of Scipio's death, but of his convalescence; and presently seven military tribunes arrived in the camp, sent by Scipio to prevent the soldiers from breaking out into any worse outrage. The tribunes affected to rejoice that matters had not been carried to any greater extremity; they acknowledged the former services of the troops, and said that Scipio was not a man to forget or leave them unrewarded; meanwhile the general would endeavour to raise money from the subject tribes of Spain, to make good their arrears of pay. Accordingly soon afterwards a proclamation appeared, inviting the soldiers to come to New Carthage to receive it<sup>99</sup>.

Scipio's recovery was felt from one end of Spain to the other; the revolted Spaniards gave up their

<sup>97</sup> Livy, XXVIII. 24.

<sup>98</sup> Appian, VI. 34.

<sup>99</sup> Livy, XXVIII. 25.

hostile purposes, and returned quietly to their homes; and the soldiers on the Sucro, moved at once by the fear of resisting one whom the gods seemed to favour in all things, and by the hope of receiving, not only pardon for their fault, but the very pay which they demanded, resolved to march in a body to New Carthage. As they drew near to that city, the seven tribunes, who had visited their camp on the Sucro, came to meet them, gave them fair words, and mentioned, as if incidentally, that M. Silanus, with the troops at New Carthage, was to march the next morning to put down the revolt of Mandonius and Indibilis. Delighted to find that Scipio would thus be left without any force at his disposal, they entered New Carthage in high spirits: there they saw the troops all busy in preparations for their departure; and they were told that the general was rejoiced at their seasonable arrival, to supply the place of the soldiers who were going to leave him. In perfect confidence they dispersed to their quarters for the night <sup>100</sup>.

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A.U.C. 548.  
A.C. 206.  
The muti-  
neers come  
to New  
Carthage.

Thus the prey had run blindly into the snare. The seven tribunes, who met the soldiers on their march, had each been furnished with the names of five of the principal ringleaders, whom they were to secure in the course of the evening without disturbance. Accordingly they invited them to supper in their quarters, seized them all, and kept them in close custody till the next morning. But all

They are  
surrounded.

<sup>100</sup> Livy, XXVIII. 26.



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A.C. 206.

else was quiet: the baggage of the army which was to take the field against the Spaniards, began to move before day-break; about dawn the columns of the troops formed in the streets, and marched out of the town. But they halted at the gates; and parties were sent round to every other gate to secure them all, and to take care that no one should leave the city. In the mean time the troops from the Suero were summoned to the forum to meet their general; and they crowded impatiently to the place, without their arms, as was the custom of the Greek soldiers on similar occasions. No sooner were they all assembled, than the columns from the gates marched into the town, and occupied all the streets leading to the market-place. Then Scipio presented himself on his tribunal, and sat awhile in silence. But as soon as he heard that the prisoners, who had been secured on the preceding evening, were brought up, the crier with his loud clear voice commanded silence, and Scipio arose to speak<sup>101</sup>.

The mutiny is quelled by the punishment of the ringleaders.

The scene had been prepared with consummate art; and its effect was overwhelming. The mutinous soldiers saw themselves completely in their general's power; they listened in breathless anxiety to his address, and with joy beyond all hope heard his concluding sentence, that he freely pardoned the multitude, and that justice would be satisfied with the punishment of those who had misled them. The

<sup>101</sup> Livy, XXVIII. 26.

instant he ceased speaking, the troops posted in the adjoining streets clashed their swords on their shields, as if they were going to attack the mutineers; and the crier's voice was again heard calling the names of the thirty-five ringleaders one after another, to receive the punishment to which they had been condemned. They were brought forth, already stripped and bound; each was fastened to his stake; and all underwent their sentence, being first scourged, and then beheaded. When all was finished, the bodies were dragged away, to be thrown out of the city; the place of execution was cleansed from the blood; and the soldiers from the Sucro heard the general and the other officers swear to grant them a free pardon with an entire amnesty for the past. They were then summoned by the crier, one by one, to appear before the general to take the usual military oath of obedience, after which each man received his full arrears of pay<sup>102</sup>. Never was mutiny quelled with more consummate ability: and Scipio's ascendancy over his soldiers after this memorable scene was doubtless more complete than ever.

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A.C. 206.

The punishment of the mutineers however, we are told, rendered the revolted Spaniards desperate. Thinking that they had already done enough to draw down Scipio's vengeance, they resolved to try the chances of war, and again took the field, and began to attack the allies of the Romans on the north of the Iberus. Scipio lost not a moment in marching

The revolted  
Spaniards  
are subdued.

<sup>102</sup> Polybius, XI. 30. Livy, XXVIII. 29. Appian, VI. 36.

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A.U.C. 548.  
A.C. 206.

in pursuit of them: he was not sorry to employ his soldiers against the enemy, as the surest means of effacing the recollection of their recent disorders; and he spoke of the Spaniards with bitter contempt, as barbarians equally powerless and faithless, on whom he was resolved to take signal vengeance. In ten days he marched from New Carthage to the Iberus; and on the fourth day after crossing the river he came in sight of the enemy. He engaged and totally defeated them, not however without a loss of more than four thousand men killed and wounded; and immediately after the battle the chiefs threw themselves on his mercy. He required nothing more than the immediate payment of a sum of money, which was to make good the money lately advanced or borrowed to pay the soldiers after the mutiny; and then, leaving Silanus at Tarraco, he returned to New Carthage<sup>103</sup>.

Scipio's  
interview  
with Masinissa.

Even yet he would not allow himself to rest. Leaving the mass of his army at New Carthage, he joined L. Marcius, his lieutenant, in the neighbourhood of Gades, for the sole purpose, it is said, of gratifying Masinissa's earnest desire of a personal interview. Masinissa had returned from Africa to Gades, and was professedly consulting with Mago how one more attempt might be made to restore the Carthaginian dominion in Spain. But his mind was already made up to join the Romans; and he took the opportunity of a pretended plun-

<sup>103</sup> Polybius, XI. 31—33. Livy, XXVIII. 31—34.

dering excursion with his Numidian cavalry to arrange and effect a meeting with Scipio. He too, it is said, like all other men, was overawed at once, and delighted by Scipio's personal appearance, manner, and conversation; he promised the most zealous aid to the Romans, and urged Scipio to cross over as soon as possible into Africa, where he might be able to serve him most effectually<sup>104</sup>. Scipio's keen discernment of character taught him the value of Masinissa's friendship; and his journey from New Carthage to Gades, in order to secure it, was abundantly rewarded afterwards; for had Masinissa fought in Hannibal's army, Scipio in all probability would never have won the day at Zama.

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A.C. 206.

Mago heard of the termination of the mutiny in the Roman army, and of the defeat of the revolted Spaniards in the north; and he found that the Roman army was again returned to New Carthage, and that all hopes of making head against Rome in Spain were for the present at an end. Hannibal summoned him to Italy; and the Carthaginian government, acting, as it seems, cordially upon Hannibal's views, ordered him to obey his brother's call. It was not the least bold enterprise of this great war, to plan the invasion of Italy from Gades, at a time when the whole of Spain, from the Pillars of Hercules to the Pyrenees, was possessed by the enemy. But Scipio, to strengthen his land forces,

Mago evacuates Spain, and makes preparations in Minorca for invading Italy.

<sup>104</sup> Livy, XXVIII. 35.

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XLVII.  
A.U.C. 548.  
A.C. 206.

had laid up the greater part of his fleet; and the exertions of the Carthaginian government, or his own, had provided Mago with a naval force, small probably in point of numbers, but consisting of excellent ships manned by skilful seamen, and capable, if ably used, of rendering effectual service. He was supplied with money from Carthage; and he levied large contributions, it is said, on the people of Gades, and even emptied their treasury, and stripped their temples<sup>105</sup>. He then put to sea, so late in the season, that Scipio was gone back to Tarraco, and was preparing to return to Rome; and the Roman army being gone into its winter quarters behind the Iberus, New Carthage was left to the protection of its own garrison. This encouraged Mago to attempt to surprise the place; but in this he failed: he then crossed over to the island of Pityusa (Iviza), which was held by the Carthaginians; and having there received supplies of provisions and of men, he proceeded to attack the two Balearian islands, now called Majorca and Minorca. He was repulsed from the larger island, but made himself master of the smaller: there he landed his men, and drew up his ships, and purposed to pass the winter, the season securing him from any attack by sea, perhaps even hiding his movements altogether from the knowledge of the Romans; while he lay in readiness to catch the first return of spring, and to run over to Italy, and establish himself on the coast of Liguria,

<sup>105</sup> Livy, XXVIII. 36.

in the midst of a warlike population, furnishing the materials of a future army<sup>106</sup>.

Spain was thus abandoned by the Carthaginians; and Gades, left to itself, went over to the Roman alliance, and concluded a treaty with L. Marcius, which for two centuries formed the basis of its relations with Rome<sup>107</sup>. He had probably been left in command at New Carthage, when Scipio returned to Tarraco. Scipio himself was known to be desirous of leaving Spain, and offering himself as a candidate for the consulship; and accordingly L. Lentulus and L. Manlius Acidius were appointed proconsuls, to succeed him and M. Silanus in the command of the Roman army and province. Scipio meanwhile, accompanied by C. Lælius, returned to Rome: he could not have a triumph, because he had been neither consul nor prætor; but he entered the city with some display, with an immense treasure of silver, in money and in ingots, which he deposited in the treasury; and his name was so popular, that he was elected consul immediately, with an almost unanimous feeling in his favour. His colleague was P. Licinius Crassus, who at that time held the dignity of Pontifex Maximus<sup>108</sup>.

Thus the war, being altogether extinguished in Spain, was reduced as it were to Italy only; and there it smouldered rather than blazed; for Hannibal with his single army could do no more than

CHAP.  
XLVII.

A.U.C. 548.  
A.C. 206.  
Treaty with  
Gades.  
Scipio  
returns to  
Rome.

Prospects of  
the war in  
Italy.

<sup>106</sup> Livy, XXVIII. 37.

c. XVII.

<sup>107</sup> Livy, XXVIII. 37. Appian,  
VI. 37. See Cicero pro Cornelio,

<sup>108</sup> Livy, XXVIII. 38.



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A.U.C. 548.  
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maintain his ground in Bruttium. Was it possible that Mago might kindle a fierce flame in Liguria? might blow up the half-extinguished ashes in Etruria, and reviving the fire in the south, spread the conflagration around the walls of Rome? This was not beyond possibility: but Scipio, impatient of defensive warfare, and himself the conqueror of a vast country, was eager to stop the torrent at its source, rather than raise barriers against it, when it was sweeping down the valley: he was bent on combating Hannibal, not in Italy, but in Africa.

## SUPPLEMENT.

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[WITH the preceding chapter the work is unfortunately terminated. From a note in the margin, that chapter appears to have been finished on the 5th of May; on the 12th of June the author breathed his last. Two more chapters at least would have been requisite to bring the history down to the end of the Second Punic War; for the heading of the forty-eighth chapter shows what it was intended to contain:—Last years of the war in Italy. Consulship of P. Scipio. Scipio in Sicily. Siege of Locri. Scipio in Africa. His victories over Hasdrubal Gisco and Syphax. The Carthaginians recall Hannibal and Mago from Italy. A.U.C. 548 to A.U.C. 551.]

Every reader of the foregoing narrative of one of the most interesting and eventful periods in ancient history, must regret that the author was not allowed to carry it on to the close of the war. As the best substitute for that which we should have had, the following account of the last years of the war, written by Dr. Arnold in the year 1823, for the life of Hannibal in the Encyclopædia Metropolitana, is here inserted.]

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The defeat and destruction of Hasdrubal's army reduced Hannibal to the necessity of acting entirely

Adventures  
and death of  
Mago.

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on the defensive. It had been for some time evident, that his single army could not overthrow the supremacy of Rome in Italy. Still, while the fate of the war was balanced in Spain and Sicily, and while he was looking forward to the arrival of his brother to co-operate with him, he might be justified in making himself as troublesome as possible to the enemy, even though by so doing he might sometimes incur the danger of some loss. But now his policy was altered: to maintain his ground in Italy, till another effort could be made by his government to support him, was become his most important duty. He was obliged to abandon several towns which had revolted to him from the Romans; and he forced the inhabitants of others to desert their homes, and to retire with him into the remotest part of Bruttium. The superiority of his personal character was so great, that the Romans never dared to attack him; and thus he might repose for a while, watching the first favourable opportunity of issuing from his retreat, and attempting once more to accomplish the design with which he had originally invaded Italy. The death of Hasdrubal had not extinguished all his hopes. Mago, after the total wreck of the Carthaginian interest in Spain, was ordered, as we have seen, to attempt a diversion in Italy, and transporting a small force with him by sea, landed in Liguria, and surprised the town of Genoa<sup>1</sup>. The name of his family urged the Gauls

<sup>1</sup> Livy, XXVIII. 46. XXX. 18.

and Ligurians to flock to his standard; and his growing strength excited much alarm among the Romans, and obliged them to keep a large army in the north of Italy to watch his movements. The details of his adventures are unknown; nor are we informed what cause prevented him from attempting to penetrate into Tuscany. We only find that he became so formidable an enemy, as to maintain an obstinate contest against an army of four Roman legions, a few weeks before the final evacuation of Italy by Hannibal; nor were the Romans certain of victory, till Mago was mortally wounded, and obliged to leave the field. From the scene of this battle, which is said to have been in the country of the Insubrian Gauls, he retreated, with as much expedition as his wound would allow, to the coast of Liguria; and there he found orders from Carthage, that he should immediately return to Africa, to oppose the alarming progress of P. Scipio. He accordingly embarked with his troops, and commenced his voyage homewards: but his exertions and anxiety of mind had proved too great for his strength; and he had scarcely passed the coast of Sardinia, when he expired. So unwearied was the zeal, and so great the ability, with which the sons of Hamilcar maintained the cause of their country, almost solely by their personal efforts, against the overbearing resources and energy of the Roman people.

When the Carthaginian government sent for Mago from Italy, they also recalled Hannibal. The account

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Hannibal  
evacuates  
Italy.

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of his operations during the three or four years that preceded his return to Africa is peculiarly unsatisfactory. The Roman writers have transmitted some reports of victories obtained over him in Italy, too audacious in falsehood for even themselves to have believed. But, in truth, the terror with which he continued to inspire his enemies, after his career of success was closed, is even more wonderful than his first brilliant triumphs. For four years after the death of Hasdrubal, he remained in undisputed possession of Bruttium, when the Romans had reconquered all the rest of Italy. Here he maintained his army, without receiving any supplies from home, and with no other naval force at his disposal, than such vessels as he could build from the Bruttian forests, and man with the sailors of the country. Here too he seems to have looked forward to the renown which awaited him in after-times; and as foreseeing the interest with which posterity would follow his progress in his unequalled enterprise, he recorded many minute particulars of his campaigns on monumental columns, erected at Lacinium<sup>2</sup>, a town situated in that corner of Italy, which was so long like a new country acquired by conquest, for himself and his soldiers. At length, when it was plain that no new diversion could be effected in his favour, and when the dangerous situation of his country called for his presence, as the last hope of Carthage, he embarked his troops without the slightest interruption

<sup>2</sup> Polybius, III. 33. 56.

from the Romans; and moved only by the disasters of others, while his own army was unbroken and unbeaten, he abandoned Italy fifteen years after he had first entered it, having ravaged it with fire and sword from one extremity to the other, and having never seen his numerous victories chequered by a single defeat.

Scipio, meanwhile, after his important services in Spain, had returned to Rome, and been elected consul, hoping to carry into execution the design which he had for some time conceived, of forcing Hannibal to leave Italy, by attacking the Carthaginians in Africa. But according to the invariable policy of Rome, he was desirous of securing the aid of some ally in the country which he was going to make the seat of war. For this end, as we have seen, he had already opened a communication with Syphax, the most considerable of the Numidian princes, and, according to Livy, had actually concluded a treaty with him. But Syphax was won over to the interests of Carthage by the charms of Sophonisba, the daughter of Hasdrubal Gisco; and a short time before Scipio crossed over into Africa, he sent to inform him of his new connexion, and to dissuade him from his intended expedition, as he should now be obliged to join the Carthaginians in opposing him. Scipio however was not yet without the prospect of finding allies in Africa. Masinissa had deserted the Carthaginian cause after its disasters in Spain, and had privately pledged himself to support the Romans on the first opportunity.

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MENT.

Scipio carries the war into Africa.



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Since that time, he had been deprived of his paternal dominions by the united efforts of Syphax and the Carthaginians; but though his power was thus reduced, his zeal in the cause of Rome was likely to be the more heightened; and as his personal character was high among his countrymen, many of them might be expected to join him, when they saw him supported by a Roman army. Accordingly he united himself<sup>3</sup> to Scipio, so soon as he had landed in Africa; and his activity, and perfect familiarity with the country and its inhabitants, made him a very valuable auxiliary. The landing had been effected within a few miles of Carthage itself; and after some plunder, amongst which eight thousand prisoners to be sold for slaves are particularly specified, had been collected from the adjoining country, the army formed the siege of Utica, whilst a considerable fleet co-operated with it on the side of the sea. But the approach of Hasdrubal Gisco and Syphax, at the head of two immense armies of Carthaginians and Numidians induced Scipio to raise the siege, and to remove his troops to a strong position near the sea, where he proposed to remain, as winter was fast approaching, and secure of subsistence, through the co-operation of his fleet, to wait for some favourable opportunity of striking a vigorous blow.

He destroys  
the Cartha-  
ginian and  
Numidian  
army.

His first hope was<sup>4</sup> to win over Syphax again to the Roman cause; and with this view his emissaries

<sup>3</sup> Livy, XXIX. 29.

<sup>4</sup> Polybius, XIV. 1, &c.

were continually going and returning between the Roman and Numidian camps. Their temptations to Syphax were ineffectual: but their report of the manner in which the Carthaginian and Numidian armies were quartered, suggested to Scipio the possibility of ensuring success by other means than negotiation. They related, that the Carthaginians were lodged in huts constructed of stakes or hurdles, and covered with leaves, and that the Numidian quarters were composed of similar materials, of reeds, thatch, and dried leaves. Upon this intelligence, Scipio conceived the plan of setting fire to both the camps of the enemy. In order to gain a more perfect knowledge of their situation, and the approaches to them, he pretended to listen to the terms of peace which Syphax had before proposed to him in vain. Under pretence of negotiation, he was for some months in constant correspondence with the Numidian king; and disguising some of his most intelligent soldiers in the dress of slaves, he procured them an easy entrance into the enemy's camp, as forming part of the suite of the officers employed in the negotiation. At last, when the season for military operations was returning, and his seemingly sincere desire of peace had thrown the enemy into a state of perfect security, he suddenly broke off all communication with them, declaring that, however disposed he himself was to agree to the proposed terms, the other members of the military council were fixed on rejecting them. This sudden rupture disappointed Syphax; but neither he

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A.U.C. 550.  
A.C. 204.

nor the Carthaginian general had any suspicion of Scipio's real designs; when suddenly the Roman army marched out by night in two divisions, the one commanded by Scipio, and the other by Lælius, his second in command, and advanced against the camps of the enemy, which were not more than six miles from their own. Lælius, assisted by Masinissa, first silently approached the encampment of the Numidians, and set fire to the first tents that he met with. The flames spread so rapidly, that the Numidians were soon precluded from approaching the quarter where they had first broken out, and thus, having no suspicion that they had been kindled by the enemy, crowded together in the utmost disorder to effect their escape out of the camp. Numbers were trampled to death in the confusion at the several outlets; numbers were overtaken by the flames and burnt to death; and the rest, on reaching the open country, found themselves intercepted by Masinissa, who had posted his troops in the quarter to which he knew that the fugitives were most likely to direct their flight. In this manner the whole Numidian army, amounting to sixty thousand men, was completely destroyed or dispersed, with the exception of Syphax himself and a few horsemen.

Meanwhile the Carthaginians, when they first saw the camp of their allies on fire, not doubting that it was occasioned by accident, began partly to run with assistance to the Numidians, and the rest rushed hastily out of their tents, without their arms, and stood on the outside of the camp, contemplating the

progress of this fearful conflagration with dismay. In this helpless state they found themselves attacked by the enemy, under the command of Scipio in person: some were instantly cut down; and the rest, driven back into their camp, saw it set on fire by their pursuers. They then understood the whole extent of the calamity which had befallen their allies and themselves; but resistance and flight were alike impracticable; the fire spread with fury to every quarter; and every avenue was choked up by a struggling crowd of men and horses, all striving with the same distracted efforts to effect their escape. In this attempt, Hasdrubal and a few followers alone succeeded: thirty thousand men, who had composed the Carthaginian army, perished. The annals of war contain no bloodier tragedy.

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Hasdrubal, hopeless of delaying the progress of the enemy, continued his flight to Carthage; while Syphax had retreated in the opposite direction, towards his own dominions, and was endeavouring to rally the wrecks of his army. After much debate in the Carthaginian supreme council, it was resolved that the fortune of war should be tried once more. Syphax was prevailed upon to join his troops to theirs, instead of confining himself to the defence of Numidia; and the recent arrival of four thousand Spaniards, who had been enlisted by Carthaginian agents in Spain, encouraged the two confederates to hope for a successful issue. Scipio was so engrossed with the siege of Utica, which he had pushed with additional vigour after his late victory, that he allowed

He gains another victory.

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MENT.  
A.U.C. 550.  
A.C. 204.

the enemy to unite their forces, and appear again in the field with no fewer than thirty thousand men. But when he heard of their junction, he lost no time in advancing to meet them; and engaging them a second time, in little more than a month after the destruction of their former armies, he again totally defeated them, and obliged their two generals to fly once more, Syphax to Numidia, and Hasdrubal to Carthage.

Defeat and  
capture of  
Syphax.  
The Cartha-  
ginians sue  
for peace.

The victors now divided their forces: Lælius and Masinissa were despatched in pursuit of Syphax; and in a short time Masinissa recovered his father's kingdom; and Syphax, having risked a third battle, was not only defeated as before, but was himself made prisoner, and his capital fell into the hands of the enemy. Scipio meantime overran the country towards Carthage, receiving or forcing the submission of the surrounding towns, and enriching his soldiers with an immense accumulation of plunder. The chief part of this, in order to lighten his army, he sent back to his winter quarters before Utica; and then he advanced as far as Tunis, and finding that important place abandoned by its garrison, posted himself there, hoping by his presence in the immediate neighbourhood of the capital, to terrify the Carthaginians into complete submission. But they had not yet abandoned more resolute counsels; and instead of suing for peace, they determined to send messengers to Italy, to recall Hannibal and Mago, and, in the mean time, to make an attempt to raise the blockade of Utica, by destroying the Roman

fleet. The attempt was made, and was partly successful; but this slight advantage was so far overbalanced by the defeat and capture of Syphax, intelligence of which reached Carthage about the same time, that the further prosecution of the war appeared desperate, and a deputation from the council of elders was sent to Scipio to solicit terms of peace. It is said that these deputies forgot their own and their country's dignity in the humbleness of their entreaties: they moved Scipio however to dictate such conditions as he might well deem a sufficient recompense of his victories; conditions which, by obliging the Carthaginians to evacuate Italy and Gaul,—to cede Spain and all the islands between Italy and Africa,—to give up all their ships of war, except twenty,—and to pay an immense contribution of corn and money,—sufficiently declared the complete triumph of the Roman arms. Hard as they were, the Carthaginians judged them sufficiently favourable to be accepted without difficulty. A truce was concluded with Scipio; and ambassadors were sent to Rome to procure the ratification of the senate and people.

With regard to the transactions that followed, we are more than ever obliged to regret the want of a Carthaginian historian. Wherever the family of Scipio is concerned, the impartiality of Polybius becomes doubtful; and besides, we have only fragments of this part of his narrative, so that we cannot exactly fix the dates of the several events, a point which here becomes of considerable importance.

SUPPLE-  
MENT.  
A.U.C. 552.  
A.C. 202.

Interruption  
of the nego-  
ciations.



SUPPLE-  
MENT.  
A.U.C. 552.  
A.C. 202.

According to our only existing authorities, the Carthaginians, emboldened by the arrival of Hannibal, or, according to Livy, by the mere expectation of his arrival, wantonly broke the truce subsisting between them and Scipio, by detaining some Roman transports which had been driven by a storm into the bay of Carthage; and then denied satisfaction to the officers whom Scipio sent to complain of this outrage; and lastly, in defiance of the law of nations, endeavoured to seize the officers themselves on their way back to the Roman camp at Utica. By such conduct the resentment of Scipio is described to have been very naturally provoked; and the war was renewed with greater animosity than ever. This, no doubt, was Scipio's own report of these transactions, which Polybius, the intimate friend of his adopted grandson, and deriving his information, in part at least, from Lælius, in all probability sincerely believed. But it is probable that a Carthaginian narrative of the war in Africa would so represent the matter, that posterity would esteem the behaviour of the Carthaginians, in breaking off the truce when it suited their purposes, as neither more nor less dishonourable than the conduct of Scipio himself, when he set fire to the camps of Syphax and Hasdrubal; and that, although the success was different, yet the treachery in both cases, whatever it may have been, was pretty nearly equal.

Battle of  
Zama.

Hannibal, we are told, landed at Leptis<sup>5</sup>, at what

<sup>5</sup> Livy, XXX. 25, &c. Polybius, XV. 1, &c.

season of the year we know not; and after refreshing his troops for some time at Adrumetum, he took the field, and advanced to the neighbourhood of Zama, a town situated, as Polybius describes it, about five days' journey from Carthage, towards the west. It seems that Scipio was busied in overrunning the country, and in subduing the several towns, when he was interrupted in these operations by the approach of the Carthaginian army. He is said to have detected some spies sent by Hannibal to observe his position; and by causing them to be led carefully round his camp, and then sent back in safety to Hannibal, he so excited the admiration of his antagonist, as to make him solicit a personal interview, with the hope of effecting a termination of hostilities. The report of this conference, and of the speeches of the two generals, savours greatly of the style of Roman family memoirs, the most unscrupulous in falsehood of any pretended records of facts that the world has yet seen. However, the meeting ended in nothing; and the next day the two armies were led out into the field for the last decisive struggle. The numbers on each side we have no knowledge of; but probably neither was in this respect much superior. Masinissa however, with four thousand Numidian cavalry, besides six thousand infantry, had joined Scipio a few days before the battle; while Hannibal, who had so often been indebted to the services of Numidians, had now, on this great occasion, only two thousand horse of that nation to oppose to the numbers and fortune

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and activity of Masinissa. The account of the disposition of both armies, and of the events of the action, was probably drawn up by Polybius from the information given to him by Lælius, and perhaps from the family records of the house of Scipio. And here we may admit its authority to be excellent. It states that the Roman legions were drawn up in their usual order, except that the maniples of every alternate line did not cover the intervals in the line before them, but were placed one behind another, thus leaving avenues in several places through the whole depth of the army from front to rear. These avenues were loosely filled by the light-armed troops, who had received orders to meet the charge of the elephants, and to draw them down the passages left between the maniples, till they should be enticed entirely beyond the rear of the whole army. The cavalry, as usual, was stationed on the wings; Masinissa, with his Numidians, on the right, and Lælius, with the Italians, on the left. On the other side, Hannibal stationed his elephants, to the number of eighty, in the front of his whole line. Next to these were placed the foreign troops in the service of Carthage, twelve thousand strong, consisting of Ligurians, Gauls, inhabitants of the Balearian islands, and Moors. The second line was composed of those Africans who were the immediate subjects of Carthage, and of the Carthaginians themselves; while Hannibal himself, with his veteran soldiers, who had returned with him from Italy, formed a third line, which was kept in reserve, at a little dis-

tance behind the other two. The Numidian cavalry were on the left, opposed to their own countrymen under Masinissa; and the Carthaginian horse on the right, opposed to Lælius and the Italians. After some skirmishing of the Numidians in the two armies, Hannibal's elephants advanced to the charge; but being startled by the sound of the Roman trumpets, and annoyed by the light-armed troops of the enemy, some broke off to the right and left, and fell in amongst the cavalry of their own army on both the wings; so that Lælius and Masinissa, availing themselves of this disorder, drove the Carthaginian horse speedily from the field. Others advanced against the enemy's line, and did much mischief; till at length, being frightened, and becoming ungovernable, they were enticed by the light-armed troops of the Romans to follow them down the avenues which Scipio had purposely left open, and were thus drawn out of the action altogether. Meantime the infantry on both sides met; and after a fierce contest, the foreign troops in Hannibal's army, not being properly supported by the soldiers of the second line, were forced to give ground; and in resentment for this desertion, they fell upon the Africans and Carthaginians, and cut them down as enemies; so that these troops, at once assaulted by their fellow-soldiers, and by the pursuing enemy, were also, after a brave resistance, defeated and dispersed. Hannibal, with his reserve, kept off the fugitives, by presenting spears to them, and obliging them to escape in a different direction; and he then

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prepared to meet the enemy, trusting that they would be ill able to resist the shock of a fresh body of veterans, after having already been engaged in a long and obstinate struggle. Scipio, after having extricated his troops from the heaps of dead which lay between him and Hannibal, commenced a second, and a far more serious contest. The soldiers on both sides were perfect in courage and in discipline; and as the battle went on, they fell in the ranks where they fought, and their places were supplied by their comrades with unabated zeal. At last Lælius and Masinissa returned from the pursuit of the enemy's beaten cavalry, and fell, in a critical moment, upon the rear of Hannibal's army<sup>6</sup>. Then his veterans, surrounded and overpowered, still maintained their high reputation; and most of them were cut down where they stood, resisting to the last. Flight indeed was not easy; for the country was a plain, and the Roman and Numidian horse were active in pursuit; yet Hannibal, when he saw the battle totally lost, with a nobler fortitude than his brother had shown at the Metaurus, escaped from

<sup>6</sup> The battle of Marengo forms, in many points, an exact parallel with that of Zama. The Austrius, having routed the advanced divisions of the French army, commenced an entirely new action with the reserve, which Buona- parte, like Hannibal, had kept at a distance from the scene of the first engagement. The struggle, which was obstinately maintained, was decided, as at Zama, by a timely charge of cavalry on the

flank of the enemy's infantry; but the victorious cavalry in the two battles did not belong to the armies whose situations correspond with one another; for at Zama the reserve was defeated by the charge of Lælius; while it was victorious at Marengo, owing to the attack made by Kellerman. See Gen. Matthieu Dumas, *Campagne de 1800*, and *Victoires et Conquêtes des Français*, tome xiii.

the field to Adrumetum. He knew that his country would now need his assistance more than ever; and as he had been in so great a degree the promoter of the war, it ill became him to shrink from bearing his full share of the weight of its disastrous issue.

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On the plains of Zama twenty thousand of the Carthaginian army were slain, and an equal number taken prisoners; but the consequences of the battle far exceeded the greatness of the immediate victory. It was not the mere destruction of an army; but the final conquest of the only power that seemed able to combat Rome on equal terms. In the state of the ancient world, with so few nations really great and powerful, and so little of a common feeling pervading them, there was neither the disposition nor the materials for forming a general confederacy against the power of Rome; and the single efforts of Macedonia, of Syria, and of Carthage herself, after the fatal event of the second Punic war, were of no other use than to provoke their own ruin. The defeat of Hannibal ensured the empire of the ancient civilized world.

Results of the battle.

The only hope of the Carthaginians now rested on the forbearance of Scipio; and they again sent deputies to him, with a full confession of the injustice of their conduct in the first origin of the war, and still more in their recent violation of the truce; and with a renewal of their supplications for peace. The conqueror, telling them that he was moved solely by considerations of the dignity of Rome, and the uncertainty of all human greatness, and in no

Terms of the peace granted to Carthage.



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degree by any pity for misfortunes which were so well deserved, presented the terms on which alone they could hope for mercy. "They were to make amends for the injuries done to the Romans during the truce; to restore all prisoners and deserters; to give up all their ships of war, except ten, and all their elephants; to engage in no war at all out of Africa, nor in Africa without the consent of the Romans; to restore to Masinissa all that had belonged to him or any of his ancestors; to feed the Roman army for three months, and pay it till it should be recalled home; to pay a contribution of ten thousand Euboic talents, at the rate of two hundred talents a year, for fifty years; and to give a hundred hostages, between the ages of fourteen and thirty, to be selected at the pleasure of the Roman general." At this price the Carthaginians were allowed to hold their former dominion in Africa, and to enjoy their independence, till it should seem convenient to the Romans to complete their destruction. Yet Hannibal strongly urged that the terms should be accepted, and, it is said, rudely interrupted <sup>7</sup> a member of the supreme council at Carthage, who was speaking against them. He probably felt, as his father had done under circumstances nearly similar, that for the present resistance was vain; but that, by purchasing peace at any price, and by a wise management of their internal resources, his countrymen might again find an opportunity to recover their losses. Peace was accordingly signed;

<sup>7</sup> Polybius, XV. 19.

the Roman army returned to Italy; and Hannibal, at the age of forty-five, having seen the schemes of his whole life utterly ruined, was now beginning, with equal patience and resolution, to lay the foundation for them again.

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From our scanty notices of the succeeding years of his life, we learn that his conduct, as a citizen, displayed great wisdom and great integrity. He is said to have reduced the exorbitant<sup>s</sup> power of an order of perpetual judges, whose authority was very extensive, and had been greatly abused. He turned his attention also to the employment of the public revenue, much of which he found to be embezzled by persons in office, while the people were heavily taxed to raise the yearly contributions due to the Romans by the last treaty. When a man of such high character raised his voice against so gross an abuse, there was yet vigour enough in the popular part of the Carthaginian constitution to give him effectual support; and it appears that the evil was removed, and the public revenue henceforward applied to public purposes. Hannibal however had thus created many powerful enemies; and ere long they found an opportunity of gratifying their hatred. The war between Rome and Macedonia had lately been concluded; and the success of the Romans, and their commanding interference in the affairs of Greece, awakened the fears and jealousy of Antiochus, king of Syria, whose kingdom was the

Wise domestic policy of Hannibal: he is forced to quit Carthage, and goes to Antiochus.

<sup>s</sup> Livy, XXXIII. 45, 46, &c.

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greatest possessed by any of the successors of Alexander. He seemed disposed to take up the contest which Philip, king of Macedonia, had been compelled to resign; and the Romans were either informed, or fancied, that Hannibal was using all his influence at Carthage to persuade his countrymen to join him. Accordingly a commission was sent to the Carthaginian government, requiring them to punish Hannibal, as a disturber of the peace between the two nations. Hannibal, knowing that he should be unable to resist the efforts of his domestic enemies, when thus supported by the influence of Rome, seems at last to have surrendered his long-cherished hopes of restoring his country to her ancient greatness. He found means to escape from Carthage, and procured a vessel to transport him to Tyre, where he was received with all the honours due to a man who had shed such glory on the Phœnician name, and from whence he easily reached the court of Antiochus, at Antioch. Finding that the king was already set out on his way towards Greece, he followed and overtook him at Ephesus; and being cordially received, he contributed powerfully to fix him in his determination to declare war on the Romans, and was retained near his person, as one of his most valuable counsellors.

War of  
Antiochus.  
Hannibal  
goes to the  
court of  
Prusias: his  
death.

The ability of Hannibal was displayed again on this new occasion, by the plans which he recommended for the prosecution of the war. He first and most strongly urged that he should be sent<sup>9</sup>

<sup>9</sup> Livy, XXXIV. 60.

with an army into Italy; there, he said, the Romans were most vulnerable; and an attack made upon their own country might distract their counsels, and at least lessen their means of carrying on hostilities in Greece or Asia. When this measure was abandoned, owing, as it is said, to the king's jealousy of the glory which Hannibal would gain by its success, his next proposal was<sup>10</sup>, that the alliance of Philip, king of Macedon, should be purchased at any price. Macedon was a power strong enough to take a substantial part in the war, and would be too important to escape, as the little second or third-rate states might do, by forsaking its ally so soon as he should experience any reverses. This counsel was also neglected; and Philip united himself with the Romans against Antiochus; so that Hannibal, employed only in a subordinate naval command, a duty for which his experience had no way fitted him, could render the king no essential service; and in a short time, when the Romans had brought the war to a triumphant end, he was obliged to seek another asylum, as Antiochus had agreed, by one of the articles<sup>11</sup> of the treaty, to surrender him up to the Roman government. His last refuge was the court of Prusias, king of Bithynia. With that prince he remained about five years; and it is mentioned by Cornelius Nepos, that he gained a victory, while commanding his fleet, over his old enemy Eumenes, king of Pergamus. All his own prospects had long since been

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MENT.<sup>10</sup> Livy, XXXVI. 7.<sup>11</sup> Polybius, XXI. 14.

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utterly ruined; and the condition of such a man, reduced to the state of a dependent exile, under the protection of so humble a sovereign as Prusias, might have satisfied the most violent hatred of the Romans. But it seems they could not be free from uneasiness while Hannibal lived; and when a Roman embassy was sent to the court of Prusias, that king, whether spontaneously, or at the solicitation of the ambassadors, promised to put their great enemy into their hands. His treachery however was suspected by Hannibal; and when he found the avenues to his house secured by the king's guards, he is said to have destroyed himself by a poison which he had long carried about him for such an emergency. Some particulars are added by Livy and Plutarch, which, not being credibly attested, nor likely to have become publicly known, it is needless to insert here. It is sufficient to say, that Hannibal died by his own hand, to avoid falling into the power of the Romans, at Nicomedia, in Bithynia; and, as nearly as we can ascertain, in the sixty-fourth year of his age.

His  
character.

If the characters of men be estimated according to the steadiness with which they have followed the true principle of action, we cannot assign a high place to Hannibal. But if patriotism were indeed the greatest of virtues, and a resolute devotion to the interests of his country were all the duty that a public man can be expected to fulfil, he would then deserve the most lavish praise. Nothing can be more unjust than the ridicule with which Juvenal has treated his motives, as if he had been actuated

merely by a romantic desire of glory. On the con-  
trary, his whole conduct displays the loftiest genius,  
and the boldest spirit of enterprise, happily subdued  
and directed by a cool judgment, to the furtherance  
of the honour and interests of his country; and his  
sacrifice of selfish pride and passion, when after the  
battle of Zama he urged the acceptance of peace,  
and lived to support the disgrace of Carthage, with  
the patient hope of one day repairing it, affords a  
strong contrast to the cowardly despair with which  
some of the best of the Romans deprived their  
country of their services by suicide. Of the extent  
of his abilities, the history of his life is the best  
evidence: as a general, his conduct remains un-  
charged with a single error; for the idle censure  
which Livy presumes to pass on him for not march-  
ing to Rome after the battle of Cannæ, is founded  
on such mere ignorance, that it does not deserve any  
serious notice. His knowledge of human nature,  
and his ascendancy over men's minds, are shown by  
the uninterrupted authority which he exercised  
alike in his prosperity and adversity over an army  
composed of so many various and discordant mate-  
rials, and which had no other bond than the per-  
sonal character of the leader. As a statesman, he  
was at once manly, disinterested, and sensible; a  
real reformer of abuses in his domestic policy, and  
in his measures, with respect to foreign enemies,  
keeping the just limit between weakness and blind  
obstinacy. He stands reproached however with  
covetousness by the Carthaginians, and with cruelty

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by the Romans. The first charge is sustained by no facts that have been transmitted to us; and it is a curious circumstance, that the very same vice was long imputed by party violence to the great duke of Marlborough, and that the imputation has been lately proved by his biographer to have been utterly calumnious. Of cruelty, indeed, according to modern principles, he cannot be acquitted; and his putting to death all the Romans whom he found on his march through Italy, after the battle of the lake Thrasymenus, was a savage excess of hostility. Yet many instances of courtesy are recorded of him, even by his enemies, in his treatment of the bodies of the generals who fell in action against him; and certainly, if compared with the ordinary proceedings of Roman commanders, his actions deserve no peculiar brand of barbarity. Still it is little to his honour, that he was not more careless of human suffering than Marcellus or Scipio; nor can the urgency of his circumstances, or the evil influence of his friends, to both which Polybius attributes much of the cruelty ascribed to him, be justly admitted as a defence. It is the prevailing crime of men in high station to be forgetful of individual misery, so long as it forwards their grand objects; and it is most important, that our admiration of great public talents and brilliant successes should not lead us to tolerate an indifference to human suffering.

## N O T E S.

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THE following notes are extracted from manuscripts of the Author's, some of them written recently, while he was collecting materials for this history, but the chief part in 1833, when he was thinking of converting the series of Biographies in the *Encyclopædia Metropolitana* into a continuous history of Rome, which was to open with the first Punic war, the period where Niebuhr's great work had just been broken off by his death. As they contain information, and express opinions, on several interesting questions connected with Roman history, it has been thought expedient to insert them in this volume, under the persuasion that the substance of them would have been inserted by the author, though not exactly in the same form and words.

Note A, to p. 22, l. 22.

IF we endeavour to picture to ourselves what the Roman people were at the beginning of the sixth century of their history, to represent to ourselves the size and aspect of their city and its neighbourhood; their language, their manners, their social and domestic habits, their wealth, private and public, their principles of religion and of law; their character and condition, in short, as men and as citizens; where are the eyes so piercing as to discern the almost vanishing forms of these objects amidst the dimness of antiquity? or how can we supply, and arrange into an intelligible whole, the disjointed and seemingly

unmeaning images, which our fragments of information offer, as perplexing and incongruous as the chaos of a dream?

The city of Rome, properly so called, was still contained at the beginning of the sixth century, and for some centuries afterwards, within the walls ascribed to Servius Tullius. Its circumference was about seven miles<sup>1</sup>; but this enclosure was far from being all built over. Sacred groves, the remains of the forest which in the earliest times had covered all the higher grounds, were still very numerous; gardens, orchards, perhaps copse-wood, such as still grows on the sides of the Monte Testaccio, also occupied a considerable space. As in so many other towns in their original state, the walls did not come down close to the river<sup>2</sup>, but ran parallel to it at some distance, passing from the Capitol to the Aventine by what is called the Janus Quadrifons, and the western extremity of the Circus Maximus. But, as was natural, one of the earliest suburbs sprang up in this quarter; and the space between the walls and the Tiber, without the Porta Flumentana, was already covered with houses in the time of the second Punic war<sup>3</sup>. Buildings had probably grown up beyond the Tiber also, connecting the fortress on the Janiculus with the city: on the eastern side of Rome, from the Esquiline to the end of the Quirinal, the space before the walls seems to have been open.

The streets were narrow and winding<sup>4</sup>, and the houses lofty; the different floors<sup>5</sup> being occupied by different families, according to the practice still so common in Scotland and on the continent. There was as yet little of ornamental architecture, such as was introduced at a later period from

<sup>1</sup> Bunsen's Beschreibung der Stadt Rom, Vol. I. p. 678.

<sup>2</sup> Bunsen, p. 628, &c. Niebuhr, Rom. Hist. Vol. III. p. 360, note 525.

<sup>3</sup> Niebuhr, Abriss der Geschichte

der Stadt [in Bunsen's Rome, p. 112.]

<sup>4</sup> Tacitus, Annal. XV. 43.

<sup>5</sup> This is said expressly by Dionysius, X. 32, of the houses on the Aventine.

Greece; and of the style of the older temples we have no means of judging. Those great works which peculiarly characterize Rome, her aqueducts and her roads, were as yet in their infancy. Of the former, only two were in existence, the Appia and the Anio Vetus; but these were not carried upon a long line of magnificent arches, like the aqueducts of a later age; their course was almost wholly underground<sup>6</sup>; for it was not yet beyond possibility that the Romans might see an invading enemy in the neighbourhood of their city, and it was of the utmost importance to conceal the line by which they obtained their supplies of water. Of the roads there existed the Appian, which in the year 459 had been paved with basalt<sup>7</sup> as far as Bovillæ, that is, to the foot of the Alban hills, ten miles from Rome; and according to Niebuhr, there must also have existed the Latin, the Salarian, the Nomentan, and the oldest Tiburine. Whether these were as yet paved, we have, I believe, no information.

If we look to the neighbourhood of Rome, we shall find that many of the old towns with which Latium was so thickly set in early times, had already been utterly destroyed. Nothing more surprises those who fancy the Campagna of Rome to be like Champagne, or like the great chalk plains of Hampshire and Wiltshire, than the sight of its actual

<sup>6</sup> Frontinus, de Aquæductibus, 7. 18. The Aqua Appia had its source near the road to Præneste, between the seventh and eighth mile-stones from Rome; and the whole length of its course to the point at which the distribution of the water took place, near the Porta Trigemina (at the foot of the Aventine, looking towards the Palatine) was 11 miles and 190 paces. It was carried underground the whole of this distance, except for sixty paces close to the Porta Capena (in the low ground, just under the southern end of the

Cælian). The Anio Vetus was contracted for in the year 482 (481 according to Frontinus), and completed a few years afterwards. Its source was twenty miles from Rome, above Tibur; and the whole length of its course was forty-three miles, all of which, except 221 paces, was underground. Frontinus, c. 6.

<sup>7</sup> Livy, X. 47. Silice perstrata est. Silix is lava basaltina, of a blackish grey colour, made up of a crystallized mass of augite, leucite, zeolite, &c. See Bunsen's Rome, p. 50, note.

scenery. The swellings of the ground continually end in little precipitous cliffs; and the numerous streams flow between deep rocky banks, offering exactly such situations as the old Italians loved to choose for the citadels of their towns. Accordingly Pliny reckons up the names of fifty-three<sup>8</sup> people of Latium, who had all perished without leaving a trace of their existence behind. Many of these indeed were destroyed at a period not only beyond historical memory, but even beyond the reach of those traditions which once passed for history; some however occur in the early annals of the commonwealth, and are afterwards lost to us altogether, as Crustumeria, Corioli, Longula, Polusca, &c., while others, as Gabii and Fidenæ, though not actually destroyed, fell into such a state of decay that they became a proverb to express the extremity of loneliness and desolateness<sup>9</sup>. No doubt the law of conquest had been applied to these states in its full extent; and their lands, having been taken in war, had mostly been occupied by the patricians, and thus became in fact, though not in law, the property of individual Romans. Thus at a very early period we find that the fortunes of the nobility consisted chiefly in land<sup>10</sup> conquered from an enemy; the old *Ager Romanus*, or original territory of Rome, extending only about five miles<sup>11</sup> from the city towards Alba, and still less in other directions. Accordingly Strabo says expressly, that Antemnæ and Fidenæ, the latter five miles from Rome, the former less than three, were in his time the property of private persons. By *property*, κτήσεις, he meant *possessiones*, land which had been originally won from an enemy, and never divided out as a colony; which was the possession of individuals, sold, let, and bequeathed, like actual property, so long as the state did not choose to exercise its right of resuming it.

<sup>8</sup> III. 5.

<sup>9</sup> Gabiis desertior atque Fidenis Vicus. See also Cicero, pro Plancio.

<sup>10</sup> Livy, IV. 48. Nec enim ferme

quicquam agri, ut in urbe alieno solo positâ, non armis partum erat.

<sup>11</sup> Strabo, V. p. 159. Compare Livy, I. 23, and II. 39.

Polybius has remarked<sup>12</sup>, that the old Latin language differed so much from that spoken in his time, that even those of the Romans who understood it best met with expressions in it which they found great difficulty in interpreting. This refers to the language spoken at the beginning of the commonwealth; and the famous hymn of the Fratres Arvales, which has been preserved to our own times, enables us to confirm the truth of the statement. But in the Punic wars the Latin language was substantially the same as in the age of Cicero and Virgil: the inscription on the Duillian column, and that on the tomb of L. Scipio, who was consul in 495, are both perfectly intelligible to us, and only differ in the forms of the words from the writings of the Augustan age.

The free male population of Italy of an age to bear arms, exclusive of Bruttium, of the Greek cities of Magna Græcia, and of the whole country north of the Rubicon and the Macra, is said by Polybius to have amounted to 770,000 men, in the year 529. It is not clear however whether there is not some confusion<sup>13</sup> in the reckoning, and whether the sum total ought not to be reduced by nearly 50,000. Even adopting the lower number, we get a free population of 1,440,000 persons in the vigour of life; and if we add half as many for those of both sexes who were under seventeen or above sixty, it makes the whole free population of Italy, with the important omissions already noticed, to

<sup>12</sup> III. 22.

<sup>13</sup> Polybius reckons the four Roman legions employed in the field, and the reserve which covered the city, as *exclusive* of the census of the Romans and Campanians; that is, the complete census, including the legions stationed in Sicily and Tarentum, would have given a sum total of 324,900. But the census for the year 532, gives only 270,213 citizens. Now if, as Niebuhr supposes, the

census included all those citizens of foreign states, who were *municipes* of Rome, it would on this occasion comprise the Campanians; and we thus get a number very closely agreeing with the sum of the Romans and Campanians as given by Polybius, 273,000, if we suppose that he ought to have included the soldiers actually employed in this amount, instead of reckoning them separately.



amount to 2,120,000 souls. The slave population it is impossible to calculate. In Campania the slaves must have been numerous: in Etruria those who were not reckoned amongst the citizens, that subject population who, though not strictly slaves, are often carelessly called so, must have greatly outnumbered those properly called Etruscans. But in Latium, in Samnium, amongst the Sabines, and in Rome itself, the slaves were as yet perhaps a minority of the whole population. Still, if we reckon the whole population, free and slave together, at five millions, and consider the number and populousness of the Greek cities, of which no account is given, the sum for the whole peninsula south of the Macra and the Rubicon will appear sufficiently great. No doubt it had once been far greater; but the long and bloody wars which led to the Roman conquest of Italy, must have diminished it enormously, to say nothing of the wasting invasions of the Gauls.

Extensive tracts of land had been seized by the Romans, and were mostly held in occupation by a small number of proprietors: nor must we conceive of these large estates, as of the large farms of modern times, which are supposed to be so favourable to agriculture. On the contrary, they were cultivated carelessly and partially; and ground, which the necessities of the small proprietor had forced into productiveness, was allowed to return to its natural barrenness. Besides, the extent of the woodlands must have been much greater than at present; and if some spots were then well peopled, which the malaria has now rendered uninhabitable, yet on the other hand there were places, as particularly in the valley of the Arno, which have only been reclaimed in later times from the state of impracticable marshes; and the number of individuals supported by trade, or by any other means than agriculture, was beyond all comparison smaller than in modern Italy.

I know of only one fact which seems to indicate the

existence of a commercial spirit amongst the Romans at the period with which we are now engaged. This is the law of Q. Claudius<sup>14</sup>, one of the tribunes, passed a short time before the second Punic war, which made it unlawful for any senator, or father of a senator, to possess a ship of the burden of more than three hundred amphoræ. The avowed object of this law was to exclude the nobility from engaging in maritime commerce; the professed reason for the exclusion was, that trade was degrading to the dignity of a senator: but the circumstance that it was resisted strenuously by the whole senate, and carried in despite of their opposition, proves that they felt the restriction much more as an injury than an honour, and makes it probable that the real object of the friends of the law was to monopolize the profits of trade to the middling classes, and to exclude the competition of the nobility, whose superior wealth would have given them great advantages in every market. But the commercial spirit of the Romans had no time to develop itself; the invasion of Hannibal was fatal to the security, and much more to the acquisition of capital; and after the struggle was over, society had undergone a change, which fixed the attention of the people on other objects. Trade therefore contributed but little to the greatness of Rome: indeed it is ridiculous to speak of the trade of a country, where some of the simplest callings<sup>15</sup> were as yet unknown, and where silver money had been coined<sup>16</sup> for the first time only five years before the first Punic war.

Were the manners of Rome then as pure as those writers would imagine, who consider an agricultural people to be placed in so much healthier a moral condition than a com-

<sup>14</sup> Livy, XXI. 63.

<sup>15</sup> Barbers were unknown at Rome, according to Varro (Pliny, VII. 59) till the year 554; bakers, or rather breadmakers, till the year 580. (Pliny, XVIII. 11.) But

the oldest food of the Romans was *puls*, a sort of paste made of spelt (*far*); like the polenta of maize, so commonly eaten in Italy now.

<sup>16</sup> Pliny, XXXIII. 3.

mercial or manufacturing one? Undoubtedly the Roman character before the second Punic war was full of nobleness : but it is idle to connect its excellence with the preference given to agriculture, rather than to trade. The Roman people were as yet in the youth of their existence ; and their minds enjoyed a youthful freshness. They had not lost the feelings of admiration and veneration ; feelings which knowledge and experience, inasmuch as their field is an evil world, surely lessen ; feelings whose destruction is the worst degradation of human nature. Respect for the gods, respect for the laws, respect for the aged, respect for the judgment of the good and the wise, powerfully influenced a Roman's mind ; and opposed to these, self-confidence and self-indulgence could as yet do nothing. What there was of crime was not the mere wickedness of individual gratification : of whatever offences a Roman was guilty, his idol was not that vilest of all, his own single pleasure or pride. He was cruel and treacherous to foreigners ; for such conduct might save the majesty of Rome from humiliation : if a patrician, he might be oppressive and insolent to the commons, or *the mob of the forum, turba forensis* : but he was striving against the confusion of sacred things with vile, against dishonouring the images of his ancestors, whose spirits watched over the welfare of their race, and required of their descendants in every generation to transmit its honour and dignity to their children unimpaired. So in Rome, as in more corrupted states, there was violence and injustice, and towards foreigners cruelty and falsehood ; but there was, withal, a surrender of self to some more general interest ; and where the commands of that interest were in accordance with truth and justice, there was exhibited virtue in some of its most heroic forms, resolute control of appetite, obedience even to death, unshaken fortitude, and entire self-devotion in the cause of duty.

In such a state of things the domestic relations are purely

and faithfully discharged; for on these points law and public opinion always speak the language of nature and of truth: it is only individual wickedness that leads to the violation of these plain duties. Accordingly we find that the marriage tie was seldom broken, either by adultery or by divorce<sup>17</sup>; and the obedience of children to their parents was secured at once by the general feeling and by law. The laws indeed relating to the *patria potestas* confer on the parent an exclusive authority, and even profane one of the most sacred of human relations by placing it on the footing of that of master and slave. Yet so strong is parental affection, that there is little danger of a father's tyrannizing over his children: and this natural love makes the great distinction between domestic government and political; neglect and disobedience on the part of the child being the evil most to be dreaded in the one, as oppression on the part of the rulers is in the other.

But although in the early times of Rome, the marriage tie was most rarely broken, yet we are not to imagine that the standard of morals approached nearly to the purity

<sup>17</sup> It is a well known story that Sp. Carvilius was the first Roman who divorced his wife; and that this took place after the end of the first Punic war (See Aul. Gellius, IV. 3. Valer. Maximus, II. 1. § 4). Niebuhr (Rom. Hist. Vol. III. p. 414) and Hugo (Geschichte des Rom. Rechts, p. 114) consider this as a mistake; and possibly it is not to be taken to the letter. But if, as the story seems to imply, Carvilius divorced his wife in order to marry another (and this is the notion of the word "Divortium," given in a Scholium on Cicero de Oratore, I. 40. Divortium est, quoties dissoluto matrimonio alter eorum alteras nuptias sequitur), then it may have been one of the earliest instances of such a divorce, if not absolutely the very earliest. For the Romans in early times, no less than the Germans in the days of Tacitus,

abhorred second marriages (Valer. Maxim. II. 1. § 3). Again, marriages celebrated with the religious ceremonies known by the name of *Confarreatio* were held to be indissoluble, except by the performance of certain other ceremonies, which were purposely made horrid and revolting, in order to deter any one from having recourse to them. This shows the old feeling with regard to divorce; for marriage by *Confarreatio* was doubtless considered originally as the only true and solemn marriage. And therefore in later times, when divorces were frequent, it fell into disuse, as did, in fact, the *Conventio in Manum* altogether; and a less formal marriage came into general use, founded merely on the consent of the parties, which could be dissolved more readily.

required by Christianity. As if compromising with passions which it could not wholly extirpate, public opinion almost tolerated some kinds of sensual indulgence, in order more effectually to put down others. The plays of Plautus, although the stories are of Greek origin, could not have been relished by a Roman audience, had not the state of morals which they describe resembled actual life at Rome, no less than at Athens. So universal is the tendency of our nature to impurity, that we could readily believe, even without express testimony<sup>18</sup>, that the conversation of the Romans at their entertainments, even in the most ancient times, was unfit for a modest woman to hear. Nor can we wonder that the young Romans acted in the entertainments known by the name of *Fabulæ Atellanæ*<sup>19</sup>, without any degradation, although these<sup>20</sup> in the coarseness of their ribaldry went far beyond the regular drama. It seems as if the ancient commonwealths acted on the famous principle of Aristotle, and deemed it wise to give the passions their full range on particular occasions, that their violence might so be exhausted, and the general course of life preserved safe from their dominion. Thus, while the purity of the Athenian tragedy has been guarded with such scrupulous care, the comedy of the same people indulged in the grossest indecencies; and thus, as the slaves had their season of liberty at the Saturnalia, so the Floralia, the Liberalia, and other religious festivals, gave free licence to the lowest and most slavish passions of our nature; and abominations were then practised and publicly sanctioned,

<sup>18</sup> See *Fragm. Varro, Satyr. Menipp.* in *Agathon*.

<sup>19</sup> *Livy, VII. 2.* *Festus in Personata Fabula.*

<sup>20</sup> *Augustine, Civit. Dei, II. 8.* "Hæc sunt scenicorum tolerabilia ludorum, comædiæ scilicet et tragædiæ, hoc est, fabulæ, poetarum agendæ in spectaculis, multâ rerum turpitudine, sed nullâ saltem, sicut alia multa,

*verborum obscenitate compositæ."*

That the "alia multa" include the *Atellanæ Fabulæ*, is clear from the distinction between them and regular comedy, and from *Livy's* words, "Juventus, histrionibus fabellarum actu relicto, ipsa inter se more antiquo ridicula intexta versibus jactitare cœpit."

which would be utterly inconsistent with the severity of the Roman discipline in other respects, did we not believe that they were looked upon as a sort of safety-valve, whereby it was possible to regulate the escape of feelings too powerful to be repressed altogether.

Note B, to p. 35, l. 25.

THE expression in Varro is remarkable, "T. Manlio Consule, bello Carthaginensi primo confecto." (Ling. Lat. IV. p. 39. Ed. Varior. 1619.) and again in Livy, I. 19. "T. Manlio Consule, post Punicum primum perfectum bellum." This cannot allude to the first treaty concluded by Catulus six years before, but must relate to the apparently entire termination of all disputes by the solemn confirmation of it in 518-19. And thus, according to the expression of Paterculus, "Certæ pacis argumentum Janus geminus clausus dedit." The gate of Janus was the *Porta Janualis*, one of the gates of the original Rome on the Palatine. Afterwards, by the addition of the Sabine settlement on the Quirinal and Capitol, it became a passage gate, rather than an entrance gate, being now in the middle of the city, just like Temple Bar. It stood near the present arch of Septimius Severus, on the edge of the Forum, and close upon the *Via Sacra*. Livy places it in the *Argiletum*, that is, in the low ground between the Capitol and the Tiber, near the site of the existing arch of Janus *Quadrifons*; but this is probably a confusion, as we read of a temple of Janus in this quarter, but one which had been built by C. Duillius in the first Punic war. (Tacitus, *Annal.* II. 49.) The notion of opening the gates of Janus in war was, that this god, who under his name of *Quirinus* was worshipped by the old Italians, as the god of battles, might go out to war in defence of his people. And his statue was set up at the *Porta Janualis*, rather than at any other place, because tradition recorded, that in



the battle between the Romans and Sabines, in the reign of Romulus, he had wrought a signal deliverance for Rome on that very spot. See Macrobius, *Saturnal.* I. 9. I am aware that Niebuhr (Vol. I. p. 202. 2nd edit.) gives a different explanation of the origin of the custom, and supposes that the *Porta Janualis*, connecting the Roman and Sabine towns with each other, was closed in peace, to show that they were distinct and independent states, but opened in war to imply that then they were allies, and rendered one another mutual aid. This seems to me rather forced; whereas the statement given above from Macrobius is simple and probable. Besides, Virgil, a high authority in such matters, declares that the custom of opening the gates of Janus in time of war was not of Roman origin, but borrowed from the general practice of the Latins. (*Æn.* VII. 601.) It could not therefore have referred to any local peculiarities in the situation of Rome.

Note C, to p. 37, l. 15.

NOTHING is known of the language or customs of the Illyrians, by which we can confidently ascertain their race. A legend recorded by Appian (*Illyrica*, c. I.), which makes Keltus, Illyrius, and Gala, to have been three brothers, the sons of the Cyclops Polyphemus, is grounded probably on the known intermixture of Keltic tribes, the Boii, the Scordisci, and the Taurisci, amongst the Illyrians at a later period; and the Japodes, a tribe on the borders of Istria, are described by Strabo (IV. p. 143) as half Kelts, half Illyrians. In the practice of tatooing their bodies, the Illyrians resembled the Thracians (Strabo, VII. p. 218. Herodot. V. 6.); the custom of one of their tribes, the Dalmatians, to have a new division of their lands every seven years (Strabo, VII. p. 218) resembles the well-known practice of the Germans, only advanced somewhat

farther towards civilized life ; and the names of Teuta and Teutus, might make us fancy a connexion between them and the Teutonic race. The author of the *Periplus* ascribed to Scylax speaks of the great influence enjoyed by their women, whose lives in consequence he describes as highly licentious ; but Scymnus Chius, writing about a hundred years before the Christian æra, calls them “a religious people, just and kind to strangers, loving to be liberal, and desiring to live orderly and soberly,” a character which often marks the first growth of the virtues of peace amongst a people newly reclaimed from barbarism ; while they yet retain the simplicity of their earlier state, but have laid aside its lawlessness and cruelty. These happy fruits of Roman conquest and dominion were exhibited in Illyria in the time of Scymnus Chius, as at a later period they were displayed among the Cisalpine Gauls, who in the time of Pliny preserved a simplicity and purity of manners unknown in the rest of Italy. (Pliny, *Epist.* I. 14.) But at the time of the first Illyrian war, the Illyrians were as yet merely barbarous, dreaded for their ferocity, and with that low sense of justice or true nobleness which commonly characterizes the barbarian.

Note D, to p. 42, l. 6.

THE Spaniards value the harbour of Carthagera so highly, that, according to their proverb, “there are four harbours in the Mediterranean ;—Carthagera, June, July, and August.”

Note E, to p. 46, l. 10.

FROM the mention of Greeks on this and other similar occasions (as in *Livy*, XXII. 57), Niebuhr concludes that the prophecies referred to cannot have been of Greek

origin, and therefore not what were properly called the "Sibylline books," but rather of Etruscan origin, or Latin, some of which were kept together with the Sibylline books, under the care of the same officers. But it does not appear that the prophecy and the method of evading it were contained in the same books: nor is it likely; for no prophecy would seek to render itself nugatory. If the books were Greek, they were likely to contain prophecies of Greek triumphs; and such must undoubtedly have been the meaning of the declaration, that the Greeks should take possession of Rome. Prophecies relating to the Gauls may have been of Etruscan origin, dictated by that fear of the Gaulish arms, which the Etruscans had learnt in earlier ages, when the Gauls had driven them from their settlements on the north of the Apennines. The evasion of these prophecies was merely the commentary of the Roman pontifices, such as was generally practised in order to avert a prediction, whose authority it was not thought proper to deny. Niebuhr refers to a similar trick practised by the Apulians against the Brundisians. An oracle had declared that the *Ætoli*ans, the followers of Diomedes, should possess Brundisium for ever; so, when the Apulians had expelled them from Brundisium, and they on the assurance of this oracle sent an embassy to reclaim it, the Apulians put the ambassadors to death, and buried them within the city; thus fulfilling the prophecy, and preventing its fulfilment in any other sense. (Justin, XII. 2.)

Note F, to p. 48, l. 15.

NOTHING shows more clearly the great rarity of geographical talent, than the praise which has been commonly bestowed on Polybius as a good geographer. He seems indeed to have been aware of the importance of geography to history, and to have taken considerable pains to gain

information on the subject: but this very circumstance proves the more the difficulty of the task; for his descriptions are so vague and imperfect, and so totally devoid of painting, that it is scarcely possible to understand them. For instance, in his account of the march of the Gauls into Italy, and of the subsequent movements of their army and of the Romans, there is an obscurity, which never could have existed, had he conceived in his own mind a lively image of the seat of war as a whole, of the connexion of the rivers and chains of mountains with each other, and of the consequent direction of the roads and most-frequented passes. The Gauls, he tells us, crossed the Apennines into Tuscany, and advanced to Clusium; and thus placed themselves on the rear of the prætor's army, which had been destined to cover the Etruscan frontier. We must suppose then that the prætor's army was posted between Fæsulæ and Pistoria, expecting the Gauls to cross the Apennines nearly by the line of the present road from Modena to Florence by Pistoria; and that the Gauls, instead of taking this line, came in the direction of the modern road from Bologna; except that after descending the main chain of the Apennines, near Moncarelli, they followed the Val Mugello, or Valley of the Sieve, to their left, and thus came out on the Valdarno, about half way between Florence and Incisa: from thence they may either have ascended the Valdarno, till they crossed over from it to the Val di Chiana by the line of the Valdambra; or else, as is more probable, they may have moved at once in the direction of Sienna, and then crossed from Sienna, by the upper part of the Val d'Ombrone and Montepulciano, to Chiusi or Clusium.

Note G, to p. 49, l. 10.

THE text of Polybius (II. 25) places this battle at *Fæsulæ*; this should clearly be corrected into *Rusellæ*. The

Italian names of places in our manuscripts of Polybius are continually corrupt, as the Constantinople copyists knew nothing about them.

Note H, to p. 50, l. 4.

IN Polybius, the Gauls are said to be intercepted, *περὶ Τελαμῶνα τῆς Τυρρῶνίας*. This is evidently a mistake. Frontinus (I. 2. 7.) places the scene of the battle at Popponia, which is far more intelligible.

Note I, to p. 51, l. 5.

IT was probably about eighty years after this period, that the historian Polybius travelled through Cisalpine Gaul, and was struck by the unrivalled productiveness of the country. It yielded wine and all sorts of grain in the greatest abundance; its oak woods, scattered at intervals over the plain, fed the largest part of those immense droves of swine which were annually consumed in Italy, or required for the use of the Roman army; and travellers at the inns were provided plentifully with every thing that they wanted after their day's journey, at the rate of a quarter of an obolus for each person. Such are the fruits of the first application of the security and energy of civilization to a soil highly favoured by nature. The earth is in its first freshness and vigour; the woods thinned, but not destroyed: the population flourishing and increasing, but far below the number of inhabitants capable of being maintained in comfort; and whilst the vices of barbarism have been put down, those of corrupted and ill-watched civilization have not yet had time to grow up. But this was the state of Cisalpine Gaul after it had been subjected for more than half a century to the dominion of Rome. It must have presented a very different aspect to the first

Roman settlers of the year 534. The roads or tracts were cut through a wide extent of forest and marshes; and only a small space of the most inviting character had been hardly recovered from its natural wildness by the lazy and careless cultivation of the Gauls. Towns were no where to be seen; the population was scattered about in un-walled villages, if the name of village may be given to a collection of wretched huts, so devoid of the commonest articles of furniture, that "man's life" spent in them was literally "as cheap as beasts'." And along with this state of physical degradation, there was the total absence of civil society. There were men in the country; there were families, bands, and hordes; but there was no commonwealth. One relation alone, beyond those of blood, seems to have been acknowledged; the same which, introduced into Europe six hundred years afterwards by the victories of the German barbarians, has deeply tainted modern society down to this hour; the relation of chief and followers, or, as it was called in its subsequent form, lord and vassals. The head of a family distinguished for his strength and courage gathered around him a numerous train of followers from other families; and they formed his clan, or band, or followers, bound to him for life and death, bestowing on him those feelings of devoted attachment, which can be safely entertained only towards the commonwealth and its laws, and rendering him that blind obedience, which is wickedness when paid to any less than God. This evil and degrading bond is well described by the Greek and Roman writers, by words expressive of unlawful and antisocial combinations ("Factio," *Cæsar, de Bell. Gallic. VI. 11; ἐταιρεία, Polybius, II. 17*): it is the same which in other times and countries has appeared in the shape of sworn brotherhoods, factions, parties, sects, clubs, secret societies, and unions, every where and in every form the worst enemy both of individual and of social excellence, as it substitutes other objects



in place of those to which as men and citizens we ought only to be bound, namely, GOD and LAW.

Note K, to p. 57, l. 19.

THE removal of the freedmen into the four city tribes is recorded in the Epitome of the 20th book, nearly in the same words as in the Epitome of the 9th. There it is said, "forensis factio cum comitia et campum turbaret . . . a Q. Fabio censore in quatuor tribus redacta est, quas urbanas appellavit." In the 20th Epitome it is said, "libertini in quatuor tribus redacti sunt, cum antea dispersi per omnes fuissent, Esquilinam, Palatinam, Suburranam, Collinam." The "forensis factio" of the 9th book is said to have consisted of "humiles," "humillimi;" and they are called also "forensis turba," as if their occupation were described rather than their birth. In the 20th book, the persons removed are called simply "libertini." But libertini in general must have followed city employments from the necessity of the case; few can have had landed property. We must therefore suppose that Fabius' measure was considered as a remedy for a crying evil, rather than a general rule for the time to come; and that, when slaves were set free, they were generally entered in their late master's tribe, which, as he was still in a close relation with them, that of patronus, would be the most natural course to take, when no particular political excitement was stirring. But that such an excitement was stirring in the years immediately preceding the second Punic war, appears from what Livy says of C. Varro: "proclamando pro sordidis hominibus causisque adversus rem et famam bonorum primum in notitiam populi, deinde ad honores pervenit." XXII. 26. Varro was prætor in 536, and before that time had been quæstor, ædile, and curule ædile; so that he must have come into notice before the censorship of Flaminius. Now it is easy

to conceive that, under such circumstances, the aristocracy would wish to lessen the influence of the poorer citizens in the tribes; but the wonder is, how C. Flaminius should have become their instrument in doing this, after his violent contests with them about his Agrarian law, and afterwards about his recall from Cisalpine Gaul, both of which took place before his censorship. Nor could his colleague have done it against his will, according to the well-known law, "Melior est conditio prohibentis."

The solution can only be, that Flaminius was a very honest man, and, whilst he liked the agricultural commons, did not like the populace of the forum. He was like M. Curius, who also vehemently upheld an Agrarian law, yet sold as a slave a citizen who refused to serve as a soldier. He was like P. Decius, the colleague of Fabius in the former clearing of the tribes, yet forward as a supporter of the Ogulnian law. He was like Marius, the stoutest opposer of the aristocracy, yet a resolute opposer also of a *Lex Frumentaria*. (Plutarch, Marius, 4.) Perhaps too, his notions were wholly against giving political influence to any thing but agriculture; and his support of the Claudian law, the object of which was to prevent the senators from becoming merchants, was perhaps conceived in the same spirit as his removing the freedmen into the four city tribes. In this, and perhaps in the vehemence of his temper, he seems to have resembled Cato the censor.

Note L, to p. 84, l. 16.

THE question, in what direction this famous march was taken, has been agitated for more than eighteen hundred years; and who can undertake to decide it? The difficulty to modern inquirers has arisen chiefly from the total absence of geographical talent in Polybius. That this historian indeed should ever have gained the reputation of a

good geographer, only proves how few there are who have any notion what a geographical instinct is. Polybius indeed laboured with praiseworthy diligence to become a geographer; but he laboured against nature; and the unpoetical character of his mind has in his writings actually lessened the accuracy, as it has totally destroyed the beauty of history. To any man who comprehended the whole character of a mountain country, and the nature of its passes, nothing could have been easier than to have conveyed at once a clear idea of Hannibal's route, by naming the valley by which he had ascended to the main chain, and afterwards that which he followed in descending from it. Or admitting that the names of barbarian rivers would have conveyed little information to Greek readers, still the several Alpine valleys have each their peculiar character, and an observer with the least power of description could have given such lively touches of the varying scenery of the march, that future travellers must at once have recognized his description. Whereas the account of Polybius is at once so unscientific and so deficient in truth and liveliness of painting, that persons who have gone over the several Alpine passes for the very purpose of identifying his descriptions, can still reasonably doubt whether they were meant to apply to Mont Genevre, or Mont Cenis, or to the Little St. Bernard.

On the whole, it appears to me most probable, that the pass by which Hannibal entered Italy was that which was known to the Romans by the name of the Graian Alps, and to us as the Little St. Bernard. Nor was this so circuitous a line as we may at first imagine. For Hannibal's object was not simply to get into Italy, but to arrive in the country of those Cisalpine Gauls with whom he had been corresponding, and who had long been engaged in wars with the Romans. Now these were the Boii and Insubrians; and as the Insubrians, who were the more

westerly of the two, lived between the Adda and the Ticinus, the pass of the Little St. Bernard led more directly into the country of his expected allies, than the shorter passage into Italy by the Cottian Alps, or Mont Genevre.

Note M, to p. 91, l. 19.

SUCH is the story of the earliest recorded passage of the Alps by civilized men, the earliest and the most memorable. Accustomed as we are, since the completion of the great Alpine roads in the present century, to regard the crossing of the Alps as an easy summer excursion, we can even less than our fathers conceive the difficulties of Hannibal's march, and the enormous sacrifices by which it was accomplished. He himself declared that he had lost above thirty thousand men since he had crossed the Pyrenees, and that the remnant of his army, when he reached the plains of Italy, amounted to no more than twenty thousand foot, and six thousand horsemen: nor does Polybius seem to suspect any exaggeration in the statement. Yet eleven years afterwards Hasdrubal crossed the Alps in his brother's track without sustaining any loss deserving of notice; and "a few accidents"<sup>21</sup> are all that occurred in the most memorable passage of modern times, that of Napoleon over the Great St. Bernard. It is evident that Hannibal could have found nothing deserving the name of a road, no bridges over the rivers, torrents, and gorges, nothing but mere mountain-paths, liable to be destroyed by the first avalanche or landslip, and which the barbarians neither could nor cared to repair, but on the destruction of which they looked out for another line, such as for their purposes of communication it was not difficult to find. It is clear also, either that Hannibal passed by some much higher point than the present roads over the Little St. Bernard,

<sup>21</sup> "On n'eut que peu d'accidens." Napoleon's Memoirs, Vol. I. p. 261.

or Mont Cenis; or else, as is highly probable<sup>22</sup>, that the limit of perpetual snow reached to a much lower level in the Alps than it does at present. For the passage of the main chain is described as wholly within this limit; and the "old snow" which Polybius speaks of was no accidental patch, such as will linger through the summer at a very low level in crevices or sunless ravines; but it was the general covering of the pass, which forbade all vegetation, and remained alike in summer as in winter. How great a contrast to the blue lake, the green turf, the sheep and cattle freely feeding on every side tended by their shepherds, and the bright hues of the thousand flowers, which now delight the summer traveller on the Col of the Little St. Bernard!

I have little doubt as to Hannibal's march up the Tarentaise; but the Val d'Aosta puzzles me. According to any ordinary rate of marching, an army could never get in three days from the Little St. Bernard to the plains of Ivrea; not to mention that the Salassians of that valley were such untameable robbers, that they once even plundered Cæsar's baggage, and Augustus at last extirpated them by wholesale. And yet Hannibal on the Italian side of the main chain sustains little or no annoyance. I have often wished to examine the pass which goes by the actual head of the Isere, by Mont Iseran, and descends by Usseglio, not exactly on Turin, but nearly at Chivasso, where the Po, from running N. and S., turns to run E. and W. In some respects also, I think Mont Cenis suits the description of the march better than any other pass. I lay no stress on

<sup>22</sup> Even as late as the year 1646, Evelyn's description of the passage of the Simplon in September can scarcely be recognized by those who know only its present state. He speaks of the house in which he lodged at Sempione, as "half covered with snow," and says that "there is not a tree or bush growing within many miles;" whereas now the pines are so luxuriant about the village,

that the road seems to run through an ornamental park. And again above Sempione, Evelyn was told by the country people that "the way had been covered with snow since the creation; no man remembered it to be without." And he speaks of the descent towards Brieg by the old road as being made for some way "through an ocean of snow." *Memoirs*, Vol. I. p. 220, 221.

the Roche blanche; it did not strike me when I saw it as at all conspicuous; nor does the λευκόπετρον mean any remarkably white cliff, but simply one of those bare limestone cliffs, which are so common both in the Alps and Apennines.

Note N, to p. 99, l. 28.

THERE is a passage in the third volume of Niebuhr's *Life*, in a letter to the Count de Serre, in which he says that Hannibal at the Trebia acted like Napoleon at Marengo, throwing himself between the Romans and the line of their retreat, by Placentia and Ariminum. I believe that this is right, and that Hannibal was on the right bank of the Trebia between the Romans and Placentia, so that the expression in Livy is correct. The Romans had several emporia on the right bank of the Po, above Placentia, Clastidium, Victumviæ, &c. From these, their army, I suppose, was fed; and the taking of Clastidium thus helped to force them to a battle. Polybius' words are equally clear with Livy's. The front of the Roman centre, he says, despaired of retreating to their own camp, κωλυόμενοι διὰ τὸν ποταμὸν καὶ τὴν ἐπιφορὰν καὶ συστροφὴν τοῦ κατὰ κεφαλὴν ὄμβρου (the rain having made the river deeper than it had been in the morning :) τηροῦντες δὲ τὰς τάξεις ἀθρόοι μετ' ἀσφαλείας ἀπεχώρησαν εἰς Πλακεντίαν. It is still a difficulty how Sempronius could have been allowed to effect his junction with Scipio, while Hannibal was actually lying between them; but I suppose that he must have turned off to the hills before he approached Placentia, and so have left Hannibal in the plain on his right.

Note O, p. 107, l. 2.

NIEBUHR in the same letter speaks of the following view of Thrasymenus as absolutely certain. Flaminius with Ser-



vilius was originally at Ariminum, expecting Hannibal by that road. But when he heard that Hannibal had entered Etruria by the marshes of the lower Arno, he hastened over the Apennines to Arezzo, eager to cover the road to Rome. He moved then by Cortona upon Perugia; but Hannibal turned to the right, and followed the western side of the lake towards Chiusi; then turning short round, occupied the defile of Passignano, and spreading out his right upon the hills, forced the long Roman column by a flank attack into the lake, while he engaged the head of it in the defile. Polybius and Livy differ decidedly as to the scene of the main battle: the latter represents it as taking place in the defile of Passignano, where the Romans had their right flank to the lake. But Polybius says, that only the rear was caught there; most of the army had cleared the defile, and turned to the left into a valley running down at right angles to the lake, so that the lake was exactly on their rear. And the modern road does so turn from the lake to ascend the hills towards Perugia: the only difficulty is (I have been twice on the ground), that there is nothing that can be called a valley; for the road ascends almost from the edge of the lake: still it is true that the hills do form a small combe, so that an army ascending from the lake might have an enemy on both its flanks on the hill sides above it.

Note P, to p. 159, l. 3.

IT seems to me that the Latin colonies and Hannibal's want of artillery were the main causes of his failure. The Romans had in these colonies, not one of which he ever took, fortresses in the heart of the countries which revolted to him. Thus Apulia revolted; but the Romans still held Luceria, Venusia, and Brundisium: Samnium revolted; but the Romans held Æsernia and Beneventum; and so on. Casilinum cost him a siege of several weeks; but the

Romans recovered it in a much shorter time. If he had engaged Archimedes as his engineer in chief, and got Philip to send him artillery, he would have done far better: for the Macedonian princes seemed to have carried their artillery to great perfection. As it was, his only very strong arm was his cavalry: for his infantry, veterans as they were, could never beat the Roman raw levies behind works. It appears to me that the sieges are the great defect of Hannibal's operations in Italy; and thus, as soon as his army moved from any place, the inhabitants who had joined him were at the mercy of the Roman garrisons. And their colonies were very strong garrisons: Venusia was originally settled with 20,000 colonists.

Note Q, to p. 243, l. 14.

ACCORDING to Livy, Hannibal collects all the boats which are to be found on the Vulturnus, orders his men to provide themselves with provisions for ten days, and *crosses in the night*. (XXVI. 7.)

He *remains on the right bank the next day and night*, then moves by Cales in agrum Sidicinum, and there *remains one day plundering*.

He advances by the Latin road, per Suessanum, Allifanumque et Casinatam agrum. He then *remains for two days under Casinum*, plundering the country in all directions.

He goes on by Interamna and Aquinum to Fregellæ, where he finds the bridges over the Liris broken down; he ravages the ager Fregellanus with peculiar spite for that reason; and then advances by Frusino, Ferentinum, and Anagnia, in Agrum Lavicanum.

From thence he goes over Algidus to Tusculum, descends to Gabii, thence marches down in Pupiniam, and pitches his camp eight miles from Rome.

He moves his camp ad Anienem, three miles from Rome, and there establishes *stativa*; he himself advancing along under the walls from the Colline gate to the temple of Hercules, to look about him.

On the next day he crosses the Anio, and offers battle to the enemy; a storm breaks off the action.

Next day he offers battle again, and there comes a second storm. He falls back ad Tutiam fluvium, six miles from Rome.

He plunders the temple of Feronia, and marches to Eretum: from thence he goes to Reate, Cutiliæ, and Aminternum. From thence through the Marsian and Marrucinian territory by Sulmo, through the Pelignian territory into Samnium, and from Samnium into Campania. From Campania into Lucania, thence into Bruttium, and thence to Rhegium.

Here are traces of two accounts jumbled together. The march from the Vulturnus, as far as the camp in Pupinia, eight miles from Rome, is all highly consistent and probable, and comes I suspect either from Fabius or Cincius. But the advance to the Anio, the crossing it to offer battle, and then the retreat ad Tutiam, belong to a different story, that namely which made Hannibal advance upon Rome from Reate. For in advancing by the Latin road, or the Via Gabina, he had nothing to do with the Anio; and if he crossed the Anio to offer battle, he must have been between Rome and the Roman army, and the Roman army would have been between him and the Tutia. This then is all absurd and inconsistent.

Again, according to Livy, Fulvius had heard beforehand of Hannibal's design, and had warned the senate of it; he receives an answer from Rome, selects 15,000 foot, and 1000 horse, crosses the Vulturnus on rafts, after a long delay, because Hannibal had burnt all the boats, advances to Rome by the Appian way, and arrives by the Porta

Capena just as Hannibal had reached Pupinia. Now, according to Polybius, Hannibal set out for Rome only five days after his arrival before Capua: there was no time therefore for Fulvius to send to Rome and get an answer before Hannibal set out. Again, Casilinum being in the power of the Romans, the passage of the Volturnus was in their own hands, and the story about the rafts is an absurdity.

Appian says, that Hannibal marched with urgent haste through many and hostile nations, some of whom could not and some did not try to stop him; and thus he arrived on the Anio, and encamped at 32 stadia from Rome. The Romans break down the bridge over the Anio; and two thousand men from Alba Marsorum come valiantly to the aid of Rome. This all agrees with Cælius, and supposes evidently that Hannibal advanced through Samnium and by Reate. The "many and hostile nations" are the Pelignians, Marsians, Marrucinians, and Sabines. Thus too he arrives naturally on the Anio; and the Albensians, seeing him pass through their country, set off at once by the Valerian road to Rome, to be ready to meet him. Had he advanced by the Latin road they would have known nothing about his march, and he would have been between them and Rome.

Fulvius then, according to Appian, hastens to Rome, and meets Hannibal on the Anio, with the river between them. Hannibal ascends the right bank of the river to turn it by its source. Fulvius ascends the left bank watching him. Hannibal leaves some Numidians behind, who cross the river when Fulvius was gone, plunder all the country round the walls, and then rejoin Hannibal. Hannibal goes round by the sources of the river; and, as it was only a little way to Rome, he steals out by night with three squires to have a look at it, and then takes fright and returns to Capua. Fulvius follows him; and Hannibal, in attempting to surprise his camp on the road, is sadly

foiled. He then marches off to *winter in Lucania*; and Fulvius rejoins Appius before Capua. This is beneath criticism; but I observe that the story of Fulvius being too cunning for Hannibal is given by Livy at the assault of the Roman lines before Capua, and is probably as true of one as of the other. Again, the line of retreat here indicated is by the Latin road; the ascending the Anio shows this, and is inconsistent with the retreat by Reate.

Cælius Antipater had expressly given Hannibal's advance upon Rome thus:—

From Campania into Samnium, and thence to the Pelignians, that is, by the present great road up the Volturnus to Venafro; thence by Isernia and Castel di Sangro to the Five Mile plain; then passing by Sulmo to the Marrucinians; thence by Alba to the Marsians; thence to Amiternum and Foruli: from Amiternum, by Cutilia, Reate, and Eretum, upon the Anio.

What a confusion! which neither Nauta nor Prinsterer meddle with. The road from Sulmo to Amiternum is simple enough; descending along the Gizio to the Aterno or Pescara at Popoli, thence ascending to the high upland plain by Navelli and Città Retenga, and so by Aquila to Amiternum, S. Vittorino. But conceive a man,—to say nothing of an army in a hurry,—going down from Popoli to Chieti, then turning back to Sulmona, and going over by the Forchetta to Celano, and thence by Rocca di Mezzo into the valley of Aquila. All this folly arises from the untimely correction where the MS. gives corruptly in Marrucinos, Martinos, Martianos, Maceranos, &c. Cælius supposed that Hannibal, instead of descending from Sulmo towards Popoli, turned to his left, and crossed the mountains by the Forchetta<sup>23</sup> to Cilano, and thence either by Rocca di Mezzo over the mountains to Aquila, or else by the Cico-

<sup>23</sup> At Raiano. This is still a carriageable road. Keppel Craven calls the pass, Furca Caruso.

lano, and down the valley of Tornimparte. Instead of Mar-  
rucinos, the better correction would be Marrubios, or Mar-  
ruvios ; the people of Marruvium, a Pelignian town on the  
E. or S.E. shore of the lake Fucinus.

According to Polybius, Hannibal, five days after his  
arrival before Capua, left his fires burning at night, and set  
off after supper. He marched by *vigorous and uninterrupted  
marches through Sannium*, always exploring and preoccupy-  
ing the ground near the road with his advanced guard :  
and whilst all at Rome were thinking only of Capua, he  
suddenly crossed the Anio, and encamped at a distance of  
not more than four miles from Rome. He intended the  
next day to assault the city ; but the consuls with their  
two newly raised legions encamped before the walls. He  
then gives up the assault, and sets about plundering the  
country and burning the houses in all directions. After  
this, (how long after is not said, nor why, but we must  
suppose after Fulvius had arrived from Capua,) the consuls  
advance boldly, and encamp within ten stadii of Hanni-  
bal. Then Hannibal, having filled his army with plunder,  
and thinking that his diversion must now have taken  
effect at Capua, commenced his retreat. But the bridges  
over the Anio had been broken down ; and in fording the  
river he was attacked and sustained some loss : his cavalry  
however served him so well, that the Romans returned to  
their camp, ἀπρακτοι. He continued his march hastily,  
which the enemy thought was through fear ; so they followed  
him close, but keeping to the higher grounds. He was  
moving in haste upon Capua ; but *on the fifth day of his  
retreat*, learning that the Romans there were still in their  
lines, he halted to wait for his pursuers, and turning upon  
them attacked their camp by night, and stormed it. The  
Romans rallied by daybreak on a steep hill which he could  
not force ; so he would not wait to besiege them, but



marched through Apulia and Bruttium, and nearly succeeded in surprising Rhegium.

Again what a narrative! with no details of time or place, jumping at once from a five days' march from Rome into Apulia, and merely implying that Hannibal's retreat was on the right bank of the Anio. But this mention of the Anio, connected with the expression "marching through Samnium," seems to show that Polybius, like Cælius, made Hannibal advance by a circuitous route upon Rome, and not by the Latin road.

The season of the year must have been early according to the Roman calendar, not later than April, whatever that was by true time; because the levy of the two city legions was only half-finished. But unless the Roman calendar was at least two months behind true time, how could Hannibal have passed such defiles as that of Rocca, Vall' Osuira; or such passes as those between Isernia and Castel di Sangro? Would not the snow have covered the ground at such a season?

END OF VOL. III.

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ERRATUM.

Page 13, l. 11, *for* Lucina, *read* Luceria.















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